To attribute the cause to some philosophical jargon that no one cares about except philosophy hobbyists seems far fetched. — Mikie

Essentially, traditional religious values provided a morally realist framework. Durkheim's anomie is the state of normlessness that arises from alienation from fundamental values of life, including the decline of traditional religious morality. So this isn't a new idea, at all. Just something recloaked in modern jargon. Which seems to be a favourite strategy of modern thinkers. Which, unfortunately tends to alienate them from the philosophical history of ideas, producing a state of normlessness, leading to the decay of civilization....lol.

This is emotional reasoning. — Leontiskos

No, it's a fact about human intentionality.

We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end. Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Precisely. I believe this is essentially identical with my observation:

Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. — Pantagruel

Some people act carefully. Others act recklessly.
— Pantagruel

How would you know, given your curious claim that, "There is no 'standard' of foreseeability"? — Leontiskos

There doesn't have to be a standard for there to be a spectrum. There is no "standard" of colour, but there are lots of colours.

I personally know lots of people that live their lives recklessly and whose "intentions" routinely cause all kinds of havoc and produce all kinds of "unintended consequences". One such person was directly responsible for the death of my fiance by being an unfit driver. I'm not inclined to pursue this further because it is so trivially evident. We are not masters of intentionality and causality such that we are capable of surgically creating only the results we intend. The consequences of our imperfect intentionality abound in the tragic mess that humans have made of their world.

unforeseeable — Leontiskos

There is no "standard" of foreseeability. Some people act carefully. Others act recklessly. Many people think that they know what they are doing and do not. We do not live in a world where we go around executing "transactional" events that are over and done with. It isn't realistic. It is an invalid abstraction to view intentional action in this "A causes B and over" sense.

This is exactly the kind of false "insular causality" reasoning that leads to the debacle of externalized costs destroying the biosphere. Along with whatever other unfortunate accidents you'd care to add.

:up:

Just because something is caused by something done intentionally, it does not follow that that effect was intentional. You are forgetting or omitting that intentionality is about what is being aimed at---not what happens.

If I am aiming with a bow an arrow at a bullseye target, and I miss fire and hit a deer of which I had no clue was somewhere behind the target; then I did not thereby intentionally hit the deer even though it follows from the causal chain which derives back to an intentional action. According to you, it would be intentional. — Bob Ross

You have misdirected my rebuttal by mis-characterizing it. Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. My point is that, whatever action you do, you are not always - not often - in a position where you can determine that exactly and only what you want to happen will happen. You may intend to help a co-worker get a promotion by doing some of his work for him. Only to have the boss discover you did it and give the promotion to you instead. Or, as I said, you may hit someone because you are mad at him. Then he goes home and hits his wife because, after a bad day, your blow was the straw that broke the camels back.

Intentional causality is often done with an imperfect knowledge and therefore, even when it "works" often has additional unexpected effects. This is exactly what companies who choose to disregard "externalized costs" do. And it is a poor choice all around. If a company disregards externalized costs, then the explicitly choose not to manage the ongoing consequences of their actions. Which means that, the system in which they are involved (the ongoing project of exploiting resources for example) they have elected not to manage some of the results of their actions, the consequence of which can only be that that system can never be made stable (by their actions).

What do you think an “intention” is? If a consequence of something intended is accidental, then it was unintentional: that’s what it means for it to be accidental. — Bob Ross

If I push someone around because I am bigger and stronger, and that person then goes and pushes another because he is upset that I pushed him around and that third person then kills himself, there is arguably a causal link there. I think it is very salient to recognize that actions inherently transcend intentions in their scope. Hence Descartes' observation that the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding.

It is completely unrealistic to envision that when we intend to do something the results will be exactly what we envision. Some corporations entire business model is structured around "externalized costs" - i.e. things that they cause to happen but don't happen to want to assume responsibility for.

The paradox here is that if someone has 'bad faith' how can we tell? This is because the very idea of 'bad faith' is a being-in-itself created by a being-for-itself. What one person may point at as a system of oppression or bad faith may very well be doing so in bad faith.

