idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.

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Really? I have spent a decent amount of time philosophizing and I have not been lead to idealism. Also many philosophers have spent whole careers philosophizing and have not been lead to idealism.

The opposite has always seemed to me to be the case: enough time philosophizing, and idealism seems more and more incredulous - a sign that one has not spent enough time thinking about the nature of things.

:up:

I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me."

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I should also mention that this seems more like Solipsism, than Idealism.

I know! Put aside all thought, all reasoning, all analysis - and then talk about it.






Oh, hang on........

"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon

A great question for me. Thanks for asking. Speaking geometrically, only circles, spheres and probably higher dimensional equivalents have centers, that are points equidistant from all other points, the circle/ sphere constitutes (the circumference of circles and surface of spheres).

What I wish you to take away from the geometry of centers is the notion of equality as represented by equidistance from the center.

Physically speaking, nothing is the center of the universe for it's obvious that any object is closer to some other object than another: no equidistance, no center.

However, in an abstract sense, a center of the universe seems reasonable; focus on equality: there are many concepts that are such that all are equal in its eyes e.g. death, justice, love, god, etc. These concepts, for the reason that every object in the universe is "equidistant" (equal in value) from them, are perfect candidates to serve as the center of the universe.

Are you death or are you justice or are you love? If you are any of these then sure, you're the center of the universe. If not, no, you're not the center of the universe.

incredulous — StreetlightX

Incredible, Shirley? (I know you're a stickler.)

I should also mention that this seems more like Solipsism, than Idealism. — Alvin Capello

Exactly. Anyone understands that solipsism is the logical conclusion that one reaches after having philosophized enough (and to say that someone has philosophized enough is to say that logic was involved) about idealism.

Idealism is essentially claiming the existence of homunculi all the way down. My brain has one, each neuron has one, each cell, each atom in my body are all possesed by homunculi.

Why would my toes need a mind if my mind was already aware of my toes?

Nah, 'tis incredulous - lacking in credibility, but without the positive association that 'incredible' now has.

:roll: (seems the nearest emoticon for "unconvinced"... don't mean "roll")

Really weird. I wonder how a Preformationist would explain evolution.

I like this.

What I had in in mind - and of course this isn't systematic, which is why it's in the misc forum - is how idealistic philosophy seems to proceed. Berkely, for example, rummages around his mind looking for something that isn't mental, can't find anything, and declares that all is mental. Somebody else refutes him by not thinking or arguing at all, but just by kicking a rock. The process paints a picture of some guy disappearing into his own mind sitting in an armchair, until somebody beans him with a spitball and suddenly he's back to his body.

But perhaps things are different than they were in Berkeley's day. Or perhaps you and the good bishop are just two different guys.

Of course, many idealists are also more sophisticated than that. They rummage around their mental locker looking for something they can know that is not in their own minds, and find nothing. Accordingly.... you get the picture.



True. But notice this thread is in the misc forum. I want to explore a point here about the relationship between idealistic philosophies and "being inside your head." I'm sort of playing around, but also sort of not.

They rummage around their mental locker looking for something they can know that is not in their own minds, and find nothing. — Pneumenon

The case against idealism has never turned upon finding something that is not of the mind; it turns instead on showing how the mind is itself 'non-ideal', how the mind itself already belongs to an outside: the mind as an involution of the outside, a fold in a fabric. It is the nature of mind itself on which the fate of idealism hangs: as origin as or product? Thought itself is a secrection, already impersonal, socialized, involuntary, alien. Thought as a monument or index of what is not thought.

I also like this.

And it brings Kant to mind. What would he have said? He could perhaps acknowledge (at least the possibility) that the mind is a fold in the fabric of reality. What he could not have accepted was the mind as a product of phenomenal reality. Where do you stand there, if anywhere?

Personally, I think that it's worthwhile to bracket phenomenonal reality, even though I can't fall into the transcendental illusion of saying that I know what's on the noumenal "oustide" of things. But yes, you can bracket it somehow, and the possibility of this bracketing is one means of escape from idealism, for all that idealists love phenomenology.

I think that idealism survived so long partially because its proponents set an impossibly high bar for its falsification: find me something in your mind that is not mental. But, as you pointed out, that's not a good bar to set. It shouldn't work like that.

Really weird. — praxis

Well, yeah. Idealism is weird.

I wonder how a Preformationist would explain evolution. — praxis

I dunno. Probably the same as an idealist would being that they believe that little minds exist in the cells and atoms of their bodies.

What I had in in mind - and of course this isn't systematic, which is why it's in the misc forum - is how idealistic philosophy seems to proceed. Berkely, for example, rummages around his mind looking for something that isn't mental, can't find anything, and declares that all is mental. — Pneumenon

Of course, many idealists are also more sophisticated than that. They rummage around their mental locker looking for something they can know that is not in their own minds, and find nothing. Accordingly.... you get the picture. — Pneumenon

Exactly. So how does an idealist escape the logical conclusion idealism leads to - solipsism?

