I've enjoyed discussing the old Freedom vs Determinism question with you. But if you are going to place Metaphysics*1 off-limits in a philosophical forum, my arguments will be nullified, because the whole point is to explore the "metaphysical implications" of physical observations.I try not to mention metaphysics, since I don't know what it means. . . . .
Now there's something to agree with, so long as it isn't taken to have metaphysical implications. — Ludwig V
Yes. But, at the macro level, the minuscule "observer effect"*1 could be ignored. Only after scientists began probing into the microscopic level of physics did the Observer play a significant role in the outcome of an experiment.But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". — Gnomon
H'm. I probably don't know enough to evaluate that. But I would have thought that observer choices in setting up experiments and interpreting evidence have always played an essential role in science. Though it is true that scientists have mostly assumed that it is possible to observe phenomena without affecting them, and that only becomes inescapably false at the sub-atomic level. — Ludwig V
Yes. I was using physical indeterminacy as a parallel analogy to the philosophical question of Freedom vs Determinism. Do you consider philosophy to be an ideal "language game" of no importance in the "real" world?Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect? — Gnomon
Any events that are not determined by cause and effect are indeterminate. Freedom (or at least the philosophical version of it) is a language-game distinct from physics, etc. — Ludwig V
Good point! Until the advent of Quantum physics, scientists had no need for a "conceptual apparatus" of "choices". But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". For example, Multiverses and Many Worlds conjectures would never have occurred to classical physicists. The Uncertainty Principle has raised many questions & eyebrows : not least about the continuity of Cause & Effect in the physical world, and the role of mental Choices in material physics. :smile:Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking. — Ludwig V
True, but your description sounds like a romantic fairytale version of history : an age of fatherly kings, and courtly knights, and fair maidens, and rustic ignorant peasants. But scientific history is less rosy. Some have described Feudalism as a "Protection Racket". In recent history, something similar to European Feudalism*1 was being established by Hitler in Germany to implement his dream of a Third Reich. At the same time in Asia, the semi-divine Japanese Emperor ruled over a feudal empire of Samurai lords, fair maidens, and millions of contented land-bound peasants. And both attempted to impose their idyllic system of governance upon neighboring countries by military force. But no one could tell the Fuhrer or Heavenly Sovereign that trying to emulate Alexander the Great or Genghis Kahn in the 20th century was not a good idea. It took a distant liberal democratic nation to say "No!" with an atomic bomb.↪Gnomon
Maybe feudalism has some good points. For example, a feudal lord lived with people in a community and could explain their needs and concerns to the king. The lord wasn't some politician who held an occasional town meeting to listen to constituents. He knew them because his mom was in their neighborhood. So, he wasn't a power-hungry politician. — BillMcEnaney
I think you missed the point of my post in favor of FreeWill for moral agents. Moral arguments carry no weight for scientists. But shouldn't they be indicative for philosophers? I wasn't presenting empirical evidence of freedom from determinism, but merely a suggestive analogy, to indicate that, in natural processes, Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect?Yes, and they are less than persuasive for that reason. . . .
Laplace's demon is a version of fatalistic determinism and easier to refute on logical grounds than causal determinism. — Ludwig V
Sorry if my term "exploit" offended your liberal sensibilities. I intended the word to be taken literally --- in the sense of manipulating Nature to derive some benefit to humanity --- but not politically. Everything artificial in the world "exploits" some feature of nature to give humans an advantage over animals. If humans hadn't "exploited" the natural phenomenon of fire, how would they survive the Ice Ages with no natural fur to keep them warm. Yes, the influence works both ways as give & take. But that's a whole other issue.It's a feature of Nature that the human mind may be able to exploit in order to impose its will on Nature. — Gnomon
If we think of it like that, we are making a mistake. The human mind is a product of Nature and part of it. Or, to put it another way, to think of Nature as something to exploit perpetuates the practices that have landed us with climate change. Worse than that, although we can and do exploit Nature in some ways, Nature also imposes itself on us - witness climate change and antibiotic resistance. It has to be a balance. — Ludwig V
Personally, I don't think human Life, or Culture, is incompatible with scientific explanation. We are just at the early stages of a science of Complexity & Chaos. Your examples of research into complex feedback & looping systems are along the same lines that the Santa Fe Institute is trying to make compatible with scientific methods. :cool:Lorenz's equations have already been used to explain why the weather is unpredictable. Maybe, in time, they will also reveal why the human mind is unpredictable. — Gnomon
Yes, I'm aware that there are many examples of systems and situations that reveal that the systems at work in the world are much more complex and much less predictable than our classical models have recognized. They do give us a basis for thinking that human life may be, in the end, not incompatible with scientific explanation. But they do not get us there, any more than simple randomness gets us there. I think that the research into self-constituting autonomous systems, feedback loops and ideas like Conway's Game of Life are much more to the point. — Ludwig V
Again, I was using weather complexity as a metaphor, from which to draw inferences about human exploitation of natural properties. I wasn't implying freewill in Natural phenomena, but in Cultural noumena, which is commonly assumed to result from collective human intentions & purposes & willpower. Here's just one of many examples of someone who thinks FreeWill is associated with the unpredictability of Complexity*2. Google "Emergence" and you will find many articles with similar associations. :smile:I don't think that unpredictability is a significant phenomenon here. Volcanoes and football matches, not to mention the weather, are all unpredictable. But no-one thinks that free will is involved. — Ludwig V
Yes. I'm aware that my "articulation" of a Causal Gap in Determinism is un-orthodox. But it's based on science, not magic. Beginning in the early 2000s, scientists began to study Complexity and Chaos seriously. The Santa Fe Institute was established specifically to bring together physicists & mathematicians, and a few philosophers, to learn about some of the Uncertainties in Nature that puzzled the early Quantum pioneers. Quantum Mechanics seemed to be missing a few gears. So, the Uncertainty Principle has been postulated as an opportunity for the exercise of FreeWill. In opposition, the Conjecture of SuperDeterminism*1 has been proposed, but as the link below notes, its argument seems circular.Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. — Gnomon
The orthodox articulation of the debate requires either positing free will as a magical kind of cause that is causally determined and/or a gap in causality that allows this unique kind of event to occur. Neither is at all plausible. — Ludwig V
Your Fork-in-the-Road argument may illustrate the notion of Free Will choices. But as a philosophical proof, it may or may not be convincing to determinists. Nevertheless, I agree that world Causation is both Deterministic and Indeterminate (undecided, uncertain). Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. Yet the unconstrained choice itself is not random (chaotic)*1, but determined by future-aimed intention.To conclude, I have proven I can change the future indirectly by interrupting the flow of the present. I also assert that at junctions we can change the future directly. This is my argument that life is both determined and has free will, but neither purely. — Barkon
Me too. Being apolitical by nature, I wasn't familiar with the notion of American "High Toryism" or Western "Confucianism. So, I looked-up those terms.↪Gnomon
Sure. But I was interested in how the OP was using these terms.
Terms like conservative and libertarian and right wing seem almost meaningless these days. And we can be sure that almost any Western government's chief allegiance is not to the people but to corporations and banks. What was Gore Vidal's salient quote? "There is only one party in the United States, the Property Party … and it has two right wings." — Tom Storm
Disclaimer : not an expert on any of these socio-political concepts. But for clarification of terms :By the way, though I'm a native-born Irish American, I believe in North American High Toryism instead of American conservatism. That's partly why Confucianism interests me. I suggest "American conservatism" may be an oxymoron because it seems to be Locke's classical liberalism. — BillMcEnaney
Excellent observation. Both Plato & Aristotle were doing Science in 500BC, but walking the tightrope without a net of technology-enhanced empirical evidence. And both saw a necessary distinction between physical Nature (Real) and metaphysical Theories (Ideal). So, Kant was merely updating that ancient science, with almost 1800 years of empirical & theoretical knowledge. Descartes' Discourse on Method had already boiled it down to the basics : the Observer, the "I" whose existence cannot be doubted, is the foundation of all other knowledge.I'll argue this way (and Kant is no way responsible for my errors). Kant's was about knowledge. His gold standard for knowledge was science - then as now understood to be the science of nature. "But," he asked himself, "how does that work? what grounds it?" — tim wood
Kant's Transcendental distinction was between "out there" empirical things and "in here" mental ideas about things. Hence, our knowledge of Nature consists of sensory appearances (haecceity), and rationally-inferred essences (quiddities). So, we don't know those ideal essences directly, but only by inferences from observations. And Hume had already noted a problem with Induction of general principles from limited observations of instances. As you noted, Kant proposed a synthesis of Ideal essences and Real appearances : the unobservable ding an sich, which we must accept as an unobtainable Ideal that we only approximate in our ideas & theories. :nerd:He noted that one theory was that nature was all "out there." But how if it's all out there can we move beyond mere observation - this being Hume's question? Alternatively, it's all a creation of the mind - but how then do we know anything of what we call nature? His resolution was through a synthesis of the two. — tim wood
Yes. The Hard Problem is not a "real" problem, it's an "ideal" problem. It's not a Scientific problem, but a Philosophical dilemma. It's not a problem of isolated material things, but of integrated mental concepts.The "hard problem" is not a real problem. It is like the difficulty of cutting apart concepts using scissors. If you think that all dividing is done using knives and scissors, it is a very hard to know how we can divide the ideas of red and green. The problem is not in the dividing, but in demanding that it be done using unsuitable methods. — Dfpolis
In Physics there is no such thing as Potential, since it is nothing until actualized. But it is a useful Philosophical notion, allowing us to think about how Nothing can become Something. For example, an isolated AAA battery has Zero voltage, but the potential for 1.5 volts, when actualized by plugging into a complete circuit : a whole recursive system.Except for the reference to non-human animals, this is very Aristotelian. He characterizes the mind/intellect (nous) as nothing until it thinks something. He would say that we have the potential to know and objects have the potential to be known, but neither is actually anything until knowing occurs. — Dfpolis
Modern Determinism typically looks to Quantum Physics to underwrite the notion that "Randomness rules!" But it may not be that cut & dried.Determinism connotes a colder, more calculated existance — Frog
gave an interesting distinction : romantic Fate vs pragmatic Determinism.What is the difference between Fate and Determinism? Is there one at all? — Frog
In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker argues against the Empiricist belief that ideas only derive from personal experience. However, his examples of "innate ideas" consist mostly of knee-jerk emotions, such as fear of snakes, that seem to be programmed into human genes via transpersonal evolutionary experiences. I'm not sure that's what Plato had in mind though. And Aristotle argued that humans do not inherit knowledge of First Principles (e.g non-contradiction), which must be derived by rational methods.In his "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," Locke makes an argument against the "innate ideas" of the rationalists. He is essentially trying to rebut the claim that all people have, by nature, certain ideas (e.g., an understanding of the principle of non-contradiction). — Count Timothy von Icarus
I found the article scientifically interesting, but philosophically unsatisfying. As I noted to : "The Aeon article is extremely interesting in terms of the science, but it only describes a separate pathway for sensory signals to reach the brain, and sheds no light on how those signals are interpreted into a meaningful mental experience" --- how we experience Qualia.If its claims are true, I believe the article may be on the right path to dissolving this problem - especially the question of why we experience qualia at all. — Luke
The April-May 2024 issue of Philosophy Now has an article by Raymond Tallis entitled The Illusion of Illusionism. Speaking of Consciousness, Tallis says, “There is . . . . nothing in matter or energy as seen through the eyes of physics that explains how a part of the material world might become aware of itself”. {my bold} The Aeon article is extremely interesting in terms of the science, but it only describes a separate pathway for sensory signals to reach the brain, and sheds no light on how those signals are interpreted into a meaningful mental experience.It’s called ‘the hard problem’ for a reason! You’re dealing with a question that is at the basis of a great many philosophical questions and there are no easy answers. — Wayfarer
Thanks. Yet I think Aristotle did associate both ideas in his discussion of Natural Purpose.This is to conflate two different ideas in Aristotle. What's usually translated as 'function' is 'ergon', the special nature of what is named, e.g. a knife cuts, humans engage in soul-based rational consideration. This is different to 'telos' or 'end', the purpose of an activity. — mcdoodle