How can this gap be closed, if at all? — I like sushi

Is it even relevant for people to know or say of others that they are in bad-faith? As you point out, it is an 'internal' concept.

Perhaps the cafe waiter who truly aspires to be the best cafe waiter possible is not in fact in bad faith at all. Sartre's biography of Saint Genet (Jean Genet) would seem to bear out this interpretation. Genet embraced the judgements of society that were heaped upon him (which is what makes him an existential 'saint').

Could Karma be the expression of basic physical laws of motion emerging/permeating into the sphere of sophisticated societal dynamics? — Benj96

Sure.

Perhaps free will and determinism both exist as a mutual duality/ neccessary dichotomy — Benj96

And I think this is the rational approach. Human beings do act "automatically" in the sense that they enact their own physical "habits", but they can also (to varying degrees) modify their own habits. Life isn't "transactional" it is cyclical. We are constantly re-enacting in a kind of cybernesis into which free will can be injected, with varying degrees of success depending on the individual.

My main point is just that accidents, by definition, cannot be intentional. That's categorically incoherent to posit. — Bob Ross

But is something accidental if it not only could have but should have been forseen? People manifest different degrees of "epistemic responsibility." Is there an objective standard separating accident from culpability?

Unintended consequences are not necessarily accidental, only unforseen.

I think this issue is good for revealing how people think and what biases they have. Notice how each participant in this thread has their own take on what it means. — frank

Absolutely. The core of Scepticism revolves around the recognition of deep (epistemic) subjective relativism, which extends so far as to be able to shape what we are able to perceive. Which is why Scepticism touts the suspension of judgement to the greatest extent possible.

It sounds like you're equating freedom with potential. That's an interesting take. — frank

How do you mean exactly? Certainly, I'm construing it within the composite framework of the subject-object system. As such, it is measurable and quantifiable. More radically, I think it may be a feature that is "conferred" by subjectivity on the system. But it is still in evidence as a systemic feature.

I guess you mean that if I have the knowledge to build a bridge, it makes it easier for me to cross the river, and so I'm more free? — frank

Yes, that would be one way of describing it. Phase space is a physical characterization of the possible states of a system. A bicycle-rider system can assume various trajectories in phase space - i.e. rolling along the path that is defined by the rotation of its wheels, the turning of its handlebars, etc. But a bicycle ridden by someone who knows how to ride a bicycle has more possibilities - more degrees of freedom - than one ridden by someone who doesn't know how to ride a bicycle.

Doesn't that seem circular to you? The proof for free will is in the institutions predicated on the presumption of free will. — Vera Mont

The proof isn't in the institutions, it is in my immediate perceptions. If I tried to lift my arm, and it didn't elevate, then I would wonder. If I was paralyzed, then if I tried to think a thought, and I didn't think that thought, then I would wonder. Except no, I wouldn't wonder, because, per the thought experiment, the intention of the thought and the realization of that intention would not coincide. Ergo I would not be thinking the thought I am thinking. Which is absurd. Cogito ergo sum.

I would ask someone who believes you don't have free will "What is stopping your will from being free? — Igitur

I agree. The evidence is so overwhelmingly on the side of freedom of will (it is the basis of all law, qua responsibility for actions, which is the foundation of civilization) that the burden of proof is certainly on the side of the unfree....

What's instrumental value? Could you give an example? — frank

Sure. If you know Archimedes principle of the lever then you can lift something you otherwise couldn't. Practical knowledge is inherently instrumental. In doing so, it creates a greater "degree of freedom" in the system - i.e. it expands the phase space of the system that includes it.

Doesn't the condition that there is no free-will exclude the possibility of the instrumentality of belief, and therefore of knowledge? And yet knowledge clearly has instrumental value.

Also, what would be the practical consequence of knowing that one has no free-will? It would seem that the answer must be, none.

Finally, what is the motivation for even asking the question? The only one that I can think of is "denial of responsibility for the consequences of ones' actions."

