what about the substratum from which quantum fluctuations emerge and disappear into?

You may be right, and that gives you the right to ignore all of my other points? Instead of addressing my argument, you simply nit-picked an inconsequential aspect of that argument out, attacked it, and just ignored the rest, as if that invalidates all of my other points, and as if my understanding of the difference between many worlds logic and many worlds physics in any way relevant to my argument as a whole. My argument pertains to the what is possible within the confines of a non-spatial realm, not what is possible within the confines of spatial realm, that is, within the context of many worlds existing in many different spatial realms.

the many worlds hypothesis has its origin in the infinitesimal chance (1 x 10^123 odds against chance according to Penrose) that the universe came into being by means of chance and not the antithesis of chance (i.e. reason or intentionality). in order to avoid conceding to the notion that the universe came into being for a reason or a purpose and not accidentally or randomly, that is, in order to preserve the validity of physicalism, the physicalists invented the many worlds theory.

I am not interested in talking about semantics. this type of talk is for the sophists. I am interested in talking about being and its limitations. my understanding of modality is grounded in the concepts of necessity and contingency, not in the concepts of necessity and possibility. I have developed my own system of logic and philosophy, and that philosophy is grounded in the distinction between necessity and contingency (as it relates to being), and not in the concepts of necessity and possibility.

I am certainly not the one who is confused here.

None of which shows that an eternal being exists necessarily.

To do that you would have to show that there are no possible worlds that are not eternal.

So, I posit a world that exists for ten minutes. Demonstrate that this involves a contradiction. — Banno

even the existence of alternate worlds is an assumption. if you wish to posit the existence of alternate worlds, please prove that the existence of alternate worlds is possible. the 'many worlds theorist' simply assumes that the existence of many worlds is possible without proof.

the 'many worlds' hypothesis states that all possible worlds are born simultaneously out of some a priori potential. this means that the only possible world that can exist eternally is omnipresent substratum from which all worlds are born and contained within. the eternality of this non-spatial realm is dependent upon whether a non-spatial entity can come into existence out of another non-spatial entity or not, for if not, it cannot have come into being and must therefore be eternal. we cannot reduce the nature of this realm to the laws of nature which necessitate space. the causal chain, therefore, does not extend into this non-spatial realm, so it cannot be just another link in an infinite regress of physical causes.

Spacetime is eternal. — Thunderballs

even if space/time is eternal, does it necessarily follow that it is not contained within an eternally existing non-spatial dimension that may or may not be contingent upon the existence of relative space/time?

Onlu the gods can create this. Time and space don't exist for them. Time is maybe not even inherent to Nature. — Thunderballs

so space/time itself is a produce of intentionality (i.e. willing)? but how can a god exist without persisting in existing from one moment to the next? it doesn't seem to be the case that anything can exist apart from the ontological category of duration. maybe this purely durational category, however, is transcendent of relative time (which is defined in relation to motion and not persistence)?

Points of singularity, whether in the physical world or mathematics, allow bizarre behavior in their neighborhoods. I dabble in the complex plane where these things appear now and then. Even in that well-trod territory there are minor differences of definition — jgill

but is it possible for there to be motion within a non-dimensional point? if, as Cantor claims, there are multiple (or an infinite) number of infinities, is it possible for an infinitely small domain to be contained within an infinitely small domain, in which movement in space is possible?

Why?

Eternity is a temporal state, necessity, a logical. — Banno

this is incorrect, you cannot have time existing in itself apart from being. time, by definition, requires the persistence of being and is therefore defined in relation to being. there is no persistence without existence, and there can be no existence without persistence. this is a necessary truth.

an eternal being exists necessarily, but a necessary being is either eternal or non-eternal, so you admit to the possibility of a necessary being that is also contingent? Which beings are necessary but not eternal? I do not think that your comment gets to the heart of the problem here.

my contention is that meaning is prior to language, or rather, that meaning isn’t to be found in language and propositions, but in what the words of those propositions represent.

of course, I agree, symbols are all that are necessary for denotation, and denotations are not limited to words, or to sounds, but can be geometrical or purely imaginative (pictorial) in nature.