Unfortunately, we can't see "purpose" in the non-self world with our physical senses, but we can infer Intention from the behavior of people & animals that is similar to our own, as we search for food or other necessities, instead of waiting for it to fall into our mouths. Some of us even deduce Teleology in the behavior of our dynamic-but-inanimate world system, as described by scientific theories. If there is no direction to evolution, how did the hot, dense, pinpoint of potential postulated in Big Bang theory manage to mature into the orderly cosmos that our space-scopes reveal to the inquiring minds of the aggregated atoms we call astronomers. Ironically, some sentient-but-unperceptive observers look at that same vital universe, and see only aimless mindless matter moving by momentum.Regarding the significance of teleology and its place in Aristotle's metaphysics, I happened on a very succinct explanation in a video talk by cognitive scientist Lisa Feldman Barrett. She simply says that teleology is 'an explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose which they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise'. That says a lot in very few words, as it demonstrates the sense in which reason also encompasses purpose for Aristotle, in a way that it does not for modernity. — Wayfarer
Thanks. That summary is in agreement my own understanding of the Real/Ideal and Phenomenal/Noumenal dichotomy. But my question was about your characterization of Kant's "equivocation" of that neat two-value division of the knowable world*1. Of course, in philosophical discourse, that "interplay" can get complicated, to the point of paradox.Within this context, 'noumenal' means, basically, 'grasped by reason' while sensible means 'grasped by thesense organs'. In hylomorphic dualism, this means that nous apprehends the form or essence of a particular - what is really is - and the senses perceive its material appearance. That's the interplay of 'reality and appearance'. Again from the article on Noumenon: — Wayfarer
Thanks. But, can you clarify Kant's "equivocation" for me? If the ding an sich is not Phenomenal, is it not then Noumenal by default? Is there a third category of Being : things vs dings vs (?) ? Or more than two ways of Knowing : sensation vs imagination vs (?) ?I would agree with that description, although not with the equivocation with ‘ding an sich’. That is owed to Kant’s confusing equivocation of ‘thing in itself’ with ‘noumenal’ which actually have two different meanings. — Wayfarer
Disclaimer : not erudite on Aristotle, Plato, or Kant. But I think they were onto something, even when I can't say exactly what it is.So, I wonder if real numbers are either subjective or objective. I mean, they're not to be found anywhere in the world, as such. Nor are they products of the mind, as they are the same for all who can count. That is the sense in which 'intelligible objects' are transcendent - they transcend the subject/object division. And not seeing that is part of the consequences of the decline of realism. The culture doesn't have a way of thinking about transcendentals. From an article on What is Math that I frequently cite in this context: — Wayfarer
Well put! Compared to blasé moderns --- with artificial senses, allowing us to see our "pale blue dot" from a god-like perspective --- ancient humans may have been more in awe of the immeasurable magnitude of the world, compared to the insignificance of the observer. That wonderful awesomeness may have been the inspiration for "Philosophy" (the search for understanding) and Science (attempts to control), and Religion (efforts to placate the sovereignty of Cosmic Powers).I think it started as pure philosophy, then wandered into superstition and lost its way in organized religion. — Vera Mont
I happen to agree with your conclusion that, in the real world, FreeWill and Determinism co-exist in the paradoxical synergy of statistical Probability. But proving that union of opposites will be like prying apart a paradoxical black box. FWIW, here's my personal take on the philosophical Compatibility Question from a few years ago. :smile:To conclude, I have proven I can change the future indirectly by interrupting the flow of the present. I also assert that at junctions we can change the future directly. This is my argument that life is both determined and has free will, but neither purely. — Barkon
Thanks. But it's a bit late in life for me to begin a scholastic study of "German idealists". I have a pretty good foundation in the pioneering Greeks. But I've never read any of Kant or Hegel or Schop --- other than popular quotes, Wiki articles and Wayfarer posts. So, all those famous philosophers are, for me, mainly symbols of specific concepts (Hegelian Dialectic) or general worldviews (Transcendental Idealism) that I may, or may not, want to use in what's left of my own real life. :smile:All his works are freely available online. Granted, a fair amount of reading, but the World as Will and Representation Vol 1 is a good start. In respect of the nature of the will, and why everything should be seen as its manifestation, read the paragraphs beginning here. Not easy reading, but then which of the German idealist were? — Wayfarer
I'm not a Schopenhauer scholar, so I'm just shooting in the dark here. His description of WILL --- "a blind, unconscious, aimless striving {random erratic motion?} devoid of knowledge {unintentional ; indeterminate?}, outside of space and time {supernatural?}, and free of all multiplicity {singular ; monistic?} " --- sounds like a natural mechanical energetic force, except for the "outside" and "monistic" modifiers, which sound more like a deity. Yet it's not an individual object or person, but more like an impersonal energy field or Causal Essence.In the OP, ↪Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. — Gnomon
Yes, I would like to elaborate on why I find it unacceptable. How is one to deny the will to live? Doesn't this imbue a persons life or deny their adaptability to the environment they are in?
