You think that existing eternally and existing of necessity are the same. — Bartricks

I have already cleared this up. I think that you are confused here. I think that there is a difference between relative necessity and absolute necessity, and that absolute necessity implies eternal necessity because it’s non-existence is absolutely logically impossible, and then there’s relative necessity, which doesn’t imply absolute necessity, which is what my method pertains to (e.g. “apples necessitate apple trees, therefore apple trees are logically necessary for apples.” I don’t claim that because apple trees are logically necessary for apples that apple trees are eternal. This is where you misunderstand me.

However, I do think that if something is eternal, that it is absolutely necessary and not relatively necessary, unless it is co-necessary with another eternal thing (then it is both relatively and absolutely necessary). But I think that we are getting beyond what you have the potential to comprehend here.

You cannot claim that something eternal does not exist of necessity, or rather, that it’s non-existence is logically possible. This is what you are saying, and this is a blatant contradiction.

Your thought experiment doesn’t imply the existence of eternal contingency (i.e. just because you can imagine a contingent being existing eternally it doesn’t follow that it is necessary that that is the case), and I’m not sure why you would think that that’s the case. You can’t imagine a contingent being existing eternally without being eternal, what you’re saying is ‘I can imagine a contingent being existing for a short duration of time, therefore, I can imagine a contingent being existing for an eternal duration of time, and this isn’t necessarily possible unless you are also eternal.” Is this what you’re claiming, that you are eternal and contingent? Where is your proof? Because you’re making an a valid induction here.


also, this is checkmate. I have to move on to having meaningful discussions now. be well, and remember, if you don’t question your own skepticism, you are a dogmatist and not a skeptic.

This may interest you

this is interesting, although, if I were you, I would define my starting axioms in terms of the concepts of necessity and contingency for the purpose of clarity.

as I said in my comments above, I have already created an entire method and system of philosophy using axioms such as these, as well as others. my conclusions prove mental monism true. It really is quite a spectacular system. I am almost ready to publish and am looking for editors. I’m also ready to present my work in a formalized setting.

However, I do think that if something is eternal, that it is absolutely necessary and not relatively necessary, — TheGreatArcanum

Yes, but you just think that and I refuted the idea. So this is tedious. I can just keep refuting it if you want, and then you can just keep insisting that if something exists eternally then it exists of necessity, even though that's demonstrably not true.

For example, presumably you do not believe all things exist of necessity. So, some contingent things exist alongside some necessary existences. Now simply imagine that at the beginning .

Well surely you see that I'm rejecting that sense of "necessary"?

:wink:

I did see that you said that, but it doesn’t make any sense to me as to why anyone would just doubt it as a presupposition when it is so clearly self-evident. Is there a reason for your doubting a truth that appears ti be undeniable? or is just to be contrarian for the sake of being contrarian because that’s what it seems. look at the discussion between me and the Barticks above, is your reasoning similar to his because if it is, I don’t think that it is sound.

You could always quote something from that link and discuss it.

I have already created an entire method and system of philosophy using axioms such as these, as well as others. my conclusions prove mental monism true. It really is quite a spectacular system. I am almost ready to publish and am looking for editors. I’m also ready to present my work in a formalized setting. — TheGreatArcanum

It would benefit this community if after publication you'd kindly let us know the publisher, the publication, and the venue (in case it's a paper you present) and the corresponding details so we could follow the events. This of course is not a demand but a request. Thanks.

Ooops. I discounted the rule on this site to preserve anonymity of users. I'd ask prior permission from Jamal before disclosing the facts, or else just forget about my request, if I were you.

You could always quote something from that link and discuss it. — creativesoul

he thinks that because he can imagine the existence of a past eternal contingent being that past eternal contingent beings exist, and therefore that it isn’t necessarily the case that all eternal beings are contingent beings, and I told him that and eternal being is, by definition, a necessary being, because it’s non-existence is logically impossible, which is not the case for contingent beings (which have a non-existence that is logically possible). he thinks that when I say necessity, that I am saying that something is eternally necessary, and that that isn’t necessarily the case, and I keep trying to tell him that I conceive of a difference between eternal necessity and relative necessity, which does not entail relative necessity (e.g. trees are necessary for paper, therefore trees are logically prior or even temporally prior to paper (but not eternally existing because they are “necessary”).

of course, I would deny that one cannot deny the existence of naturally existing (non thought dependent) modal relationships without denying the existence of time and mind as natural (non thought dependent) categories of being.

