Yes. Aristotle's hylomorphism was a proposed explanation for the philosophical distinction between Body & Mind. But it could also serve as a metaphor for the modern analysis of material/physical Hardware and abstract/metaphysical Software. Presumably, only rational animals are able to make that differentiation between what we see and what we infer. In a computer, the hardware serves as the Hyle to embody and process the abstract data of digital logic : Morph. Together they become a "computer", and act as a "thinking machine".But the reason that passage appeals to me, and I've mentioned it many times, is because it lays out the outlines of Aquinas' version of Aristotle's 'matter/form' dualism very clearly. (You can find it here. Incidentally, also check out this dialogue with Google Gemini on the possible link between hylmoporphic dualism and computer design.) — Wayfarer
I assume the "underlying issue" for you is similar to what Chalmers labeled "the Hard Problem" of how humans are able to distinguish (differentiate) between obvious physical Reality (things) and obscure essential Ideality (essences). That's the job of the Rational Faculty of human intellect. But how it works in a physical neural context is a multi-millennial philosophical mystery that may be closer to becoming a mundane science fact.I can’t help but be struck by the resemblance to a passage I’ve often quoted in the past here in respect of Aquinas:
"….if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality."
Can you see the resemblance in those two passages? The differentiation between ‘sense perception’ and ‘ideas grasped by reason’? That in the platonic vision, the faculty of reason is able to grasp what is ‘always the case’? I know my attempt here might be a bit simplistic but I’m trying to get a handle on the big underlying issue as I see it. — Wayfarer
I too, haven't been concerned enough to make a detailed study of the roots of philosophical Determinism, perhaps in ancient Greece. But, I assume its modern form could be traced back to the secular Enlightenment (materialism), which broke away from medieval religious Theology (spiritualism). And which usually viewed the rational human mind as evidence for a dualism of supernatural soul within a natural body. In reaction, Science -- the philosophy of the mundane world -- became a monism of Materialism.So it seems to me - not being versed in the details of Determinism - that among the first things a determinist must make clear is what, exactly, it means. — tim wood
Yes. Most humans seem to take their own personal agency for granted. Since they get their desired results from voluntary actions, they feel like they can control some aspects of the non-self world. But some philosophers see that what-we-call-agency might be just a continuation of physical causation that began in the Big Bang.Hard to see how any would not ultimately be "directed by an internal agency." And here implied a development, hierarchy, and a taxonomy of purpose, starting with the infant(ile), through to adult. But I wonder if there is a sub-taxonomy either within the adult or transcending or otherwise moving beyond adult, and what the names of those would be. — tim wood
I'm a latecomer to this thread. But I just read an article in Scientific American magazine, that discusses "an infant's aha! moment" when they realize they can influence the world. The authors ran experiments with babies to see "when the lights come on", as you put it. The point (purpose) of the investigation was to learn "about the origins of agency". They concluded that "the birth of agency is a dynamic, self-organizing process". Humans are not born with fully developed minds. At first, we are at the mercy of The World, but eventually we can become causal Actors in the non-self world.The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? . . . .
My own answer, briefly, is that the lights come on when mind is. No mind no world. — tim wood
Determinism is a necessary assumption in order to do practical Science. But it may be optional to do theoretical Philosophy. In any case, Determinism is a metaphysical (philosophical) generalization, based on incomplete evidence.FreeWill is not a physical (empirical) question, it's a metaphysical (theoretical) inquiry. My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon
This changes everything. But let me ask whether you think that determinism is not a physical (empirical) question? I'll tell you now that I don't think it is. It is a way of thinking about the world and science. . . .
