But that is an article on epistemology and modality, not metaphysics and modality. There are myriad considerations and presuppositions involved in relating epistemology to metaphysics. But the most salient is that metaphysics is about what is real. I don't consider modal statements to be in themselves fundamentally real, only symptomatic of features of what is real. Anyway, you continue to discuss what might be possible in a thread concerning the nature of metaphysics. I'll continue to focus on what is real.

It's pretty straightforward. Human beings exist and are not merely logical. Therefore logic does not subsume metaphysics. Logic does not in any way supersede, condition, or determine existence; rather the reverse. As an epistemological construct, maybe logic is fundamental; probably not. But this is about metaphysics.

Again, this venn diagram subsuming everything within logic isn't accurate.

Modal metaphysics concerns the metaphysical underpinning of our modal statements. These are statements about what is possible or what is necessarily so.

Metaphysics underpins modal logic. Which, if you had to venn it, would make metaphysics the containing set. Which is logical.

We can focus our language down to highly objective degrees, where it becomes particularly well defined and hence useful for scientists studying the natural world. But to the extent we do so, we necessarily lose another essential aspect of words, namely, their ability to have multiple meanings depending on how we use them.

Great answer. In fact, we don't just lose the complexity of words, we lose touch with the complex-totality of the reality upon which words are based. Esoterica are one way we have of preserving the ineffable that for the moment exceeds our grasp. Perhaps until such time as deeper understanding and experience cloaks them in more familiar garb.

Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments
Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer

Gray Lensman (Lensman #4)
by E.E. "Doc" Smith

Jonathan Black, in 'The Secret History of the World' makes reference to the idea of subjectivity and objectivity spoken of by Julian Jaynes in 'The Bicameral Mind: The Origins of Consciousness'. Jaynes spoke of how at one stage of consciousness the division between the inner and outer was not clear, with so much being projected onto gods or God. This is very different from the state of present consciousness, in which the psychological dimension is understood and it is important for considering the nature of concrete thinking in which the differentiation of the inner and outer aspects are extremely blurred. — Jack Cummins

I guess I am assuming that nature of concrete thinking is related to thinking about the nature of the concrete. I recall discussing Jaynes' theory with my Chaucer professor at an end of term gathering at his home in Rosedale in 1988. I do know it involves the hypothesis that the hemispheres of the brain were not fully integrated thousands of years ago, so that communications between them were perceived as messages which might have been interpreted as coming from gods.

Hmm. I just looked up structural realism, and it is the exact opposite of a concept I've been in the process of describing in another thread concerning the nature of the concrete. So I suppose that is my whole problem, I don't understand your fundamental assumption. Scientifically, it seems to boil down to what I said describing the actual nature of reality in a way that contradicts your descriptions.

I guess that even the idea of concrete thinking has varying meanings and associations. — Jack Cummins

Yes it does. Think of the relationship between the word (concept) concrete and actual concrete. Concrete is what it does, it is its function. It is solid, it binds together. But actual concrete is a complex amalgam of diverse formulae, including contaminants. What is actually concrete (i.e. what exemplifies the concept) is actual concrete, including all of its apparently contingent features, adulterants, contaminants. Reality overflows our attempts to encapsulate it. Concrete is what fuses the disparate. What is identical cannot be (therefore does not need to be) more fused than it already is. This is how Collingwood differentiates the abstract unity of a set (a unity of abstractly identical entities) versus the concrete unity of a world, a unity of unique, discrete identities.

A world or a universe can only have one physics. It can hardly be assumed that different laws of nature prevail in the microcosm described by quantum physics than in the mesocosm or macrocosm, for which classical physics is responsible. — Wolfgang

How is this a valid assumption? The hypothesized unified force shattered into the four fundamental forces, resulting in the stratification of effects between the quantum and the cosmic, owing to the different scales at which different forces predominate. There is an apparent phase transition between the quantum and the classical which is not well understood. Also, it is invalid to conclude that it makes no sense to apply quantum mechanics to the classical world. There are natural macroscopic processes that function through quantum effects. The transistor utilizes quantum properties. One could argue that the modern era is an expression of quantum-aware ontology.

