The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot: Philosophy As Practice, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson — 180 Proof

Nice.

Nor do religious people or culture at large. Instead, they maintain that people must have some objective, interpersonally verifiable or agreed upon reasons for believing something, in order for those reasons to count as "good reasons". — baker

I think the fact of a belief being validated by its actions is about the apex of intersubjective verifiability, don't you? Unless your are talking about something that is trivially measurable. As soon as value enters the picture, it becomes a matter of what constitutes proof.

I guess my point is, people justify their beliefs by their commitment to them, ultimately.
— Pantagruel
This is not a stance generally held by philosophers or scientists. — baker

That belief is deeply embedded in action is not a generally held position? Thanks for the tip. You might want to enlighten the advocates of embodied/embedded cognition, because I'm pretty sure they are all about enactment in context. I think those guys are mostly philosophers and scientists.

Well, does one have to be epistemologically sophisticated in order to assess
and hence justify the validity of one's own beliefs? If so, I wonder how many people can be said to believe anything at all?

I guess my point is, people justify their beliefs by their commitment to them, ultimately. If a belief can find positive enaction (i.e. you believe in god, so you volunteer, treat your fellow man with dignity, etc.) then that is the best reason there is to hold a belief.

↪Pantagruel No ... not a clue what "special usage" you're referring to. — 180 Proof

I assumed you were distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths, except I never made mention of the word "necessary." So I am not sure what you are referring to there.

It is one which permeates our lives and cannot just be answered by the people who are ranked as the philosophers. — Jack Cummins

Yes. And philosophy shouldn't be just for philosophers, should it?

... metaphysics involves the understanding of "the supreme finite fact"
— Pantagruel
:point: Necessarily 'necessary facts' are impossible; therefore, only contingent facts are possible. — 180 Proof

I think you are inferring the special usage of "necessary," but it wasn't used.

Scheler says that metaphysics involves the understanding of "the supreme finite fact," the most incredible thing which the universe reveals to us, the essence of what it means to be a human being. The essence of philosophy is the essence of humanity. Hence his program of "essential intuition."

If this is philosophy at its deepest roots, the origin of all meaning, then everyone is a philosopher to the extent that they consciously participate in the discovery and creation of this meaning.

However if you accept the theistic claims made by people who argue from personal experience — Tom Storm

This is my own position with respect to that specific approach of his. I (or anyone else) can argue compelling reasons not on his list because they have to be compelling to me and by my standards. If he failed to find them he failed to find them is all that can be said. The fact of his good evidence argument or standard does not itself justify or recommend the conclusion he reaches for anyone else.

↪Pantagruel You're pinning "intentention" on my post as the process of creation of consciousness. That is unfair, although it makes no difference whatsoever. — god must be atheist

Again, it was strictly a hypothetical, "if you believe in strong AI and if you also believe in atheism" then those positions lead to contradictory conclusions. For me personally, the jury is still out.

I didn't expect so much reaction to the logical form of the argument itself - obviously it isn't as self-evident to others as it is to me!

I didn't say that god exists. I said that something that can be described as "the creator of consciousness" possibly exists to the same extent that you believe in strong AI. That's all. However a believer reconciles those two beliefs, if an atheist, is that believer's business. I don't believe the strong AI premise myself.

Unless you happen to believe in strong AI. Which Daniel Dennett demonstrably does. And his 'no good reasons for believing' foundational argument explicitly contradicts that consciousness, what we are, could be created.

Wrong thread for this. Sorry. I shouldn't have rambled.

Could be. How does that relate to what I'm proposing? I am discussing beliefs qua beliefs, which may or may not accurately represent the mechanisms involved. But the beliefs as beliefs have meaning. If not, then what does?

Creation involves a creator. One scenario necessarily involves creators while the other doesn’t. I don’t see any contradiction here. — NOS4A2

Exactly. They are equally possible.

I'm not following that. — Banno

No?

This does not follow. Besides, you're begging the question – the creator of the consciousness creator's consciousness, etc ... — 180 Proof

No, it is premised as the position of a Strong AI proponent that consciousness can be created, that's all. It is a hypothetical, applicable in the case of that position.

Are you claiming that it was a thought before it was painted — Banno

Not before only, because.

What is the ultimate currency, the ultimate validation of belief to the believer?

You should feel the sense that your belief, your philosophy, is shaping your experience of Life.

And if you do, then your belief is at least that valid.