Well, we can talk about that. — Ludwig V
My personal worldview is ultimately Holistic and Monistic. But when we begin to "describe" the world, in language or math, it is necessary to make "distinctions". Reductive Science is all about naming & knowing particular things. But Holistic Philosophy is about wisdom & understanding of All things. Structure is interrelationships between things that bind them into a knowable Whole. Substance is the indivisible essence of a thing, which makes it a knowable concept. Real is what we interact with physically, Ideal is what we imagine metaphysically. :smile:↪Gnomon
I'd like to get into what we can and can't describe. In the meantime I'm hoping the above diatribe gives you some insight into why I don't immediately accept your distinction between ideal, real, structure and substance. — Treatid
That's OK. As I said, I wrote that for me, just to express the aha! idea in words, as it occurred to me.I'm afraid I don't see that the Small Worlds model affects the issue at all. Sorry. — Ludwig V
Come on. It's a metaphor. You seem to have a problem with both Metaphors and Metaphysics. Do you remember how I define "meta-physics", not as religious doctrine, but as philosophical reasoning?But I'm not a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. I'm a person, as free as anyone is. — Ludwig V
I'm getting the impression that you don't do philosophy. I'm not sure what you think this forum is all about, if not attempts to construct or destruct a "philosophical position". Do you have a "position" on the Freewill question, other than "I just don't get it"? Maybe everyday is Sunday for you. FWIW, my philosophical position is Both-FreeWill-and-Determinism Compatibilism .Well, I suppose I can make some sort of sense of that. But not enough to add up to a philosophical position. — Ludwig V
But this thread is about how free-effective-willful-mental (meta-physical) choices can Cause changes in the real world outside the imagining mind, despite the dominance of linear physical Determinism. Is that a "special", perhaps supernatural power for you. Or is it simply a normal "ability" of the human mind to reach-out and to exert influence on (affect) the non-self world? FreeWill : the ability to make choices that affect, not just the body, but other minds, and the physical world. Are you a "free person" in that sense, are you an Agent in the world, or just an object? Or do you want to change the OP subject : Freedom and Determinism?Either we are free all day and every day, or we are not free. It is entirely mundane, not special in any way. But perhaps you just want to change the subject. — Ludwig V
The June 2024 issue of Scientific American magazine has an article on how human babies learn that they can control material objects with their power of Agency : their WillPower. It's what the article calls "ability". The causal ability "within me" is different from physical causation, in that it would never happen in a million years without Purpose (goal setting) within me. Intellectual Purposes may be difficult to achieve, but not denied by Destiny, and not chosen by Determinism.What is wilful action as contrasted with physical action? In what way is a cause "within" me any different from a cause "without" me? — Ludwig V
Sorry. I'm currently reading a book that gets into Small World math & physics. I didn't really expect you to grasp the concept of "short-cuts" without a long digression. But I liked the neatness of the concept, in the context of this thread. So I wrote it down.Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny. — Gnomon
I get the first half of the sentence. But the meaning of the second half is not at all clear to me. Your diagram in your "Small world model" doesn't help. — Ludwig V
As Daniel Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, concluded : "… although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved". The example I gave before is the Panama Canal, which was only an imaginary dream for over a century, until many people, motivated by that dream, devised ways to move mountains. That small-world social mind-meld (inter-communication of motivation) is one of the "abilities" that Dennett noted. I think it's a pretty good trade-off as a substitute for non-human impotence or super-natural magic. :wink:Are you suggesting that an imagined freedom is any substitute for the real thing? Seems like a very poor exchange to me. — Ludwig V
It's not the heavenly ideal, but a free-roaming mind is better than being a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. N'cest pas? In a Matter-only world, "it is what it is" ; but in a Mind & Matter world, what is imagined might also become realized. As one writer put it : "I feel that as human beings with free will, the mind tends to limit itself from living to the fullest when we become prisoners of our own mind." Is your mind locked-in? :chin:In case, the freedom to "roam the world of ideas" is no substitute for the freedom to go home to you partner and kids. — Ludwig V
Perhaps, but the "cause" of willful action --- as contrasted with physical actions --- is presumed to be within the agent. That's why we call it "Will Power". Otherwise, the action would be pre-determined instead of free-will. :cool:3)the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent: acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires etc... — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism
So an action is free if its causes are inside the agent.If the causes of those causes are outside the agent, can we conclude that his acts of will, etc are not free? — Ludwig V
I think was arguing for compatibility of natural human FreeWill, not as an abnormal exception to Causation, but as a statistical option within causal Determinism. Not for supernatural freedom from Causation, as in the ex nihilo Big Bang Theory. Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny.Thanks for the invitation. I can try. But as long as people think that the search for free will is the search for an uncaused cause or a search for indeterminacy, I doubt that anyone will be interested. — Ludwig V
I Googled the phrase "network of relationships" and found it most often applied to social relations between humans. But, on a universal or sub-atomic scale, the term might also refer to Positive & Negative interactions, or Attractive & Repellent behaviors, or Back & Forth exchanges of Energy. In every instance I could think of, relationships are not physical things, but as-if mental images, where the invisible bonds are imagined, not seen. Causal Energy/Force is invisible & intangible, so only its after-effects are detectable by human senses.But concrete is loose sand bound together by a mineral matrix, the binder. — Gnomon
Well... funnily enough. Given the binder, it is sufficient by itself.
