It was the unions who gave us the 5 hour work week — StreetlightX

Wow, that is short!

What I was referring to was the hermenutic circle, where the meaning of anything (word, concept, idea) is determined by the context in which it occurs, while simultaneously the context is composed of such meanings. Then the concept of "thinking" is different for us to the extent that we have different contextual-histories involving the concept of thinking.

we've reached a point in the evolution of our language-use where words are being convoluted and loaded with with meanings that contradict how words are used in other instances, which just makes words useless if they can mean their opposites in the same context. — Harry Hindu

I think that you have hit on a key idea here. Words are indeed polysemous, and in the very lively sense you allude to here. But it isn't necessarily in the "same context" as it is I think in "overlapping contexts". Whatever our current state of accord might be, the foundational experiences that circumscribe your life-world are necessarily different than mine.

So, how do we reasonably reconcile these opposing viewpoints to the point where our opposing viewpoints aren't actually in opposition, but were seemingly in opposition prior to any reasonable reconciliation? — Harry Hindu

Yes, that is the challenge to which dialectic aspires.

So, is the "reasonable reconciliation" ...arrived at via correct or incorrect reasoning? — Harry Hindu

Hmmm. Can you arrive at correct conclusions from incorrect premises? Insofar as the conclusion is viewed as a synthesis of its premises it is not possible to do so. This was Aldous Huxley's construal of the ends-means relationship. One cannot achieve a goal through methods that contradict the goal because the means are constitutive of the end.

However some people do hold true beliefs without being aware of the foundations of those beliefs. Also, it seems quite possible to think completely reasonably, and yet arrive a spurious beliefs. If significant information is missing. The history of science testifies to this.

1) according to the rules of logic
his answer is perfectly reasonable — Harry Hindu

This says that logic is reasonable, not that reason is logical.

If it is logical that if A then B, then it is reasonable to believe B given A.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to believe that particles can exist simultaneously in two different places because scientific experiments have established this as a fact. However this paradoxical result is not logical. In fact, it arguably contradicts all the rules of logic.

What does it mean by "reasonable" if not "logical" in the classical sense? — Harry Hindu

It says reasonable precisely because reason does not reduce to mere logic. Otherwise it would have said logical.

Again, you fundamentally misconstrue.

Dialectic presupposes disagreement.

Seems to support what I said, not what you said. Bravery comes in degrees, not on or off / true or false. Some are braver than others. Tell me, Pantagruel, what room does the word "braver" have in your example? You seem to say that the word would be meaningless if you were to apply dialectic logic to bravery. So it seems that either you have the wrong idea about dialectic logic, and how and when to use it, and it reflects in your example. — Harry Hindu

Au contraire. It was a perfectly valid choice of a dialectical problem. It was never intended to be conclusive, only illustrative (as I have repeatedly pointed out, yet you inexplicably refuse to acknowledge).

"Dialectical thinking refers to the ability to view issues from multiple perspectives and to arrive at the most economical and reasonable reconciliation of seemingly contradictory information"

Dialectical Thinking

Certainly your counter-argument was applicable, and amplified the issue. In doing so, you thereby participated in the process of dialectical reasoning, and gave a strong argument yourself for the use of many-valued (versus dyadic) logic.

Having read the Critique of Dialectical Reason a couple of months ago. I feel I have a pretty solid grasp of the basics.

"Many-valued logics are non-classical logics. They are similar to classical logic because they accept the principle of truth-functionality, namely, that the truth of a compound sentence is determined by the truth values of its component sentences (and so remains unaffected when one of its component sentences is replaced by another sentence with the same truth value). But they differ from classical logic by the fundamental fact that they do not restrict the number of truth values to only two: they allow for a larger set W of truth degrees."

Many Valued Logic

This is all I proposed. Dialectical logic is just a different style of many valued logic one which is not limited to a dyadic truth relationship. I only ever suggested it as an example, and never proposed it as authoritative. In fact, I specifically stipulated that. I have nothing beyond that to contribute to this particular conversation.

You attempted to show an example of it's use and failed miserably — Harry Hindu

Or else you simply failed to grasp it because it doesn't fit in your procrustean perspective..

So, it seems to me that you think dialectic logic is the solution to everything — Harry Hindu

Not at all. I am merely pointing out that it exists, in contrast with your claim that everything reduces to true and false. Cheers.

And one could argue his voter base gets what they voted for. — Marchesk

If by that you mean what they deserve, then :up:

One could argue the various communist countries have attempted this approach, and have noticeably failed on the freedom front. I'm skeptical that freedom can take care of itself, because there are always those would like to have power, or deny it to others. That's why rights have to be explicitly protected. — Marchesk

Sure. And on the other hand, does it seem that Trump is driven by the welfare of his voter base?

Sure. But the essence of the man is the synthesis of all his past moments, so the synchronic condition still exists.

Yes, I picked that up...wrote my post before I saw yours.

