(A Peircean definition for example does focus on triadic or hierarchical organisation - the maths of thermodynamic complexity. And it is a physicalist metaphysics in that it extends causation to formal and final cause by embracing the materiality of symbols, or sign relations. So the notion of universal habits means something specific in natural philosophy.) — apokrisis

This is a bit misleading. As you are no doubt well aware, although you have adopted and adapted many of Peirce's ideas in developing your version of physicalism, he explicitly rejected metaphysical materialism and characterized his own position as objective idealism. Furthermore, it remains controversial among Peirce scholars whether his philosophy is properly characterized as naturalist, especially since he himself was a theist.

"Modal collapse" is intriguing. — tom

Indeed, and it is related to the modal fallacy that came up a few days ago in the ongoing thread about the free will defense.

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates." — aletheist

Basically, the mistake is thinking that the actuality of P, a contingent proposition, entails the impossibility of not-P, and hence the necessity of P. However, this is not the case, unless we embrace strict determinism - which seems to be a requirement of the axioms underlying Gödel's ontological proof.

God can be real but inaccessible. — unenlightened

I almost included that caveat myself, but I share Peirce's view that there is no good reason to posit anything as real that is inaccessible or unknowable in principle. His definition of "real" at the third (pragmatic) grade of clarity is that which would come be known, if an infinite community of investigators were to carry out an indefinite inquiry.

I will suggest that experience is the only guide, and experience is only of creation. — unenlightened

That would be natural theology. Of course, many theists also subscribe to revealed theology, and thus contend that it is possible to experience God directly.

In which case one might well ascertain that God likes increasing chaos, beings that eat each other and widespread suffering. In which case that must be good. — unenlightened

This would be the mistake of theological determinism, which assumes that everything that actually happens must be in accordance with the will of God. But if God granted libertarian free will to humans, then He enabled us to make choices that are not in accordance with His will; and He also allowed the consequences that followed from those choices - including chaos, carnivorism, and suffering, at least according to the traditional Christian doctrine of the Fall.

You mean we make it up. — unenlightened

Only if God is not real.

we ascertain what God is like — aletheist

How? — unenlightened

That would be theology, rather than philosophy.

So you're not talking about the meaning/definition of "good"? — Michael

As should be clear by now, the meaning/definition of "good" is "whatever is consistent with God's nature," which accords with saying that "we ascertain what God is like and then define 'good' accordingly."

But you said that we define "good" according to the nature of God. If it's God's nature to be omnipotent then we define "good" as "omnipotent". So what's wrong here? — Michael

Perhaps formulating my previous response as a syllogism will help you see your mistake.

• Whatever is consistent with God's nature is good.
• God's omnipotence is consistent with God's nature.
• Therefore, God's omnipotence is good.

Sounds to me like: "Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" — Cavacava

The Euthyphro dilemma poses a false dichotomy by assuming that either (a) good is defined apart from God as an independent standard to which He conforms, or (b) good is defined as whatever God arbitrarily does. Instead, good is properly defined as whatever is consistent with God's eternal and immutable nature.

So what is God? Well, for one he's omnipotent. Therefore we define "good" as "omnipotent"? Obviously that doesn't work. — Michael

No, we characterize God's omnipotence as good. By analogy, our own abilities are also good - including free will, even though (unlike God) we exercise it in ways that are not good.

You guys can correct me if I am wrong, but I think as a general rule, an argument is an opinion backed up by reason; and then an argument becomes a proof when it gives certainty, or close to certainty. — Samuel Lacrampe

Peirce made a distinction between an Argument as "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief" and an Argumentation as "an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses." A proof would presumably be an instance of the latter when all of the premisses are believed to be true.

God is, in essence, a hypothesis aimed at explaining the universe, its origins and workings. — TheMadFool

That is essentially Peirce's view, as laid out in his 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God."

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's. — Marchesk

The theist calls God "good" because whatever God is, that is what is good. We do not define "good" and then ascertain whether God satisfies that definition, we ascertain what God is like and then define "good" accordingly. The assumption is thus that our human conception of good is imperfect, but ultimately grounded in God's very nature, which is the basis upon which we seek to correct it as we come to know Him better.