Practically speaking, no one would ever utter the phrase "this sentence is false". What they might do is assert "I am telling you the truth". Which, if you do not believe them, translates into "this sentence is false." This would maintain the integrity of the logical form (the meaning of the sentence would contradict its sense), and remove the apparent paradox (by way of the assumed premise that people actually say things for a reason).

I am inclined to think that concrete thinking is the problem, especially in why people hold onto dogmas, of both religion and science. — Jack Cummins

I think you are using concrete in a different sense than me though. Being concrete refers to the complete, complex totality which is the now. Any particularization of which is really an abstraction (a dogmatic one, as you note). So from the perspective with which I use the term concrete (the total-synthetic now), dogmatic thought is the opposite of concrete. It is the abstract denying its own abstract nature and pretending to concrete existence (i.e. to be the only comprehensive explanatory scheme).

In some ways, Hegel may be esoteric, but going beyond the basics of spiritual understanding. Also, in that sense, Nietszche can be seen as esoteric, in the sense of going beyond conventional understanding. It may be that ideas of the 'esoteric' are too boxed into the categories of the challenge between religion and science as a black and white area of philosophical thinking, missing some blindspots, which may go outside of the conventions of metaphysics, into a more fluid picture of ideas. — Jack Cummins

I think the notion of esotericity and its meaning (as discussed) is a crucial factor. I also commented on the various aspects of skills and capabilities both in acquiring and expressing understanding. The question is, is esotericity just a function of the difficulty of plumbing those depths, both of knowledge and action, the demonstrated conviction of the belief in the truth of one's knowledge? This is a good summary of a central question for me.

I also wonder about the ideas of Hegel on 'spirit' here. His understanding is not simply about the 'supernatural' as separate from the nature of experience itself, but as imminent in the evolution of consciousness on a collective and personal basis. It may be that mysticism itself was a problem because it tried to separate the nature of experience and reason as though they were different categories of knowledge and understanding — Jack Cummins

I'm thinking about revisiting Hegel, in light of my recent readings which highlighted Collingwood's emphasis on the immanence of the concrete universal in the concrete mind, attuned as it is to the fullness the actual (the totality of what is occurring at any given time) versus the bits and pieces of reality that we comprehend using our powers of abstraction and categorization.

I do believe that consciousness is already and constantly enmeshed in a reality that is, perhaps, unimaginably more complex that what is compassed by our representations of it (as Hamlet said to Horatio). Which is why I endorse and embrace a philosophy of enaction, assuming that our actual capabilities will always precede and engender our further understanding. As Descartes notes, the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding....

Supervenience is indicative of a dependence of a higher order entity on its constituent components. Strong emergence, on the other hand, is defined precisely in terms of non-reducibility (the whole is more than the sum of its parts). So, for example, if a man was able to build a neural computer, and transfer his consciousness to that computer, his consciousness would definitively be strongly emergent and not supervenient. This would also be an example of downward causation.

Here is a paper about meditation causing structural changes in the brain, for example.

To argue that our consciousness is highly emergent you must show that the features of our consciousness are supervenient over the underlying complex structure of neurons. — Ypan1944

Doesn't the strength of emergence tend to contra-indicate supervenience.

b) the supervenience of sentience and reason is so strong that minor changes in brain tissue can radically alter practice of sentience and reason. — ucarr

Conversely, the brain is also damage tolerant and in some cases is able to rewire itself to compensate for damage. So perhaps there is both supervenience and some form of strong emergence?

What facts or metaphysical truths can it guarantee? If you think there are such facts or truths, how does it guarantee them? — Janus

Perhaps the challenge is knowing in the face of uncertainty, in other words, belief. For me, the notion of spirituality aligns precisely with the noumenon-phenomenon (mind-body) problem and is to that extent "de-mystified", although it is still mysterious. Yes, we can have some certainties of the material world, which are in a sense trivial. These form the framework of our human existence, the stage whereupon we live our lives. And those human truths are not so easily acquired or proven. And of course, when human knowledge has reached a high level of sophistication, we begin to discover that the so-called simple truths of the material world are not themselves straightforward, when we finally reach the horizons of the quantum and the cosmic.