Effectively this agrees with your substantive point: freedom to choose, without the freedom to determine the very choices set out, is no freedom at all. — StreetlightX

But isn't this the entire nature of freedom as it is really experienced? Sartre characterizes us as theoretically free, but at the same time constrained to choose within already well-defined material contexts, what he calls praxis.

Isn't the very nature freedom that it must be limited/defined in order to be actualized? Sydney Hook says that the limitation of possibilities is the necessary condition for the liberation of possibilities, and I tend to agree with this view. (Metaphysics of Pragmatism).

I find it very strange that you don't see your own presuppositions of truth in every sentence that you make - that every statement you make is about how things are - from what dialectical logic is to what your thoughts are. — Harry Hindu

That's because I am capable of dialectical reasoning.

If A mans his post in the face of an attack, then A is brave.
But A can man his post for a while, but abandon it when the fighting becomes too fierce.
So A is both brave and not-brave.

I guess the whole point is that there are scenarios where the true/false (binary) state is inadequate. Even in physics, particles can be in more that one state simultaneously, it's what makes quantum computing possible. So it seems that there are empirical conditions in which the true/false dyad breaks down. Nature, it seems, never learned boolean logic.

So in terms of the OP, can we achieve a mutual understanding such that both your notion, that logic is foundational, and my notion that logic transcends the boolean form, co-exist?

If you are asking if I think that there is any logic that doesn't presuppose that there is such a thing as true and false, then no. — Harry Hindu

Translation:
X = Does Harry Hindu think (Y = there is a logic that doesn't suppose T/F)?

Interpretation 1: Harry Hindu believes believes X - truth about Harry Hindu.

Interpretation 2: Multi-valued (dialectical) logic does not fit the simplistic interpretation T/F) - so Y is not true, in the sense at the very least that it is incomplete.

If we are talking about interpretation one, we could basically stick "I think" in front of everything that everybody says, and it will always be true. But why would we ignore the external referents of propositions in this way?

If you are asking if I think that there is any logic that doesn't presuppose that there is such a thing as true and false, then no. — Harry Hindu

Even if we allow that it is trivially true that my statement is really my statement, you asked merely if there was any logic that doesn't presuppose true and false. I merely pointed out that dialectical logic transcends the true-false simpliciter dyad. I'm prepared to acknowledge that it is always true that I have made any statement I have made. Are you prepared to expand the concept of modal logic beyond the scope of true and false?

Does this statement presuppose some truth about what you think, and that you think? — Harry Hindu

The statement is not about me, it is about dialectical logic. You are conflating the reference of the statement with its origin. Smacks of the genetic fallacy. Dialectical logic can be many-valued.

And so we find ourselves arguing about the length of the stick and who has the better grasp on it. And the original question is quite forgotten. — unenlightened

Seems like we have a real live example of a conflict to resolve....

f you're asking if I think that there is any kind of logic that isn't presupposed by every sentence and every thought, then no.

If you are asking if I think that there is any logic that doesn't presuppose that there is such a thing as true and false, then no. — Harry Hindu

I think dialectical logic transcends the simple true-false dyad of traditional logic.

https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/4/4/69/pdf

:up:

To me, freedom is a bit of a red-herring as it quickly becomes contentious. I see prioritizing social welfare - establishing a baseline of core human values that supersede monetization - as the focus. Freedom can take care of itself as long as we start to take care of each other.

Can anyone tell me why this should be banned on any grounds? — Shawn

I'd suggest moving to Canada...it's perfectly legal here.

Descartes' quote which you posted a couple of rows above suggests Descartes had a very high opinion of common sense which leads me to believe he equated it to what these days we call critical thinking. — TheMadFool

I am very much aligned with your introduction of the concept of critical thinking, as a recent convert to Popper's theories of critical realism. However I must point out that you have misconstrued Descartes' account of common sense. Descartes is acknowledging that there is a universal tendency to believe that one is possessed of common sense, but the fact that no one "desires more" than they already have implies that this is can also be a huge "blind spot."

I would say that common sense is the prime target of critical thinking. In more modern parlance, excavating our prejudicative presuppositions, so-called background knowledge of which the lebenswelt is constructed.

A bit more about Mead's thesis that mind is fundamentally an intersubjective or social phenomenon.

Mead examines the failures of the individual-centric theory of mind to account for shared or common meaning. Whereas, for the social-communicative theory of mind, this is a fait accompli.

If, as Wundt does, you presuppose the existence of mind at the start, as explaining or making possible the social process of experience, then the origin of minds and the interaction among minds become mysteries. But if, on the other hand, you regard the social process of experience as prior (in a rudimentary form) to the existence of mind and explain the origin of minds in terms of the interaction among individuals within that process, then not only the origin of minds, but also the interaction among minds (which is thus seen to be internal to their very nature and presupposed by their existence or development at all) cease to seem mysterious or miraculous. Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience-not communication through mind...