I would further call attention to the fact that the earliest conceptions of "god" were of animistic spirits of particular natural phenomena (whose causes were not understood). Suggesting that the idea of god is really, in its most general form, about whatever is "occult" (i.e. hidden) at the time. Since science continuously redefines the boundaries of the occult, it is only reasonable that the idea of "god" should likewise evolve.

Additionally, the whole foray down the tangent of theism is misdirected. Most major religions include a core "monastic tradition" whose emphasis is decidedly on the individual experience of the divine, not on the narrative details of scriptures. Arguably, monks, and not priests, are the keepers of the faith. Priests are just the popularizers.

Anything that isn't a contradiction is possible. It doesn't then follow that it is not reasonable to believe that some possibilities are true and some are false. — Michael

Yes, that is precisely my point. As I said, my experiences on earth have included events indicative of meaningful connections that transcend current scientific explanations. It is a very well-known fact that cognitive predispositions can dramatically affect not only how events are experienced, but whether they are even observed at all. If your experience doesn't support the inference, then it doesn't. Is it because you have a pre-existing bias that is preventing recognition?

I'm currently reading some classical Scepticism. It is a powerful presentation of the benefits of the rationale of "suspending judgement". I highly recommend.

I would say that it is reasonable to believe that Zeus does not exist, that Odin does not exist, that Shiva does not exist, that Allah does not exist, that Yahweh does not exist, and that a supernatural intelligent creator deity does not exist. — Michael

And I already provided the example by way of analogy with the theory of the atom. We have no problem seeing Democritus' theory as a "precursor" to a more cogent theory that evolves in light of the progress of civilization. What possible reason could there be for not allowing for the same possibility with respect to theories about "transcendental entities"?

I'm asking you why a narrative that is from the limited human-centric perspective cannot both be inaccurate but also refer to something that in fact exists. Assuming which, yes, the claim that Zeus does not exist (qua "any possible deity") is not logical, that is, is not warranted.

As I maintained early on, the "story of god" has as much right to evolve as does the "story of the atom". Only a fool would deny quantum theory by refuting Democritus.

P1. Zeus does not exist
P2. Odin does not exist
P3. Shiva does not exist
P4. None of the Greek, Norse, or Hindu deities exist — Michael

Is the "Sun" of the geocentric cosmology the same as the "Sun" of the Heliocentric cosmology?

If you say no, then possibly Odin does not exist. If you say yes, than any and all references to any and all transcendent beings are logically flexible in the same way.

Do you just mean that the proposition "no deities exist" is insufficiently justified? — Michael

You could state it thus. This is the problem with symbolic logic, the elevation of form over content. Existence is not purely logical. Certainly quantum physics is not, as many quantum phenomena transcend traditional logic.

So, yes, it is not "logically substantiated" to arrive at the conclusion that "no deities exist." Whereas, based on the experiences I have had of a kind of overarching meaningfulness, I have at least some kind of empirical basis for intuiting the operation of "occult" (literally, hidden or concealed) connections between events that could be consistent with something like the existence and operation of a transcendent entity.

No, atheism is not illogical. The proposition "no deities exist" is not a contradiction. — Michael

Doing the same action repeatedly expecting a different result is not a contradiction either, but it is illogical. The logic of human actions is not entirely compassed by formal symbolic logic. But if I had to put it in propositional form I would say:
1. The universe is full of things that are beyond human comprehension.
2. Some of those things might be deities.
3. Therefore the proposition that no deities exist is illogical.

Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".
— Pantagruel
Non sequitur. — 180 Proof

It's a non sequitur to argue within the stated parameters of the question? That is a very strange conception of logic indeed. Which IS precisely to the heart of the stated parameters of the question.

But again, as to your idiosyncratic characterization of theism (as a complete tangent), the burden of proof is, of course, on you to establish that your framework is valid. I challenge you to provide an authoritative source corresponding with your views. In addition to which, I did provide the counter-examples you demanded (to which you once again failed to respond).

Whatever might be the specific details of any and all theistic religions are incidental to the salient fact, which is the possibility of the existence of the deity at the core of theisms. And THAT most certainly is what is in question, per the OP. The Aztecs, Egyptians, and Greeks all incorporated sun-worship in their pantheon, with vast differences in detail. But there is no question that they were all talking about the same sun.

Cite any deity-tradition, sir, that you consider 'theistic' and that does not conceptualize its (highest) deity with these attributes, or claims. :chin: — 180 Proof

I'll go you one better. Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".

This thread is about whether atheism is illogical. Atheism isn't about refuting theism. Atheism is a disbelief in the existence of god or gods.

I continue to dispute that theisms accord with your ad hoc criteria. Simply put, your criteria don't appear in any definitions of theism. The "ultimate mystery" condition is completely vague, therefore meaningless. Being "morally worthy of worship" isn't true. The gods of the Greek pantheon exhibited no such consistent morality. Nor the Egyptian. As I said, that is about what humans think about gods, not what gods might be in and of themselves.

But all of that is moot, since none of that is relevant to the belief in "the existence of god" which is black letter by definition atheism. Which just goes to show, I guess, how illogical some atheists are prepared to be in defense of their dogma.

I love how you strategically omit citing the argument. Wise choice.

It isn't against you. It is a generalized fact about the epistemological makeup of individual entities, of which you happen to be one.

"In general, if an argument is to convince you, then, first, you must be capable of understanding it; and secondly, you must accept the truth of its premises. You may be capable of grasping arguments (say, in some of the more esoteric branches of mathematics) which others are quite unable to understand; others may have no inkling about the truth of certain propositions (say, in the history of logic) which are utterly familiar to you. For such simple reasons an argument appropriate to you may be inappropriate to me."
(Annas & Barnes, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism)

edit: In other words, no more or less ad hominem than your criticisms of my experiential claims. And I like my substantiating argument far better. I love scientific realism, because the first tenet of science is to acknowledge its own limits, including its approximate nature. I don't know what the limits of possibility are, but given what I can see of them in the span of one little human lifetime, I'd assume that much vaster intelligences would compass magnitudes more. Same thing with abilities.

We do not "deny" anyone's "experience" only observe that such "experience" does not correspond to anything outside of your head. The experiential difference between us, sir, is not that we 'have failed" but that you seem to emotionally need to take fantasies (of "possibility") literally and we do not. — 180 Proof

Or you have failed to observe the evidence in the events comprising your own life due to your own attitude, or simply some inherent limitation of your cognitive makeup.

"In general, if an argument is to convince you, then, first, you must be capable of understanding it; and secondly, you must accept the truth of its premises. You may be capable of grasping arguments (say, in some of the more esoteric branches of mathematics) which others are quite unable to understand; others may have no inkling about the truth of certain propositions (say, in the history of logic) which are utterly familiar to you. For such simple reasons an argument appropriate to you may be inappropriate to me."
(Annas & Barnes, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism)

"Do I really have free will?"

Doesn't asking the question itself imply that you do? It is like asking "Am I conscious now?"

i.e. it is the difference between Cogito ergo sum being a declaration and a question. If you can't be certain of that, then there can be no certainty.

It's funny how the same circumstances can breed opposite results. One self-made man who raised himself up from poverty believes "anyone can do it" because he did and is critical of social welfare. Another dedicates himself to philanthropy. It is all about how one chooses to interpret something, which is really about how one chooses to live one's life, I suppose. Poverty motivates some, while it surpasses others. Freedom might be like that. If you deny freedom, then you excuse yourself from responsibility for everything that freedom implies, but also forgo whatever benefits it confers.