In the human body, muscles work in opposing pairs. And the ultimate strength of any muscle is always limited by the weakness of its antagonist partner. I conceive the mind (spirit) matter dyad to be like that. Indeed, all knowledge. Hence the power of dialectic.

Such understanding ranges from the comprehension of the babblings of children to Hamlet or the Critique of Pure Reason. From stones and marble, musical notes, gestures, words and letters, from actions, economic decrees and constitutions, the same human spirit addresses us and demands interpretation. (Dilthey, The Rise of Hermeneutics)

You may or may not know "the truth of your own experiences" whatever that might mean. Assuming for the sake of argument that you do know, the point is that you are the only one, so such knowledge can never be intersubjectively corroborated. — Janus

If I don't have certainty of my own experience I can't very well have certainty about anything else, since anything else will always be an aspect of that experience.

As far as being "reliably trained," you oversimplify. Not everyone can be reliably trained, it requires at least some aptitude. Conversely, for people with the appropriate aptitude, the contention is that they are being educated with spiritual knowledge, whose broadened awareness is the practical result. Knowledge of the human spirit evolves right along with civilization. Some people even think that is what civilization is. Hegel, to name one. As well as the hordes who have tried to follow in his footsteps.

I think it is fairly clear what is determinate knowledge and what is not. — Janus

Sure, things that are trivially true are usually trivially evident. But some things are not trivially evident. And to people who lack the ability to comprehend the basis of organic chemistry, for example, there is a whole lot of determinate knowledge that is not clear. So if you are talking about an ideal knower, who is equally well-informed (and equally capable) in all areas, then maybe it is clear. But if there are such knowers, they are less rather than more common. Agreeing in theory as to what constitutes knowledge, and agreeing in practice as to the details of knowledge are not at all the same thing. For the bulk of human history, knowing how to throw a stone accurately in the terrestrial gravity field was far more important than knowing that the interior angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.

Only basic empirical observations and mathematical and logical truths are known to be true. — Janus

I assume that you are classifying privileged internal mental states as empirical observations then, since I know and experience the truth of my own experiences.

they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything, unlike empirical investigations and logic/ mathematics. — Janus

Ok. A lot of people place a lot of stock in logic, mathematics, and science. Let's take string theory. It looks all highly scientific, is based on a lot of advanced math. It's an hypothesis. Is it "determinate knowledge"? Maybe. It's a complex hypothesis about the nature of reality. Same thing for dark matter and dark energy cosmology. Bunch of unknowns.

There are things which are trivially evident, and there are things which are harder to grasp. Exactly where that line gets drawn that you call "determinate knowledge" is a function of innate ability, expertise, and experience.

You had said there were "unique" features, so I was curious as to support for this uniqueness. — wonderer1

As I said, this seems quite unique to me. I don't know whether I would be capable of it. There are other studies looking at long term effects in emotion regulation networks as well.

The article Buddha's Brain: Neuroplasticity and Meditation says, "When the framework of neuroplasticity is applied to meditation, we suggest that the mental training of meditation is fundamentally no different than other forms of skill acquisition that can induce plastic changes in the brain." — wonderer1

Isn't that enough? The fact that thought can have similar effects to practical physical enaction is meaningful to me.

Ha! And possibly not. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is the definition of possible. The question is, to what extent is knowledge instrumental in actualizing the possible? A savant card-counter could win a huge amount of money from a game of blackjack that would leave most people broke. That's why I never eliminate possibilities unnecessarily. You don't know what you don't know.

Here's a nice quote from Thomas Hardy that illustrates a reversal of the materialistic prejudice through the clever usage of real and corporeal. It involves Mr. Melbury who is deeply animated by considerations of possibilities regarding his daughter's future, which would have been observable "Could the real have been beheld, instead of the corporeal merely."

I love this locution. I'm going to start regarding the day to day world as the "corporeal"....

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible? — Fooloso4

Possibly.

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge? — Fooloso4

Are you suggesting that those are the only possible kinds of knowledge? "Mystical" could in one sense just mean "beyond our current understanding." In which case, the negative prejudice associated with the word is attributable to the critic. IMO there is knowledge appertaining to the possible transcendence of consciousness, especially in the case where expansion of knowledge could also be construed as expansion of consciousness. In which case, people who claim not to be able to understand something are telling the truth, and are simply not capable of (or interested in) experiencing the type of consciousness in question.

Many others have claimed to know something we do not. I am not inclined to believe them based on their reports of mystical experience. — Fooloso4

Just as I have consistently argued for the existence of a spectrum of consciousness there is also evident a spectrum of knowledge (possibly there is a connection). Individuals with certain mental capacities are capable of grasping complex mathematical concepts far beyond the ken of most folks. Savants can have incredible mathematical (and other) skills, often with minimal formal training.

Given the breadth and depth of human knowledge and experience, I don't find it in the least surprising that people of varying constitutions and varying experiences have a variety of different types of knowledge, or that some people have intuitions and awareness that some others do not share. In fact, it would be surprising if there were not such a variety. Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity.

This is probably hard to believe but I do not have the intuitions necessary to see the “mysteries” of some paradoxes. For example, the liar paradox “this sentence is false” simply appears meaningless to me and I do not enter the logic of: If 'This sentence is false.” is true, then since it is stating that the sentence is false, if it is actually true that would mean that it is false, and so on.
Language conveys information and I can’t extract relevant information from this sentence, this is why I do not understand why people manage to reason logically with it. — Skalidris

I agree. That is what comes of attempting to abstract logical form from content. There is a formalization in set theory involving the set of sets that are not members of themselves (normal, versus abnormal sets). Essentially, this recognizes exactly the real language constraint that a claim be about something.

I'm working on something new now, what I think of as the 'science of everyday life.' It concerns the ongoing undercurrent of the Cartesian and Positivist legacies in modern thought, and their mutual failure to either successfully accommodate or integrate. I do think there is a growing trend towards a naive scientism (because more and more people don't really understand the science of the modern world). And I think that scientism is also naively driven (at a more informed but still insufficiently critical level) by idealogues of more extreme forms of positivism (like Carnap). Of course positivism isn't, prima facie, scientism. But it can so very easily become that.

And in context of this thread, conflating the journey for the destination is exactly the problem with bias that theists and religious thinkers have. — Christoffer

So if I ignore the evidence of virtuous behaviours of a social group I dislike, that is confirmation bias. But if I ignore the evidence that a certain practice is socially accepted, but I still reject the practice and subsequently succeed in overturning it (such as racism) then that is not confirmation bias. Both those biases are contrary to fact. But one is productive. I don't see at all how theists conflate the journey for the destination and what that might have to do with bias.

Specifically, in cases of purely objective knowledge, biases are as you describe them. However, in any case where the states of affairs confirming or disconfirming belief are themselves influenced by beliefs, the biases can just as easily be viewed as convictions. You presented initially what amounts to a positivistic argument for bias-elimination. But your positivistic argument only applies to scientific facts, of which the theism-atheism issue is not one. Hence your claim is normative (we ought to think in this way) and so itself exemplifies the kind of bias-as-conviction phenomenon that I am describing, and which you endorse eliminating.

I think you are applying too many vague definitions of biases within the context of this topic. — Christoffer

Here I was thinking the same about you.

Do you have any examples of concepts that benefit from biases? Or are the biases within those concepts only there as temporary necessities because we've yet to answer the concepts fully? — Christoffer

The concept that we must put a man on the moon was a bias that flew in the face of current technology (so to speak). The resultant Saturn V project was a monument to the power of human creative thought resulting in countless technological innnovations.

And rather focus on emotional influences than logic and rational reasoning. — Christoffer

Who says that logic and rational reasoning are the sole measure of validity? Again, this is one of your own biases....

towards further and further rigid structures until a solid form of conclusion emerges. — Christoffer

the exploration of ideas require going from the abstract to the solid. — Christoffer

exploratory journey from abstract chaos to solid order — Christoffer

Again, these are all scientifically biased, with respect to the role that science plays in human existence. To claim that science provides (or can provide) an adequate framework for existence is, number one, not itself a scientific claim. For which reason such perspectives are usually criticized. Which was the original point, that your estimation is itself value-laden, hence typical of the very belief-structure that you reject.

It is entirely quantum, not a classical copy. — noAxioms

:up:

How can you or Deacon prove the instantiation of the teleonomic properties of the nature is related to human consciousness? And indeed how human consciousness is related to God, if God is something that you cannot define, but presume or deduce from the natural world? It sounds like a serious circular reasoning going on in your explanations. — Corvus

All I did was provide some evidential bases for my perspective. You yourself are drawing the inferences to the point where they fail, because you are unfamiliar with the evidential bases, and are just using my cursory synopses, which don't purport to be exhaustive.

I stated that human consciousness displays an evident spectrum both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. This is a statement of fact, entrenched in both developmental psychology and evolutionary biology and archaeology. So yes, it is a scientific fact. My hypothesis is congruent with known scientific facts. It is not itself a scientific fact.

As to the Deacon, again, you aren't really familiar with the work so it isn't fair of you to form conclusions about it. Teleonomy doesn't prove panpsychism, but it could certainly be viewed to be congruent with such an hypothesis.

I understand your approach. However, as I said, you are generalizing both with respect to belief and bias and, in the human world, knowledge is not exclusively of the scientific kind. There are types of belief that cannot be reached through bias elimination; but which in fact function through bias-amplification (which could be described as the instantiation of value, which is one way that a bias could be described). Any creative human enterprise, for example, goes beyond materialistic-reductive facts to assemble complex fact-value syntheses. It is these artefacts which form the basis of human civilization. And, in fact, science itself is one such construct. Science was discovered through pre-scientific thought, after all.

They have quantum teleporters, which means they actually have teleported a small object from here to there. — noAxioms

Isn't quantum teleportation essentially just the transfer of information though?

Do you have argument for the natural world provides us a vast spectrum of consciousness? In what sense and evidence? — Corvus

Well, you can start with human consciousness, which clearly evolves both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Which therefore also links unproblematically (for me) with consciousness in other species. If you research the nature of consciousness in the natural world, you can read examples of how primitive colony organisms exhibit purposive behaviours (in The Global Brain, by Howard Bloom, for example). Indeed, you can even pursue the concept to the limits of the animate-inanimate boundary and discover how natural systems can be seen as instantiating teleonomic properties (Incomplete Nature, by Deacon). The spectrum of organic consciousness alone is sufficient warrant however.

What I actually said that is that the natural world provides evidence of a vast spectrum of consciousnesses, of which there is no reason to suppose the human mind to be the apex. Therefore the concept of "god" seems a reasonable heuristic to me (i.e. the most highly evolved form of consciousness in existence).

If the natural world is ample evidence of God, then how do you explain the mindless, irrational and unpredictable natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods which cause destructions and damages to innocent people? — Corvus

Who says it is a god's role to intercede or interfere with the unfolding of events? That's a presupposition. A hurricane is just a weather feature that is endemic to the ecological health of our planet. I certainly don't assume that human preoccupations are necessarily universal values.

Yes, I agree that a decent grounding in eastern culture is definitely key to breaking the shackles of certain western prejudices. My last observation would be that there tends to be a reactionary condemnation of the idea of god in the west because of the history of abuses by the churches. However every human institution is subject to corruption by man. We don't dispense with the ideas of justice and good governance just because criminals pay off judges and politicians. We recognize that the corrupt judges and politicians are not good exemplars of the ideals they purport to serve.

Adhering to what "is" negates belief — Christoffer

I'm not so keen on your characterization of bias either. Perspective is essentially a form of bias. There can be healthy biases as well as unhealthy biases. In particular, if the belief in question is a factor in its own realization (which, lets face it, many, perhaps the most important beliefs, certainly are), then having a powerful bias can contribute to the success of the belief. Fake it until you make it. Belief systems are the fabric of our human reality.

adhering to how we function as an entity — Christoffer

I didn't realize we had a choice in that? Oh wait, we do? Of course. That is the essence of belief.

Of course, if you are saying that we haven't any choice in it, then it can't be a problem or a solution, can it?

I'm reading Robert Saplolsky's, "Determined - A Science of Life Without Free Will". I read some good reviews, but I'm finding the book extremely disappointing. — Relativist

I came across an interesting observation recently, that asked, if everything is behaviourism, then what exactly is it the behaviourists are doing?