Thanks for the further details of Scheler's ideas. It does seem that the themes on the various threads overlap frequently. I am also quite interested in your new thread, but I have a book with a few chapters on Dennet, so I may have a look at that first. It is sometimes hard to find the time to write informed comments to other people's thread discussions. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I am reasoning backwards in that thread, Hypothetically, if the belief that AI is possible is not un-selfcontradictory, then our consciousness must also possibly have been created. That is, possibly being created must be a property of consciousness. So there possibly could (a fortiori) be a creator of consciousness, which is more or less consistent with a universal description of "god."

So all I said was IF Dennett does espouse hard AI (which I looked up, he does) then his whole "reasons for believing" argument at its foundation collapses because his conclusion is self-contradictory, in that it necessarily posits both the falsity and the possibility of god.

I accept that consciousness is created. But who says it is created by god? It could be created by a salamander. Or a black hole in the vast expanse of the universe. They are NOT GOD. — god must be atheist

If consciousness can be created intentionally, then our consciousness could have been created intentionally. All it does is put the concept of god on equal footing with whatever other theories you would care to propound in good faith as having produced consciousness.

Again, I am not conceding that consciousness, can be created intentionally. I believe all AI will ever be is a sophisticated facsimile. It's only if you actually do believe it that this argument has force.

And yes, I am saying that if something has the property "It created our consciousness intentionally", then it matches in a very broad sense a key feature of a god, as we commonly understand it.

But "fantasy" can be, at its best, playing with counterfactuals — 180 Proof

Yes. Scheler even describes a scenario in which the ultimate counterfactual (that the principle of non-contradiction is false) can be proven true based on an aesthetic metaphysics:

There are even attempts to see aesthetic principles of pleasing relationships
and configurations in subjects such as logic. Certainly, as far
as mathematics is concerned, Poincaré expressly stated that the highest
measure of mathematical achievement was not logic itself, but an aesthetic
value, whereby a unity and harmony of thought and proposition
were reached. Poincaré sought to prove, against the opinion of pure
logicians, that there were an infinite number of mathematical representations
of some logical problem, all of which could be equally correct,
and that it was infinitely boring, and scientifically pointless, to go
through all, or even most, of the proofs. The achievement of a creative
mathematician lay exclusively in being able to select that sort of proof,
from among equally correct candidates, which was the most ‘elegant’,
in terms of a harmony between axioms, consequences, theoretical
principles and proofs. This selection of aesthetic, valuable and elegant
proofs constitutes, according to Poincaré, the only and ultimate way
of measuring the value of mathematical achievement. Even illogical
and contradictory propositions can, and should, conform to the same
value of maximum unity and harmony as proposed for logical ones,
according to him. Above all, the principle of the non-contradiction of
a proposition – if A = B then A = non-B cannot be true – would be
deniable [if its denial were couched in more aesthetic terms than the
actual proposition itself ].

Jack, I think you and I bruited about the concept of "elegance" a while back.

I'd like to provide some more details on Scheler's "more radical" version of the transcendental reduction if you are interested Jack. I'm not sure they fit entirely in the scope of this thread though.

success, anything you want to achieve. — Huh

Hmm. Doesn't that seem to be a kind of task-oriented or episodic definition? Whereas "success" usually connotes ongoing and in-the-balance or cumulative achievement in a variety of different types of tasks.

Consciousness is consciousness. There's no equivocation possible.

Is success more influenced by luck or skill? — Huh

What is your definition of "success"?

↪Huh Before I answer, could you give us a definition of luck. — Sir2u

I think luck is pretty unambiguous, sums up in the "right place at the right time" chesnut, no?

Near as I can make out, Scheler is describing how fantasy is integral to the conative-creative power of the mind. He also discusses the connection between "wishing" and "willing".

"We can feel what we have never exactly experienced, and wish for something that we have never personally known....there is a gradual shrinking of the realm of wishing [as one ages]."

But conversely, eventually,

"there is a transformation in the realm of striving from what was originally a 'will'...to a 'wish,' when the impracticability is experienced, so, in each individual's old age what was once a 'will' becomes a 'wish.'"

His conclusion approaches what I'd call my own metaphysical position of "radical experimentalism":

"[The] original productive power of imagination...is subjected by the noetic acts of spirit to an increasing correction, critique, and selection."

No, his good reasons for believing in “strong AI” are not thats it’s possible. There is an entire branch of science that give good reasons to think AI is possible contrasted by no such scientific field to source for good reasons god exists. All believing in god has is naked possibility, — DingoJones

No, this is precisely not the case, which is the entire point of my post. The only germaine possibility is the possibility of creating consciousness. If you hold that human beings can create consciousness, then consciousness can be created. End of story, nothing more is required than that. If AI were created, it would only strengthen the argument for the existence of God. As it is, it validates the possibility to the extent that it is believed to be possible.

