Maybe read some evolutionary biology. The notion that what constitutes an entity is relevant to your frame of inquiry seems to elude you. A genetic population can been analyzed as an entity, and exhibits unique characteristic properties, as well as being attached to a specific organic extension. No different from you my friend. A rock is a rock only for a specific duration of time, then it is just a bunch of atoms, which themselves only exist as entities for limited times. If you want to do metaphysics, you need to go "beyond" science, and you can't do that if you don't actually understand what science is showing you.

I suggest you change your handle from "Metaphysician Undercover" to "Buried in Metaphysics." You seem to forget, Metaphysics is only relevant if it can be made integrated with the comprehensive context of the life-world.

I am trying to look at the whole issue of the competing truths of the sciences and arts for the paradigm underlying the the bias of many philosophers. — Jack Cummins

Isn't this really an established fact? I have pretty much always assumed what you are proposing is the defining dialectic of human culture. The schism between materialism and idealism is as old as time. I guess you could say that art is the paradigmatic product of the mind, so idealism in its most basic material presentation.

I tend to focus on discovering the underlying unity of these views. Here's an excerpt from the book I just started reading:

"...man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net."
~Ernset Cassirer, An Essay on Man

Popper is also someone who tends to bridge the competing paradigms. His "third world" aligns with this "symbolic universe". In the symbol, the material and the mental are united.

This is not true. The cells in your body are united and supported in their existence by physical systems like the blood system, the respiratory system, and the nervous system. The cells in your body cannot exist without the support of these physical systems. There are no such physical systems which are required to maintain the existence of the individuals within a species. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dude. Seriously, take some science classes.

Strictly speaking, I was not referring to the humanities when speaking of the arts, but art, literature and music. Of course, it is a whole spectrum with humanities and the social sciences. In this respect, I think that psychology is fighting its way to claim its places in the realm of hard sciences.

Having written my post, I kept seeing more 'scientific' posts popping up. Then, the one on liking music sprung up like again. The arts cannot be suppressed.

What I am really saying is that it sometimes appears that the sciences are seen as superior. Are the arts just relegated to the domain of pleasure. I am querying the scientists claim to a monopoly upon truth.

Are the perspectives of Shakespeare, Salvador Dali to be thrown into the bin of human culture, along with the creative thinkers going to be dismissed as inferior in the search for wisdom and truth? — Jack Cummins

Ah ok. My degree is in literature, so I certainly appreciate Shakespeare, and I am also a musician. I guess I didn't think of the fine arts as strictly comparable with sciences as their objective is purely creative. However they are undoubtedly cultural artefacts; in that sense, I guess all products of the human mind, including science, are comparable. I haven't read a lot of aesthetics, but Gadamer presents some interesting ideas about art in Search for a Method.

the reading of Practical Reason is done in a very strong American accent, which is a little off-putting, — Wayfarer

I bet.

Mine is a Kindle, so it is read by a computer-generated voice (Alexa). Oddly enough, I actually prefer this to Audible's human narrators!

Well, the humanities in general tend to be viewed as "less scientific" compared to the traditional scientific domains (physics,chemistry,biology) but even in those domains you can see a progression from the inert towards the organic. So for me, the humanities just lie further along the continuum bounded by objectivity and subjectivity. Wilhelm Dilthey (repeatedly) attempted a comprehensive survey which was inclusive of the "human sciences". He just never seemed to finish. I believe he was known as "the man of first editions" or something to that effect, because he was constantly starting over....

Saussure, Course in General Linguistics

I just downloaded a 30 hour (!) reading of the Immanuel Kant collection for nothing, by virtue of having signed up for Amazon Audiobook and cashing in my free intro offer. CPR, Metaphysics of Morals, and Critique of Practical Reason (which I’d already started as a separate volume.) Reading plan is to listen while working out. If I can get a compatible waterproof MP3 player, I can also listen while swimming laps. Improve mind and body simultaneously. — Wayfarer

:up:
How is the audio-Kant going? I got the Critique of Pure Reason for free too and listened to the intros last night. I found it pretty decent.

how can those printed marks first represent and then be read as ideas? — magritte

Yes, the whole problem of symbolicity really is the crux of the modern problem of thought I think. Not a simple problem either, there are so many different dimensions (which I think is the point, it is the confluence of these dimensions). I'm focusing on this topic currently, as it happens.