The person uses the word to denote an entity. The person refers uses the word as an intermediary symbol to denote the thing. You are right, but both are true.

The subject never even arises until or unless the system thinks about itself, insofar as the subject merely represents the first person nature of the system, by means of propositions the system constructs in accordance with its own rules. — Mww

this is not entirely true; there is a passive state of subjectivity (when thought is not active) and an active state of subjectivity (when thought is active), but the subject, while the active state is not instantiated, is not non-existent, but existent in a state of potentiality, in which every aspect of its essence (with the exception of a few; I'm sure you can guess which ones are active and which are not) are still existent. in this state, prior to reflection, that is, prior to thinking, the subject must have knowledge, otherwise it would be impossible for the subject to instantiate the active state of subjectivity through thought. that is to say that the subject has a quasi-unconscious non-representational a priori knowledge of its potential to create change within itself through thought. the subject doesn't need to represent itself using propositions to know that it exists, in other words, one doesn't need to say inside their "move your arm to grab that cup," they can do it without using language, and this is experimentally verifiable. In other words, one can move their arm and grab a cub while knowing the reason for their performing the action without using any words at all, so how can we say that knowledge is reducible to propositions if this is empirically the case?

The subject is that to which the thoughts belong, the subject is not itself the process. — Mww

the process is contained within the essence of the subject and does not exist independently of it. for this reason, my thoughts are contained within my mind and not yours, or rather, within my mind and not within some external object outside of myself in the world. The subject is not identical to the process of thought just the same as the whole is not identical to one of its necessary parts.

The essence of the subject, though, is merely the manifold of his representations. — Mww

however, the essence of the subject is not entirely reducible to the manifold of his representations, this is because an aspect of the essence of the subject involves the potential to formulate representations and this is not a representation (a mere concept). this is because all representations are passive entities which do not possess the inherent ability to actualize potential and are thereby distinguished from subjects, which possess the inherent potential to actualize potentiality (through willing) for a purpose that is known by the subject at the time of willing.

But hey........it’s your philosophy, do with it as you wish. Who knows; we might be witnessing another paradigm shift. — Mww

i contend that even people who disagree with my philosophy are going to love my philosophy simply because of its poeticness and its originality.

Exception taken as note: Is 'perception' tantamount to self-awareness? And of so, what is self-awareness, a metaphysical, or as so well articulated, an immaterial entity? — 3017amen

perception involves spatial relations, self-awareness does not involves spatial relations. self-awareness involves the subjects inherent understanding (in each present moment so long as it exists) that it possesses the potential to create change (within itself). there are several essential aspects to subjectivity, which are necessary for self-awareness. these will be elucidated in my upcoming book.

No exceptions taken there. However, what about the proposition : All events must have a cause. Assuming that is a classic synthetic a priori proposition, can you put that into context? — 3017amen

I do not like defining things in terms of causes because the term is ambiguous, and one must also distinguish between physical causes and mental causes, because they are not the same, for one involves spatial relations and the other does not. The mere existence of physical causation is an assumption, yet hitherto, philosophers have thought it reasonable to ground their philosophies in the supposed truth that "all events must have a (physical) cause." According to my understanding, this proposition must be changed to "all events must have a mental cause," and this is because subjectivity in itself is transcendent of space. This means that all physical causes are mental causes in disguise.

And, what are you thinking is transcendent of perception? — 3017amen

the essence of subjectivity in itself is transcendent of perception.

If I could paraphrase, is that another way of saying that each individual has volitional existence and/or their own sense of same (subjective truth)? — 3017amen

to be a subject is to be free, each subject, however, has a varying degree of freedom, and this is ultimately because the body has the potential to limit their freedom to think, act, and speak, and also, if there is no body, then they are limited by the number and nature of the concepts which are stored in their memory set.

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy. — Mww

I think that it's best to break this all down into unambiguous terms.

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. — Mww

meaning that the essence of the subject involves the formulation of thoughts;

further, it must be noted that thoughts are abstract representations (concepts) of actually existing beings (whether spatial or non-spatial), or even representations of relations between actually existing beings (concepts of concepts). These representations are called propositions.