It would benefit this community if after publication you'd kindly let us know the publisher, the publication, and the venue (in case it's a paper you present) and the corresponding details so we could follow the events. This of course is not a demand but a request. Thanks. — god must be atheist

I would like to do this. As of right now, I am having trouble finding people in academia who are willing to help me, I am also thinking about presenting my work in a YouTube video after my book is released, and then just making a condensed “bare bones” academic paper which does not include any of my prose sections, but only the method and it’s application, and applying to present it at a graduate conference.

my doctoral dissertation is pretty much done, as I’ve created an entire original system of philosophy and this, I think, probably makes me worthy of a receiving a PhD (at least in some places?), but I don’t even have my bachelors yet because I am self-taught, so I am not sure if it is possible to just apply for a PhD and get it without getting my bachelors (which is what I would prefer to do).

and I told him that and eternal being is, by definition, a necessary being — TheGreatArcanum

Er, it isn't. So, I present you with an argument that demonstrates your view to be false (and the example I employed is based on one by Kant so, you know, not some dumbo). And your reply is simply to reiterate your conviction that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.

Once more: if something exists of necessity, it exists eternally.

It does not follow that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.

Now, try and address my argument. The mug in front of me exists contingently (or those who believe in contingency and necessity will all agree it does). And it exists now. Nothing in principle stops something tah exists at one moment in time from existing at all of them. There aren't weird 'no entry' signs around some moments of time and not others.

So, it can exist at every moment in time. But it wouldn't thereby magically become a necessary existent. See yet?

YOur view is demonstrably false. There is nothing in the notion of necessity that requires that a necessary existent must exist 'prior' to the existence of any contingent thing, for there is nothing in the notion of a contingent thing that is incompatible with a contingent thing existing eternally.

All you are saying in reply is to reiterate over and over your conviction that to exist eternally is to exist of necessity.

If entity A is necessary for the existence of entity B (and B is not necessary for A), then does it necessarily follow that that entity A is also logically prior to entity B, and if entity A is logically prior to entity B, does that not also mean that it is temporally prior to entity B as well (in terms of the first possible occurrence of entity B), or does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority? — TheGreatArcanum

I think it was either Plato, Socrates, or Aristotle (although I might be totally wrong) who said that a future event could be considered the cause of a previous one in the sense that the future event is the only possible end for the previous one (I might also be totally wrong here). How I see it, for example, is that I imagine there is a black hole which originated from a star; and I consider the possibility of there being a black hole right now as the cause for the origin and evolution of the star. So, that the star will become a black hole and that a black hole is possible to occur after the death of the star is what causes the star to become. In this case the black whole would be logically prior to the star (as in it is necessary that a black whole can form for the star that will become it to exist) but would follow it, temporally.
Now that I think I recall a bit better, I think the original argument concerns form and substance and that it is the end of substance to acquire shape through the assimilation of form and that it is this end the actual cause of the behaviours one observes in substance, or something like that. I guess one could consider the end of an evolving process to be its own cause if the end is necessary.

Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not.

Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not. — creativesoul

my philosophy is defined in terms of contingency (dependency) and not necessity, I just see them as being logical opposites (e.g. if x is contingent upon y, y is necessary for x).

You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you?

You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you? — creativesoul

I didn’t say that you could. I speak of relatively necessary truths and then absolutely (eternally) necessary truths.

I’ve laid all of this out as clearly as I possibly can in my previous comments.

I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements.

It also seems like you're equivocating the term "necessary", at first blush anyway.

I have created an entire system of philosophy — TheGreatArcanum

Perhaps, but in order to have accomplished such a feat, pursuant to the query in the OP, logically consistent refutation of CPR B288 should be presented, or at least be expressed in abstentia.

The Kantian provision says….

“….. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding….”

….which is to say, entities A and B, and the relations between them, are irrelevant without an exposition beforehand on the faculty of understanding, such that A and B are entities determinable as conceptions in a predicate, or entities as simple stand-alone subject.
————

On the other hand, if this should be the case provable in your thesis…..

does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority — TheGreatArcanum

….then you haven’t created an entire system of philosophy at all, but instead, merely clothed an established transcendental philosophy in a different colored dress, insofar as the understanding, being conditioned by time alone, makes temporal priority explicit in the deduction of its categories.

Still…..cheers for diving into the metaphysical deep end. Most folks don’t much care that there is one, and thereby don’t realize how deep it can be.

“….. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding….” — Mww

the intuition is grounded in self-intuition, and my method is grounded in the structure of self-intuition, or rather, in the axioms that mediate the categories of the mind.

