But an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth could be freely and even positively interpreted to not retaliate in kind. — Vaskane

:100:

As a slight interlude: The ethical dictum of "an eye for an eye" strictly upholds a 1:1 ratio of retribution as moral. So both a 100:1 or a 10:1 ratio would be misaligned to it, and thereby immoral.

Just wanted to say it.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me. — ToothyMaw

This will likely to be very incomplete reasoning, but I’ll give outlining my current idea of metaethics a best shot:

First, consider that all ethics results first and foremost from what one oneself wants to obtain in the future given a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering (a premise which I grant can get very complex when looked at in detail) and b) that one is not alone in the cosmos as an agent described by (a) but that, instead, all coexistent agents in the cosmos are likewise described by (a).

Any conceivable end, or telos, that satisfies (a) given (b) will then be that which is good for oneself. One can of course envision more than one such possible future state of being. Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. Here, then, some things one could do to satisfy (a) given (b) will be objectively good (for they approach the objectively true telos just specified) and others will be objectively bad (for they approach objectively bad teloi at expense of the objectively good telos). Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue.

All this as an exceedingly terse outline of how I so far approach the issue of metaethics. And, of course, none of this makes any sense in a world wherein no teleological processes (and, hence, wherein no teloi) occur.

And, as a reminder, metaethics isn’t about prescription but about description. If telos 1 were true, it would justify the given ought. If telos 2 were true, it would not justify the given ought. The issue, again, is which conceived of ultimate telos is true and thereby conforms to what in fact is.

While I respect the overall sentiment of your post, I disagree in war never being an act of self-defense.

One could address the issue via individuals or via groups of such. War, or course, consists of the latter. But since addressing individuals is far more simplistic:

If person A is walking home and person B assaults and batters person A, person A can either do nothing and potentially end up dead or could defend themselves for as long as person B persists their aggressions. This, I believe, would be a just use of aggression on the part of person A. What would be an unjust use of aggression would be for person A to then assault person B beyond what is needed for person B to stop their unprovoked violence. (To not here also address person A's aggression toward non-aggressors as being unjust.)

Same, I so far believe, can be said for groups of people - where the term "war" can become appropriate. If group B assaults and batters group A, then group A is justified in using aggression in the same manner as person A is, and this to the same limitations: no more aggression than is required to desist group B's aggression, and no willful aggression toward non-aggressors.

Would you disagree with the examples just given?

In term of tribalism/patriotism there is a vague case here maybe. Vague though. — I like sushi

Short of immorality in willfully killing innocents, can you spell out the "vague case" here. I'm so far having a hard time understanding it.

You have 2 competing rules:

1. You have the right to defend yourself.
2. You are forbidden to kill the innocent.

Your question is what happens when the killing of the innocent is required to defend yourself, which is often the case in war. — Hanover

Required? The "Fog of War" syndrome is working overtime here. Mistaking an innocent for an aggressor is one thing in war, but one being required to kill non-aggressors so as to defend oneself from aggressors is incredibly topsy-turvy reasoning.

Person A holds an innocent child in front while holding a loaded gun at person B. Person B is not thereby required to shoot the child. Person B has options; the more forethought, the more options available given the particular context. And if person B were to have no other option while being an upright individual, person B's then murdering of the child (the newspeak Orwellian language of "collateral damage") so as to save their own life would weigh heavy on person B's conscience. For why ought person B judge their own life more valuable than that of the child's?

[...] self-preservation is of the highest priority, meaning you have the right to kill the innocent to save yourself, meaning I prioritize #1 over #2 when there is a conflict.

[...] The concept of self defense being a duty (not just a right) also has roots in secular Western philosophy, meaning pacifism for the sake of protecting the innocent among your enemy is itself immoral. — Hanover

So what, then, makes it immoral for one or more of those innocents you speak of to hold the same exact views toward their assailants (e.g., in regard to their assailants’ innocent loved ones) in the name of “self-defense”, and to then act accordingly in return?

Very much appreciate the Nietzsche quotes. Its been a very long time since I read him with zeal, and I've forgotten much of the details, but reading these aphorisms is heartwarming to me.

To me, love seems to be about wanting the best for a person, but also a sharing in that goodness through a transcendent union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Love is just a word and how similarly it's being used in different contexts isn't necessarily indicative of anything. What does it say if certain aspects of love between parent and child weren't present in how one loves food? Surely, the answer is close to nothing. Is the love felt towards one's parents only truly what you can also say about how one loves music and food? — Judaka

It’s often been said that “love is nothin’ more than chemicals in the brain”. But then, what of anything cognitive—percepts, convictions, thoughts, disdains, etc.—that relies upon the brain’s operations doesn’t consist of neurotransmitters? So then why do so many out there want to downplay love by insisting on a difference that makes absolutely no difference whatsoever?

Not that frivolous a question to me. Since antiquity love has been deemed by some to be “supra-physical”, so to speak, and far more important than a mere emotion to add to the collection. One form of this which is relatively commonly known to moderners being that of “God = Love (this rather than an omnipotent and omniscient male psyche somewhere up in the skies)”. No one doubts that imbalanced, or unharmonious, interpersonal love typically results in psychological pain to one party if not to all. Yet, in so affirming, the implicit issue becomes that of what a perfectly balanced, or perfectly harmonious, love would be—and it is the latter which idealistic youngsters (to name a few) typically aim for. All the same, the notion of a non-physicalist interpretation of love can get exceedingly complex even when only addressing the animate world of agents and our interactions. So, I won’t further pursue this ontological issue.

I for one fully agree with (authentic) love being a drive to maintain and increase unity of being, a "transcendent unity" so to speak.

I here mention the qualifier “authentic” because love as extreme liking is readily discernable as, well, intense liking but not as authentic love (regardless of form the latter might take): When one loves another sentient agent, aspects of the other’s being become an integral part of oneself for as long as the love persists, and, in due measure to the love experienced, one will be readily willing to risk personal suffering and corporeal death so as to aim at preserving the love which is, if such risk is required. When one loves raspberry ice-cream, however—this contextual expression here conveying “strong liking” and not “authentic love”—one does not intimately experience an emotive union with the raspberry ice-cream’s being. An English speaker can even state that the ice-cream is "to die for", but one would in all likelihood be pathologically disturbed to hold authentic love for the ice-cream cone which one is about to eat—such that one feels the death of a part of oneself with the eating of the “loved” ice-cream, or such that one will be readily willing to die in a conflict/war for the wellbeing of the love, the unity of being, between yourself and the ice-cream cone.

Mainly want to make the point that there is a substantial ontological difference between love as unity of being and love as strong liking of. The two are distinct.

Doubtless to me that the equivocation in semantics which many hold between the two senses of the word, despite the different contexts of use, is in large part resultant of an ongoing materialistic/physicalist worldview.

-------

Ps. As long as I’m at it, here’s an affirmative stance irrespective of one’s views regarding the ontological nature of love:

Love (in the strict sense of: an either conscious or unconscious drive to maintain if not also increase unity of being) is perpetually present and inescapable for any lifeform which perpetuates its own life, this minimally in the form of self-love (although one need not also like oneself for this self-love to be). In contrast, its opposite of hatred need not be experienced in order for love (at minimum, self-love) to occur and, furthermore, will always be contingent on the presence of self-love (for oneself or one’s cohort, of which one is a member) when experienced.

Due to this, there is therefore no necessary dyad between love and hatred: while the later will always be dependent on the former, the former can well occur in the complete absence of the latter.

Maybe "cosmic evolution" would have been a more appropriate term to use? The concept itself is that every "thing" within the universe/cosmos evolves via some form of selection that is fully natural. Back in my twenties, I upheld physicalism and causal determinism with a "naturalistic pantheism" worldview - held for ontological reasons. Things have since then changed for me. But the concept I've just outlined intrigued me back then - as it still does, though now within a different ontological frame of mind (one of non-physicalism and of a partially determinate indeterminism).

I'm currently not antagonistic to to Chardin. But, back then, I couldn't have cared less.

Hope that clarifies things.

so again, it is an weasely way of framing that question because the history went hand in hand with an Israel as reality and the Nakba.

I'll answer the rest later.. I haven't looked at it sufficiently yet.... — schopenhauer1

Your answer does not answer the question. But why even discuss with someone who's "weaselly" to begin with.

I've been more than forthright all along. Have a good one.

BTW, used to contemplate the notion of universal evolution a lot in collage days. . . . . At any rate, a universal evolution would help explain how life evolved out of nonlife, but its mechanisms would need to be ironed out properly in order to be taken seriously, or at least so I find. — javra

By "universal evolution" are you referring to the theory of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*1? — Gnomon

In relation to what I said, most definitely not.