Right, "within its domain" being the key words here. And when people twist the evidence to make it appear like science has answers to issues which are outside of its domain, that is called scientism. Do you recognize, that the proposition that the human species, or that society, or the community, is an entity, is an ontological claim. — Metaphysician Undercover

The proposition that the individual exists is an ontological claim. And it depends on the perspective being taken. The individual cells in your body exist. The species, as an organic entity, exists, in exactly the same fashion as the cells in your body. Whether you ascribe identity to the cells in your body, or your body/brain/ego complex, or the species, depends on which perspective you adopt. If you adopt the perspective of evolutionary biology, then the species becomes the the operative entity (or a genetic population, more accurately). And that entity has its own unique domain of interactions, consisting of the biotic environment, including the systems composed of other species.

The question is, do you understand how all observation is theory-laden? Every perspective is exactly that, a perspective, with antecedent assumptions. Granted, most of the time, these assumptions are deeply buried and prejudicative. But that is certainly one of the challenges of philosophy. So your assuming that the human body-ego is the exemplary ontological entity is just that, an assumption. And, as I've just explained, you can equally apply ontological primacy to a variety of physical entities, depending on which perspective you take. It really isn't complicated. You are making it so.

Thinking and focused rational thinking are not the same, they aren't even done by the same mental facilities. — magritte

Are you suggesting that there are different kinds of thinking? I never really thought about that before. Off the top of my head, however, I would believe that thought is thought, and that, if it is differentiated, it is differentiated by degrees. So thought might be more or less pragmatic, more or less rational, more or less utilitarian. What happens when one kind of thought communicates with a different kind of thought? Is that, then, a different kind of thought again?

Oh my goodness, I wouldn't say so, no. Writing is a unique capacity. You are actually kinaesthetically integrating with words, concepts and ideas, you are getting visual feedback, it certainly adds a modality to thought.

I can't believe that you do not see how this is a false premise. To know how someone else is going to perceive something requires that you have communicated with the person already — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it requires the genetic process of sociation in which concepts are formed. It's basic stuff.

And evidence (evolution for example) indicates that it is the unique and particular features of the individual which provide the meaningful aspects of the "system". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non-sequitur. Individual features are meaningful at an intra-systemic level certainly.

To understand an activity requires understanding its cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. This is why Mead stipulates that, in order to understand the meaning you are trying to convey, you must first understand the way that meaning is going to be perceived by someone else. Which is why meaning, and ultimately mind, is a social construct.

What terms like "systems theoretical analysis", and "emergence" actually signify is a lack of understanding of the activity being referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they signify that there is a layer of meaning (and a corresponding entity) operating at a different level. Again, your conclusion is a non-sequitur which merely contradicts the principles being invoked.

This is a false premise. If it were true that we rely on "commonly accepted vocabulary" to get our ideas across, nothing new would ever "emerge" in the realm of ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it means that language evolved through actual social interactions. This is so trivially evident I'm not even going to bother amplifying it.

Do you apprehend this contradiction Pantagruel? — Metaphysician Undercover

No I don't apprehend any contradiction. The entire description is consistent, based on my previous clarifications. It is possible that you may misunderstand sociology. Sociology is a very real and valid science.

Alternatively, I'd like to suggest that your conception of metaphysics really amounts to a mass of speculations, loosely attached to some collection of metaphysical notions, not borne out by any significant historical metaphysical thinkers. I reread the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason last night. Kant certainly never construes metaphysics as contradicting science. Quite the contrary, he maintains the validity of science, within its domain. It just so happens that our current level of science has reached the point where it is able to account for mental constructs and entities, at least to some degree.

Here is Mead's account of how mind and self are social emergents, and language provides the mechanism for their emergence.

In order to express your ideas, you must convey them to an audience. In doing so, you therefore rely upon a commonly accepted vocabulary of "social acts." The social act can be described without introducing the pre-conception of consciousness. (Mind, Self and Society, p. 18)

For illocutionary acts, the intent is to evoke a behaviour from the other. But, in general, communication is an illocutionary act where the intent is to evoke understanding of a specific meaning. So "consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on...taking the attitude of the other towards [your] own gestures" (p. 47) Gestures become symbols for particular types of responses within communities of understanding. The existence of mind is only intelligible in terms of these symbols.

As Dewey says, meaning arises through communication. In other words, communication is fundamental to identity, not the reverse. The idea that sociation if fundamental to the genealogy of the self-concept is basic to the science of sociology.