I have also used my method to establish an original philosophy of mind. I believe that philosophers will find this section to be very profound, and even, one of the most profound sections on the mind ever written.

….then you haven’t created an entirely new system of philosophy at all, but instead, merely clothed an established transcendental philosophy in a different colored dress, insofar as the understanding, being conditioned by time alone, makes temporal priority explicit in the deduction of its categories. — Mww

there is no method like mine, so far as I am aware, although, there maybe similar methods which are not widely known because a prior methods are presupposed by many today to be less preferable than empirical methods.

also, I would say that intuition is not conditioned by time alone, but also by memory, and also, that time and intuition are co-necessary.

I have worked the relationship between time and precedence out in a way that is sufficient for me to use my method in a apodictic way, and to establish the precedence relationships between all of the most fundamental categories.

Still…..cheers for diving into the deep end. Most folks don’t even realize there is one. — Mww

Thank you for your response. I have had the most rewarding experience while writing this book, I am no longer just conceiving of spirit anymore, I have become it.

I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements. — creativesoul

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment.

my method is grounded (….) in the axioms that mediate the categories of the mind. — TheGreatArcanum

That would be interesting. What does a propositional account of such axiom look like? In a tripartite logical human cognitive system, the categories are the mediator. Being pure conceptions themselves, it would seem self-destructive of the system for the pure mediator to be mediated.

But I see why you might attempt such an exposition, insofar as no established philosophical doctrine has been able to state that by which the categories are themselves legislated. I might caution, perhaps unnecessarily, that metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it becomes logically absurd.
————

I would say that intuition is conditioned by time alone, but also by memory, and also, that time and intuition are co-necessary. — TheGreatArcanum

“but also by” negates “alone”. Minor self-contradiction, to be sure, but might warrant some re-consideration.

If you say intuition is conditioned by time alone, are you referring to the faculty of phenomenal representation in itself, without regard to sensibility? I ask because intuition of real physical objects by which our internal phenomena are possible, are also equally conditioned by space.

Time and intuition are co-necessary…..for what? For cognition in general, sure. Intuition, whether faculty or representation created by that faculty, without time is impossible for humans, but time is already given whether there be intuition or not. Your thesis should demonstrate how time is in fact a given, if it is, or, how the system would operate if it is not.

Finally….do you have a connection between the conception “memory” and the conception “consciousness”?

That would be interesting. What does a propositional account of such axiom look like? In a tripartite logical human cognitive system, the categories are the mediator. Being pure conceptions themselves, it would seem self-destructive of the system for the pure mediator to be mediated. — Mww

my categories are not purely abstract, as is the case with Kant’s, but natural categories. My main categories of the mind are memory, understanding, and intentionality, not modality, quality, quantity, and relation. I think that Kant went too far in his deduction, and this is because there are no categories beyond’ the understanding that exist independently of the understanding.

I might caution, perhaps unnecessarily, that metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it becomes logically absurd. — Mww

I am not sure what you mean by this, but I probably disagree with it and have a sound reason for doing so.

“but also by” negates “alone”. Minor self-contradiction, to be sure, but might warrant some re-consideration. — Mww

I went back and edited my comment shortly after posting, it is supposed to say “not” conditioned by time alone.

If you say intuition is conditioned by time alone, are you referring to the faculty of phenomenal representation in itself, without regard to sensibility? I ask because intuition of real physical objects by which our internal phenomena are possible, are also equally conditioned by space. — Mww

I would never claim that intuition is conditioned by time alone unless I’ve made a typo. Also, I would contend that the category of understanding can exist independently of the categories of sensation (touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing), and can prove rather easily using my method that this must be the case.

Time and intuition are co-necessary…..for what? For cognition in general, sure. Intuition, whether faculty or representation created by that faculty, without time is impossible for humans, but time is already given whether there be intuition or not. Your thesis should demonstrate how time is in fact a given, if it is, or, how the system would operate if it is not. — Mww

co-necessary for each other, and also, for memory, and also, intentionality. the totality of which formulate cognition (although, I would never use that word because it is too robotic and lifeless), or rather, as I like to call it “subjectivity.”

time is given whether or not there is intuition, if and only if the mind is not an eternally existing entity. I can show that the mind is eternally existing, and therefore that time and mind are eternally co-necessary for each other.

Finally….do you have a connection between the conception “memory” and the conception “consciousness”? — Mww

consciousness is an ambiguous term, hence the reason I don’t use it very often. but my conception is that consciousness pertains to the logical relationships between the categories of the mind and the categories of sensation (and also, the categories of perception), while subjectivity, or the mind in itself, pertains to the internal relationships between the categories of the mind considered in themselves (independently of the categories of sensation and perception).