As I understand it, such a teleological process is directed by divine Will (intention ; orthogenesis ; programming ; elan vital)*2 — Gnomon

I'm in agreement with here.

Is there a Final Form toward which the world is enforming? — Gnomon

Most all cosmologies speculate on what the "final form" of being might be. Here fully including those cosmologies of eternal return that postulate no final form whatsoever. As to the commonly accepted variants that can be currently found, there's a big freeze, a big crunch, a big rip, etc. And then you have the big bounce which fits an eternal return model.

Teilhard's final form, what he termed the omega point, is most certainly non-materialist in nature. As can also be said for notions such as those of Moksha or Nirvana. But that doesn't mean that materialists uniformly reject there being a final form of the world.

So the question is not as esoteric as some might make it out to be, this even from a materialist's pov.

Jesus Christ man, I did not say or imply that, just the formation of Israel. I knew you were going to bad faith argue by technically saying the "Nakba" which went hand-in-hand with the 1947 UN Resolution and the formation of Israel. — schopenhauer1

I asked for clarification in what of the Holocaust and of historical antisemitism justified the Nakba (as per Wikipedia, aka, “the violent displacement and dispossession of Palestinians, and the destruction of their society, culture, identity, political rights, and national aspirations” … which is a lot easier to express by use of one term). It wasn't a "bad faith argument". I also don't personally know you, and so I made it clear that I assume in good faith that what I expressed is not your view.

Your reply in no way addresses the issue.

To be clearer in where I presently stand, I can definitely see how the messianic traditions in both Christian and Judaic cultures would justify the establishment of a Judaic nation in the region from an overall Western pov. But I, again, so far fail to understand how the Holocaust and antisemitism in general does. Again, for example, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 could have established plans for a future official Judaic homeland in an area that wasn't already populated with an established peoples - thereby not requiring a Nakba or anything close to it for a Judaic state to occur.

Do Gypsies have a tradition that always points to a homeland that they mention daily in prayers, in traditions, etc? — schopenhauer1

Definitely not. Please let me know how this relates to what I previously stated regarding the Jewish people historically being nomadic for the greater portion of the past two millennia on account of not having a homeland (and of how a fair sum of antisemitism relates to this).

I would argue, by-and-large "Jews" define themselves more as an ethno-religion, and it is exactly Enlightenment movements (especially Reform Judaism) that made it less about the ethno and more about the religion to match their Christian peers. — schopenhauer1

Hm. Though I'm appreciative of the reply, this take on Reform Judaism conflicts with both my limited experiences and with what Wikipedia states:

Reform Judaism, also known as Liberal Judaism or Progressive Judaism, is a major Jewish denomination that emphasizes the evolving nature of Judaism, the superiority of its ethical aspects to its ceremonial ones, and belief in a continuous search for truth and knowledge, which is closely intertwined with human reason and not limited to the theophany at Mount Sinai. A highly liberal strand of Judaism, it is characterized by lessened stress on ritual and personal observance, regarding halakha (Jewish law) as non-binding and the individual Jew as autonomous, and great openness to external influences and progressive values. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_Judaism

Not-so-long-ago Palestine wasn't a thing. It was a province of "Palestine" (not a nation-state) under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire. — schopenhauer1

My bad. I should have said "Mandatory Palestine". Which was not "under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire" for nearly 30 years, this after the Lawrence of Arabia days during WWI. A complex historical issue, true. But that the Arabs were betrayed by the West, specifically by the United Kingdom and France, in not being granted autonomy after helping in driving away the Ottoman Empire as they were promised is a staple aspect of this history.

And indeed, that is really the real questions. What does a nation in wartime do? How does one "get rid of" an enemy? — schopenhauer1

Well, to run through the some of the options that come to mind:

a) One can completely kill off "the enemy", in full (man, woman, and child) when the enemy is a populace, so that the enemy no longer is. Which to me is reminiscent of what the Holocaust attempted to do. I.e., this would be a deplorable thing to try to do for various reasons.

b) One can completely subjugate and segregate the "the enemy" to ones despotic interests. This, however, tends toward perpetual revolt toward and animosity for those who subjugate.

c) One can find common ground with "the enemy". As one very simplified example: the enemy is pissed because they don't have water to drink; you then give them water in exchange for something you want (hostages for example); then there is a commonly understood situation wherein "the enemy" gets to drink water when needing it and you don't have hostages taken from your group. When either side breaches this commonly promised situation, then you can again stop their water supplies and they can again take hostages violently. Or something along these lines.

In addition, according to The Art of War, there's also this: the best way to win a war/conflict is the get what you want from "your enemy" before any war/conflict commences, this so that no war/conflict occurs. But it's a little too late for that.

I'm personally strongly in favor of option "c".

My guest got delayed for the time being. So I’ll go back on my word and make reply now.

Does this give us any reason to suppose that "perspective" of some sort is relative to all physical interactions? — Count Timothy von Icarus

To suppose, why not? But this would lead into supposing some form of animism/panpsychism, which I so far can’t make sense of. To accept? I’d so far say “no”.

His point was that the information content of things varies by context, even at a very basic level. The relevance here is that discoveries about the natural world sometimes require looking into interactions that only a handful of individuals are ever going to see, because they only occur in contrived lab settings, so they won't be part of most people's experiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course. Trust is a big part of both society and the knowledge spread within. But then these discoveries ought also be replicable by anyone who so cares, making the data equally available to all that would be interested (and have it within their technical and financial means) to empirically experience the same data. Otherwise, one would quickly run into bogus claims and authoritarianism.

I'm not sure if that becomes a problem or not, but it does seem like advanced instrumentation can help create a more authoritative view on "what there is," even if most people aren't privy to using or understanding it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I so far don't see how this would in any way conflict to what I theorized about the nature of physical objectivity, and agree with the observation.

The other problem is that the majority of any sort of "community" can obviously be wrong about facts, which gets at the idea of "justification" of claims. So maybe "everyone would agree on x if given the same data," not "everyone agrees about x." Historically, there are well accepted "objective facts," that it has nonetheless taken time to discover and satisfactorily demonstrate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, I don't find disagreement with this overall picture. Examples might help: that the planet is roughly spherical is an objective fact that has taken time to discover and satisfactorily demonstrate. Yet not everyone agrees (if one can take flat Earth society as a serious enterprise by some), and such will disagree due not to greater intelligence or rationality or better data regarding the matter but due to, here it comes, biases to which they seek to conform the data of which they are aware. (This where "a bias" is roughly understood along the lines of favoring what one wants as an ego at the expense of what in fact is.)

I'm curious. If you have an ontological understanding of what physical objectivity consists of, as I presume you do, how do you go about demarcating the notion of "the objective world"?

Currently short on time, but yes, in many ways very much agree with your post. I mentioned the spatotemporality of a rock as objective on grounds that time and space will themselves be equally intersubjective to all coexisting beings that in any way interact (though, when further enquired into, this gets into parallels with the Theory of Relativity: whatever is in close enough proximity to causally interact will share a common space (distance between givens) and time (duration between the commencement of significant changes) ... but not necessarily so otherwise).

But yes, to simplify things, to my mind: a certain flower, for example, will have a certain pheomenal appearance to (almost) all members of the human species, which here share a common intersubjectivity as a species (with deviations deemed un-normal, such as with color-blindness). And so the flower's color being, for instance, red will be deemed objectively real by all humans. Different species of life, however, will perceive the same flower as holding different phenomena - all yet bound to the same spatiotemporal limitations of what the flower objectively consists of. So a bird, or cat, or insect will see the flower differently according to their own species-spacific intersubjective reality. Etc. With plenty of overlap between species in terms of phenomena.

If one likes, the objective world is however constituted of Kantian-like noumena.

As to issues of identity, that does get complex. But I'd yet maintain there occurs an intersubjectivity equally applicable to all sentient beings all the same when, for example, a bee, a human, and an extraterrestrial (if they occur) causally interact (such as by perceiving each other in relation to what the human sees as a red flower).

I'll revisit tomorrow. Thanks for the input.

:up:

Sure, there is obviously some bracketing here. The "closed" sign on a store objectively means "the store isn't open for business," but that doesn't mean that such a meaning is accessible from the viewpoint of a passing cat or dog. There is a context that is relevant. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is use of the term "objective" in the same relative sense we use terms like "good" or "perfect" or "selfless"; relative to that which is less [X] that address is [X]; which leads to humorous tropes such as something being "better than perfect" (i.e., better that what was required for a proper fit, for instance).

