Yes, yes, yes!! Now you are starting to understand. But Socrates DENIES that.
— god must be atheist
He does not deny it. Plato makes it quite clear. He says that we find the Forms in the world of our experience unalloyed but mixed together. — Fooloso4
I have to differ again, sorry. The things in our world are mixed objects that contain Forms. A plant that can cure people of a disease, is both a plant and a curative device. A doctor who uses this plant is both a person and a healer. But the forms in and by themselves are unit-ideals. They don't have sub-components. They each represent a kernel form. The Forms are true, everlasting, perfect. The objects in our world lack in each of these qualities.
So indeed Socrates denies that forms have more than one qualities or essences. I know I am mixing concepts and mixing adjectives with nouns. If this is objectionable, I can rewrite my opinion to make the naming structure uniform, but that would lead to some awkward constructs along the way, awkward language constructs. If you can close an eye to my calling the forms sometimes unique essences, and sometimes of unique qualities, and sometimes of kernel qualities, then please let me know and I'll try my best to get rid of this failing in my text.
At any rate, I misunderstood your statement that I referred to as "yes, but Socrates denies that." And with some tact, I must let you know it was not entirely my fault that I misunderstood you. Let's put it this way: 90% my fault, 10% your fault. You said, "They are found in combination in the world we live in, the world of our experience." I was momentarily lost in finding the antecedent to the first word in this quote by you, "They". I figured those were the kernel qualities, not the forms. And by continuing my faulty line of understanding, I somehow -- entirely my mistake -- figured the combination refers to the contents of the Forms. The things in our world are combined, and they are found in the Forms. What a major mistake I made! My only defense is that I am not so apt at matching antecedents with pronouns. My language processing is faulty in this aspect.
So now I get you. The objects of the world we live in contain Forms, which are not forged, or alloyed, together, but are mixed, and the operation of them is a resultant of their community of qualities, so to speak.
This is a claim by Socrates. But it does not negate my claim, which I quote here for ease of reference:
This is of course conjecture, complete conjecture, but not any more of a conjecture than to claim that each displayed quality is a unique kernel quality, like Socrates claimed. Furthermore, Socrates claim seems to suggest that there are no combined qualities -- each displayed quality is the effect of a distinct unit of a quality source. — god must be atheist
You say Socrates did not claim this, which is true. But it does not contradict the claim of Socrates. While we accept (both of us) that Forms can combine but not forge to produce new qualities, different from those of the forms, it is equally possible (whether likely or not) that the objects found in our experiences are indeed representations of nothing but one single solitary Form, in a somewhat bastardized version of it.
How can the version be bastardized if it is a replica of the Form? And how can it be bastardized if the parts are only of a single Form, and not mixed with the qualities of other Forms? To which I would answer, Why does or why should the mixing of the Forms bastardize their effect, when represented in our world? The problem is that Forms are perfect and atomic. Mixing them with other perfect and atomic essences or qualities, that is, mixing them with other Forms, should not take away neither from the perfection, nor from the truth and its being everlasting.
So there is an effect in our world which bastardizes the Forms. It is not the mix of Forms, because that alone should not affect the objects in ways that take away from the quality of forms. There is a substance in the world we observe, which "dirties" up the Forms, so they lose their everlasting quality, their perfection, and their truth. What is this thing, matter or otherwise, that dirties up the Forms? Well does Socrates name it, or describe it, the dirtying thing? I don't think so, but you may know of one or more.
But again, I digressed. My only job here is to show that Socrates committed an Ad Hominem fallacy.