Or maybe some genius sat down and, through pure reason, constructed a template of symbolic actions, which the rest of the world then adopted owing to their manifest (although not pragmatic) superiority.

Tell me then, what is your response to the simple logic which I presented. The activities of a group of people cannot be described as the activities of a "system", until the people can be observed to be acting in a specific way — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that is exactly what systems theoretic analysis does, establishes that systems of all types exist and behave according to predictive models.

Therefore it is impossible that the "system" is the cause of the people acting in the specified way, because that type of activity is necessarily prior to the existence of the system. — Metaphysician Undercover

The system doesn't have to be the cause of the actions per se. Only that the actions of the individual components of the system, taken collectively, have additional effects at the (inter)systemic level. That is the essence of emergence.

↪Echarmion

It's fundamentally a personal stabdard,
— Echarmion

I feel that this is one thing a categorical imperative is not. — Brett

Habermas relies heavily on the categorical imperative in his theories on legitimation in discourse theory and deliberative democracy. Certainly he feels that it is a collective principle. Inasmuch as duties and rights reciprocally entail this seems to make sense.

Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture

The very idea that, just because metaphysics is 'beyond physics', it somehow implies that physics (science in general) is invalid or untrue is ludicrous and laughable. That is a patent non-sequitur. I know of no serious philosopher who ever held such a view.
— Pantagruel

Clearly this does not apply to anything I've said. — Metaphysician Undercover

usefulness of a theory does not indicate truthfulness — Metaphysician Undercover

The usefulness of a theory certainly is a better indicator of truthfulness than of falsity. Whereas an utterly useless theory, if not false, is at least unsinn, or meaningless. Unless it is to be interpreted as art. I find yours unredeemed in that respect however.

Oh, and just saying that you have refuted my examples, doesn't make it so. I stand by the fact of the entire science of sociology as validating my evaluation of the scientific status of collective-conceptual thought. And, yes, it has proven useful. I'd say that makes it more true than false. At least I admit of a definable and objective criterion of truth, beyond just opinion.

The very idea that, just because metaphysics is 'beyond physics', it somehow implies that physics (science in general) is invalid or untrue is ludicrous and laughable. That is a patent non-sequitur. I know of no serious philosopher who ever held such a view. Henri Bergson, a personal favourite of mine, was extremely well-versed in the science of his day. The only way to truly go beyond science is first to understand what it is you are going-beyond. Likewise Popper, the prototypical philosopher of science, advocated for "metaphysical research programs", which he conceived as building upon, but extending past, the limits of current science.

There are some metaphysical notions that make sense. Yours...do not.

And pragmaticism is in bed with scientism — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you crossed a line. That's unwarranted and insulting. Clearly you understand neither the meaning of pragmatism, nor scientism.

I'm afraid you've got that backward. Truth is a much more robust principle than applicability. — Metaphysician Undercover

As a pragmatist, I would have to disagree with you one-hundred percent.

It seems to be, that these theories are dependent on a creative interpretation of empirical evidence in the first place. So they all rely on making up fictitious relations between the actual evidence and the proposed theory. Therefore one theory cannot be singled out as the true theory, because they are all false. They all propose an illogical part/whole relationship which ought to be rejected. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so. They are simply based on a systems-aware perspective. One which you reject in favour of your individual-centric perspective. Which is no less an interpretive choice that you are making. The only difference is, the systems-centric perspective tends to solve problems rather than generate aporias.

As an example, the calculation of quantum collisions is a massively complex operation requiring vast amounts of computational power. However a recently discovered mathematical entity known as the amplituhedron, which mathematically reconceives reality as a differently ordered type of system (removing the traditional constraints of locality and unitarity), facilitates the calculation of some quantum collisions on a sheet of paper.

There is no "misinterpretation," just an alternate interpretation. One which can be meaningfully applied across many, many different domains. And that meaningful applicability is itself the best gauge of the power of a theory.

Versus a metaphysical interpretation which only really works if you allow it to be unyoked from the constraints of scientific realism (which was your initial proposal, that ontological truths can/must exhibit independence of scientific truths).

So yes, in a cooked up, abstract sort of way your notion of ontological singularity makes sense. In a much more robust and edifying way, the notion of systemic entities makes better sense, facilitating, as it does, a practical and universally inclusive model of reality.