Yet an objective rock will hold the same spatiotemporal properties to all humans, cats, and dogs; to all coexistent beings that happen upon the same rock in practice.

Getting back to what Joshs was saying about objectivity being intersubjective, hypothesize there being a reality which affects all coexistent psyches equally - this in principle at least - this irrespective of species of life or of the life addressed being earthbound. This I would term objective physical reality. Then, given this premise, one can either hold a materialist-like view of it or a constructivist-like view of it. In exploring the latter view, objective reality would then be that singular intersubjective reality (such as a language or a culture) which is common to all beings in the cosmos. This can then be inferred to lead to an idealism of sorts very much in keeping with Peirce's notions of physicality being effete mind that is itself always perpetually evolving, with universal laws being global habits. Here, objectivity is singular and, because it pertains to all equally, it pertains to no one individual being or cohort. Yet it is still "that actuality which, in being equally actual to all, is perfectly impartial to any one psyche or grouping of these", in this sense being (individual) mind independent. An objective reality we as individual minds perceive intra-subjectively via our inter-subjective filters of interpretation. Physical objects as those physically objective givens that invariable stand before us as subjects irrespective of our wants and desires as individual minds or collections of these.

I get this is an extravagant and, currently, idiosyncratic view of what objectivity entails. It's been my modus operandi for some time now, all the same.

If anyone finds inconsistencies with this given view in terms of what objective reality is, I'd love to know about the proposed inconsistencies.

(Within this worldview, an objective good - in the sense of that which is factually good for all when all biases are removed - can obtain. But this doesn't focus on physical objectivity, instead addressing that which is objectively real for all psyches, and which, in part, would govern the evolution of physicality's natural laws which C.S. Peirce for example makes mention of. But this is a mouthful - and I likely won't be able to adequately argue for it in a forum format. I would be grateful for any criticism regarding physical objectivity as just outlined, though.)

Why so? For instance, what other interests do you find occurring in Western Civilization post Enlightenment which justify what Palestinians term the Nakba? — javra

The Holocaust, historical reasons, and antisemitism in general in the West. — schopenhauer1

I don't yet understand how the Holocaust and the history of antisemitism justify the Nakba. To make myself better understood, it so far seems to be affirming that because the Nazis (and many others) considered Jews as "sub-human", Jews in Israel have had the right to consider Palestinians as "sub-human" in relation to their own worth. But I so far doubt this is what you're intending to say.

"To the Jews as individuals, all rights. To the Jews as a nation, no rights." was what came out of the National Assembly convention in 1789. — schopenhauer1

OK, but back then Jews as a people did not have their own nation. (Having heard, lets say, plenty of bias against both, this is the one thing that Jews and Gypsies have traditionally held in common as otherwise two very different peoples: they were nomadic peoples.)

Another very touch topic, but is a Jew defined as Jewish - this throughout history - by an ethnicity (something that, for example, can thereby be traced with mitochondrial DNA nowadays), by the specific religion of Judaism, by a nationality, or necessarily by all three simultaneously? I've heard of or encountered plenty of Jews that are either not religious or else hold onto different religious convictions (this, particularly, in the modern neopagan community; e.g. Starhawk), but Jews they nevertheless are. As to a Jew being necessarily defined by a nationality, namely that of ancient Israel (as in “Israelite”), this is to me strongly connected to religious convictions themselves. Which in part gets to the quote you've provided (given its proper historical context) and, in part, gets to many a non-Zionist Jew who do not identify with any nationality other than that nation in which they have grown up in (this not being that of modern Israel).

So the Nakba came about from internal conflicts that were ongoing right before the UN 1947 declaration, and after that turned into a regional war. And indeed it is about land rights, and whether to acknowledge a Jewish state. — schopenhauer1

Yet, that the establishment of a Jewish state after WWII happened to be within not-so-long-ago Palestine, this rather than somewhere else in the world that was not already populated in an established way, to me, at least, directly coheres into the very messianic prophesy I initially brought up.

More-or-less, yes. That is to say, the way history unfolded, the reality is these "nation-states" are fully European in origin, not a sort of political entity indigenous to X (regions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, etc.). So excuse my language, but WTF would one be talking about when discussing "self-determination" when it is already confined to YOUR (yes YOU Western person who claims to be pro-underdog) who has thus defined it to be self-determined in YOUR Westphalian/Atlantic Charter/Post-Colonialist way?

But you see, there is NO GETTING OUT of the system either. You cannot turn back post-colonialism to so pre-colonization time. So what is one to do? — schopenhauer1

Speaking for myself, I don't favor underdogs on account of their simply so being. And true, there is no going back. Something that Native American Indians (First Nations) know all too well, for example. The issue isn't about how do we go back to the way things once were but how do we move forward from here on out.

But to be blunt: My little mind foresees a lot more hatred of Jews, hatred of the USA, and hatred of the West at large if this conflict can only be resolved via the extermination of the Palestinians from their current land ... or else gets turned into the largest concentration camp the world has yet to witness. This increased inter-cultural hatred is not something that I want. But the world at large is watching. And every Palestinian child that escapes death and will grow into an adult will likely not hold kind thoughts regarding the three populaces just mentioned - to which I pertain. This as just one little - but maybe all the same significant - example of what will await in our future. This apropos a ceasefire that stands relatively little chance of occurring anytime soon – as in, right now.

So, at to "what to do", from where I stand, those who are more quote-unquote "civilized" should be the first to stop the killing of innocent people - on the streets, in shelters, in hospitals, etc. - and this for their/our own future interest in both the short-term and the long-term.

No worries mate. :wink: — Gnomon

:grin: :up:

Regarding Causation, the origin & direction of causation (First Cause ; Teleology) is not important for materialists. What matters to them is tangible results. — Gnomon

Hm. I rather think that explanatory power is the principle issue, and that this is the "tangible result" that most are interested in. For instance, between things such as "getting what is the point of this life/existence" and things such as "having a gadget that technologically surpasses all gizmos previously owned", I'm wagering that most would choose the former (granting that it manages to make any coherent sense)

But in the absence of the former, as most of us happen to be, the latter serves as a very good means of distraction and, thereby, amusement. With a little bit of functionality thrown in.

I suppose the postulated New Law of Evolution will be judged, not by its abstract universal Truth, but by its concrete lab Results. :smile: — Gnomon

This gets back to its explanatory power, I think.

BTW, used to contemplate the notion of universal evolution a lot in collage days. Given a) some ready established forms and b) a force placed upon them, they will most often naturally develop into a new structure whose form as such was selected by (a) and (b). For instance, take ten randomly placed coins in one's palm or in a cup, randomly shake them, and they will naturally organize into one or more columns. Same can be said for most anything, with no life required for this selection of form. But the philosophical underpinnings here get complex. At any rate, a universal evolution would help explain how life evolved out of nonlife, but its mechanisms would need to be ironed out properly in order to be taken seriously, or at least so I find.

I don’t know if it’s that simple. Now you are reducing this conflict more than probably the case. — schopenhauer1

Why so? For instance, what other interests do you find occurring in Western Civilization post Enlightenment which justify what Palestinians term the Nakba?

No, I specifically defined what I meant by 17-18th Enlightenment movement. — schopenhauer1

Ok. I then take your reply to indicate that criticism of Western civilization at large by westerners is not something that is to be proscribed? The proscription simply applying to the potential denunciation of the ideal of "universal rights for all people" and the like?

Well, "apocalypse" means a sort of "revealing or revelation" and can mean some sort of esoteric secrets like the beginning of the world, the end of the world, heavenly realms, heavenly hosts, etc. In other words, its very esoteric. — schopenhauer1

Right. And so understood from a non-Abrahamic perspective (here written as an umbrella generalization and not looking at what more often than not are deemed heretical variants--with aspects such as the Kabbalah as exceptions), an apocalypse is always a strictly personal experience regarding the nature of reality - i.e., mysticism 101 (of which Gnosticism is one variant) - rather than about the living dead rising up from their graves or some such.

So I would say it is a bit of a misnomer to say "the Christ arrives for fundamentalist Jews". The idea of the messiah being "The Christ" is a very "Christian" concept (mainly from Paul and his writings). Messiah comes from the Hebrew "moshiach" and was meant to refer to a leader who would bring an end to any occupying civilization and restore the old kingship back to the an heir from the lineage of the House of David. Later versions (starting around the Book of Daniel we'll say), had a more apocalyptic aspect where the dead will rise, and there will be universal peace (lion lies next to the lamb, etc.). Some versions around the time of Jesus had an apocalyptic aspect of the warring of the "elect of Israel" and the rest, etc. (the Dead Sea Scrolls is a good source for this more apocalyptic version of events). Some of that may still be in there, but the beliefs of the mystical aspects are more fluid and open to interpretation. The basic gist is that it is a Jew (literally a Judhite as David was from the tribe of Judah) restoring the kingship of Israel.