It would seem then that conceptual schemas are fluid, and subject to revision or replacement after checking the world. — Marchesk

"Fluid" is probably too strong a term, since conceptual schemas tend to be relatively stable, especially for any given person. It seems to me that each such schema is a set of retroductive hypotheses that we have deductively explicated and inductively corroborated to a degree sufficient to warrant embracing them as provisional beliefs. Any experiences that are inconsistent with the expectations generated by one's conceptual schema will be unpleasant surprises that prompt the irritation of doubt, which motivates a process of inquiry, which may result in revising one or several of the hypotheses.

You may be aware that a family of theistic arguments (generally, the argument from reason) make the claim which Peirce here rejects, i.e. that beings whose mental processes are wholly governed by naturalistic or material forces thereby have cause to doubt the reliability of their ratiocinations. — Arkady

Keep in mind that Peirce was a self-described objective idealist who held "that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, 1891). In other words, he believed that mental processes and material forces are only different in degree, rather than in kind, and that the former are primordial relative to the latter. "Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thought is in us" (CP 5.289n1, 1868). Therefore, I suspect that he would have agreed with the argument from reason that our beliefs cannot be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. Furthermore, he was himself a theist who argued that the reality of God is a highly plausible hypothesis - a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason, just like any successful scientific theory in its initial formulation.

The fact that we are largely always acting through established habits is not treated as much of an excuse. Society operates on the principle that we are in ceaseless charge of our thoughts and actions. — apokrisis

This is an interesting point, consistent with Peirce's observation that only our future conduct is subject to self-control - obviously not our past conduct, and really not even our present conduct. How should this inform our whole approach to ethics? Perhaps that question belongs in its own thread.

How could I be so incredibly wrong about the existence of my own mind? I am my mind, aren't I not? It seems like a non-starter. If you tell me that mind does not actually exist and it's just an illusion, I'm gonna wonder what else I'm hallucinating about. — darthbarracuda

Peirce seems to have shared these sentiments:

Tell me, upon sufficient authority, that all cerebration depends upon movements of neurites that strictly obey certain physical laws, and that thus all expressions of thought, both external and internal, receive a physical explanation, and I shall be ready to believe you. But if you go on to say that this explodes the theory that my neighbour and myself are governed by reason, and are thinking beings, I must frankly say that it will not give me a high opinion of your intelligence. — CP 6.465, 1908

My issue is with the parenthetical "freely" you included. What is that adding? What does it even mean? — Thorongil

God's knowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not entail that Jane will necessarily buy the red car, such that buying the blue motorcycle instead is impossible. The latter is thus still an alternate possibility, and Jane freely chooses to buy the red car (in the libertarian sense), rather than being (deterministically) compelled to do so.

The error is to go from ¬◊(A ∧ ¬B) to A ⊃ ☐B. — Michael

Right, ¬◊(A ∧ ¬B) entails ☐(A ⊃ B), not A ⊃ ☐B. Likewise, "if x knows that p, then p must be true" is properly formalized as ☐(Kxp ⊃ p), rather than Kxp ⊃ ☐p.

The Big Bang is a singularity and a singularity is just a word used to describe the breakdown of physics equations. — Thorongil

This is true, and (as you say) often overlooked or misunderstood. In fact, it is a rarely acknowledged assumption that the so-called "laws of nature" have operated throughout the past exactly as we observe them operating today, all the way back to that singularity or very shortly thereafter. Are you saying, then, that we can meaningfully talk about something that was before the Big Bang?

Can you summarize the error? — Thorongil

Please explain, in your own words, the modal logic and how the problem of divine foreknowledge I presented is solved. — Chany

Basically, the mistake is thinking that the actuality of P entails the impossibility of not-P, or that God's (or anyone else's) knowledge that P entails that P is necessarily true; P remains contingent in both cases. It is not the case that Jane buys the red car because God knows that Jane will buy the red car; rather, God knows that Jane will buy the red car because Jane (freely) buys the red car.