It's quite a jump from rummaging through the mental locker and declare that it's all mental to declaring what presently isn't in the mental locker still exists and is also mental. If it's not presently in the mental locker, how and where does the idea of your mom exist? Where does the idea come from when it comes to be present in the mental locker - someplace else that is mental? How would you know if your mother only exists as an idea when you think it?

I wonder if trees believe everything is bark.

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.

On the other hand, that mind is intrinsic and underlies everything, is exactly what creatures with minds would say. Especially after they spend a lot of time thinking.

"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon

Some people are accused of being crazy if other people find out they think that, so for expedient purposes we should either hide or attempt to reject that belief or thought path.

I wonder if trees believe everything is bark. — Harry Hindu

It's actually dogs who believe that their bark is everything.

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing. — Pneumenon

This entire thesis rests on suppositions: (1) that there's such a thing as the mind/body problem, (2) that there's a subject apart from an object, that there's an "external world," etc. These show up over and over again.

But as I've pointed out elsewhere, the very notion of subject/object, "inner and outer worlds," mind and body, etc., already presume an understanding of what it is to be. They themselves operate in the context of an ontology. In the West, at least, that ontology is still very much Greek. Until we understand this point fully, we're operating in a blind alley.

(This is not to say these problems don't exist, or that they're "wrong," by the way.)

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing. — Pneumenon

this is true, although, this forum isn't exactly teaming with critical thinkers, so most here will probably disagree. unfortunately, today, most who have degrees in philosophy are postmodernists or empiricists and thereby have about as much knowledge about ontology as the uneducated laymen. it's almost impossible to have a conversation with them because once you ask them to give support for their presuppositions, they no longer want to discuss the topic.

this is true, although, this forum isn't exactly teaming with critical thinkers, so most here will probably disagree. unfortunately, today, most who have degrees in philosophy are postmodernists or empiricists and thereby have about as much knowledge about ontology as the uneducated laymen. it's almost impossible to have a conversation with them because once you ask them to give support for their presuppositions, they no longer want to discuss the topic.

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I'm no postmodernist and certainly no empiricist, and yet I roundly reject idealism. There are several reasons why, but the most fundamental can be encapsulated in the following argument:

1: If idealism is true, then everything is an idea or a mind.
2: All ideas and minds are existing objects, according to idealism.
3: Therefore, if idealism is true, everything is an existent objects. (1,2)
4: But some objects do not exist.
5: Therefore, idealism is not true. (3,4)

All ideas and minds are existing objects, according to idealism. — Alvin Capello

You need to change this to "entity" as opposed to "object." According to idealism, not all objects are spatially extended objects; meaning that there are both spatially extended objects and objects that are not spatially extended.

According to idealism, there is one mind that contains all other minds as subsets within itself, they are not, mutually exclusive, as it were, and they are not independent or self-existent, but contingent.

According to idealism, objects are sensible concepts; and some objects do not exist, or rather, cannot exist, because contradictions can exist as concepts (i.e. objects of awareness), but they absolutely cannot become actualized as spatially extended objects. This is the reason for your misunderstanding.

Of course, there are many different versions of idealism, but there is only one correct version. I will be releasing the book on it soon. I have found a method that essentially makes philosophy into a science, and allows us to ascertain all the questions concerning metaphysics which have hitherto remained unanswered.

You need to change this to entity as opposed to object.

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An entity is just an existing object, so effecting this change would make no difference either way to the argument.

According to idealism, not all objects are spatially extended objects; meaning, that there are both spatially extended objects, and objects that are not spatially extended.

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What do you mean by spatially extended here? If it means extended in an independently subsisting spatial reality, then the object is not an idea, thus this would not be coherent with idealism. If you mean existing in the spatial faculty of the mind, then the object is indeed an idea, and thus an existing object (or an 'entity', if you prefer). Leading into your next point, viz.

According to idealism, objects are sensible concepts, some objects do not exist because contradictions can exist as concepts, or rather, objects of awareness, but they cannot become actualized as spatially extended objects.

This means that, because sensible concepts are entities (according to idealism), even if the sensible concept is not spatially extended, it still exists as a sensible concept,and thus it still exists. And since all objects are sensible concepts, as you claim, then all objects exist. But many objects do not exist. Therefore, we must reject the notion that all objects are sensible concepts.

I will be releasing the book on it soon. I have found a method that essentially makes philosophy into a science, and allows us to ascertain all the questions concerning metaphysics which have hitherto remained unanswered.

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Can you let me know when that happens please? :smile:

An entity is just an existing object, so effecting this change would make no difference either way to the argument. — Alvin Capello

You need to clarify your definition of "object" here. an existing object that is either spatial, or non-spatial; but we cannot equate them in terms of identity because they have different logical forms.