There are no propositions — Mww

It is a presumption to say that there are no propositions, especially whilst formulating propositions; that is, whilst formulating a collection of words (or symbols) that represent objects or concepts which has meaning to one or many subjects (i.e. a proposition).

There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it. — Mww

we've established that one cannot use propositions to make the claim that propositions do not exist, so this next point about "no circular reasoning is involved therein" is inconsequential. of course, propositions are derived from thinking, as you claim, but the thinker is not derived from propositions.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy. — Mww

the subject possesses the inherent ability to reference its own memory and thereby reference itself. the fact that I must reference myself to speak about self-reference is not illogical at all, because, as I said, self-reference is only fallacious if the entity in question is not, by its very essence, a self-referential entity, which I am, so there is no fallacy. These two must be mixed if philosophy is to progress, that is to say that we must create a system of logic which accounts for the fact that to be a subject is to be a self-referential entity.

How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible? — 3017amen

a synthetic proposition is a proposition which is not true by definition.

an a priori proposition is a proposition which does not have its origin in perception.

a synthetic a priori proposition is a proposition which is not true by definition and does not have its origin in perception.

answer: a priori propositions are possible because the mind in itself is immaterial and possess the inherent ability to know itself, meaning, of course, that the mind, in using propositions to conceive of its own structure or essence, is formulating a priori propositions. they cannot originate in perception because that which is immaterial is necessarily transcendent of perception, which necessitates space.

further, synthetic propositions are possible because the subject possess the inherent ability to synthesize concepts into conceptual wholes which did not formerly exist (this is the essence of freedom).

so, in short, synthetic a priori propositions are possible because the subject in itself is immaterial, and also, free (in the sense that a subject, by its very nature, has free will).

Systems. Antecedent to propositions constructed by it. — Mww

not sure what you're getting at here.

Have you checked-out Kant's Metaphysics? For instance: How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible? — 3017amen

Yes, and I think that I have successfully answered this question.

And what is to be done with the intrinsic circularity of such a system? — Mww

circular reasoning is fallacious if and only if the subject and the predicate of the proposition in question are not co-dependent aspects of the same entity.

Basically what you're doing is pointing to your head and talking about the rich inner mental world that you can never describe. Why bother? — Zophie

how am I describing it if it cannot be described? if it cannot be described, how is it possible me to conceive of the fact that "memory is necessary for knowledge"? if the processes inside my head cannot be described, how is it possible for me to say, without a reasonable doubt that "I, the knower, am necessarily distinct from the transient objects of knowledge which come and go inside my mind"? It wouldn't be possible, and for this reason, we must contend that, our "rich inner world" (at least in part) can be denoted using words, at least so long as the processes or entities inside of it have an aspect which remains unchanged over time (this is the precondition for denotation). That is to say that the structure of the mind is logical, and can be known, logically. This is not an absurd idea, for the mind, or rather, the subject, by its very nature, possesses the inherent ability to know itself.

Where are you getting the idea that the mind cannot be grasped using concepts from?

Imagine nothing. Do not give the nothing a name. That seems to be the base unit of your mental analysis. And whatever it is, it's incommunicable. Yet it has a function. How is this coherent? — Zophie

one cannot "imagine nothing" without imagining empty space. the base state of our minds is prior to and transcendent of intentionality. your experiment necessitates intentionality so it cannot be a description of the base state of the mind.

when the mind is in a passive state of potentiality (i.e. when the mind is silent), which is the base state of the mind, the object of knowledge (or awareness as it is often called) is not nothing (it is not an object-less awareness), but the totality of the subject's potentiality, or rather, the conceptual representation of the subject as a whole. It is definitely not incommunicable.

Right, but nobody is telepathic. Yet. — Zophie

assumption.

By "the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly" I mean that psychological studies have found, and will probably continue to find, people engaging in thought processes do not use any known formal method for their reasoning as dictated by the cannons of deductive logic. — Zophie

This is inconsequential. Just because people don't think using any known formal logical method doesn't mean that they cannot think using a formal logical method or that the mind considered in itself is transcendent of logic.

