It isn't "non locally real" it is "not locally real" - as in "locally non-real"

The title may be confusing some people unfortunately.

The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
by Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels

The Three Musketeers
by Alexandre Dumas

Man and Crisis
by José Ortega y Gasset

John Carter and the Giants of Mars; The Skeleton Men of Jupiter
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

Can we ever know what "the good" is? If we accept that our knowledge is inevitably limited, then, in any given circumstance what one person thinks is good may not be what another person thinks is good. So at a bare minimum saying that we ought to do what is good endorses a moral relativism which can result in not doing the right, supposing that some people are better able to identify the good than others.....

I think the gap between the heights of human knowledge and values and the depths of the mass-mind has never been greater. There is an economic-power and awareness-morality schism that it seems to me will eventually result in some kind of catastrophe.

History as a System and other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History
by José Ortega y Gasset

The Way Things Are (De Rerum Natura)
by Lucretius,

And yet, I don't think we would want to say that the shape of the Earth or the nature of infectious diseases is just about cultural norms. To be sure, our understanding of these is bound up in and filtered through such norms, since education, science, etc. are social practices, and the findings of science can fit into a metaphysical framework. But presumably we'd like to say that there is a "fact of the matter" about the shape of the planet or germ theory, and that this has been what has driven the evolution of cultural norms on this topic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I would agree in general with this argument. Except to say that, at a fundamental level, there may indeed be "facts of the matter" which cultural norms - or metaphysical presuppositions - both proscribe and prescribe. So there may be things about reality - facts of the matter - that our presuppositions (of whatever kind) don't allow us to grasp. And also, yes, perhaps there are facts of the matter when it comes to incest-prohibitions, but these would be more like "genetic imperatives," for which there is no trivial translation into a moral vocabulary.

Descartes was right in saying the most self evident reality is"cogito" or "Ich denke" in Kant. All other reality is based on it. Indeed one cannot doubt one is thinking. In Kant, all experience is based on Ich denke, so it is the a priori precondition for possibility of all existence. — Corvus

My avatar agrees.

I didn't say it isn't real. I said that I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is more real than justice. — Michael

:up:
If we can agree that there can be degrees of reality then, for my part, that is the critical thing.

Well, one definition of "real" is "existing or occurring in the physical world; — Michael

Well that doesn't beg any questions.....

Ideas exist in the physical world (ta-da). Justice is an idea. Ergo justice is real.

Cogito — Corvus

ergo sum

Gravity
Kings
Justice

I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is "more real" than kings and that kings are "moral real" than justice.

There's an extensional component to "gravity" that "justice" doesn't have (unless Platonism is correct), and there's an intensional component to "kings" that "gravity" doesn't have. — Michael

Consciousness
Matter

Consciousness may not itself be more real than matter. But the state of affairs that includes both consciousness and matter is "more" than the state of affairs consisting of only matter. What else can that "more" be if not "more real"? Ideas are realized. Things become real that weren't before in a non-trivial, non-mechanistic way.

It's a question of cultural norms. Incest has historically been widely practiced to varying degrees, especially among ruling classes. Is morality a cultural phenomenon? Or is culture a moral phenomenon? You decide.

The Revolt of the Masses
by José Ortega y Gasset

The Soul of Man Under Socialism
by Oscar Wilde

:up:
This is fundamental to a philosopher like Collingwood, for example, and his notion of "absolute presuppositions," which are the epistemological cornerstone of his metaphysics.

There are also a ton of hits on TPF if you search "theory-laden".

Not quite sure what you mean by observation is theory laden either. — Corvus

As I said, it is a well-known concept; there is actually a wiki on it. I would start with that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory-ladenness

:up:

\ This basically says that observation is theory laden, so all thought is the product of its history of conceptualization (including observations). Fundamentally (observation is theory laden) it's a pretty basic concept. Collingwood expands upon it considerably.

Whatever the case, they all need observation by humans who record and monitor the process, and simulation and modelling wouldn't replace observation in science. — Corvus

Yes. Bearing in mind that

...the work of observing facts is really done by the senses with assistance from the intellect. What the positivists called ‘observing’ facts is really historical thinking, which is a complex process involving numerous presuppositions
~Essay in Metaphysics

At present, I'm not seeing how:

Our thoughts exemplify what they conceptualize
— Pantagruel

is inconsistent with:

...consciousness formats the boundaries of perceived things as a translation of things-in-themselves.
— ucarr — ucarr

I don't know that I said it was inconsistent, merely that your concept of "boundary administration" isn't gelling with me. Perspective might dictate that we perceive the same thing through different metaphors.