From the individual perspective, this involves "taking the attitude of the other," a method that is likewise central to the works of Sartre:

As we shall see, the same procedure which is responsible for the genesis and existence of mind or consciousness - namely, the taking of the attitude of the other toward one's self, or toward one's own behaviour - also necessarily involves the genesis and existence at the same time of significant symbols, or significant gestures

Essentially it is a 'symbolic behaviouristic' approach:

Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed; and in all conversations of gestures within the social process, whether external (between different individuals) or internal (between a given individual and himself), the individual's consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures.

Presumably "common sense" denotes a certain type of knowledge that can be qualified and quantified. Something akin to our prejudicative grasp of background knowledge maybe? Probably we all lie somewhere on a spectrum of accuracy with respect to this.

Common sense is over rated. — fdrake

Maybe. I think, as Descartes says, the reality is that everyone thinks they have common sense, implying that not everyone does. So, yes, maybe the appeal to commonsense (in an argument) is overrated. I think, by definition, common-sense (when it is genuine) is absolutely fundamental.

Clearly, he was wrong. Some of us think they have more common sense than others. — TheMadFool

And those are the people who are always eager to share it....

The difference between them, ergo, is not logic in the sense one side has used it well and the other side has not; rather the actual source of disputes is the assumptions each side has made in their arguments and assumptions are not a matter of logic. Assumptions are made in the low visibility fog of ignorance — TheMadFool

Common sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world, for each one thinks he is so well-endowed with it that even those who are hardest to satisfy in all other matters are not in the habit of desiring more of it than they already have.
~Descartes

Change it to which opinions or parts thereof are true. — creativesoul

So you are basically asking if there is a universal method of identifying truth? Again, that would depend on the context.

Let us start by supposing that there are two opposing opinions on some matter. Is there a tried and true universally applicable method of determining for ourselves what's best to believe regarding the subject matter? — creativesoul

It seems to me this hinges on what was meant by "best to believe."

There is no build-up to awareness. You're either aware or you're not — neonspectraltoast

So awareness does not hold in degrees? That isn't my own personal experience. When I was a child, my plans and expectations did not stretch to anywhere near the extent they do now, my recollection of the past was similarly circumscribed. I understood very little of what was going on in the world compared to what I do now.

I think that the most universal experience is one of constantly expanding awareness.

A simple question: Can one be obligated to do something AND free to not do it? The answer to this question will settle our difference. — TheMadFool

As I said, it is clear that people do not always fulfill their obligations.

What would be the point of having the concept of obligation if it dictated action? There would be no "cognitive gap" - obligation would become just another kind of behaviouristic causation.

Well, my contention is that a nonmathematical law leads to chaos but a mathematical law leads to order. — TheMadFool

But chaos has an inherent order, as non-linear dynamics clearly establishes through the use of attractors.

obligatory moral codes rob us of freedom, freedom of will to act the way we wish to act so that we may own them and bear their consequences, good or bad, with the full conviction that the fruits of our actions are well-deserved. — TheMadFool

I think what you are saying amounts to a contradiction.

On the one hand, you suggest that in order to be responsible, we must act freely. On the other hand, you suggest that if a moral code is obligatory, that contradicts the premise of moral action being freely chosen.

But moral obligation is volunteeristic. Yes, it is an "obligation," but an obligation is not a cause. This is clear from that fact that people can and do ignore their obligations.

If, as I suggested, however, we usually only grasp our obligations imperfectly (due to whatever limitations of our own knowledge), then the "necessitation" of moral obligations is really a function of the degree of our understanding of same.

So if we do, in some sense, lose our autonomy in submitting to moral choice, it is in the form of embracing a higher rationality. So how is acting in accordance with the dictates of reason any different in the moral sense than in a positivistic sense? We choose to do anything because our reason leads us to the choice.

Your objection would apply equally to the very concept of free-will: I cannot choose X if there are independent reasons for choosing X....

To begin with, the postulates of moral theory are supposed to be self-evident truths which means we don't actually have a choice. These postulates are then used to infer logically necessary conclusions regarding what course of action we must take given any situation. Here too we lack choice in the matter. — TheMadFool

Do we lack a choice, or are we limited by the scope and extent of our own reason? Moral theories may entail or at least imply action consequences, but only to the extent that they are comprehended. Most people in fact suffer from a host of insidious cognitive biases which may (have been proven to) prevent the drawing of accurate conclusions.

So how can we assume the standpoint of successful and deliberate rational choice. when even attaining this level of pure objectivity is itself problematic?

To respond to the original question I'd suggest looking at the work of George Herbert Mead (which I just started reading).

Mind, Self, and Society explore's Mead's views on the social genesis of thought. As the editor puts it, "how certain biological organisms acquire the capacity of self-consciousness, of thinking, of abstract reasoning, of purposive behaviour, of moral devotion; the problem, in short, of how man the rational animal arose."

I like Mead's approach because it, ab initio, avoids the false dichotomy of the mind-matter dualism by assuming what is, essentially, a systemic view of consciousness.

Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States edited by Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg — Maw

:cool:

Huxley's Island for a bit of a change

GH Mead's, Mind, Self, and Society