Frege thought there were real things called "The True" and "The False" in which his concept of logic (based on arithmetic) constitutes what is or is supposed to be how humans do or should reason. Supposedly he is the precursor of modern logic as it's commonly understood. — Zophie

I believe that the foundations of logic lie in the concepts of contingency and necessity, concepts that originate in the logical structure of the mind itself.

I'm also not sure "why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind", but I think it may have something to do with the way that nothing can be expressed in a non-language. — Zophie

thought doesn't necessitate words, only symbols which can be purely imaginary. Indeed, if we reduce language to symbols, then thought necessitates language, but if we reduce thought to words, then thought doesn't necessitate language.

the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly — Zophie

I'm not sure what this means, can you please explain?

I also understand there is also no such thing as any kind of recognized causal link between the neurological and the psychological, hence the mind-body problem. — Zophie

I agree.

What do you want? Frege? — Zophie

I'm not sure. I'm not that familiar with Frege. I'm not sure why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind?

thinking is a universalising activity...This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Nice! I have not added this truth to my collection yet. Thank you. Is this part from De Anima, as well, or is only the bold writing from De Anima?

Well, being creative here, perhaps if Will is not limited by space/time, perhaps what we think are separated entities of "wills" and objects (the flipside of Will?), is just maya or illusory. That is to say, the principle of sufficient reason, with its seeming causes of space/time, logical necessity, goal-seeking, and such is really frothy illusory foam that is really atemporal/non-spatial Will. However, even me just saying that, makes me think it begs the question as to why then is there this illusion then? Why the frothy foam of reality as Representation- that is to say, as objects and individual, seemingly non-connected wills? — schopenhauer1

According to my understanding, willing is a duration-less process unless it is intended by the subject that the object of willing should remain present in awareness for an extended period of time. In other words, when I will to think a particular concept or image, that that concept is represented simultaneously with my will to represent it, but that if I will to think a proposition as opposed to a single concept, it takes time for that proposition to be thought inside the mind (unless it is an object of intuition, in which case, an entire proposition can be represented simultaneously in my understanding and is not present in my mind as a result of my subjective will, but as the result of a transcendent will).

Ultimately, I contend that there are thoughts which are heard in the mind that are spatial and thus temporal, and thoughts (in the form of intuitions) that are not heard, but known immediately and thus transcendent of space and time (in the relative sense).

Much more can be said of these relations.

My biggest question of his metaphysics right now is how is it that Will can have many "wills"? Why is it also that there is representation in the first place, if all is ultimately Will? I guess I never really got how the "objectification" of the representational reality really manifested or coincided as a "flip side" of Will. I can describe it, but I guess I don't understand how it fits together. — schopenhauer1

Yes. I have had a problem with this question as well. The problem is that if there is only one Will, or rather, one Absolute Subject willing from many sub-centers, how is that I am ignorant and forgetful and not omniscient? If I were identical to the one Subject which wills all wills, wouldn’t I necessarily be omniscient? Would forgetfulness even be possible? Where would my memories go? How could I lose them?

The Will is an essential aspect of subjectivity, but not the only essential aspect (this is the catch), so there can be no “Will-in-Itself” apart from the other essential aspect of the Mind-In-Itself. In Willing, the subject brings an abstract concept from memory into the understanding which is simultaneously stored as in object of memory once again, albeit, in a different configuration (if it is a novel thought and not a mere representation of an old one).

I think that I have found a way to fit it all together. If you like Schopenhauer and his conception of an Absolute Will, I think that you will enjoy my philosophy immensely because I am a pure idealist in the sense that I that that the world is a representation, and no representation can exist apart from willing in the absolute sense.

Try Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation.. His premise is basically the title of the four-volume work. — schopenhauer1

I’ve read this book too, and I really, really love it, to be quite honest. Schopenhauer, in my opinion, has the best prose of all the philosopher’s, with the exception of Nietzsche (of course). I do agree with him that the world is ultimately a representation (a collection of ideas), but disagree with him that those ideas are ultimately “my ideas.” I also disagree with him on the essence of willing, which, by its very nature, is teleological and this not a “blind and incessant willing,” but “a purposeful, future-oriented willing.”

Oh. Ok.

Good luck with that. — Mww

Thank you. But it’s actually already finished (with the exception of the final touches). I’ve been working on it for almost five years now and plan to release the first edition within a year. I have a very good feeling about it and think that it is going to be well received by many.