You are arguing a strawman.

It’s fallacious as an argument against a position Dennett holds. You started by quoting Dennett, “good reason” being the two key words. You have not provided a “good reason” to believe...something being possible is not a good reason to believe in it. So your argument in no way refutes what Dennett said. Dennett isnt denying the possibility, he is denying that there are good reasons. — DingoJones

I'm not arguing against Dennett explicitly, as I made clear. What I am doing is presenting my own argument, which amounts to a type of "ontological proof," which establishes Dennett's position as self-contradictory. Hence casting doubt on the whole "reasons for believing" approach in the first place.

i thought that what my main argument was was pretty clear, inasmuch as it was both stated and short.

If Dennett has "good reasons" for believing in strong AI then he as equally good reasons for believing in God.....

Jack, you must be reading my mind. I literally just read Max Scheler's take on "Metaphysics and Aesthetics" which culminates in the role of fantasy in metaphysics:

Because metaphysics, which is knowledge of the real...begins at the pont where possible direct and indirect sensory experience come to an end, all its concrete intuitively-derived settings-out...are works of fantasy.
(Scheler, The Constitution of the Human Being)

Ok, so you don’t seem to really be saying much at all then. You haven’t presented a “good reason” for believing, just acknowledging a possibility.
A - that is one possibility out of a virtual infinity of possibilities and demonstrates nothing.
B - it doesn’t refute anything you say Dennett claims.

I’m afraid your argument is still fallacious. — DingoJones

What I am saying is that if Dennett (or anyone) believes that consciousness can be created, a fortiori, he must believe that his own consciousness could be created. And since being the creator of consciousness is one of the most important properties (if not the most important) usually ascribed to the concept of God, if Dennett (or anyone) believes that consciousness can be created, he a fortiori believes in the possibility of God.

How is that fallacious?

It doesn’t follow that because consciousness can be created by humans that human consciousness must be created too. — DingoJones

I didn't say must be created. It follows that if you believe consciousness can be created then you believe consciousness can be created.

It's the simplest possible form argument. If A believes in the possibility of x, a fortiori, A acknowledges the possibility of y.

Your inability to follow or comment on the actual argument suggest that the problem lies more on your side rather than mine.

Though like I said, I am not familiar with Dennett's argument, this doesn't sound remotely like your 5-word summary of it. — SophistiCat

I don't need to summarize his argument if his own beliefs demonstrate the contrary, in the context of my argument. (As I said, even the argument itself proves nothing except that he himself fails to find any good reasons for believing. That's another thread, but one obviated by this one).

I don't follow Dennett, but I checked and he seems to be a very active proponent of strong AI. That's all that is required to substantiate my argument.

The arguably irreversible damage done to children and teens by the restrictions and changes to their freedoms is huge. — dazed

Like spending more time with their parents? A large percentage of children surveyed in Canada now identify their parents as their "best friends". Like learning the value of sacrificing trivial personal freedoms for the greater good? Like being forced to utilize their minds to come up with creative alternatives to habitual rituals?

Human beings thrive and grow and learn through challenges.

That’s ‘cause he believes in science, and he thinks it’s one or the other. — Wayfarer

Right. So I am assuming he probably believes in the possibility of realizing AI. In which case, per my argument, a fortiori, he should believe in the possibility that human consciousness is itself created...

Personally, I do not believe that we will succeed in creating actual artificial intelligence, only a facsimile. Consequently, this proof does not work for me. However I also do not "actively disbelieve" in the possibility of God, in abstracto.

If it can be thought, it can be put into words. — baker

Can the Mona Lisa be put into words? It certainly was thought.

Good question. I think you have hit the psychological nail on the head.

The Constitution of the Human Being by Max Scheler

Max's central writings on metaphysics and anthropology

"Why is there something instead of nothing"
Since there are two threads with the same title I guess my answer works for both of them...

This is the central theme of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics :"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing" (p. 215)

What he does is essentially recast and reconceptualize the understanding of the nature of Being in a way that encompasses the concept of nothing. One of his most interesting conclusions is:
The concept of being that has been accepted up to now does not suffice to name everything that "is". (p. 218)

I recommend this, it's a good read, extremely dense but fairly short. As the "successor to Being and Time" alone it is worth consideration.