When you score a victory against your opposition, it has meaning and value. The circularity of you being you in isolation has no meaning or value. — ucarr

Which is why Collingwood's conception of logic-metaphysics is not just dialectical, but dialogical. Propositions only have meanings as answers to questions.

We are alive and real only because we can die. Consciousness divorced from death is a childish game. We grow up when we accept the strategic incompleteness of ourselves; it fends off death until the living project extends beyond the individual’s strategies for preserving its incompleteness. — ucarr

Consciousness can be construed as a species-collective property, which at the bare minimum distances (and possibly insulates) it from the individual notion of (ego-)death. Your statement reads as existential. I've been a determined existentialist in the past; I'm coming to see existentialism, however, as more of a very sophisticated kind of psychology.

But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Absolutely. Models don't exclude the modeler and the modeled, they unite them.

Instead, cogito-spacetime takes the place of cogito ergo sum. With consciousness now inducted into the physico_material realm of physics as the boundary administrator for the cognition of the physics of physico_material reality, this addition resolves the seeming inconsistency between QM and Newton. The seeming inconsistency between QM and Newton, plus Descartes' cogito ergo sum, operate as the wellsprings of the HPoC. — ucarr

I think conceptually this accords with R. G. Collingwood's elaboration of the Ontological Argument:

The distinction between processes that we can discover in the object, and processes which we can discover in our minds when we reflect on our thought about the object, is a distinction that we have no right to make here, because, as we learnt in reflecting upon the idea of nothing, we are here in a realm of thought in which there is no object, and in which therefore whatever necessarily happens in our minds when we think about a given concept is a process necessarily ascribed to the concept itself.
~Collingwood, The Nature of Metaphysical Study

Our thoughts exemplify what they conceptualize. This is why I don't quite gel with your notion of the "boundary administrator" role. I would say we are quantum-mechanical adjudicators of the quantum.

As regards its modus operandi, then, all analysis is metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific character to science, science and metaphysics are inextricably united, and stand or fall together.
~R.G. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics

Rather more on topic...

"That truth is greatest or truest which expresses most, which includes most successfully within itself a number of diverse and by themselves conflicting points of view."
~R.G. Collingwood, Truth and Contradiction

I'm merely pointing out the limits of our relation to the answers, that some answers require a drastic change in perception in order to know where to look and where to conduct the further research. — Christoffer

Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift.

Still there can be no science without art:

"For Collingwood, art is the beginning of the process by which we create the self and the world. The distinctions between the self and the world and between the world as discovered and the world as made only occur at the level of intellect. However, for intellect to function, there must first be art."
~Richard Murphy, Collingwood and the Crisis of Western Civilization

If science is a tool then it is susceptible of improper use, like any other tool.

We lack enough comprehension to fully grasp the implications of what we objectively know. And therefor we lack in the instinct which guides us towards further knowledge. — Christoffer

Which is why it is so important not to overestimate the scope of our empirical "knowledge". What is real now might not cover what is real tomorrow.

What usually comes to mind for me about energy is how scale influence the perception of entropy. — Christoffer

I wonder too about time, whether time at micro-scales is even a well-defined property.

A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need of magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for lack of interest in its own maintenance.
~R.G. Collingwood, Principles of Art

Collingwood and the Crisis of Western Civilisation: Art, Metaphysics and Dialectic
Richard Murphy

A Harlot High and Low
Honoré de Balzac

Is there a sense in which consciousness overflows its symbolic representations? Empirical knowledge is precisely reflected in exhausted by what is symbolically represented. However consciousness can know some things in a way that seems to transcend empirical encapsulation of this kind. The fact that it can "know" that something can be brought about by conducting itself counterfactually, for example, acting "against" the way things are in order to bring about something different. So does intuitive knowledge transcend empirical encapsulation? Or is it in fact such an encapsulation itself?

Presently, I am focusing on consciousness as a builder by way of being a boundary administrator. The boundary negotiations work towards construction of a representation of reality. — ucarr

Conceptually, this is cogent. But it still begs the question of the exact nature of the representation construct. I view it in light of what I'd call "constructive realism".

Math...among other things. But are we talking about the conscious experience qua representation, or are we talking about some kind of construct - presumably a material-symbolic artefact - that instantiates or incorporates this conscious experience?

Is it strictly mental, or does it also inhabit the empirical realm of practical physics? — ucarr

To me this seems like asking the question, Is the "representation" real? It seems incontrovertibly to be so, the question being posed (by the representing faculty). Our increasing mastery of quantum phenomena being solid evidence.

If you are suggesting that consciousness functions as an organizational principle of reality I'd agree that is evident.