I would be interested in an example? — Pop

If I give an example, I will have to divulge the secret to my method (to a bunch of philosophers) prior to publishing it (which I’m not willing to do). I can assure you, however, that it is so simple, and so apparent, that it has been in front out very eyes (so to speak) for thousands of years, and for this very reason, no one has discovered it. How is that for irony?

Phenomenology may be a topic of interest to you. — Pop

I have read some of Husserl and Heidegger’s writings, but haven’t found much that is useful in them, especially Heidegger. His philosophy is pretty much useless to me, as I’m not looking to base my philosophy in empirical facts, but in a priori truths.

Start at the beginning: Critique of Pure Reason. Make no mistake......whatever is said today, about what you’re asking, is grounded in one way or another, pro or con, by that complete metaphysical treatise on the human cognitive system.

As an added bonus, you get a real test of your comprehension abilities.

Have fun!!! — Mww

I’ve read most of the Critique of Pure Reason, and several commentaries on it, as well as several commentaries on Hegel’s writings, but very little of his actual writing. I wouldn’t say that I’m an expert on either of their philosophies, and that is fine, because I do not wish to be. My goal is to create my own system of philosophy, so I’ve taken bits and pieces from both of their philosophies to construct my own philosophical system using an original analytic method which allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty.

Specifically, I’m looking for my information on the immateriality of subjectivity because I find both Kants philosophy to be primitive in this sense.

Thank you James. Isn't it funny how man, in being so evolved (in his own mind), knows nothing of the essential structure of his own mind?

No, I'm talking about a book on the essence of the mind considered in itself, that is, a book on the logical relationships between the essential components of the mind considered in itself.

Not at all. Philosophy is not a secret cult that you need to become initiated into. It is for everyone. Anyone who loves wisdom, and who is willing to critically analyze their own presuppositions and to rationally argue for their beliefs is a philosopher. — Alvin Capello

Yes. they both possess the ability to think.

the unenlightened philosopher is to the enlightened philosopher as the child is the educated adult. a child is a human, just the same as the adult, yes, and the unenlightened philosopher can think, just the same as the enlightened philosopher; but still, they are "very different," to borrow your terminology from earlier. One is on the earth staring at the ground, the other is in outer space, flying amongst the stars.

A blank canvas of only one color is the foundation of patterns. — Gregory

are you sure that their is a foundation for the blank canvas? This might be a bad analogy...

Something comes from nothing. — Gregory

sounds like a presupposition.

That's why we die says Heidegger. — Gregory

Do you have proof that nothing can contain something within itself. or are nothing and something mutually exclusive? how do they relate?

We were always at home until we existed and what was not is what it is — Gregory

this is incoherent. I remember you saying this last time we talked.

Boo! God clearly doesn't exist. — Gregory

this is an opinion. I don't see supporting arguments either. don't forget, opinions are like assholes, everyone's got one and they all stink.

Haven't you seen a Christmas tree? — Gregory

this is nonsensical and irrelevant.

People say they didn't feel like a person till their teens. — Gregory

sounds like a belief.

I felt like a full person with free will and reason at age 3. — Gregory

yep. me too.

The only thing towards which this world doesnt exist Is Pure nothingness — Gregory

this is worded very poorly, and contradicts your belief in our prior conversation, in which, you claimed, without reason, that nothingness is prior to being, or rather, that being can come from nothingness. Then I said, if nothingness possesses within itself the potential to become something, that it cannot be nothing. Are you saying that you've changed your mind?

I’m not claiming that the mystical experience doesn’t exist, but if you claim that it overrides any arguments, then you are no longer doing philosophy. — Alvin Capello

You become one with absolute being, then you earn the title of "philosopher." until then, you are merely fumbling around the outskirts of knowledge because the existence of the absolute is still a presupposition for you and not a direct experience.

Wait, you are writing the next Critique of Pure Reason and you don't even believe the world is real? Are you saying there is a greater reality in comparison to which this one we live in doesn t exist? Is this God or a Form? — Gregory

Yes. According to my philosophy, the world is not not "real," but existing, as it appears, in relation to sense perception only. It is thus "illusory," as opposed to "real." Only a fool would understand that objects are composed of more than 99.99% empty space and still think that the world is "real."