The Christ is Paul's notion that the messiah has a metaphysical component. He may be pre-existing (though in Paul's letter that might not be the case), and eventually tied into the notion of a literal Son of God, and that his death acts as a sacrifice abrogates the original covenant such that the Laws of Moses become nullified. This is actually the real split from Judaism, not believing that "Jesus was the Messiah" (though that didn't help too between the very early group after his death, because a dead messiah doesn't seem plausible as restoring the kingship.. If he is dead, he cannot fulfil that). — schopenhauer1

Hm. From what I know, “Christ” or, more accurately, “Khristos” is the Ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew word for Messiah, ”מָשִׁיחַ”, both having the same exact meaning of “the anointed one”. For both religions basically meaning the chosen one who will lead his people into salvation of one type or another. Let’s not forget that all “Christians” were in fact Jewish and pagan (if Gnosticism-like beliefs held by former polytheists get so labeled) before the first Council of Nicaea with its newly found doctrine of the Trinity. But yes, today “Christ” distinctly connotes Christian religion whereas Messiah tends to connote Judeic religion. Thanks for the correction in that regard.

Anyway, yes there is a strong tie of Evangelical theology with Israel as the belief is that if all Jews go back to Israel Jesus would come back and then send the non-believers to hell and start the whole rapture and the like. — schopenhauer1

Right. This state of affairs has always made me doubtful of the sincerity of a two state solution as sponsored by the USA and Israel. I used to hope for the best in this respect—thinking that this would best facilitate relative peace given regional politics—but constantly saw all signs indicating that this “two state solution” proposal was nothing but a facade for stopping any opposition to the forceful disappearance of all Palestinians from the former state of Palestine … this to facilitate the coming of the Messiah/Christ at nearly any cost. And today’s activities in these two countries in no way contradicts this in fact being so. I know it’s a very touchy topic, but there you have it. To non-extremists—be they Jews, Christians, Muslims, pagans, Buddhists, atheists, or what have you—were this to in fact be so, it can well be looked upon as an unwholly alliance between two otherwise antagonistic extremist factions … which as alliance is set on destroying what we have of global harmony so that they might have their personal salvation in the here and now.

My questioning, though, was more in regard to what constitutes this “Western Civilization” of ours that should not be derided by us westerners. Many fundamentalists will maintain that it is the very fundamentalist interpretation of scripture—including that of the Messiah’s/Christ’s coming—around which Western Civilization pivots. And I can see this argument: from “in God we trust” written on money to bibles in trials and more (although, to me, were Cleopatra to have succeeded in her endeavors, and were ancient Egypt to have united with ancient Rome, it would still be Western Civilization—albeit one likely not pivoted around anything Judeo-Cristian).

But then, are you saying that us non-extremists are wrong for wanting this aspect of current Western Culture, which longs for some violent apocalypse to occur, to no longer be of any influence in politics (or in society at large for that matter)?

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ps. Personally dislike this use of “apocalypse” to address supernatural doings, like the reawakening of the dead of which you make mention. It initially strictly meant a revealing—literally, an un-covering of what is (which makes far more sense in a gnostic-like interpretation of the world). Bummer, that’s all.

pps. Grew up around more than a few non-extremist Jews, many of which are still good friends of the family if not personal friends. That said, in high school had one Orthodox Jewish friend who latter on became extremist. He for example once informed me that Palestinians were “sub-human” … the same rhetoric used by Germans toward Jews before the Holocaust … and he claimed to have quite a following online, this a few years back. Gained a rather bad impression from this now no longer friend in respect to extremists.

It seems I might have been too terse in my reply. Certainly: science is thoroughly founded upon philosophy and in no way the other way around. By “science” I am here strictly referring to the scientific method regardless of domain—which is fully fallibilistic in both theory and practice (this as per fallibilism …. aka, a newly coined term for the academic skepticism of ancients such as Cicero)—and in no way things such as technology, scientism, or the like. So understood, science is strictly in the business of gathering dependable data, which is equally available to all in principle (overlooking its sometimes corporatized aspects, e.g. typical pharmaceutical research), via which to validate our best suppositions and to falsify our erroneous beliefs. In so being, it is strictly limited to those observables that are observable by all in principle (this leading to the somewhat different issue of things such as consciousness not being scientifically evidenced, this in the strict sense of science just expressed). The theory or evolution and that of relativity were not in and of themselves in any way developed through the scientific method—but are very well supported by data that has been thus obtained while providing best explanatory power for the said data to date, and are thereby scientific only in this latter sense. These two examples of scientific theories illustrate how science is founded upon philosophy, but things in fact get more complex, for all science (be it today’s, yesterday's, or tomorrow's) is founded upon metaphysical postulates, such as that of causality as we currently interpret the term.

In large part due to Descartes, we now largely consider two out of Aristotle’s four causes to lack ontic reality (this contra the reality of someone’s mind and belief structures therein): formal causation and teleological causation. Moderners thus do not believe that there are teleological causes in the world, but answering the question of “What caused you to rob the bank?” with “I needed money” is in no way outdated, being deemed a rational (if in no way reasonable) answer to give. Here, then, is teleological causation: “the want to have money in the future” will, as telos/goal/aim, significantly determine what one presently does or formerly did.

At any rate, science cannot establish via its data acquisition whether teleological causation is real or only imaginary, for example. Were there to be an ontology proposed which incorporates teleological causation, it would nevertheless need to not contradict the established data obtained via the scientific method (say, like insisting that dinosaurs and humans once coexisted so as to fit data into a Young Earth Creationism account of things—which would contradict the established data of fossil records in layers of earth; else, were free will to be real, it could not contradict the established data regarding our central nervous system’s operations). Again, the occurrence or absence of teleological causation is not something that science can establish. Current science operates upon the philosophical position that teleology does not occur. Yet an ontology of teleology, in order to be coherent and consistent, would a) need to hold a greater explanatory power than the established philosophically metaphysical position that teleology is nonexistent and b) be conformant to all data (rather than theory) we hold regarding the world and ourselves. Were at least (b) to occur, then one could then uphold a new metaphysical postulate (relative to current day postulates) in coherent and consistent manners. And the scientific method as practice would continue just as before.

I hope this better presents my position regarding science and causation (as just one example of science and metaphysics in general).

The most common argument against the existence of objective morality and moral facts besides moral differences between societies is that they aren’t tangible objects found in the universe and can’t be measured scientifically. Are there any refutations or arguments against this?- — Captain Homicide

Same can be said of psyches … if by “universe” one here intends the physical universe.

Here’s a premise: good = preferable. Good/preferable to whom or what if not to psyches themselves? Seems to me that if there are no psyches, then there cannot be anything good/preferable.

As to objective good, this would translate into that which is objectively—i.e., impartially or unbiasedly—preferable to all coexistent psyches in the cosmos (who might or might not then be ignorant of what this objective good is). And this postulate of an objective good would in turn be in part contingent on there being underlying universal(s) to all coexisting psyches.

If no such universals to all coexisting psyches—to simplify, let’s just say consciousnesses here—then no such thing as an objective good. But then, there wouldn’t occur such a thing as consciousness as a commonly occurring, or else commonly shared, property of being; i.e., the very word “consciousness” would then become meaningless, for it would mean something different, and utterly unrelated, to each and every individual [… ?].

By this general account I then take it that there are universals to all coexisting consciousnesses. Which then facilitates the possibility of an objective good.

This is a bit like preaching to the choir, here. :smile: I’ll only add that any new metaphysical postulations (e.g. as to the nature of causality) will need to remain conformant to established data obtained via the scientific method. But maybe this goes without saying.

There is no going back. There is no way out, for good or bad. Mine as well embrace what makes the West work, as you are living in that framework. — schopenhauer1

Apropos an underlying current that's been in many of the more recent posts I've read regarding the Israel / Palestinian conflict on this tread:

First off, I am extremely in favor of a cessation to all antisemitism worldwide. (To the antisemites out there this would make me a hardcore “Jew lover”.) However, I am also one to sternly believe that a Semite—which, let's face it, is a technically inappropriate and often derogatory slang for “Jew”—is not to be absolved of all wrongs merely on account of so being Semitic.