Compare and contrast the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest with Schopenhauer's notion of the denial of the will to live? — Shawn
He probably didn't say that in so many words. But the common quote attributed to the "wise man" is an English paraphrase of the Greek original, intended to indicate that it's wise to not be too cocky about your all-knowingness. Especially on philosophy forums, where you will be called to account. :wink:One question on the link to note 3:where does Socrates say he knows nothing? I think it is a misquotation but would be glad to be shown that I am wrong. — Fooloso4
Ari did seem to assume the existence of some kind of supernatural beings, beyond the limits of human senses*1. But to me his "unmoved mover" sounds more like an abstract Nature-God than the Judeo deity, who walks in the garden with his creatures, and communicates his divine Will in no uncertain terms. In any case, I was using the term "to divine" in a colloquial metaphorical sense, not to be taken literally.Interesting comment on one sense of divine, but he is talking about divine beings. — Fooloso4
I'm not an Aristotle expert, but I do refer to his ideas on Metaphysics whenever discussions about philosophical "hard problems" --- as contrasted with scientific empirical problems --- come up. Perhaps Ari is saying that in order to divine*1 First Principles, penetrating wisdom (insight) is more important than mere superficial observation.I decided to start a new discussion rather than continue in the thread on the hard problem. . . .
"Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes." — Fooloso4
So, Lewis Carroll proved that what we see in the "looking glass" is actually a separate dimension where everything is reversed from the normal world. Now it all makes sense. :joke:In other words, what we see in a mirror is an optical illusion? — Gnomon
Assuredly not! As this paper by a famous mathematician demonstrates. — unenlightened
In other words, what we see in a mirror is an optical illusion? Does the brain try to make sense of the symmetry flip, by imagining the third dimension inverted? :joke:It doesn't flip things vertically or horizontally but in the third dimension - front to back. The confusion arises because humans have bilateral symmetry. — unenlightened
Interesting summary of general philosophical principles, extracted from real-world details. Forms are the essential idea of a thing that is instantiated in actual real things. The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind. The World-Will concept has been represented both as an unstoppable destructive tidal wave, and as an ongoing creative process, suitable for the evolution of thinking & willing & adapting beings. We are all in the same world, but we can choose to look at the dark side, or the brighter side of the same cloud.PLATO
Forms(X)-->Particulars(Y)
KANT
Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)
SCHOPENHAUR
Will(X)-->Representation(Y)
ALTERNATIVELY
Being(X)-->Becoming(Y)
[Body]-->[Mind]*
[Living]-->[knowing]* — ENOAH
Yes. I don't project a sunny Pollyanna view onto our imperfect world. But I also can't subscribe to Schop's gloomy-give-up outlook. I wouldn't want to model my personal worldview on his example of analytical intellectual critical methodology*1. His scientific approach to criticism is reductive, but I look to philosophy for a more holistic & creative big picture, including both the bad and the good stuff. Since I am a sentient creature, I can experience pain & suffering for myself. I don't need Schop's help to touch it where it hurts, to feel the exquisite agony of physical & psychological trauma. But I could benefit from a longer-broader view that envisions some "end" of suffering, preferably in the here & now world.In other words, it's not suffering all the way down - suffering has a cause and an end. I wouldn't look to Nietzsche for insight on that, however. — Wayfarer
OK. I'll leave the grown-up philosophy to those who are able to gnaw on tough gristly meat. But his fatalistic worldview (amor fati) is not for me. Although Siddhartha was also moved by the suffering of his huddled masses of countrymen --- several thousand years before Schopenhauer's insight --- at least he proposed a self-help attitude that might make the toughness more palatable. Other than a few quotes & wiki articles, I know little about scowling Schop, and I'm content to leave it that way.I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" — Gnomon
