The exchange of goods and services through the use of money.

I am willing to say he "took to the teachings and beliefs of a brand of Christianity as he saw it and thus philosophized about the world in those terms" rather than "strait-jacketing" — schopenhauer1

That's much better.

I only want emphasize that the difference with religious belief and any old philosophical belief is the expectation that one can only view other philosophies in relation to a core belief system rather than one amongst many. — schopenhauer1

This is too vague.

A society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. — schopenhauer1

But this is impossible, There will always be some beliefs that dominate others, such as the belief that society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other.

If there is some sort of prosperity or benefit that ensues from sameness in beliefs, does this outweigh the possibility for general freedom to entertain any belief? — schopenhauer1

That was basically what I was asking. I don't have an answer to it, but it's a good question I think.

Again, there was a time before this in Western history where one did not have to vow fealty to a system of thought. After this time period, it would return again. — schopenhauer1

And I'm not trying to dispute this.

one should not overlook the Church's concerted effort to keep its grip (trials of Galileo and Bruno, Protestant persecution, the Inquisition, Crusades, numerous individual trials on heresy, etc.). — schopenhauer1

This and what you say before it is all granted, but I feel like adding some qualification here. Heresy was a state crime at the time. The inquisitors would hand over those accused to the state and the state would then determine the punishment; and the vast majority of those accused of heresy were not killed or tortured. Second, Galileo and Bruno did have demonstrably heretical and heterodox views, so it would make even less sense for the Church not to investigate them, considering they identified as Catholic. Lastly, the crusades were originally conceived as a defense of Christendom from Muslim invasion, not bloodthirsty imperialist and colonialist expeditions.

taking on the Christian system strait-jacketed his thought to then only view things in the prism of the core doctrines/beliefs of this belief system — schopenhauer1

If he voluntarily found the Christian system true, then he was not "strait-jacketed" into anything. Or would you rather him view things through the prism of doctrines and beliefs he thought to be false?

freedom to explore other systems of ideas the way he was able to do in the relative diversity of ideas in late Antiquity. — schopenhauer1

Fully agreed. Nonetheless, I would be hesitant to praise diversity for its own sake. In modern cultures that do so, there is always a diversity of the false and the bad, which makes the truth harder to find and pursue. Could it also be that "enforcing" a certain set of beliefs produces a healthier, more harmonious, and culturally richer society? Does it really impede the truly critical and original thinkers out there that much? I am reminded of the long history of the method of esoteric writing and a particular line about Meister Eckhart from Schopenhauer:

"[W]e shall find that Sakyamuni and Meister Eckhart teach the same thing; only that the former dared to express his ideas plainly and positively, whereas Eckhart is obliged to clothe them in the garment of the Christian myth, and to adapt his expressions thereto."

If the same ideas are getting across, what harm is being done that the mode is not the same? Only the intellectually deaf will fail to understand the meaning being conveyed, which is just as well. Moreover, why cannot one mode be more generally beneficial than another?

I guess I have no problem if people choose to strait-jacket themselves into a belief system — schopenhauer1

What is this supposed to imply? That one not ever commit oneself to what one finds to be true? That one must remain skeptical, even in the face of evidence to the contrary? Critical thinking doesn't, or needn't, cease when one commits oneself to a philosophical or religious system.

It is when that one belief system becomes the dominant power in a region and systematically creates a climate and structure that disallows other points of view. — schopenhauer1

Well, it depends on the belief system. Christian Europe was far less destructive in this regard than the Muslim Middle East and North Africa, if only for the simple reason that the former produced all those things you seem to be indirectly praising, namely, freedom of speech and religion, democracy, modern science and philosophy, etc - whereas the latter actively fought against them.

I acknowledge that, and hence why it is a tragedy that he chose, at the end, a narrow focus on Christianity — schopenhauer1

But why narrow? You are assuming in advance that Christianity is untrue, so that if someone like Augustine formally turns away from Neoplatonism and toward it, he is ipso facto making the wrong decision.