What do you mean by spatially extended here? If it means extended in an independently subsisting spatial reality, then the object is not an idea, thus this would not be coherent with idealism. If you mean existing in the spatial faculty of the mind, then the object is indeed an idea, and thus an existing object (or an 'entity', if you prefer). Leading into your next point, viz. — Alvin Capello

when i say that an object is spatially extended, I mean that it has volume, and when i say that an object is not spatially extended, I mean that it does not have volume. According to my understanding, volume is contingent upon perception; meaning that there is no independently existing spatial reality. However, the answer here is a little more complicated because space implies geometry and geometry implies space, or rather, the idea of space.

According to idealism, objects are sensible concepts, some objects do not exist because contradictions can exist as concepts, or rather, objects of awareness, but they cannot become actualized as spatially extended objects.


This means that, because sensible concepts are entities (according to idealism), even if the sensible concept is not spatially extended, it still exists as a sensible concept,and thus it still exists. And since all objects are sensible concepts, as you claim, then all objects exist. But many objects do not exist. Therefore, we must reject the notion that all objects are sensible concepts. — Alvin Capello

the sensible concept itself is not spatially extended, but through geometry and mathematics, it somehow appears to be. it's not the case that, if a concept exists in the absolute mind, that it must become actualized in space as a sensible concept relative to a perceiving subject. what keeps concepts in the mind of the absolute from being sensible concepts in relation to perceiving subjects is intentionality. This is a very important point in regards to your argument. All objects that exist, exist, but not all objects exist in the spatial sense; only those that are willed to exist in a spatial sense, exist. A good analogy here is action vs. thought. Do al thoughts have to become actions in the world? No. Just the same, not all concepts must become sensible concepts.

Can you let me know when that happens please? :smile: — Alvin Capello

I will post the news here when it comes out. I've been working for about 2 years on it, and it should be about another year until I finish it.

And it brings Kant to mind. What would he have said? He could perhaps acknowledge (at least the possibility) that the mind is a fold in the fabric of reality. — Pneumenon

Kant is interesting because because although we can only know the world through our representations of it, Kant, in all his rigour, says that the same applies to the self: self-knowledge is not exempt from representation and the self has no special status in this regard: "I, as intelligence and a thinking subject, know myself as an object that is thought, insofar as I am given to myself … like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself … I therefore have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself." Elsewhere: "Of this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X … This I or He or It … is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever".

This is the basis of what alot of commentators have referred to as the Kantian 'split subject': a subject at once both an object like any other and that which is a condition of any knowledge whatsoever. In the words of Markus Gabriel: "We have no grasp of that which constitutes our world even though it is we who perform said constitution. The uncanny stranger begins to pervade the sphere of the subject, threatening its identity from within. Kant is thus one of the first to become aware of the intimidating possibility of total semantic schizophrenia inherent in the anonymous transcendental subjectivity as such". The possibility of madness is one of the marks of the real in the subject - in thought - and not merely 'beyond it'. Kant himself vacillates on this point and it causes all sorts of issues, but there's definitely a way to read Kant as opening the issue of 'subject as object' in a way that's worth pursuing.

You need to clarify your definition of "object" here.

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It's rather hard to define in terms of other things, because objects are the absolute baseline of my philosophy. But if I have to give it a shot, I would say that an object is anything that can possess properties and stand in relations. Some objects, like horses, exist; while other objects, like unicorns, do not. Make no mistake though, unicorns still have four legs, fur, manes, etc. in exactly the same way that horses do; they just don't exist.

it's not the case that, if a concept exists in the absolute mind, that it must become actualized in space as a sensible concept relative to sense perception. what keeps concepts in the mind of the absolute from being sensible concepts in relation to perceiving subjects is intentionality. This is a very important point in regards to your argument. All objects that exist, exist, but not all objects exist in the spatial sense; only those that are willed to exist in a spatial sense, exist.

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I'm willing to grant on your own terms that concepts can exist in the absolute mind without becoming actualized in space. But if a concept (or object, as you mentioned earlier) exists in the absolute mind, then surely it exists. I'm claiming that many objects do not exist at all, in any sense of the term. Idealism does not allow for this; hence it must be rejected.

It's rather hard to define in terms of other things, because objects are the absolute baseline of my philosophy. But if I have to give it a shot, I would say that an object is anything that can possess properties and stand in relations. Some objects, like horses, exist; while other objects, like unicorns, do not. Make no mistake though, unicorns still have four legs, fur, manes, etc. in exactly the same way that horses do; they just don't exis — Alvin Capello

you need to define the object in terms of the subject, and this is because the properties of the object, without question, are contingent upon the brain. You must also understand that unicorns exist as images inside the mind, but do not exist in the world, so you cannot say that they absolutely do not exist, but exist as objects of imagination only. They thus have existence in some sense.

I'm willing to grant on your own terms that concepts can exist in the absolute mind without becoming actualized in space. But if a concept (or object, as you mentioned earlier) exists in the absolute mind, then surely it exists. I'm claiming that many objects do not exist at all, in any sense of the term. Idealism does not allow for this; hence it must be rejected. — Alvin Capello

you're straw-manning a particular form of idealism here, and you're not acknowledging the fact that ideas exist as objects of memory.

Kant settled for the finite in his mind