Well, maybe you could show me the empirical evidence of "distributed cognition", and explain how these instances of evidence are not better described as distinct cognitive beings involved in distinct acts of cognition, who are communicating with each other through language, rather than your assumption that these instances are a single act of cognition. Do you recognize the role of intention within cognition, and the fact that different people have different intentions? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, this is a pretty comprehensive article with lots of citations.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-013-0131-x

I would never want to persuade anyone who didn't wish to be persuaded of anything. For me, this perspective solves a lot more problems than it raises. I think that about says it.

edit. Here's a nice excerpt from that article:
Transactive memories reside in the memories of both individuals when considered as a combined system, given their shared awareness of the way information is distributed within the group, which can take more or less differentiated and specialized forms.

edit2. I suspect the section on the Metaphysics of Group Memory will also interest you.

You appear to be introducing ideas here which have no support in evidence. My cognitive process is proper to myself, and there is no evidence to indicate that my thinking is shared with you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Distributed cognition has been studied extensively and experimentally. Hence it can be said to have empirical evidence. It is certainly a different paradigm of thought from the individual-centric one we have inherited from antiquity. However it just makes more sense inasmuch as it does explain socialized and coordinated behaviours. Outgrowing this individual-centric (selfish) paradigm will be key to the future of our society I believe.

Anyway, yes, distributed cognition, environmental and social, is very much a real thing. I'm not going to try to sell you on the idea, the literature abounds. I've cited many already. George Herbert Mead's views are also insightful:

One of the most important sociological approaches to the self was developed by American sociologist George Herbert Mead. Mead conceptualizes the mind as the individual importation of the social process.
This process is characterized by Mead as the “I” and the “me. ” The “me” is the social self and the “I” is the response to the “me. ” The “I” is the individual’s impulses. The “I” is self as subject; the “me” is self as object.

For Mead, existence in a community comes before individual consciousness. First one must participate in the different social positions within society and only subsequently can one use that experience to take the perspective of others and thus become self-conscious.

You are free to explore these or not. It seems these domains of study are not familiar to you.

Cheers.

minds are the property of individuals — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather, this is entirely what is in question. I think we have reached the impasse of a basic difference in approach which your premise about concepts doesn't address for me. It just seems another fiat to rescue the privileged role of the self.

Another tack on this issue is the theory of embedded or distributed cognition:
Cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group.
Cognitive processes may be distributed in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves coordination between internal and external (material or environmental) structure.

Cultural artefacts for me are exactly the sedimentation of human actions and concepts. I do take sociology to be an empirical science, as do sociologists. It sounds to me as though you believe you live in a nominalist-idealist world. Charming, but really not reflective of the total gamut of modern understanding.

Surely I agree that concepts arose through the interaction of individuals, that's what I've been arguing. What I've been denying is that there is an individual thing called "the species", and that concepts arose as an activity of this thing, the species — Metaphysician Undercover

If concepts arose as the result of the interaction of individuals A and B, then the concepts are a function of those two organic beings. Since concepts arose as a result of the cumulative interaction of all organic beings (people) then the concepts are a function of the interaction of all those organic beings, aka...the collection known as...the species! It isn't something that has to be proven, it is simply an empirical fact.

So while we may not seem to differ that much on this, I do think you are clutching at something more illusory, since you seem to believe that the individual has some kind of privileged, context-free status. Language is one giant set of inter-relations, where the meaning of anything is conditioned by its context, both present and historical. It's central to hermeneutics. And the same is true of people, qua language users. I don't necessarily ascribe an emergent-ontological status to the collective; however nor do I see any particular reason to deny it.

Thought as we know it is the prime tool a philosopher uses to find the higher truths of our existence. I am aware of the many methodologies that are in place for thinking. But, I am wondering if there is ways to perhaps accelerate or sharpen the thoughts themselves in order to almost physically comprehend more in a given moment without the use of psychoactive drugs.

View Answer — Thinking

Yes, read huge amounts of high-quality writings, and write every chance you get. If such is your aspiration, then lifelong/higher education sounds like your best bet.

In reality, human intention, which is the driving force behind the creation and use of language, and meaning in general, is outside the domain of science, being the domain of moral philosophy. But your false premise, that language can be defined as an attribute of a species, rather than as intentional actions between individuals, creates the illusion that it can be understood scientifically. — Metaphysician Undercover

The premise that concepts arose through interaction is pretty fundamental. Think of the genealogy of the mind. Individuals did not evolve in a vacuum, create a set of concepts, then proceed to try them out on each other. All of our concepts, including the concept of the individual self, obviously evolved through the normal, pragmatic, day-to-day interactions through which (the individuals of) our species survived and developed. If we are speculating, that speculation certainly makes more sense than the opposite (that we create our own concepts in vacuo, as it were).