So he indirectly (in a link with other apologists) influenced the idea that philosophy is only in employment of Christian theology — schopenhauer1

Yes, because he and others like him thought Christianity was true. A lemonade stand is likely to sell lemonade.

Church being fused with the State in 380 CE (under Theodosius), persecution and coercion were the norm — schopenhauer1

And prior to then, people converted to Christianity freely and in the teeth of brutal Roman persecution. Enough of them did so to constitute a majority of the population, which then carried over into the Middle Ages. Naturally, Christian rulers then persecuted others into conversion, but this was not the primary means of how the Roman world became Christian to begin with.

1) Christian texts would be the only texts that mattered most for copying and recopying in monasteries and libraries. — schopenhauer1

Right, because they thought these texts contained the truth.

Thus, the educated class, instead of following the dialectic to wherever it led, were instead following it wherever it led as long as it had the tinge of Christian belief. — schopenhauer1

Here again you're simply parroting Russell's patronizing treatment of these philosophers. Has it ever occurred to you that perhaps, in following where the argument leads, they thought it lead to Christianity?

3) The various inquisitions (the major ones being in the 14-1600s), crusades, and especially via Papal edict and Church Councils, were enforced via courts and kings who made alliances and thus indeed did keep a tight grip of Church order in this time period. — schopenhauer1

Correct. The Church had quite a bit of power, but it also encouraged philosophy, learning, etc. Like all large institutions it has a mixed history.

Would you be willing to share what those are?

I'm not sure if that is sarcastic which, if so, is kind of funny. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what you mean. I wasn't trying to be sarcastic. I just didn't know who you were referring to with your post.

But what I meant is he could have put his theological tendencies energies into Neoplatonism proper or traditional Greco-Roman schools of though but instead he became the mouthpiece of what would become orthodox Christian thinking which became an oppressive system as it became one of the only allowable points of view. — schopenhauer1

You appear to be talking about Augustine. I would say that your criticism is quite unfounded. He did identify with pagan philosophies as a young man. He was a Neoplatonist and a Manichean before becoming a Christian, and if you want to know why he became the latter, you can read the Confessions. Secondly, I don't think anyone could honestly accuse Augustine of not having fully acquainted himself with Neoplatonism and other Greco-Roman schools of thought. He was probably the most learned and often sympathetic authority on these schools you could find in the entire Roman world at the time. Finally, trying to pin on Augustine all the alleged oppression perpetrated by Christianity is nothing more than a fallacious attempt to impute guilt by association.

Being heavily involved in what is considered right interpretation of Christian metaphysics/ethics and what is heretic- he along with other Church Fathers was a main architect of the demise of diverse thinking, heterodoxy, and the relative free thought of the upper classes enjoyed in Greco Riman times. — schopenhauer1

I don't know, the demise of diverse thinking could have been due to the weakness and corruption of the later Western Roman emperors, the barbarian invasions, the cultural deterioration of Rome, and so on.

The Christian point of view being the "only" point of view carried over into the Middle Ages with scant alternative. — schopenhauer1

And? Most of the Roman world had converted to Christianity by the time it evaporated in the West, so I don't know what you expect.

Granted, contingencies of Germanic tribal culture, the collapse of the Roman economy, and the general decline of knowledge didn't help- the archetype of only viewing philosophy in service of bolstering Christian belief was established. — schopenhauer1

I'm glad you clarified here, but I don't like your insinuation in the last part. I find most of the medieval philosophers to be genuine searchers after truth, not cynical opportunists making due under an oppressive church. The oppression thesis is simply too patronizing to these often profound thinkers. And remember that the seeds of the scientific, political, and philosophical revolutions of the early modern era were laid during the medieval period by these thinkers.

Who, Augustine? How so?

You mean recommendations about Augustine? In his case, I would recommend simply reading the man himself. He's honestly one of best prose writers to have lived.