My main categories of the mind are memory, understanding, and intentionality — TheGreatArcanum

That’s fine, although I myself see your distinction as exchanging category for faculty, but to each theory its own definitions, right?
————

I would never claim that intuition is conditioned by time alone unless I’ve made a typo. — TheGreatArcanum

Cool.
————-

time is given whether or not there is intuition, if and only if the mind is not an eternally existing entity. I can show that the mind is eternally existing — TheGreatArcanum

In my parlance, and perhaps I should have made it explicit, the time I talk about is no more than the time I conceive as ground for something else also of mine that I can talk about. Hence, a mind considered as eternally existing is not a required antecedent for this conception of time.

Perhaps in your parlance, time is being treated as a completely self-subsisting something-or-other, then the argument could be made that kind of time needs an eternally existing mind for its possibility. Dunno how an eternally existing anything can be shown beyond logical conditions. And logical conditions alone have no warrant for ontological existences.
————-

….(time and intuition are) co-necessary for each other — TheGreatArcanum

Yes, I’d agree with that, with the caveat that time is also co-necessary for the objects of the understanding, which are usually called conceptions.
————-

my conception is that consciousness pertains to the logical relationships between the categories of the mind and the categories of sensation….. — TheGreatArcanum

Ok.

…..while subjectivity, or the mind in itself, pertains to the internal relationships between the categories of the mind considered in themselves — TheGreatArcanum

Ok, with qualifications, in that you assign categories differently than what I’m used to. Usually, the categories proper have no internal relation, at least to each other, which I take you to mean.

Anyway….this new philosophical method. How does it work? What’s the irreducible starting point?

In my parlance, and perhaps I should have made it explicit, the time I talk about is no more than the time I conceive as ground for something else also of mine that I can talk about. Hence, a mind considered as eternally existing is not a required antecedent for this conception of time. — Mww

I’m not entirely sure what this means exactly.

Perhaps in your parlance, time is being treated as a completely self-subsisting something-or-other, then the argument could be made that kind of time needs an eternally existing mind for its possibility. Dunno how an eternally existing anything can be shown beyond logical conditions. And logical conditions alone have no warrant for ontological existences. — Mww

in my philosophy, time is nothing but ‘the persistence in existence of that which exists.’ one could also call this “duration.” It is distinguished from relative time, which is defined in relation to the categories of space and motion. This is not the case for the category of duration (which I also call “absolute time,” for it pertains to that which exists outside of space, and is not contingent upon relative time.

In my philosophy, logical conditions are presupposed by ontological conditions and ontological conditions are presupposed by logical conditions. that is, the law of identity (for example) (X=X) is defined such that X represents a particular category, and that category is what it is and is not what it is not in each moment of time so long as it exists, meaning that that which exists is necessarily defined in relation to what it is not, and also, in relation to time because as a fundamental principle of ontology, nothing can exist that does not persist for a non-zero duration of time.

Ok, with qualifications, in that you assign categories differently than what I’m used to. Usually, the categories proper have no internal relation, at least to each other, which I take you to mean. — Mww

I think that the purely logical categories do share modal relationships with each other.

Anyway….this new philosophical method. How does it work? What’s the irreducible starting point? — Mww

the irreducible starting point is the first principle shown above in my original post. I call it the Law of Precedence. There are other variations of it that I have not yet divulged. I am very excited about it. I’m having my book edited right now.

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment. — TheGreatArcanum

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas?

I think that the purely logical categories do share modal relationships with each other. — TheGreatArcanum

I’d agree modal categories share the relationship of time with each other, but that’s the extent of my agreement so far. Mostly because I don’t consider the categories in accordance with your thesis.
————

there is no method like mine — TheGreatArcanum

What method? There may be an irreducible first principle employed by the method, but first principles do not describe the method that uses it.

Precedence. As in ordered sequential priorities? So…Law of Ordered Sequential Priorities? Sounds an awful lot like plain ol’ cause and effect to me. Why isn’t it?

And…..

the law of identity (for example) (X=X) — TheGreatArcanum

….is straight outta Aristotle, unequivocally applicable to objects whether in concerto or in abstractia

that which exists is necessarily defined in relation to what it is not — TheGreatArcanum

Yeah, that too. For any given conception, for whatever can be thought, its negation, is given immediately by it. It follows as a matter of course the relation of a definition is that it simultaneously defines its opposite. It’s the complimentary nature of the human intelligence itself, writ large.