Grow up mate. Schopenhauer is for Big School, not kindy. — Wayfarer
I wasn't talking about , but about a dismal worldview that is not amenable to my own. From comments by other philosophers, I concluded long ago that "his ideas" were not conducive to rational philosophy*1*2*3. As depressed Hamlet said, "there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. To me, it is a prison". He wishes that his “thinking” would allow him to live out his life in ignorance, insentient of the tragedies of his polarized political world, in which fatherly kings can be slain, by a treacherous mother. The Will of the world may seem "aimless", in that it is not aimed at yours truly. But, the Will of a human is aim-able by intention.This is extremely uncharitable... This is dismissive, trivializing, mocking, etc. all with admittedly not reading much of his ideas. This is a transparent smear campaign! — schopenhauer1
I can see why Kastrup might endorse Schopenhauer's analytical Idealism, and why you could appreciate his notion of a Mind Created World. But I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" Cynicism. Hence, I've never attempted to actually read any of his "succinct" prose. All I know of his work is limited to his aphorisms. One of which inspired my latest contrarian blog entry*2.I still think the opening few sentences of WWR are among the immortal utterances of philosophy:
“The world is my idea”. — Wayfarer
I'm not sure what the "contradictory propositions" are in this case. Are you talking about A> knowing-Omniscience vs B> acting-Immanence : design & creation of A> perfect self-adjusting evolutionary space-time system vs B> imperfect mechanism requiring occasional adjustments (interactions ; interventions) to physical settings? "A" would leave the creator-demon outside the creation, but "B" would require the demon to stick-around to tweak the dials of Nature to keep it on track.Oh no, that's not it. I'm just saying that it cannot do what it doesn't do. This is the law of non-contradiction: it states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time.
Hence it cannot simply be omniscient when it interacts with the universe. The only way the demon can be omniscient about an universe is when it's not part of it. And when it's not part of it, it cannot give any information to anybody (interact with it, in general). — ssu
Some self-reference is necessary to have a self-concept. So I guess you're saying that Laplace's demon is omniscient until it begins to doubt its own abilities : to have a negative bias against itself. However, there may be another interpretation of that negative-self-reflection notion*1.Everything is truly predetermined. The future is what it will be. There is simply no room for choice, chance or randomness.
The negative self-reference refutes this possibility. — ssu
OFF TOPIC AGAIN. You might want to move these devolutionary digressions to a new or old thread : Realism vs Idealism or Phenomenal vs Noumenal, or Physical vs Metaphysical.My take is - and this is another digression, but what the heck - there is no electron until it is measured. — Wayfarer
In my own attempts to make sense of quantum queerness, I have postulated that an "entangled" particle is unknowable only because it is immersed in a holistic system of particles, like a drop of H2O in the ocean. If so, how does the observer pry-apart the entangled mass of particles in order to isolate a single part from the whole? Does the observer imagine the revealed particle by analyzing part-from-whole, or conjure from scratch, ex nihilo? Does the inquiring mind "create" a real world from scratch, or an ideal world-model from concepts? Is this physics or metaphysics?When those elementary particles are entangled, acting holistically, are they real or ideal? These are philosophical questions about physical & meta-physical states of being. — Gnomon
OFF-TOPIC : not specifically about evolution vs alternative theories of how we got to hereI’m curious about your reaction to his take on the ’mind-dependence’ of the world.
<< Dreyfus and Spinosa do much the same-‘consequently they are led to suppose that there is no possibility of access to things `in themselves’ from within the framework of the everyday and that the defence of scientific realism must therefore depend on severing the scientific from our ordinary, everyday access to things >>. — Joshs