I also ask this because I'm not religious in any way, and am skeptical of a deity, and kinda want to see some other perspectives and fight the cognitive dissonance for self-improvement sake. — darthbarracuda

I have found that there are those who have a religious sensibility and those who lack one. It's more to do with character, in other words, than with the arguments at hand that decides one's orientation toward religion and its claims. For me, I am caught somewhere between the two, in that I cannot rationally commit myself at present to belief in various dogmas and yet also deeply yearn for a mystical glance at the ineffable, the path to which is inherently religious in some way. I can see myself perhaps formally converting to Catholicism one day or remaining a skeptic. Either choice would be anticipated given my perspective on things now. In your case, you might not have the religious sensibility and so don't know this tension. If so, I would envy you in some respects, but it also means that the project of someone like Aquinas might seem ridiculous or uninteresting.

I was contemplating buying one of his books on Thomistic metaphysics — darthbarracuda

Why not read or reread Aristotle and Thomas for yourself? I always buy primary literature rather than secondary literature when it comes to philosophy, except for biographies. I also plan on purchasing physical copies for myself, but if cost at the moment is an issue for you, as it is for me (which is frustratingly why I have a huge backlog of all kinds of books), then you could peruse this site, which has virtually everything Thomas ever wrote translated into English: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/.

Alternatively, if you are looking for some good commentary, then you might check out Garrigou-Lagrange. I became interested in him because of his spiritual writings, but he was a prolific commentator on Aquinas as well. He's very readable from what little I've read of him so far and would likely address how Aquinas belongs to the perennial tradition.

Aquinas had his Five Ways that make Thomism famous, but is that all that's really different from him and Aristotle other than his efforts to fit Aristotelianism into Catholicism - theology? — darthbarracuda

Two things. One, there are people like Anthony Kenny who are not formally Catholic and yet are strongly influenced by Aquinas, such that they would call themselves Thomists, "analytic Thomists" to be exact, which you alluded to. Second, I think Aquinas does actually significantly depart from Aristotle's metaphysics in various ways, so he's not as unoriginal as he might initially seem, if that's what you're worried about. But even if he were, I find the synthesis of Aristotle with Christianity an interesting feat in and of itself, one worthy of one's attention. I am still drawn to Plato/Augustine more than I am to Aristotle/Aquinas, but they're both very important streams of thought.

That's Berkeley*.

Btw, if you highlight a piece of text, a quote button will appear and allow you to quote someone so it's clear who wrote what.

It was just a general comment. You'll notice it wasn't directed toward anyone in particular.

Some people think that we should all aspire to a lifestyle of high consumption — Bitter Crank

I'd say most people think this, sadly.

As David Harvey says, the current economic system is predicated on 3% annual growth forever, which is impossible given the finite resources of the planet, some of which are nearing complete exhaustion. This means that at some point, probably several decades from now, we will be forced into thinking about a zero growth economy.

In the meantime, let's please try and get as many people and countries on board with the secular rule of law and the respect for human rights.

I meant the industrialized world and the aspirations of the developing world, summarized and spoken to in the second person, since I don't live or care about such a lifestyle. I want nothing to do with it.

What would you say the odds are of your being killed by a militant jihadist? And how does that compare to your odds of being killed by a car, a preventable disease, a drive-by shooting, a police shooting (silly me, reaching for my wallet to show my licence) or a workplace accident? — andrewk

None of those things have to do with climate change.

I think the bigger threat at the moment, which requires more urgent attention and resources given to it, is militant jihadism. Greens, and human beings in general, face being literally impaled by a nut screaming Allahu Akbar, which is much more imminent than whatever is supposed to happen due to climate change. The majority of climate change's most deleterious long term effects are irrevocable now anyway, so there's no use crying over spilled milk. Annihilate the violent maniacs trying to kill you first, then worry about how to maintain your posh, materialistic lifestyle and rampant consumerism indefinitely. The former is eminently more achievable than the latter and will in fact better aid in its maintenance.

Hegel, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Leibniz, and even Kant — darthbarracuda

Hegel and Leibniz are the only "flamboyant" ones here to me. The other three are all careful immanentists.