The little revolution I'm trying to foster is regarding the necessity of the bits between structure.
A network of relationships doesn't require us to define what the relationships are binding. The structure of the relationships is enough by itself. — Treatid
Just for funsies. Are you thinking of a human building a physical universe from raw materials, or a god creating a dynamic world from scratch? For the human, no single element would ever be sufficient to produce something that is more complex than the original element. A pile of sand is just grains of rock particles, with nothing to hold them together, into a structural system. But concrete is loose sand bound together by a mineral matrix, the binder.If we were to create a universe, what are the simplest possible building blocks that we could use? — Treatid
The "Logical Limitation" I referred to is both a measurement problem and a modeling problem. And the Logic in both cases is Mathematical (1+2+X=?), not necessarily physical*1. The physics happens, presumably according to the rules of physics and logic. But the steps between phases are hidden in a fog of Chaos. :smile:The "logical limitations" can be observed in physical Phase Transitions, where a stable organization of molecules can suddenly transform from one structural state (water) to another (ice), but scientists can't follow the steps in between. — Gnomon
The logical limitations start from what we can calculate and prove. What you are describing is more physical limitations that we notice in our empirical tests.
The logical part here is of course when a measurement effects what is being measured. This is something that isn't at all trivial. And then there's things that you simply cannot model in a laboratory. — ssu
Yes. Causal Closure (Determinism) was a simplifying assumption of 17th century physics. But 20th century physics has complicated the math with non-linear Chaos, and causal Uncertainty at the physical roots of reality. :smile:↪Gnomon
Thanks for the link to Bishop's review. Bishop's most salient point is that physicalism is inconstent with libertarian free will (LFW) because of Jaegwon Kim's causal closure argument. — Relativist
I agree with your Both/And conclusion. My latest BothAnd Blog post is on the topic of Synchrony*1. The author of the 2003 book SYNCH, Steven Strogatz, says "These, then, are the defining features of chaos : erratic, seemingly random behavior in an otherwise deterministic system ; predictability in the short run, because of deterministic laws ; and unpredictability in the long run, because of the butterfly effect*2." The physical universe is an almost infinite system of malleable Matter and deterministic Thermodynamic laws that is also chaotic at the core, but with pockets of sublime order, such as our own blue planet. which defies the destiny of Entropy with emergent Life & Mind.In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. Free will is a great concept to use as it easy describing various events and phenomena extremely well. Yet so is determinism too. What we have is logical limitations in understanding a deterministic reality, making predictions about it or calculating what will happen. — ssu
I missed the earlier discussion. But I Googled "Peter Tse's physicalist account of mental causation", and found the contrary argument below*1. We could argue the rational vs empirical merits of Physical vs Mental Causation forever. But Quantum Physics has contradicted the Classical Physics assumption*2 of Determinism (causal completeness) by revealing the role of Randomness in the chain of causation. For me, that's enough to allow me to believe that I am in command of my little jello-like bundle of cerebral Causation. My car is not a self-driving Tesla, it's a Myself-driven conveyance. :smile:Earlier in the thread, we discussed Peter Tse's physicalist account of mental causation. If something like this is correct, it means that the product of our thoughts truly has causal efficacy. We're not just going along for the ride (as you seem to be suggesting) we're driving. — Relativist
Right on! All living organisms have an innate driving purpose : to stay alive. But philosophical discussions of Purpose may be traced back to Theological notions that each moral agent of the world has a unique role to play in the epic of creation. In Genesis, the bit-part role of pre-enlightenment Adam & Eve was simply to be caretakers in the garden, as the animals with hands. No need for reasoning or insight, or concepts such as Good vs Evil.Purpose is a property of life and becomes a concept when intelligent minds recognize it. — Vera Mont