As long as you are a human being, reason is the irreducible starting point for the construction of your philosophical method, as it has ever been for anybody’s method. Even principles themselves precipitate out of reason, or, to put in other words, you had to reason to your first principle.

Even if I got all that wrong, it shouldn’t be so easy to compare something claimed as new, with something already established. If it’s new, it shouldn’t have anything to compare with, insofar as the new cancels the established, or at the very least, makes it obsolete.
(Sidebar: like Hume’s philosophy, positing that interrupted impressions of a particular is proof subsequent impressions of it are always new relative to its antecedent impression, when in fact, a new philosophy showed each impression is merely a member in a series of successive identicals, therefore not new at all.

On a new philosophical method. Interesting? Yeah, somewhat, sure. A paradigm shift? Nahhhh, I don’t think so.

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas? — creativesoul

Yes. His distinction is a categorical error.

I’d agree modal categories share the relationship of time with each other, but that’s the extent of my agreement so far. Mostly because I don’t consider the categories in accordance with your thesis. — Mww

for example, does the category of identity relate to the category of modality, that is to say, can something be is identical to itself and not possible, necessary, or contingent? absolute not, and further, can something be possible, necessary, or contingent without being self-identical, absolutely not. Hence, the categories of modality and identity are co-necessary.

What method? There may be an irreducible first principle employed by the method, but first principles do not describe the method that uses it. — Mww

It’s not an irreducible first principle, but an interconnected web of co-necessary first principles. the method is defined in relation to itself, in a circular fashion, but it isn’t fallacious because not all circular arguments are fallacious. The notion that they are is really just presupposed.

Precedence. As in ordered sequential priorities? So…Law of Ordered Sequential Priorities? Sounds an awful lot like plain ol’ cause and effect to me. Why isn’t it? — Mww

no. If x is contingent upon y (e.g. motion is contingent upon space), it doesn’t mean that y causes x, and this is because they could be mediated another entity z that causes.

is straight outta Aristotle, unequivocally applicable to objects whether in concerto or in abstractia — Mww

I’ve altered it to be defined in terms of time, that is, ontologically, and also in terms of the law of contradiction, rather than purely logically, that is, not defined in terms of time and ontological antitheses, so it’s not the same as Aristotle’s notion.

you had to reason to your first principle. — Mww

Yes. But there is no problem with this.

If it’s new, it shouldn’t have anything to compare with, insofar as the new cancels the established, or at the very least, makes it obsolete. — Mww

It’s just a new way of looking at things, and a way which guarantees certainty if used correctly. I think that the academics are going to ignore it because it’s “metaphysical,” and also written by a non-academic philosopher who writes under an alias (me). I am going to market the book to the general public and not the academic philosophers for this reason. eventually, the students are going to become better philosophers than their professors because they’ve read my book, and then the professors will have to acknowledge its existence. It’s going to create a second renaissance, I believe.

for all? how can it be true for some and not for all? do you have any examples of things that can come into being independently of the things which are necessary for their existence? — TheGreatArcanum

Self-fullfilling prophecies/outcomes come into being from none other than themselves. They require no external neccesity.
"Jane fully believes she will fail her maths class on Monday. Jane is so sure that she becomes depressed, feels worthless and wholly anxious. Jane does not listen to any support/wisdom provided by her parents and friends (external neccesity to avoid failing).

Jane thus fails her exam. All by herself. Resounding Belief manifested as real with time.

If x is contingent upon y (e.g. motion is contingent upon space), it doesn’t mean that y causes x — TheGreatArcanum

Yes. Can we say y is merely the necessary condition for x? If there’s going to be an x, there must first be a y?

the method is defined in relation to itself, in a circular fashion, but it isn’t fallacious — TheGreatArcanum

Agreed. Reason is like that, intrinsically circular, and the basis of my position that metaphysical reductionism taken too far leads to absurdities. So…don’t take it too far, and it is non-fallacious.

can something be is identical to itself…. — TheGreatArcanum

You’d have to unpack that for me. For that which is identical to itself just is itself, fas as I can tell.

can something be is identical to itself and not possible, necessary, or contingent? — TheGreatArcanum

So if something identical to itself just is itself, then we have….can something be that is not possible, not necessary or not contingent. To possibility and necessity, I would agree, absolutely not. As for contingency, not sure. There is no possible knowledge of uncaused causes, so it may be possible for something that just is itself not to be contingent on any cause. All predicated on the conception of time as a relational qualifier.