What more do you want me to say? — Thorongil

Nothing at all. I am not the participant in this exchange who said "Go on" and "Either address it or stop replying."

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates."

To say that time did not always exist is to say that there was a time before time, which is absurd. — Thorongil

Even Big Bang cosmology posits a "beginning of time." It is indeed problematic to talk about anything "before" time, but that is simply a limitation of human thought and language.

I am honestly not trying to be obtuse. What more do you want me to say? What is it that you want me to address? If your account is correct, then the Genesis account is wrong, or at least has to be reinterpreted somehow to allow for suffering and death prior to the Fall. If the Genesis account is correct, then your account is wrong, and the world was indeed "very good" prior to the Fall.

Either address it or stop replying. — Thorongil

Address what? You evidently believe that there was life (and death) on earth for hundreds of millions of years before humans appeared. The Genesis account says that God created humans on the sixth day from the beginning, the same day as all other land animals. The two accounts are obviously inconsistent with each other, but there is nothing internally inconsistent with the claim in Genesis that the world before the Fall was "very good."

You're being coy I see. — Thorongil

Not really, I was just unsure what further elaboration you were seeking.

Of course it doesn't. It claims that the world, pre-fall, was "very good." — Thorongil

I still do not see the problem. The Genesis account gives no indication of any suffering, evil, or death until the Fall, which it presents as happening fairly soon after the beginning, not hundreds of millions of years later.

The history of life we now know about says otherwise. — Thorongil

Like I said before, you believe a different account.

The Genesis account does not involve "hundreds of millions of years" of "horrendous suffering, evil, and death."

Some say that this issue is resolvable such that both God's foreknowledge and human freedom can be preserved. — Chany

I am one who would say this. God's foreknowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not cause Jane to buy the red car, He simply knows beforehand that she will freely choose to do so. More accurately, God is outside of time - after all, He created time - so there is no "beforehand" from His point of view, He simply knows what she will/does/did choose.

God could be perfectly evil from our point of view, but perfectly good from God's. — Marchesk

And if that were the case, whose point of view would be correct?

My problem with the Genesis account is that the history of life on the planet as we now understand it rubbishes God's boast that it was created "very good" prior to the fall. — Thorongil

Your problem with the Genesis account is that you believe a different account, one that involves "hundreds of millions of years" of "horrendous suffering, evil, and death."

Faith is not so much intellectual assent to a set of propositions but a way of life. — Thorongil

I prefer to say that faith is not so much belief in a proposition as trust in a Person.

The point is that if God is real, then "perfectly good" is whatever He is. If that turns out to be different than what we humans define as "perfectly good," then we are the ones who have it wrong, not God.

If God is real, then who has the authority to define "perfectly good" as anything other than whatever God is?

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. — Marchesk

Obviously, given your posts.

Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure. — Marchesk

If God is real, then whatever He is, is perfectly good. Who are we to judge otherwise?

I don't think something can be love if it's absent the feeling. — Marchesk

Again, that explains why you are having so much difficulty with the free will defense.

Humans are imperfect lovers. We don't always love the people we're friends, family, lovers with. — Marchesk

I would never argue otherwise.

How is it that I love person B? — Marchesk

Precisely by choosing to act well toward that person, despite your negative feelings about him/her, rather than simply acting in accordance with the latter.

As to the usefulness of distinguishing between natural and artificial, consider SETI, the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. — Marchesk

It is interesting that SETI, forensics, and certain other fields that are widely acknowledged to be properly scientific rely on the presupposition that the outcomes of intentional processes are objectively distinguishable from the byproducts of natural processes; yet the same principle is somehow ruled out of bounds in biology.

My point here is not to argue for intelligent design, just to highlight a philosophical curiosity.

The exercise of will can prevent us from acting on our feelings, but it is practically unable to prevent feelings (emotions) from arising. — Bitter Crank

As I said before, love is not a matter of feelings (emotions). Otherwise, the exhortation to love our enemies would be absurd.

I think the claim that we can choose who to love is as mistaken as the claim that we can choose who to be attracted to. — Michael

Love is not a matter of attraction, either.

But it seems the best we can do is choose to act humanely toward them, despite not loving them, because we want them to do the same to us. — Marchesk

Choosing to act humanely toward them is choosing to love them - especially if we do so not because we want them to do the same to us, but simply because they are our fellow human beings.

No doubt it's beyond my limited ability. — Marchesk

Maintaining this kind of humility would be a significant step toward properly understanding the free will defense.

You are correct, the word "subject" has different meanings depending on the context. But that is not at all unusual, especially in English, which borrows so much of its vocabulary from other languages.

And let's say one of the things I could do is change their genes so that sociopaths couldn't be born into that world. I would do so, and moreover, I would increase the genes responsible for feeling empathy and experiencing love. — Marchesk

You are presupposing that being a sociopath, feeling empathy, and experiencing love are all entirely a matter of genetics. In other words, you are already ruling out the possibility of libertarian free will before you even start setting up your world. Obviously the free will defense is grounded in a different assumption - while genetics contributes to these aspects of humanity, we are still responsible for making our own choices. Evil in the actual world is not God's fault, it is our own; that is the whole point of the story of the Fall.

In that sense, I would act in a way to constrain their free will from behaving in a manner that is without consideration for others. But that's only as a start. — Marchesk

That seems pretty vague. Evil behavior is limited to that which is "without consideration for others"? What does "consideration" mean in this context? How much "consideration" is sufficient to make an action good, rather than evil?

What other abilities would you grant and deny the creatures living in your world? I am looking for a comprehensive response. If that seems unreasonable, maybe creating a better world than the one we have is harder than you think.

Say you were granted the power to create your own world of your choosing (just another planet). Would you grant the creatures living there the ability to freely will all manner of evil? — Marchesk

What would that world look like, if it were up to you? Would you prevent "all manner of evil," or only certain kinds of evil? What abilities would you grant and deny the creatures living there in order to achieve that end? How do you define evil in the first place?

What Peirce wrote about Cartesian doubt seems relevant here.

We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. — CP 5.265, 1868

I don't know how you can choose to love anyone. — Marchesk

I choose to love my wife, even in those moments when I do not like her very much, and she does the same. That is what keeps our marriage intact. Wrongly thinking that love is merely an emotion is one reason why there are so many divorces these days.

Sure, I can act as if I love someone, out of duty, or because I think society requires it, or because my religion demands it, but that doesn't mean I actually love them. — Marchesk

Right - you actually love someone only if you freely choose to do so. And obviously we are not talking about romantic love here (eros), but self-sacrificing love (agape) - putting the interests of others ahead of our own.

I don't see how you can divorce love and hate from feeling. Imaging telling a loved one that you brought them a gift because it was your duty. — Marchesk

Why would you think that feeling and duty are the only possible motivations for bringing someone a gift?

But I don't think that love has much to do with free will. — Marchesk

That explains why you are having so much difficulty with the free will defense. The typical argument is not that free will itself is a good that outweighs the resulting evil, but that free will is a prerequisite for love, which is a good that outweighs the resulting evil.

Is love a freely willed choice, though? Do you get to choose who you love, who you hate, and who you're indifferent too? I have my doubts. — Marchesk

Really? It seems obvious to me that love, hate, or indifference is always a choice that we make. Jesus taught that we should choose to love everyone - even our enemies. It is a mistake to treat love as merely an emotion that comes and goes; in fact, it is an explicit commandment: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind, and your neighbor as yourself." (Luke 10:27)

Let's say it is necessitated by having free will. Does that mean free will to do anything, or just free will to love? — Marchesk

How could someone have genuine free will to love, while having no genuine free will in any other respect?

I'm not seeing that my free will to love needs the ability to murder to exist. — Marchesk

Having free will to love entails having the ability to hate. "Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in him." (1 John 3:15)

But what's really being argued is that God values free will at the cost of permitting various evils to exist. It's not a matter of weighing goods, it's a matter of weighing the good of free will over permitting evil. — Marchesk

Is love possible without free will? If not, could the possibility of love perhaps be a good that far outweighs the cost of permitting evil and suffering? Would not an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being know the true answers to these questions and act accordingly?