Talcott Parsons and Jurgen Habermas both wrote multi-volume works about this specific concept. So it certainly carries enough weight to be taken seriously.

You are proposing that truth requires the elimination of error in one's previous conceptions, including possibly presuppositions. That's a very solid and traditional claim. How you get from that to "proof muddying the waters" isn't clear to me though.

So I guess what you're saying is, "I can't offer any proof for my claim that proof is counter-productive". In which case, I answer "since I can't follow your reasoning that proof is counter-productive, it seems evident that proof is not counter-productive."

That says it all. Scientism attempts to extend "science" beyond its domain of enquiry, through the use of false premises, such as the one you describe above, that the human species is an entity which can be treated as a system — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not a false premise, but an established scientific fact. Aggregates of human behaviours have been proven to be amenable to systems theoretical analysis. That is good science.

Rather, what you are doing is attempting to utilize the gloss of scientism to foster your own metaphysical agenda, which is bad philosophy, since it is pure prejudice.

No, obviously I didn't say that science is the same thing as scientism. But assuming that a scientific theory provides us with a true understanding of the events which it predicts, because it has a proven track record in its predictions, is a mistake of scientism. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a complete mischaracterization. Scientism claims that scientific certainty is exclusively authoritative, even in domains that are beyond that of its inquiry.

Science obviously provides an accurate understanding of the phenomena it examines, that is the whole point of science.

edit: although scientific knowledge is always an approximation and constantly evolving, I"ll give you that...

This is the folly of scientism, the belief that the capacity to predict implies a true understanding of the phenomenon. Pragmaticism provides us with no guidance toward ontological truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you implying that science is the same thing as scientism? If so, you are operating under a massive misconception and a prejudice.

Systems theoretic analysis has a proven track record across a broad range of empirical fields, including sociological ones.

I've spent the last six months reading material which entirely contradicts your position. Mead, Parsons, Habermas. Of course, you are entitled to your opinion. Just be aware, there is an opposing viewpoint, and it is cogent and coherent. Viewing collectives of biological entities as complex systems in their own right perhaps is just too "modern" a perspective for you.

It may indeed be a scientific term, nevertheless, the species is also the sum total of its organic constituent entities on the planet. And we are not in a science class, nor are we using the term for classificatory purposes. If you really think that the term "species" has no organic extension then that would be an end of fruitful discussion I fear.

edit: spe·cies
/ˈspēsēz,ˈspēSHēz/
noun
1.
BIOLOGY
a group of living organisms

Clearly, the species is an abstraction. — Metaphysician Undercover

The species certainly not an abstraction. It is entirely concrete. And as the overall expression of cumulative genetics, arguably more concrete than the individual. It is a question of perspective. In any case. Characteristics of the species I could see one arguing are abstract, but the species is no less concrete than the entities which compose it. That is like saying, atoms are concrete, but a ball composed of atoms is abstract.

Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth

"In this study Cassirer analyzes the non-rational thought processes that go to make up culture. He demonstrates that beneath both language & myth there lies an unconscious "grammar" of experience, whose categories & canons aren't those of logical thought. He shows that this prelogical "logic" is not merely an undeveloped state of rationality, but something basically different, & that this archaic mode of thought still has enormous Power over even our most rigorous thought, in language, poetry & myth. The author analyzes such seemingly diverse (yet related) phenomena as the metaphysics of the Bhagavat Gita, the Melanesian concept of Mana, the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, modern poetry, Ancient Egyptian religion & symbolic logic. He covers a vast range of material that is all too often neglected in studies of human thought."

Clearly, what is the case is that the "species" is an abstraction, nd individual beings are the true existent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

The species includes the individual, the individual represents the species.

Just think about what it would mean to build up a framework of communication ab initio. We share much, much, much more than we are unique.

I don't wish to downplay the importance of the individual, but without the social, meaning loses its...meaning. I'm about to undertake Saussure, so I'll certainly be bearing your comments in mind.

Autopoiesis - systems theory as metaphysics
— Pantagruel

Thanks for that - I wasn't aware, I'll check it out. — Pop

Check out Fritjof Capra's A Systems View of Life to see the scope of the model's applications in hard science. I'd start with Ervin Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy if possible. It purports to be a "new paradigm" for viewing reality and, in my opinion, meets the burden of that goal. Enjoy.