The concept of a metaphysical "God" is dependent upon other metaphysical concepts, like "The Absolute" or "The Unconditioned" or "The Primordial Basis", none of which are able to be meaningful themselves. — darthbarracuda

Hence, ignosticism.

surely Plato knew his Allegory was a metaphor but meant to establish a point that could not be explicated by a meaningful word — darthbarracuda

But if he has a "point" capable of being understood then it isn't strictly meaningless....

Carnap's verification principle applies to synthetic statements, not analytic statements, and the verification principle is an analytic statement. — darthbarracuda

"The verification principle" is not a proposition. It becomes one when a predicate is attached, such as, "The verification principle is true." But when you do this, it becomes circular. The truth that the verification principle is true cannot be verified and so cannot be said to be true. This is to say that the verification principle presupposes another principle, the principle of sufficient ground.

That vocabulary is really unintuitive to me. I suppose there may be a connection, but I shall have to take your word for it for now. Have you read any of Process and Reality and if so would you recommend that I do at some point?

It's not really to do with epistemology per se. I will find and then send you my thoughts soon.

So, if an ethical nihilist denies there is any meaning to moral terms, are they not merely denying that there is any objective meaning; and would this not be the same as to say that they are inconsistently denying there are any objective values? — John

It seems to me that in denying meaning to moral terms, they deny it in an objective and subjective sense. Hedonism, as an ethical position that does think moral terms are meaningful (in a subjective sense), would be something the nihilist would deny. So I think your target is actually hedonism, not nihilism.

On the other hand, if moral nihilism is the view that rejects "intrinsic" value, but not necessarily the meaning of moral terms, then would this be the same as what you mean by "objective?" If so, one could deny that there is intrinsic moral worth and yet still hold to moral objectivity. The latter would be to claim, so far as I am aware, that ethical statements are not relative. If X is wrong, then it is wrong everywhere and for all time. I think one could hold to this and yet claim that there is no intrinsic moral worth, for the word "intrinsic" points to something that ought to be pursued for its own sake. Moral objectivism is thus a metaethical position, whereas the notion of intrinsic value applies to normative ethics.

The idea I am proposing is that what matters to the individual on the most basic animal level is the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure. Anything that is of interest to the individual beyond that is of interest either because it leads to a pleasurable feeling or avoids a painful feeling — John

I suppose I get this. We're still talking about what the nihilist is committed to, right?

But the salient point is that what makes those more elaborated pursuits and situations joyous or sorrowful must be the acceptance of values which embody some conception of what is beautiful, true or good, or on the other hand, what is ugly, false and evil; values which are well outside of the simplistic animal ambit of 'pleasure/pain'. — John

And this is a problem for the nihilist, as you see it, correct?

I might question what you mean by nihilism. Ethical nihilists deny meaning to moral terms. Someone who assigns meaning to moral terms, but does not consider there to be any such thing as intrinsic moral worth, need not be a nihilist.

Lol.

I think that there are degrees of reality — Wayfarer

Okay, but the word reality is not the same as existence. I'm fine with degrees of reality, but not degrees of existence. The latter is nonsensical to me.

But that was very much what was lost in the transition to modernity, via the rejection of universals by the nominalists, as universals are part of that structure. — Wayfarer

I don't think I was ever disputing this claim. My original purpose was to point out the distinction between a cause and reason and warn one not to conflate them.

The article you linked about William of Ockham looks interesting. I'll try and read it here.

As a follow up, your question also reminds me that for some time I've had the thought that Aristotle may prove useful in further clarifying and possibly widening Schopenhauer's metaphysics. I wrote some brief notes to myself on it a while ago and can share them with you if you want.

Is that a comment or a rebuttal? I'm no fan of empiricism qua empiricism either.

He's still treating as if the is an "unfiltered" reality out there we can never access. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, the thing-in-itself.

What we filter is still mistakenly understood as a "flawed picture" rather than understanding of the world wider than ourselves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I have no idea what you're talking about here.

More critically, he still treats the "unknown" as if it is outside our filter. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The thing-in-itself? Yes, because it is outside the filter.

But this cannot be true . Since any unknown state if in relation to us, it must be within the filter, be something we might know. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is a non-sequitur.