As such, I am very opposed to the slaughter of innocent Palestinians (btw, don’t know how more innocent a person can get than being a child) by the Israeli state … which indeed is, from at least my pov, nowadays in large part internally supported by Judaic religious fundamentalists rather than Jews who take views such as that of “not in our name”. (such as those who some years back outlawed interracial marriages between Palestinians and Jews, if memory serves me right)

With that general background in mind, apropos the allegiance to Western Civilization by westerners, or something to the like, which this thread in part seems to be about:

Has anyone so far brought up the following issue?

The religious fundamental-extremist drive, yearning, and often undulated lust for the coming of the Messiah asap (the first time the Christ arrives for fundamentalist Jews; the second coming for fundamentalist Christians)—which is supposed by fundamentalist-extremists to only occur once the nation of Israel is fully inhabited by only Judaic people is, to the best of my knowledge, a staple part of the Western Judaeo-Cristian civilization. Some such extremist Christians at least seem to exhibit some degree of blood-lust in this craving; cf. the whole “Armageddon days” that is desired to arrive by some, and as was supposedly prophesied in Revelations (for only then will Christ’s second coming occur, according to this common interpretation of scripture). Some current fundamentalist-extremist Jews seem to not be lagging too far behind in this same lust for blood (from human lesser-animals, apparently).

Christ’s coming for the first time for Jews can be, for fundamentalist-extremist Jews (btw, a group to which, tmk, many Orthodox Jews are sharply antithetical, the latter being very peace-loving and such), interpreted to signify the exaltation of the chosen people and, by certain inferences, thereby the subjugation of all non-chosen-people, i.e. Gentiles—or something to this effect (heck, one can even see the case for the existential disappearance of Gentiles world over for not being “sufficiently close to G-d” as understood by self-labeled “true Jews”). Whereas Christ’s second coming for fundamentalist extremist Christians will basically signify that all non-believers get sent to eternal Hell right away, Jews most typically included.

But, despite this, till then, there is all indication of a strong, unassailable allegiance between fundamental-extremist Christians and fundamental-extremist Jews, for both seek the same given aforementioned goal of fulfilling the prophecy of the Messiah’s coming.

One could bicker among the details of the just expressed (and I wrote them down from best recollections, mistaken as these sometimes are, without going through the trouble of finding references where appropriate, and most certainly with the hew of my own current biases as a human)—but the overall gist to me seems to remain. Oddly, I haven’t heard of this commonly known reality of fundamental-extremist religious belief structure among the Judaeo-Christian civilization/populace often spoken about publicly, such as in media or in houses of worship with publicly accessible sermons. And those brights/atheists in the populace haven’t managed to make the slightest dent in this situation; if anything, only adding fuel to the fire. In democracies, politics is determined by the population’ intentions. How much of the western populace is fundamentalist-extremist is hard, if at all possible, to accurately judge. But there’s plenty of evidence that fundamentalist thought and practice has not diminished, and has likely increased, in the West at large over the decades. If nowhere else, then at least in the USA.

So—this just mentioned issue of the Messiah’s coming sure seems to me to be a purely Western Civilization thing. Many might even say that the West as we know it required, and still requires, Judaeo-Christian ideology in order to work.

The pinnacle issue all this is intended to ask about: Ought this policy-influencing yearning in our Western culture for the Messiah's coming to not be mentioned, questioned, and disapproved of by us westerners … this on the grounds that it has been a staple aspect of Western Civilization for the past two millennia?

--

Ps. Not only am I very pro all peace-loving and justice-loving Jews of the world, I’m also for all Christians that—in the paraphrased words of Bill Maher in the documentary “Religulous”—are “Christ-within-ers” or some such (to my reckoning: hold the ethical teachings of JC as that which ought to be lived and practiced via works). Well, since I also mentioned atheists, also very much pro all humanitarians as well. All the same, the issue I posted is still of interest to me.

If these fields were trying to replace the intuitive concepts that are misleading about human nature, we wouldn't spend hours on this forum pointing out how they don't make sense. "Are humans selfish?", "Does freewill exist?", "What's the meaning of life?". We still use these poorly defined concepts that, when you think about it, are contradicting our knowledge of reality. — Skalidris

I for one find the issue of free will important - it facilitates a non-causally-deterministic ontology, for instance. And as to everyone being selfish, I'd say "of course" but in different degrees and with different ambitions (the altruist and the scrooge are both technically selfish, but one is far more selfless than the other). Still, I think I get what you're saying. One thing that's always bothered me, for example, is the concept that authentic love is always unconditional (which I encountered far too often in my youth). To which I say bull. Love between people is always conditional on one person not mistreating the other, this just because they can. Otherwise, dysfunction ensues.

So I think we agree with the concluding sentiment. But maybe approach it from different angles.

Why make it binary? There is no such thing as "perfect knowledge", knowledge is always evolving. — Skalidris

No, I didn't intend a sharp dichotomy. Empirical data on the human condition is quite important. But with this issue of whether it's within human nature for humanity to change into something better or of else being doomed to always remaining the same (as in the Roman coliseum days of bread and circus, for example, which I find we're currently reliving), I don't find that empirical data can ever be sufficient to evidence things one way or another.

For another instance, human nature is intimately entwined with ethics - and empirical data to my knowledge cannot evidence the nature of ethics (e.g., of whether the good is relative or objective), although it can greatly benefit our knowledge of what is and has been in practice.

To give you another example, the expectations we have of romantic love, the way it is painted in movies, is honestly closer to expecting being love bombed by narcissists than actually wanting to be close and spend your life with someone because you truly love who they are. And I believe so many relationships fail because people still hold on to these expectations and never reach it. — Skalidris

:up:

So, this part of the thread started with theorizing on possible actions and explanations of actions of gods. In your understanding are the purported behaviors and actions of gods (as described by religions), "supernatural", examples of the "metaphysical", or both? — LuckyR

One can find variations. For example, if one’s belief is that lightning is caused by Zeus because that’s what everybody else says, or because so it was somewhere written, but one does not hold a coherent and consistent explanation of why this is the case, then one will be holding supernatural beliefs without engaging in the philosophy of metaphysics. If, on the other hand, one for example hypothesizes that a god Zeus holds the properties of being all-powerful and all-benevolent as a premise and then processed to conclude that such a Zeus is existentially impossible on grounds of contradictions (lack of consistency)—e.g., that of Zeus not being able to create an object that is too heavy for him to lift, and that of evil occurring in the world—then one would here be engaging in the philosophy of metaphysics without upholding supernatural beliefs. And then there might be instances where the two converge. Here, Heraclitus philosophy comes to mind: he’s well enough known as a forefather of process philosophy (which is metaphysics) but, for example (from about 2/3 into §4):

There is, however, a guiding force in the world:

Thunderbolt steers all things. (B64)

The fiery shaft of lightning is a symbol of the direction of the world. Anaximander may have already used the image of the shipmaster of the universe (Kahn 1960: 238). Heraclitus identifies it with the thunderbolt, itself an attribute of Zeus the storm god. The changes wrought by and symbolized by fire govern the world. The ruling power of the universe can be identified with Zeus, but not in a straightforward way: “One being, the only wise one, would and would not be called by the name of Zeus” (B32). And here the word used for ‘Zeus’ can be rendered “Life.” Like the Milesians, Heraclitus identifies the ruling power of the world with deity, but (like them also) his conception is not a conventional one. — Heraclitus - SEP

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In the context of this thread, I so far take the issue of god/s to have been addressed with the intent of addressing philosophical metaphysics in the absence of supernatural beliefs.

Okay, I guess my previous understanding is correct. Namely that academic Metaphysics does NOT necessarily (even with a ten foot pole apparantly) address the actions of "metaphysical" entities. That second use of the word perhaps being a "colloquial" use of the term.

So we're addressing two different uses of the term. — LuckyR

Yes, two different usages of the term, but I for whatever reason feel that I've not been quite understood. So I'll write a bit more.

I’m assuming you were referring to this statement:

My point was why look at the issue solely "logically" when the hallmark of the metaphysical is the "magical"? After all, that was the whole reason humans invented the metaphysical, namely to explain the (currently) unexplainable. — LuckyR

In the context of philosophy, metaphysics is neither an atheistic nor a spiritual discipline; it’s indicative of neither. Its hallmark is, pure and simple, the study of reality’s fundamental principles. As such, its hallmark is not magic but reasoning, logic as you say.

Whereas the terminology of a “metaphysical entity”—by which I interpret you meaning a god, ghost, or the like—to me lucidly illustrates the prejudice against tampering with physicalist metaphysical principles which I previously mentioned. This as though physicalism is not of itself a metaphysical doctrine through and through.