Historically, Enlightenment era scientists & philosophers were forced into Materialist & Physicalist positions by the Catholic church's Spiritualist & Dogmatic positions & propaganda. Burning at the stake as punishment for Mental transgressions (unbelief or heretical belief) would tend to radicalize freethinkers. But, since then, the world has moved toward more liberal positions, that allow for broader worldviews.Strict materialism and physicalism simply leads people to make silly generalizations and to wrong conclusions. — ssu
The term "meta-physics" was applied by medieval scholars to certain aspects of Aristotle's ouvre (collected writings), that were of special interest to theologians*3. Literally, it referred to the later books, that discussed opinions & interpretations (philosophy) instead of observations & investigations (science). But metaphorically, "meta-" came to be associated with "above" in the sense of spiritually transcending the material world.I didn't know that. I meant metaphysics as things before physics, like the nature of existence (and universal principles) and as the study of mind-independent features of reality. It's really hard to prove something with the scientific method of these kind of basic questions. Hence even if very important, it's not a field you can assume to have dramatic breakthroughs. — ssu
I agree. But I was referring to the formalization of Reason & Logic that is characteristic of Philosophy in the Greek tradition. Mathematical Logic pervades all aspects of the world. But only humans have made Language & Logic into systems appropriate for online forum discussions. :cool:Well, I think that animals are also rational, so they don't have to be just "philosophically inclined" to have rational thoughts. That we just have and advance language and even the abiltiy to store it (written language) makes us quite different in my view, but still we are animals (even if smart ones). — ssu
If a single path suddenly & surprisingly branches into two paths, with completely different end-points, is that not a true philosophical dilemma? One end-point may be my original intended destination, and the other a different unintended destination : as in Robert Frost's Path Not Taken. But if I didn't know that alternative when I set out, my choice to change destinations would be a change of personal intention (goal selection). Was that new information also eternally destined to make the choice for me?When you come to a fork in the road, do you stop and imagine taking the road less traveled, or do you start walking in the desired direction? In what sense is an actual choice an illusion? — Gnomon
The choice is not an illusion: we are actually making the choice - we have to actually go through the mental process to reach that choice.
The illusion is that of hindsight : that we could actually have made a different one. In actuality, we could have only made a different choice had there been something different within us (a different set of beliefs, disposltions, impulse...). — Relativist
When you come to a fork in the road, do you stop and imagine taking the road less traveled, or do you start walking in the desired direction? In what sense is an actual choice an illusion? :smile:What material evidence to you have to support your belief that personal choice is illusory? — Gnomon
That's not what I said. I said there "is an illusion of freedom". — Relativist
Aristotle intuitively made a distinction between physical and mental processes in the world. He divided his treatise of Phusis (nature) into an encyclopedia of observations by early scientists. Then in a separate (meta-) chapter, he summarizes some of the opinions of theoretical scientists (philosophers) to explain those facts. That "separation" was later formalized by others into categories of A> Physics : particular material objects and B> Metaphysics : general mental ideas (universal principles) about those objects.In fact then when Gnomon's idea is viewed as an ontological idea, that "Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic", it can be argued that he is making the argument that there's something else than the physical. But has there to be a separation? — ssu
Do you think I'm being fast & loose with my language here? In my thesis and my posts, I provide specific definitions of such terms as "physics" and "meta-physics", giving examples from the history of science & philosophy. For example, I specify that my use of the "meta-" term is Aristotelian, not Scholastic ; psychological, not religious. Are you uncomfortable with my use of "meta-physics" in reference to mental processes. Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions?Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. — Gnomon
One has to be careful about language here. . . .