The filter must be reality. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It is. For us.

Everything must have an understandable from regardless of whether anyone knows about it-- that's why there is an unknown state. There can be no reality to know beyond how things might be filtered to experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Kant would agree with this.

Not in any great depth. I remember long ago looking into him and not liking or agreeing with what I found. I've ignored him ever since.

I think you're actually advocating a subtle dualism here, though - 'ideas' being in a 'mental realm' which is causally inactive, i.e. can't effect changes, and the 'objective domain', which you presume is the really existent domain. — Wayfarer

The scare quotes can only impute metaphorical dualism to my position, not the real (Cartesian) thing. And objects exist just as much as the Ideas. I propose no chain of being whereby some things can exist "more" than other things.

But recall the Kantian insight that reality is not simply given to us, we're not passive spectators of an already-existing vista. The mind orders and constructs according to judgements and the categories of the understanding. — Wayfarer

Yes and no. Reality is actually given to us, according to Kant, it's just filtered by the forms of understanding. So the product of the filter is constructed, not reality, though the filtered construction then becomes reality for us.

It is much nearer to a pure potentiality, the way things are likely to form — Wayfarer

Doesn't Aristotle conceive of matter as potency and form as act, though?

I'm afraid it's still a muddle to me. Thanks for trying at least.

I'm saying, in the case of the masochist, what you are calling "bodily pain" does not involve "ethical pain." Their body might hurt, but they do not expeirnce the ethical pain (which is just as much of the physical) that many other people would. Rather, they feel ethical joy at being subjected to this "bodily pain." — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm still not getting this distinction. What and where is "ethical pain/pleasure?"

It's in our nature to pursue our own interests, and the state provides a means of doing so, a better and more reliable means than the state of nature.

I think your question and then the options you present as answers are incongruous. Based on the latter, you seem to be asking what causes or gives rise to conscious, rather than for a description of it.

My answer as for why there is consciousness is that it is due to brain activity, just as digestion is due to intestinal activity. This is to give an empirical explanation, which we are perfectly obliged to do, but it is also one-sided and incomplete, since all objects, including brains, depend upon a knowing subject and its a priori forms of understanding.

Any "mental" pain involves a body that hurts, a body that responses to the environment. When the body hurts, "mental" anguish is frequently a result, sometimes even the majority of the pain (think of the distress and fear of seeing oneself injured). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but the exception of the masochist seems to contradict this. Are you saying that he may feel bodily (what I would call physical) pain but nonetheless have a different than normal psychological reaction to it? What would that reaction be?

I don't know. A lot of SEP articles are ponderously dense and unreadable. Yeah, SEP tries to get experts to write them, but these people are in some cases awful writers not suited to writing encyclopedia entries, which, by definition are meant for a general audience.

What is mental pleasure and how is it the same as physical pleasure?

Instead of calling out the noumenon as nonsensical full stop (i.e. not just that it cannot be known by us, but that it cannot be anything to know) — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think he admits this, though.

Cartesian dualism seems a fact because we are minds that seem to be able to make things happen. — apokrisis

I know not "seems," but only what "is." Or would prefer to. I've not read Peirce, so I don't know how he argues for what you're trying to say. I think Cartesianism is best solved by Kant. Causality is just an a priori concept of the intellect that structures and indeed constructs the world of appearance. The Ideas are not in space and time, and so are not causally efficacious.

I'm still not convinced. To feel pleasure in harming oneself means that the pleasure cannot be purely physical, or else, these words lose all meaning. If physical pain can be physically pleasurable, then we have a contradiction.

Just to chime in here, I think one can maintain realism with respect to universals without speaking of them as causes and, in fact, that it is logically preferable to do so. This is because a cause and a reason (or ground) are not the same thing. If, say, a Platonic universal is posited as the cause of some material particular, then one runs into the insoluble incoherence of Cartesian dualism. If, on the other hand, a Platonic universal is taken to be the reason for some material particular, then one has posited not an ontological but merely a logical explanation for said particular. Not only that, but the notion of a cause implies change, which the Ideas do not do.