That's a nice position to take outside a prison cell. — Vera Mont

Or inside. Consider Boethius.

but you can't have decided differently. — Vera Mont

Ok. I believe that I make decisions based on a process of reasoning. This belief is itself (per now) a process of reasoning. So you are saying that this process of reasoning now is completely determined? In what sense can that possibly be true? Or is it only true if I come to a decision? i.e. I "decide" now that I am free. So I am wrong? I "decide" that I am determined. I am right? Kant says the "idea of freedom" is sufficient to freedom.

Outlines of Scepticism
by Sextus Empiricus

You sound like the God of Abraham. Or Socrates. Or Descartes. Or the ministry of truth. — Fire Ologist

:up:

Realistically, there may well be things happening in the universe that the human mind - intermediated by the limited faculties of the human body - may only be dimly able to grasp. The golden ratio has been "known" for millenia; fractal patterns abound in nature. But it is only with the advent of advanced computer modelling that that we have identified the real effects of this mathematical phenomenon in the existence of attractors at the heart of non-linear systems.

Hence, I believe that some people are simply "open" to certain types of experiences which, while "meaningful," may not be immediately reducible to a concrete meaning. Other people, of a more inflexible frame of mind, are not open to these kind of experiences and, hence, simply do not have them. Or, more precisely, do not recognize that they have them.

The substance of any belief is the effect that belief has upon the actions of the believer. Individuals inspired by the sublime, the divine, have created great works of art and philosophy, sacrificed themselves for the common good, and, yes, achieved great scientific breakthroughs. I personally am inspired by the glimpses of the sublime my life has afforded me.

To deny the possibility of something that someone else has experienced because you have failed to experience it seem to me nothing more than a bad case of sour grapes.

Just finished Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." It knocked my socks off. I've been looking for something like this for a long time - a discussion of how our human nervous system and mind have evolved as a "negotiation" between Kant's things-as-they-are, the noumena, and our animal need to survive — T Clark

Cool. On Aggression was excellent; this looks fascinating.

intervenes in – causes changes (which cannot be accounted for otherwise) to – the universe — 180 Proof

This single condition alone defines the being practically and can be the sole sufficient condition to account for your other conditions, such as having created existence. Being morally worthy of worship is a function of human relationship, not an intrinsic property. Having an 'ultimate mystery' certainly doesn't mean anything relevant to the being of the deity, that is a feature of the religion itself. We are not talking about religions, we are talking about conceptualizations of deities.

That condition I agree is universal, and it correlates with what I said, possessed of abilities which humans don't understand. Which is really all it would need to be and, given the limitations of the human mind, isn't all that high a bar anyway, as I mentioned.

Your muddled interpretations aside, the actual state of affairs is that the concept of "God" exists across all cultures and in such variety that your claim that there is some definitive version of that concept that anyone wishing to discuss the concept must adhere to is trivially false.

As to your position. You reject the supernatural concept of god because it is illogical. Fine. But then you reject my non-supernatural characterization...because it is not of the supernatural variety. Your dogmatic mind is evidently in a state of blatant self-contradiction. One of the hazards of dogmatism.

You also should not comment on God, as what you understand by the word "God" is completely distinct from what God actually means. — Lionino

Surely you see the irony of someone who denies entirely the notion of God setting himself up as an authority on "what God actually means"?

Ok, I challenge you to bring up any academic citing (not mentioning) another academic using the word "God" in a way that is not supernatural. — Lionino

Ever hear of pantheism?

The definition of mathematics doesn't contradict the definition of banana, and yet the two are not the same thing. — Lionino

This is a complete non-sequitur. I said that the description of the being(s) that I provided did not preclude them being consistently identified with the being(s) that conformed to the Cambridge definition that you supplied. Which isn't to say the Cambridge definition is authoritative, because it isn't.

What you are doing is not refining a concept but changing the meaning of a word completely — Lionino

Refining a concept could certainly ultimately end up in changing the meaning of the word. That is entirely the point.

Unintentional denial of the scientific method and proofs by contradiction right here. — Lionino

What does this even mean? I certainly did not deny the scientific method or proof by contradiction. I pointed out that someone who is authentically interested in framing a concept should not appeal to someone who denies the validity of the concept.