The physical both constrains and enables what we do. — Ludwig V
What material evidence do you have to support your belief that personal choice is illusory?There is only an illusion of freedom. — Relativist
Yes. That's why I'm only advocating FreeWill in a Compatibilist sense. Humans obviously don't have god-like magical freedom to do anything they want. But they are also not constrained from exercising a few degrees of freedom from absolute locked-in Determinism. If I choose to reach-out and pick-up a cup of coffee, I don't have to stop and think whether this choice was allowed by the all-powerful Big Bang roll-of-the-dice 14 billion earth-years ago. I just do it. My freedom is not an illusion, if the cup actually rises to meet my mouth.That's true only because of quantum indeterminacy. So, instead of strict determinism from big bang to present, there's numerous instance of probabilistic determinism along the way. It remains to be seen if quantum indeterminacy plays a role in mental processes (some think it does), but if so- it would only seem to add a random element to the otherwise fully deterministic processes, which doesn't make it more free (in a libertarian free will sense). — Relativist
This is a philosophy forum, not a Communist Re-education Camp. So of course we are free to disagree. But, I suspect that we are not that far apart on the topic of this thread. So, once more into the breach . . .I'll buy that. I'm sure we can get along and maybe occasionally agree to disagree. Most topics in philosophy seem to have only contested definitions, so there's nothing new here. — Ludwig V
I've enjoyed discussing the old Freedom vs Determinism question with you. But if you are going to place Metaphysics*1 off-limits in a philosophical forum, my arguments will be nullified, because the whole point is to explore the "metaphysical implications" of physical observations.I try not to mention metaphysics, since I don't know what it means. . . . .
Now there's something to agree with, so long as it isn't taken to have metaphysical implications. — Ludwig V
Yes. But, at the macro level, the minuscule "observer effect"*1 could be ignored. Only after scientists began probing into the microscopic level of physics did the Observer play a significant role in the outcome of an experiment.But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". — Gnomon
H'm. I probably don't know enough to evaluate that. But I would have thought that observer choices in setting up experiments and interpreting evidence have always played an essential role in science. Though it is true that scientists have mostly assumed that it is possible to observe phenomena without affecting them, and that only becomes inescapably false at the sub-atomic level. — Ludwig V
Yes. I was using physical indeterminacy as a parallel analogy to the philosophical question of Freedom vs Determinism. Do you consider philosophy to be an ideal "language game" of no importance in the "real" world?Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect? — Gnomon
Any events that are not determined by cause and effect are indeterminate. Freedom (or at least the philosophical version of it) is a language-game distinct from physics, etc. — Ludwig V
Good point! Until the advent of Quantum physics, scientists had no need for a "conceptual apparatus" of "choices". But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". For example, Multiverses and Many Worlds conjectures would never have occurred to classical physicists. The Uncertainty Principle has raised many questions & eyebrows : not least about the continuity of Cause & Effect in the physical world, and the role of mental Choices in material physics. :smile:Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking. — Ludwig V
True, but your description sounds like a romantic fairytale version of history : an age of fatherly kings, and courtly knights, and fair maidens, and rustic ignorant peasants. But scientific history is less rosy. Some have described Feudalism as a "Protection Racket". In recent history, something similar to European Feudalism*1 was being established by Hitler in Germany to implement his dream of a Third Reich. At the same time in Asia, the semi-divine Japanese Emperor ruled over a feudal empire of Samurai lords, fair maidens, and millions of contented land-bound peasants. And both attempted to impose their idyllic system of governance upon neighboring countries by military force. But no one could tell the Fuhrer or Heavenly Sovereign that trying to emulate Alexander the Great or Genghis Kahn in the 20th century was not a good idea. It took a distant liberal democratic nation to say "No!" with an atomic bomb.↪Gnomon
Maybe feudalism has some good points. For example, a feudal lord lived with people in a community and could explain their needs and concerns to the king. The lord wasn't some politician who held an occasional town meeting to listen to constituents. He knew them because his mom was in their neighborhood. So, he wasn't a power-hungry politician. — BillMcEnaney
I think you missed the point of my post in favor of FreeWill for moral agents. Moral arguments carry no weight for scientists. But shouldn't they be indicative for philosophers? I wasn't presenting empirical evidence of freedom from determinism, but merely a suggestive analogy, to indicate that, in natural processes, Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect?Yes, and they are less than persuasive for that reason. . . .
Laplace's demon is a version of fatalistic determinism and easier to refute on logical grounds than causal determinism. — Ludwig V
Sorry if my term "exploit" offended your liberal sensibilities. I intended the word to be taken literally --- in the sense of manipulating Nature to derive some benefit to humanity --- but not politically. Everything artificial in the world "exploits" some feature of nature to give humans an advantage over animals. If humans hadn't "exploited" the natural phenomenon of fire, how would they survive the Ice Ages with no natural fur to keep them warm. Yes, the influence works both ways as give & take. But that's a whole other issue.It's a feature of Nature that the human mind may be able to exploit in order to impose its will on Nature. — Gnomon
If we think of it like that, we are making a mistake. The human mind is a product of Nature and part of it. Or, to put it another way, to think of Nature as something to exploit perpetuates the practices that have landed us with climate change. Worse than that, although we can and do exploit Nature in some ways, Nature also imposes itself on us - witness climate change and antibiotic resistance. It has to be a balance. — Ludwig V
Personally, I don't think human Life, or Culture, is incompatible with scientific explanation. We are just at the early stages of a science of Complexity & Chaos. Your examples of research into complex feedback & looping systems are along the same lines that the Santa Fe Institute is trying to make compatible with scientific methods. :cool:Lorenz's equations have already been used to explain why the weather is unpredictable. Maybe, in time, they will also reveal why the human mind is unpredictable. — Gnomon
Yes, I'm aware that there are many examples of systems and situations that reveal that the systems at work in the world are much more complex and much less predictable than our classical models have recognized. They do give us a basis for thinking that human life may be, in the end, not incompatible with scientific explanation. But they do not get us there, any more than simple randomness gets us there. I think that the research into self-constituting autonomous systems, feedback loops and ideas like Conway's Game of Life are much more to the point. — Ludwig V
Again, I was using weather complexity as a metaphor, from which to draw inferences about human exploitation of natural properties. I wasn't implying freewill in Natural phenomena, but in Cultural noumena, which is commonly assumed to result from collective human intentions & purposes & willpower. Here's just one of many examples of someone who thinks FreeWill is associated with the unpredictability of Complexity*2. Google "Emergence" and you will find many articles with similar associations. :smile:I don't think that unpredictability is a significant phenomenon here. Volcanoes and football matches, not to mention the weather, are all unpredictable. But no-one thinks that free will is involved. — Ludwig V
Yes. I'm aware that my "articulation" of a Causal Gap in Determinism is un-orthodox. But it's based on science, not magic. Beginning in the early 2000s, scientists began to study Complexity and Chaos seriously. The Santa Fe Institute was established specifically to bring together physicists & mathematicians, and a few philosophers, to learn about some of the Uncertainties in Nature that puzzled the early Quantum pioneers. Quantum Mechanics seemed to be missing a few gears. So, the Uncertainty Principle has been postulated as an opportunity for the exercise of FreeWill. In opposition, the Conjecture of SuperDeterminism*1 has been proposed, but as the link below notes, its argument seems circular.Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. — Gnomon
The orthodox articulation of the debate requires either positing free will as a magical kind of cause that is causally determined and/or a gap in causality that allows this unique kind of event to occur. Neither is at all plausible. — Ludwig V
Your Fork-in-the-Road argument may illustrate the notion of Free Will choices. But as a philosophical proof, it may or may not be convincing to determinists. Nevertheless, I agree that world Causation is both Deterministic and Indeterminate (undecided, uncertain). Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. Yet the unconstrained choice itself is not random (chaotic)*1, but determined by future-aimed intention.To conclude, I have proven I can change the future indirectly by interrupting the flow of the present. I also assert that at junctions we can change the future directly. This is my argument that life is both determined and has free will, but neither purely. — Barkon
Me too. Being apolitical by nature, I wasn't familiar with the notion of American "High Toryism" or Western "Confucianism. So, I looked-up those terms.↪Gnomon
Sure. But I was interested in how the OP was using these terms.