To better illustrate this point: The claim what we as conscious beings transcend into a state of absolute nonbeing (of nothingness) upon our corporeal death is not commonly considered metaphysical but rather factual (this by the typical atheist at least), though it is an inferred conclusion that is usually derived in full from the purely metaphysical principles of physicalism/materialism (again, its interpretations of causation, substance, and the like)—and is thereby a metaphysical conclusion.

If you want to use “metaphysical” to address divinations, ESP, house fairies and the like, so be it. But, as I previously argued, that meaning seems to stem from a derogatory and reactionary interpretation of any academic metaphysics, else of metaphysics as a philosophical study, that questions the physicalist/materialist metaphysical worldview. And that meaning is certainly not what “metaphysical” means within philosophical contexts, such as the one we’re presently in.

Certainly one can find synonyms such as "supernatural", "spiritual", or "supernal", this while on a philosophy forum, rather than claiming that metaphysics is founded upon, or else is about, magic. Or at least qualify what type of metaphysics one is referring to. Or not. At the end of the day, just sharing perspectives here.

Just because some humans do some things doesn't mean everyone should do it, that has nothing to do with being closer to human nature. When I mentioned making concepts that are closer to reality, I meant it in a scientific way, gather the best knowledge we have about human nature and try to change concepts that are misleading like those I mentioned. — Skalidris

I think I understand you better now. Don't we already have such fields, though, including those of sociology, anthropology, and cognitive sciences?

I instead generally find that most are unconcerned for the established data thereby produced, especially when it conflicts with their preconceptions. And you generally can't force education down someone's throat against their will and expect the other to actually assimilate the data into their belief systems. So, to me, it seems to comes down to the issues of education and self-determined interests.

How is considering rape as a crime distorting human nature? — Skalidris

Well - although I fully agree with the sentiment - this pivots on the cultural battles that occur in some spheres regarding what human nature in fact is. We all project to some extent of ourselves onto others, and society at large. (is reality dog-eat-dog or not) But, what I find more important, we all hold some metaphysical pre-judments regarding the nature of reality and our place in it as humans. No doubt some empirically discoverable human universals occur and will continue to occur for as long as the human species remains human - but this doesn't come close to defining what "human nature" in fact is. This latter issue is fully contingent on the nature of metaphysical topics - as previously alluded to, such as the extent to which the human nature is plastic rather than being fully determined. Scientific data will not resolve this question.

To more directly answer, to some of those who deem human nature fully deterministic, the rape and assault and misogyny/gynophobia (latter: fear of femininity) that currently occurs in societies is there as a God or Nature given aspect of human nature. One that cannot be changed even in principle; one that is therefore not an intrinsic bad. If not a bad ... then it shouldn't be looked down upon when, for example, the male victors or a war or battle or conflict rape the women of the vanquished populace or party. Or, one can express something of the same for marital rape - which until recently was commonly accepted as not a crime.

As to crime, instead of rape being viewed an intrinsic wrong and thus criminal, one could go by the crime of damaging another men's property. Not unheard of in history. And this would make certain rapes non-criminal.

To be crystal clear, I'm not one to endorse the view just expressed, but I find it (or else something close enough to it) sufficiently prevalent to make mention of ... such as guys that want to (and thereby fantasize about) forcefully having sex with women that are antagonistic to them in arguments (etc.), and deem this natural. As in an integral aspect of human nature - or else of blatant reality that only ignoramuses of one type or another don't see.

But then, in my own belief systems, I do uphold that humanity has within it the potential to globally occur in world wherein sapient beings don't rape other sapient beings. Not tomorrow, and not in a hundred years. But as I view the issue, the potential is nevertheless there. (this to stay on the same topic rather than to address far more complex issues, such as the notion of a global, voluntary peace (here strictly meaning lack of warfare) among humans being possible, or not, in principle).

I'm quite capable of thinking, remembering, imagining without seeing images. — Ludwig V

I’m very curious: you say you don’t experience visual remembrances. I take it that, then, for example, you cannot recall what a childhood pet dog (in case you had one) looks like—but can instead only recognize the pet’s visual appearance if you were to see a photograph of the former pet? Also, I take it that you are not able to manipulate a geometric object, such as a square, within your mind? (“Imagination” can be a very ambiguous term at times--due to its etymology not being representative of all the terms often seeks to convey.)

Does the aphantasia you experience by any chance extend to any other sense of perception: sound, touch, taste, smell, and so forth? For instance, can you experience any such thing as an “internal voice” while thinking?

The issue is besides the thread’s topic, but I’d welcome your response.

How do you manage? — Ludwig V

Taking your question at face value: speaking for myself, I view it as an ability that can be used or not used. As one additional tool in the toolbox of cognition. It in no way interferes with any day-to-day cognitive process.

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Since I’m posting on this thread, my own position is that all perception of the external world is directly real when addressed from any first-person point-of-view. When addressed from a third-person perspective, however, perceptions of the external world are known to differ; sometimes mildly, such as with the various types of color blindness among humans, sometimes starkly, as can be found in the sometimes starkly different perceptual senses of different species of life (e.g., we don’t perceive the magnetic fields the way homing pigeons, for example, do and always have—cf. magnetoreception); thereby implying indirect realism in terms of individuals’ perceptions of what the external world factually consists of. Because of this, to me, both direct and indirect realism are valid, but occur in different layers of reality as a whole. (Said this to contribute, but I’m not much inclined to read along with the literature of Austin and Ayers, though I’ve been reading parts of this thread.)

Why don’t people change their expectations instead of being mad about human nature? Why isn’t there a discipline that aims to build concepts that are closer to reality? — Skalidris

I’ve heard people maintain that rape is an ingrained aspect of human nature. Their argument basically boils down to “the proof is in the pudding: rape happens in the world and always has”. This genetically determined aspect of human nature is so called “reality” as they see it. So, does that mean that the rest of us ought to change our expectations so that they are accordant to this real reality … say when our wives, or children, or other relatives and loved ones are raped or assaulted? Is acceptance of rape, as a staple aspect of human nature that can’t be changed, then supposed to somehow make us less melancholic, or worse, when rape happens?

For those who happen to know what the true nature of Human Nature is, is it dynamically plastic (on account of givens such as environment) or is it eternally static in full (due to some ontologically deterministic reason)? More specifically, this in relation to givens such as rape.

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In Hugo’s Hunchback of Notre Dame there’s mention of “Tempus edax, homo edacior” (time is blind, man is stupid). I rather like it as aphorism, being a man myself. I'm thinking it might be of help with the melancholy of “knowing too much".

We have not been emotional or irrational reactionaries in our entire conversation. — Merkwurdichliebe

:grin:

Yes, now that you bring it up, quite true. Somehow was taking this for granted before as the way things ought to be. Especially on a philosophy forum. But I guess it is something significant enough to be worthy of mention. :up:

Why is that? — Apustimelogist

Space, time, and matter no longer make any mathematical sense within a black hole's singularity, are often enough said to "break down" at such juncture, and with some affirming that information itself becomes erased therein.

Again, why would information be assumed to survive at such juncture?

To me, this is having information. Though I think we are getting into the territory where we will have disagreements about the contents of experience or philosophy of mind generally, which would hinder agreement. — Apustimelogist

Most likely, yes. How do you define information? For me, quintessentially, information is to be defined by that which informs, or else "gives form to" ("form" in the Aristotelian sense). In so holding, I then take awareness to be informed by its percepts but to not of itself be information.

I don't think it is the average person that determines the government, despite the system. Whether constitutional republic or ochlocracy, it always seems to be controlled by a select few. When has the average person ever mattered? Was it Lenin who said: "The best way to control the opposition is to lead it ourselves."? — Merkwurdichliebe

That made me laugh a bit, in a good way. Sure, but then it sure sounds like were addressing dysfunctional democracies here: states that are democratic only in name. This in full parallel to how communistic states have only been communistic in name.

Seems like the same applies to both in like measure: "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others". (to quote from Orwell, of course)

As for those who might be naysayers when it comes to functioning democracies, they've been in the past. Ancient Athens as a good example: the citizens - male though they all were - where deemed equal enough to have most offices of state settled by lottery. I say this laughingly: imagine having the secretary or state or some such selected by lottery nowadays. Its why education has always played one of many pivotal roles in any functioning democratic rule. So as to no result in a system wherein some are deemed "more equal than others". But this is a wholly different issue.

As for the connection topic, I'm OK at this point with agreeing to disagree on the matter.

The question is what information cannot be experienced and what experiences are not information? I think its quite hard to give examples for any of those things. — Apustimelogist

I'll give this a shot.

Information that goes past a black hole's threshold toward the singularity within the black hole cannot be experienced - at least not when at the singularity itself.