There is a higher reality, yes, and it is much, much different than this one. Trying to explain it is pointless. It is like trying to teach the blind about sight. The only eternal form is the unchanging structure of God in Himself.

This is because there is a mystical experience that comes along with the path that cannot simply be discredited by words. To say that this experience does not exist is to be a dogmatist. This is why philosophers today are a joke, and the gods are laughing at them. It's hard to tell who is more foolish, man, or the educated man.

i think that you should come up with a new argument. but ultimately, it will doesn't matter what argument you come up with, for they will all fail because idealism is absolutely true, and materialism is only relative true, or rather, appears to be true.

I do not define the object in terms of the subject, for the properties of the unicorn are not dependent upon the brain. — Alvin Capello

You're presupposing that the subject, in its entirety, is contingent upon the brain. In idealism, it isn't. In materialism, it is (this is called reductionism).

Unicorns would still be horned horses, even if no humans had ever existed — Alvin Capello

but according to idealism, the unicorn then, which is product of imagination, is thus a product of mind, albeit, a mind existing prior to the human mind.

And to say that unicorns exist as images in the mind is to make a common mistake. Surely ideas of unicorns exist in the mind, but unicorns themselves do not. — Alvin Capello

Be careful.

A unicorn and the idea of a unicorn are two very different things, so conflating them is a mistake (indeed, I think this is one of the central errors of idealism). — Alvin Capello

This is an assumption. You cannot say that unicorns do not have the potential to exist in the actualized sense. Maybe they existed before, exist now on some planet somewhere, or will exist in the future somewhere.

A unicorn and the idea of a unicorn are two very different things, so conflating them is a mistake (indeed, I think this is one of the central errors of idealism). — Alvin Capello

not exactly; not in terms of idealism. It's like saying that the computer code for the existence of a unicorn in a video game is "very different" from the unicorn in the game relative to the perspective of one of the characters.

What I want to claim is that unicorns do not exist anywhere, and thus don't have existence in any sense. — Alvin Capello

again, this is a presupposition. In philosophy, we don't do presuppositions. Those are for theologians.

I accept this point, but a nonexistent object and the idea of a nonexistent object are very different things. The idea of a nonexistent object exists in the mind, but the nonexistent object that it is an idea of does not. — Alvin Capello

what do you mean by "very different." you don't have a point until you can represent this concept using sets. If they have the same logical form, how can they be "very different?" they only appear to be very different. There's no contradiction here. The idea of a nonexistent (i.e. non-actualized) object exists in mind, but you cannot prove that this object is not actualized somewhere else, and an idea came from another mind on another planet who perceived it, through a collective unconsicous, and into a human mind. This a huge flaw in your argument. you would first have to prove that this is not possible as opposed to take it as a presupposition.

It's rather hard to define in terms of other things, because objects are the absolute baseline of my philosophy. But if I have to give it a shot, I would say that an object is anything that can possess properties and stand in relations. Some objects, like horses, exist; while other objects, like unicorns, do not. Make no mistake though, unicorns still have four legs, fur, manes, etc. in exactly the same way that horses do; they just don't exis — Alvin Capello

you need to define the object in terms of the subject, and this is because the properties of the object, without question, are contingent upon the brain. You must also understand that unicorns exist as images inside the mind, but do not exist in the world, so you cannot say that they absolutely do not exist, but exist as objects of imagination only. They thus have existence in some sense.

I'm willing to grant on your own terms that concepts can exist in the absolute mind without becoming actualized in space. But if a concept (or object, as you mentioned earlier) exists in the absolute mind, then surely it exists. I'm claiming that many objects do not exist at all, in any sense of the term. Idealism does not allow for this; hence it must be rejected. — Alvin Capello

you're straw-manning a particular form of idealism here, and you're not acknowledging the fact that ideas exist as objects of memory.

Can you let me know when that happens please? :smile: — Alvin Capello

I will post the news here when it comes out. I've been working for about 2 years on it, and it should be about another year until I finish it.