Terms like conservative and libertarian and right wing seem almost meaningless these days. And we can be sure that almost any Western government's chief allegiance is not to the people but to corporations and banks. What was Gore Vidal's salient quote? "There is only one party in the United States, the Property Party … and it has two right wings." — Tom Storm
Disclaimer : not an expert on any of these socio-political concepts. But for clarification of terms :By the way, though I'm a native-born Irish American, I believe in North American High Toryism instead of American conservatism. That's partly why Confucianism interests me. I suggest "American conservatism" may be an oxymoron because it seems to be Locke's classical liberalism. — BillMcEnaney
Excellent observation. Both Plato & Aristotle were doing Science in 500BC, but walking the tightrope without a net of technology-enhanced empirical evidence. And both saw a necessary distinction between physical Nature (Real) and metaphysical Theories (Ideal). So, Kant was merely updating that ancient science, with almost 1800 years of empirical & theoretical knowledge. Descartes' Discourse on Method had already boiled it down to the basics : the Observer, the "I" whose existence cannot be doubted, is the foundation of all other knowledge.I'll argue this way (and Kant is no way responsible for my errors). Kant's was about knowledge. His gold standard for knowledge was science - then as now understood to be the science of nature. "But," he asked himself, "how does that work? what grounds it?" — tim wood
Kant's Transcendental distinction was between "out there" empirical things and "in here" mental ideas about things. Hence, our knowledge of Nature consists of sensory appearances (haecceity), and rationally-inferred essences (quiddities). So, we don't know those ideal essences directly, but only by inferences from observations. And Hume had already noted a problem with Induction of general principles from limited observations of instances. As you noted, Kant proposed a synthesis of Ideal essences and Real appearances : the unobservable ding an sich, which we must accept as an unobtainable Ideal that we only approximate in our ideas & theories. :nerd:He noted that one theory was that nature was all "out there." But how if it's all out there can we move beyond mere observation - this being Hume's question? Alternatively, it's all a creation of the mind - but how then do we know anything of what we call nature? His resolution was through a synthesis of the two. — tim wood
Yes. The Hard Problem is not a "real" problem, it's an "ideal" problem. It's not a Scientific problem, but a Philosophical dilemma. It's not a problem of isolated material things, but of integrated mental concepts.The "hard problem" is not a real problem. It is like the difficulty of cutting apart concepts using scissors. If you think that all dividing is done using knives and scissors, it is a very hard to know how we can divide the ideas of red and green. The problem is not in the dividing, but in demanding that it be done using unsuitable methods. — Dfpolis
In Physics there is no such thing as Potential, since it is nothing until actualized. But it is a useful Philosophical notion, allowing us to think about how Nothing can become Something. For example, an isolated AAA battery has Zero voltage, but the potential for 1.5 volts, when actualized by plugging into a complete circuit : a whole recursive system.Except for the reference to non-human animals, this is very Aristotelian. He characterizes the mind/intellect (nous) as nothing until it thinks something. He would say that we have the potential to know and objects have the potential to be known, but neither is actually anything until knowing occurs. — Dfpolis
Modern Determinism typically looks to Quantum Physics to underwrite the notion that "Randomness rules!" But it may not be that cut & dried.Determinism connotes a colder, more calculated existance — Frog
gave an interesting distinction : romantic Fate vs pragmatic Determinism.What is the difference between Fate and Determinism? Is there one at all? — Frog
In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker argues against the Empiricist belief that ideas only derive from personal experience. However, his examples of "innate ideas" consist mostly of knee-jerk emotions, such as fear of snakes, that seem to be programmed into human genes via transpersonal evolutionary experiences. I'm not sure that's what Plato had in mind though. And Aristotle argued that humans do not inherit knowledge of First Principles (e.g non-contradiction), which must be derived by rational methods.In his "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," Locke makes an argument against the "innate ideas" of the rationalists. He is essentially trying to rebut the claim that all people have, by nature, certain ideas (e.g., an understanding of the principle of non-contradiction). — Count Timothy von Icarus