The experience one holds of oneself (as the observer of information) being certain about what is observed ... is not itself information; it, instead, is a mere direct awareness of one's own being as that which observes information (though it can become information when later on remembered and possibly contemplated as a remembered former state of personal being, this by oneself as observer of the remembrance).

If you disagree with these examples, I'd like to understand why.

I understand that, and police have a culture all their own. Maybe there are currents of racism running through police culture, I don't know. Let us impugn all police as racists (against black people, whatever), — Merkwurdichliebe

A touchy topic for a number of reasons. Besides, I've conversed with more than one police officer who was anything but a racist. Of course, if the culture of a particular precinct is, then those police officers within the precinct that aren't generally have a very hard time with things.

I still do not see any necessary connection between that, and the general sentiment of the average person. — Merkwurdichliebe

There's a lot of connections in life that cannot be epistemically established as necessary. All I've got to go on are my own experiences, of which I think I've addressed enough of.

Do you by chance uphold there being a "necessary disconnection" between the actions of state sponsored officials within a democracy and the general sentiment of the average person within said democracy?

:up:

As an aside, I thought it was interesting the you distinguished stage magic from purported Magick, since stage magic is, of course completely logical and scientific ie in no sense metaphysical. — LuckyR

Yet, as per my intended point in my previous post, the logical and scientific is itself fully grounded in pre-established metaphysical concepts and, thus, is itself metaphysical. Here’s where I find the colloquial use of “metaphysical” as that which is illogical and contrary to science fits in: the logical and scientific as we currently know it today is grounded in a set of metaphysical understandings which those who want to preserve the status quo don’t want to be interfered with. To such, metaphysics—such as everything which @Wayfarer addressed as examples—is a done deal that shouldn’t be meddled with. As such it ought to no longer be in any way addressed. So when such people hear that there is metaphysical debates and enquiries going on, they reflexively view it as an assault upon the status quo on which current logic and science is grounded. Thereby resulting in the purely colloquial understanding that enquiry into metaphysical issues entails that which is not supported by modern-day logic and science.

If this appraisal happens to at least partly describe your own view on the matter, then—as @Wayfarer points out—metaphysical issues as a grouping are in no way satisfactory resolved. Logic without identity is not logical. Science without temporality is not empirical science (at root: knowledge gained via experience), for experience of anything other necessitates duration. And yet what identity and time are—to readdress just two examples of metaphysics—is in no way satisfactorily resolved. Moreover, any new metaphysical understandings regarding, for example, identity and time would not destroy the logic and science of today. It would only better account for what is currently known, this in more coherent and consistent manners. Via analogy, the Theory of Relativity does not destroy the knowns addressed via Newtonian physics, but only better accounts for the knowns which Newtonian physics sought to explain (and yes, the ToR introduces new metaphysical notions, such as the nature of time; without these, the mathematics required for ToR would not be possible, or, at least, in any way intelligible ... to the best of my knowledge on the matter).

In short, current day logic and science is in every way metaphysical (invariably comprised of metaphysics of a certain type).

And, as it currently stands, these currently established metaphysics have been unable to resolve some of the core issues humanity at large is concerned with; for one example, the nature of consciousness and its volitions. Nor, for that matter, have they facilitated anything close to a physical Theory of Everything.

Anyway, your example of religious miracles as an example is right on. How do the academic Metaphysicians describe the parting of the sea, or the multiplication of the fishes and loaves? Myth? Magic? Some rationalization using vague pseudoscientific terminology? — LuckyR

Well, in my own opinion, the "academic metaphysician" wouldn't touch such an issue with a ten foot pole. It would be fully out of scope of what academic metaphysics entails (unless one happens to be a metaphysician upholding metaphysical notions of causality, time, etc., which ground some system of atheism; in which case their explanation would consist of all it being bogus, with the case closed).

The closest that academics would get to it is via comparative religion studies; such as those done by Joseph Campbell and Mircea Eliade, and I suppose one could add Carl Jung to the list. But such studies wouldn't be metaphysical studies, not by a very long shot.

All of the latter, to hold any water, need to be coherent and consistent in what they explain. So—unless someone somehow develops a coherent and consistent metaphysical account of (not just one, but) all spiritualities the world over which can thereby stand up to logical scrutiny and is not in conflict with empirical data—one has no business in metaphysically explaining JC's reported miracles (if, that is, any aspect of them happened to ever occur).

If magic is aprioristically understood as nonsensical, then metaphysics—such as the study of causality - has nothing to do with magic: for metaphysics attempts to make sense of what is, i.e. of the ontic, thereby being the ideally both coherent and consistent understanding of ontology and its various aspects (e.g., causality, time, identity, reality, etc.). These musings are what all science is founded upon, without which no science could be possible.

If however magic is understood in a more sensible manner - such as along the lines of “the process of aligning one’s environments(s) to one’s will” * - then certain types of metaphysics will indeed address magic: predominantly those which do not deny the possibility of us having some capacity of free will (there can be no conformity of environments to one’s will in ontologies such as that of eternalism (aka the Block Time model of reality), for one example). But then, the mere act of blowing one’s nose will be, of itself, an act of magic ** - making magic a very trite reality that can be deemed to apply to all sentient beings that in any way conform their environment to suit their own will/volition, this all the time and without exception.

In support of the latter affirmation, as is maintained by many modern pagans:

*

Aleister Crowley (1875–1947), an influential British occultist, defined "magick" as "the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Will",[9] adding a 'k' to distinguish ceremonial or ritual magic from stage magic.[10] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(supernatural)

**

What is a Magical Operation? It may be defined as any event in nature which is brought to pass by Will. We must not exclude potato-growing or banking from our definition. Let us take a very simple example of a Magical Act: that of a man blowing his nose.[1] — https://pagan.fandom.com/wiki/Magick

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The non-pagan communities which don't in any way practice magic thinking it nonsensical will of course want to define magic differently - but then you have the aprioristic understandings of magic being nonsensical, which is not sponsored by those who do uphold that magic is real. All this overlooking the Abrahamic admonition against it as evil ... although Mr. JC sure seems to fit the description of someone who practiced magic, for one example. :grin:

As was previously pointed out more indirectly, we want to progress toward that end which we value—such that when we approach it, we deem this progress. We regress when we distance ourselves from that same end. Individuals will hold different goals in mind, as will different societies. Still, all this progress/regress analysis presupposes a true, or real, end (i.e., one that is ontologically actualizable at least in principle—rather than being a fiction imaginatively concocted by us which can never be obtained even in principle and which is thereby a deceitful/false/wrong/bad end to pursue … one that could be approached but then always results in failure and associated dolors), a real end which serves as that which is to be definitively valued by us sentient beings—this irrespective of one being religious or not. To this effect:

I consider the idea that our culture’s quest for interstellar travel is really the sublimated longing for immortality. Having substituted material progress for spiritual liberation, only by ‘slipping the surely bonds of earth’ is freedom to be found (pace Elon Musk’s desire to populate Mars). — Wayfarer

That sublimated drive for immortality you mention is almost nothing in comparison to what’s been coined “singularitarianism” … transhumanism 101 on steroids (probably nothing new here). I won’t bother with what I find to be the many unaddressed metaphysical underpinnings of scientism that are here taken on faith to be blatant truths. I’ll just say that if it’s metaphysically absurd to presume an Abrahamic Heaven wherein all immortal psyches forever therein interact with lack of any suffering on anyone’s part at any point in time (or else some eternal Hell wherein there is only dolor without any vacillations toward some states of happiness or pleasure, such as that of momentarily reduced dolor), then so too is absurd the notion of uploading our consciousnesses into some AI assisted cosmic mainframe—or some such—so as to obtain a blissful immortality (explicitly stated, this regarding the personal self as we empirically know it).

Here speaking in Eastern semantics, if there is ego, I-ness, then there will be samsara, necessitating both pleasures and pains of various degrees: same conflicts but in different, nonbiological makeup. No transcendent bliss to speak of. And I’ve yet to understand why, for example, one hard AI program could not lie to, steal from, or kill another hard AI program. So much for immortality. Yet the same underpinnings that drive some people toward the spiritual immortality supposed to occur in Heaven now drives many mostly secular folk toward this future state of immortal being via unification with machines. This being the exact same underlying drive toward immortality as end to progress toward that is expressed in different ways via different metaphysics.

In one possible contrast, there is no immortality of the ego to be had in the goal of actualizing what’s supposed to be the absolute bliss of Nirvana, else the absolute bliss entailed in the Western notion of henosis—these as only two examples from human history of a drive toward egoless being—for these states are deemed perfectly devoid of I-ness and, thus, of ego. This then being an utterly different goal-directed drive: one oriented at becoming selfless, this in contrast to the, well, selfish drive to hold on to the cherished aspects of one’s own empirically known self eternally.

Yet I’ve heard respectable scientists speak of such upcoming future transhumanist state when morning the natural death of their loved ones. Well, more precisely, one: a friend of the family’s relative, this when I when to the funeral.

Religion or no religion, the same underlying human drives toward future ends remain—toward which we either progress or don’t. And the end we individually pursue typically has a way of dictating the means we utilize in our want to get there. For one example, the want to never ever die as the ego one is aware of will often stand in the way of societal givens, such as that of altruism when looking death in the face (as a simplification of the issue: no soldiers going to war to defend one’s nation, no firefighters running into houses on fire to save others, no police chasing after bad guys with guns, etc.). Whereas the want for selflessness facilitates the altruism just mentioned.

I take it that most would deem selflessness to be a virtue and selfishness a vice.

So when we talk about progressiveness (progressives and the like) I tend to believe we’re generally thinking along the lines of progress toward a state of being that exhibits less selfishness and more selflessness. To me, there’s a lot to unpack here. Still, doesn’t secular notions of humanism and humanitarianism consist of drives such as those of greater compassion and less sectarian hatred, thereby being driven by an intended progression toward states of lesser ego?

[edited the first paragraph for better clarity, and added a bit more info to it]

Write more, please. You are a well-spring of fresh thought, don't cut yourself short for anybody, nor Time. — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh … just stop it. :smile: Thanks though. :pray:

If we are talking racially motivated homicide, it is pretty evident from police statistics that, whites are predominantly killing whites, and blacks are predominantly killing blacks. — Merkwurdichliebe

Interesting. I’m in fact surprised by the relatively low percentage of race on race killings among blacks—this considering that there’s a far higher percentage of black street gangs with violence in-between, or at least so my presumptions hold. I added that part about death due to what I’ve heard on the news regarding police killings. Here’s one statistic relative to the US:

Black males comprise 6.1 percent of the total U.S. population but 24.9 percent of all persons killed by law enforcement. — Law Enforcement Epidemiology Project - U.S. Data on Police Shootings and Violence

The statistic, though, doesn’t give context to why the disparity occurs. And I for now can only speak of cases I’ve heard of in the news, granting that they’re preselected to be newsworthy.

With that I can agree. Everyone holds racial prejudice, even those that genuinely consider all races equal. Prejudices of all types. The question is about which prejudices we can tolerate while respecting the core principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity/duty". Is it even possible to push the limits of tolerance? — Merkwurdichliebe

Aye, to that. It would be dysfunctional for developed life not to form pre-judgments (i.e. prejudices in this sense) via generalizations from past experiences. What degree of prejudice (in all senses) can or should be tolerated is a tough question; akin to asking how many grains of sand does it take to make a heap. Don’t know. Still, at the end of the day, we can all distinguish between a blatant heap of sand and a few sprawled out grains of the stuff ... or so I'm thinking.

I'm sorry you had to experience that xenophobia. I suppose you know first hand what it's like to be prejudged because of some perceived ethno-cultural differences. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nice of you to so say. My pov: In life, shit happens; don’t know of anyone who can affirm otherwise.

All one needs to do is look out the window a bit to see that racism of all stripes and flavors is alive and well in Western society. — javra

That is quite an exaggeration. It is the kind of thinking that this thread is meant to address. The notion that "racism of all stripes and flavors is alive and well in Western society" is known as "racial realism". This concept originated with Derrick Bell, who applied marxian critical theory to his civil rights work and has become known as the core architect of crt.

I don't think that it is a coincidence that many Leftists are echoing the ideas of Derrick Bell. Impossible to think that so many would independently arrive at such complex ideas with such uniformity.

It seems much more likely that ideas based in critical theory (like those of Derrick Bell) have been taught in top tier Western universities for decades, and adopted by myriad successful people who have gone out into western societies to evangelize and exert varying degrees of influence. Many of those ideas have come to be go-to, boiler-plate talking points of the Left, particularly when pointing out how oppressive Western civilization is. — Merkwurdichliebe

Myself, I’m not well enough versed in political science to have much of an idea of what you’re referencing with Derrick Bell, unfortunately. I have however had Asian, Hispanic, and Black friends and acquaintances over the span of my life, aside from the white. From their stories—and from a little that was directly witnessed by me—incidences of racism from some pockets of society were and remain. Then there’s things like me hearing the N-word used in derogatory manners by folk that happen to be white thinking they're talking to another likeminded white person (for better or likely worse, I admit that I most often didn’t start lecturing them on why racism is not good). I've seen swastikas drawn up in humongous sizes in sand on easily seen beaches; and I don't think they were there to reference what the swastika represent in Eastern cultures.

Despite not knowing much about Derrick Bell, I greatly doubt that most of the “black lives matter” people in the USA gained their perspectives from writings, or even from the media; and I instead firmly believe that most have had shitty experiences due to racism on repeated occasions (with the untimely death of loved ones here included). Nor do I take the anti-Asian sentiments, assaults, and battery that are sometimes reported in the media to be some sort of a hoax sponsored by a cabal of liberal academics. And there’s a longer list here regarding present day accounts of racism. There’s antisemitism, as previously touched upon. There’s anti-non-Jewish-Middle-Eastern-ism. And more. Granted, this from my own largely USA-centric (more specifically Californian) acquaintance with the topic (though, being from Europe and having traveled there often enough, I’ve seen it there as well first hand).

What you’ve mentioned at least seems to indicate the view that racism is something only perpetuated by the majority populace toward minorities which are thus oppressed. However, in my experiences, there’s also racism that can and in some circles does occur from minorities toward the majority, as well as from one minority toward another. (For example, with the friends and acquaintance previously mentioned, some groups would make derogatory racial jokes against the race of other friends I had, with which the first batch of friends was not acquainted.)

So again, from what I know of the society I’m living in via my own experiences, racism—though not pertaining to the majority of the populace—does nevertheless exist well enough in society at large, and with no signs of stopping. It’s like traffic on the streets: most drivers are polite enough to make driving manageable, but there always were and still are those who can make driving in traffic an unpleasant experience due to being assholes. Yes, the latter are a minority on the streets, but there’s still enough of them to make driving, let’s say, unnecessarily stressful and antagonistic.

I’m not here offering any academic theory regarding the matter. It’s simply my honest observations that—although not pertaining to the majority as it currently stands—racism is alive and well in society. For me to deny this is for me to deny my accumulated experiences, as per those mentioned above.

[BTW, a funny anecdote: Normally cops are pretty cool with me on the rare occasion they’ve stopped me in traffic. Now, I’ve been confused over the years for a number of different races by some: Gypsy, Hispanic, Middle Eastern … Anyways, a white cop who gave all indications of at first thinking me Hispanic once pulled me over for driving about 5 miles per hour over the speed limit in a 40 or 45mph zone. I politely told him “good afternoon officer” as he was nearing my open window. He immediately pulled his pistol out of its holder in front of me while asking, “what did you say to me?”. At the end, he let me go scot-free … this after at first forcefully asking me if I was ever imprisoned and the like. Funny anecdote to me. But shoot, this doesn’t compare to stories I’ve heard from Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks I’ve personally known.]

With all that said, I'm by no means one to deem Western civilization oppressive! I find it to be quite the contrary. Racism can be found in individuals everywhere (like in many a Buddhist, of all people, in Myanmar toward the Rohingya people). But, to my knowledge, only in the West was the affirmation of "liberty, equality, fraternity" made explicit with ambitions to create states that more perfectly embody this ideal. This as just one example of what I have in mind. (The politics of any given moment does not constitute a civilization ... ah, but I've already written more than I initially wanted to, so I'll cut this short.)

At any rate, this doesn't make the West a place where racism is as infrequent as is murder.

Same can be generally said about the two different types of laughter at the exact same racial stereotype joke. A black, a white, and a purple walk into a bar ... — javra

BTW, I previously thought this self-evident, but now feel compelled to make the point explicit.

Talking about races, acknowledging their social reality (for they have no biological foundations*), and occasionally finding humor in some racially stereotyped jokes does not somehow make one a racist by default. Racism, in order to so be, is about deeming some races superior and others inferior—which is not necessarily entailed by any of the aforementioned.

* Plenty of online articles on this. Here’s a quote from one of them:

However, purported race differences are entirely man-made, and lack biological, physiological, or genetic underpinnings. — WHAT IS THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR RACE - IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS