Faith gets a lot of contempt here on the forum as a synonym for unjustified belief. I’ve taken it upon myself to try to rehabilitate it as a valid epistemological method. — T Clark

:grin: Groovy. :up:

But seriously, for a moment, a 'mass delusion', is by definition not a mental illness but a social one - and that has profound implications. It becomes a great stretch to maintain the medical model at all. — unenlightened

For those who don’t know of it, there’s a parable/fable that speaks to this exact issue. In short, there’s a kingdom with a water well that, when drunk from, turns the individual crazy—this due to having had a spell cast on it by somebody or other. Everyone but the king and the nobility drinks from it (the king and nobility have their own water source). The king still wants to rule his kingdom but the general populous, now of the same mindset and in agreement with each other, comes to perceive the king and his associates as insanely crazy people, proceeding to rebel against them in all sorts of ways (with a give me liberty or give me death mindset). Eventually, out of fear for their own safety and in desperation, the king and nobility then come to decide that the only way out of the situation is for them to drink from the spell-cast well as well. At which point, the populace rejoices in the kings newly found sanity. And the king rules the kingdom happily ever after to everyone’s pleasure and benefit.

Multiple versions of this fable, some more philosophically poignant than others. Myself, I think I first heard of it as a child. And it does tend to illustrate well enough how certain notions of insanity and sanity are purely social constructs that have nothing to do with any solid grounding—other than that of an interpersonally created reality (with interpersonally created realities including those of languages, cash values, and most of what is cultural, culture-specific mores included).

Example: was Moses a man with mystical abilities and visions … or was he a full-blown schizophrenic who would have benefited from modern day anti-psychotics so as to not be bothered by things such as burning bushes that spoke to him? But as the stories go, at the end of the day, dude was functional. Hence sane (i.e., of a healthy enough—but never completely perfect—mind). From a different vantage, for those who believe in the possibility of such things, same can be said of all modern-day psychics world over (who happen to not be deceiving charlatans): they're sane rather than in need of psychiatric institutions.

You rely on these notions of "nature" extensively. They are however meaningless devoid of an explanation of what "our true human nature" which awaits to be fulfilled in fact is. So please explain what in your opinion this ultimate nature of humanity whose fulfillment we ought to strive for is. This being quite pivotal to the subject matter at hand -- javra

We don’t need to have perfect and complete knowledge of the nature of a being to have good reasons to believe they have a nature. — Bob Ross

And yet the speak of it with such immense authority and complete conviction in passages such as this:

Nothing about two consenting, superficially (hedonistically) happy homosexuals having sex is loving, harmless, nor good for them; because it goes contrary to their nature. — Bob Ross

Boldface mine. All this at face value being utter doublethink.

As to the rest, I'll skip the religious fluff and stick to facts regarding what Jesus Christ himself did and said ... and facts regarding what he didn't. I admire him far too much to not do so.

Yes, I relate to your definitions here and my next point was going to be about what you refer to here;

"More complexly, all humans will typically hold a proto-understanding throughout our adult life of being a human earthling—rather than of being,"

Which I was getting ready to explain myself. I would add that this proto-understanding is shared with all plants and animals and we can learn a lot from communing with nature. — Punshhh

It's good to hear, and yes, I'm in agreement.

Again I agree and would add another system I use a lot, the idea of orientation. So the clicking into place is like focussing a lense. Or like an astrolabe, we are like a combination lock, a combination of a number of parts which when aligned allow the clear passage of light. This is built upon a foundational belief* of the idea that we are already at our destination (enlightenment), there is not really any extension in time and space and that all that is required is to re-orientate in subtle ways. — Punshhh

Very nicely said.

I don’t think we can presume any of these ideas about the nature of Nirvana, God, or a deeper reality. These can only be taken on faith, on trust so to speak, of what sages have written down the ages. There must be something in common in the form these descriptions take, as they are all similar and follow a common pattern. But I choose not to define it myself, because It may be a consequence of human nature, ie a reflection of something in us. As such we may be idolising something about ourselves. — Punshhh

Fair enough.

What does the abbreviation JTB represent? — Punshhh

Ah. Justified True Belief.

Thank you for your feedback!

Perhaps. But I think what javra was describing could be called faith—or maybe intuition—as well as trust. As I understand it, all three are based significantly on past experience, as well as other factors. — T Clark

In certain contexts, I could see how the three terms could be interchangeable. However, here are some differences I think notable:

Re intuition: We sometimes do consciously choose what to trust and what not to trust. We, however, don’t ever consciously choose what intuitions to have.

Re faith: The term “faith” has definitions, and meanings, which range quite a bit. The following are just two such meanings: Sometimes it’s synonymous to reason or evidence grounded trust one nevertheless engages in unthinkingly; however imperfectly so grounded, this type of trust can yet be readily justified by you once it is brought into consciousness (e.g., I have faith in my friend’s passing the test, this on account of them having studied for it and having to brains to so pass. Or: I have faith each and every day that the sun will rise again tomorrow, this on account of there being no credible alternative to the contrary. Or: I have faith that, however unlikely, it is yet physically possible to hold a winning lottery ticket while in the jaws of a shark just as a lightning bolt strikes (I have a thing for the latter example when it comes to probabilities of what is physically possible :razz: )) Other times it stipulates trust that is neither grounded in experience nor coherent reasoning (e.g., I have faith in the Spaghetti Monster responding to my prayers if only I pray sincerely enough; I have faith in the spiritual reality of unicorns; I have faith that in the next month I will have won the lottery when I’ll be bitten by a shark while swimming in the sea/ocean just as I’m being hit by a lightning bolt.). Here things can indeed get far more tricky, since both are forms of what could well have been at some past juncture consciously chosen trust. And all these are impossible to have devoid of at least some experience. Yet both will require consciously aware will to maintain (unlike, for example, a baby’s trust that it will find the nipple to suckle on when placed on its mom’s belly—for this trust is had without conscious volitions).

All that said, trusting things such as that the alarm clock will wake you up as you expect is not equivalent to having faith that it will, this in the second aforementioned sense of the term. And this because you generally have good reason to so trust, even if its engaged in unthinkingly.

Same, then, with trusting another human: one's trust can either be grounded in some form of reasoning or evidence and thereby be justifiable once questioned or, else, one can simply take a leap of faith in trusting the other, in which case you won't be able to properly justify why you trusted.

Loving someone is ‘willing the good of someone for its own sake whereby what is good for them is to realize their nature’.

Nothing about two consenting, superficially (hedonistically) happy homosexuals having sex is loving, harmless, nor good for them; because it goes contrary to their nature. — Bob Ross

You rely on these notions of "nature" extensively. They are however meaningless devoid of an explanation of what "our true human nature" which awaits to be fulfilled in fact is. So please explain what in your opinion this ultimate nature of humanity whose fulfillment we ought to strive for is. This being quite pivotal to the subject matter at hand

As to politics, for my part I am neither liberal nor conservative, but a bit of both. I just don't like scapegoating by those who behave as though they themselves and their preferred faction(s) are angels incarnate who do no wrong.

Jesus didn’t come to condemn: He came to save. This is no way suggests that Jesus condoned homosexuality and, in fact, the apostles were very clear about it being immoral. https://www.gotquestions.org/New-Testament-homosexuality.html — Bob Ross

No apostle was Jesus. Period. Moreover, Christ man, Jesus condemned galore. It's he who stated that the camel (a beast of burden) will have an easier time than the fat rich guy when it comes to entering the kingdom of god (the needle's eye). It's he who gave the allegory of souls that deviate from god being placed into trash bins that get set on fire so as to become annihilated into oblivion. It's he who rode the white donkey into the marketplace to condemn those within. But no, he, Jesus, never once condemned homosexuality. And yes, this lack of condemnation by he upon which all of Christianity is pivoted on is not only indicative but immensely informative.

Oxford American Dictionary says—believe in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something. — T Clark

:up: Beautiful!

To which I'd also add: belief in the reality of. Also, this being a philosophy forum: that trust is not entirely an aspect of the conscious being: we as humans acquire much trust in our lives with experience, most of which remains non-consciously held at most times. Example: we always unconsciously trust that the earth beneath our feet will not dissolve or fragment or the like, this even though no conscious thought is given to the matter - and even though, once brought into consciousness, we don't come by justifications of why this must be so all that easily. And some of it is fully innate, and hence genetically inherited. Even a human infant holds the vast body of innate unconscious trust which allows for the breast crawl instinct to take effect. Non-human animals, on the other hand, can readily enough be observed to have a far greater body of instinctive trust, such as for what is real and what to do when stimulated by it. Even though more intelligent animals, much like us, can gain or loose trust with acquired experiences (e.g., a pet dog's trust toward you). That mentioned, when we choose to trust X we consciously decide upon it, and, if the trust consciously persists, it then generally becomes a staple aspect of out unconscious body of trust via which we act and behave.

But, yea, to trust is to have confidence in, and hence to in one way or another depend upon, the reality / actuality of something - which to me can well enough encompass the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of something or someone.

When I was a kid, trusting someone would mean "someone who keeps my secrets...". — GreekSkeptic

As a tangential, if you've ever seen the movie "Cousins", there is a conversation between a grandfather and a grandchild in which the kid wants to know a secret the grandfather holds. The grandfather asks, "can you keep a secret?" To which the adolescent kid solemnly promises he can. The grandfather playful but solemnly then replies, "So can I", ending that bit of the conversation.

Poignant to me.

Nice work, ain't it? — Banno

Yup. Definitely so! Having worked a bit in Photoshop, you sometimes get those types of results, as you say. Cool art, though. In a way, it reminds me of Dadaism the the Surrealism which grew out of it. (I greatly like the best of both.)

How the so called "mind" of AI can interpret the property of chair-hood. I like it!

The methodological approach is to empirically investigate what is essential to a given thing, such that it would no longer be that thing without it, and that would be a part of its nature. E.g., you are no longer talking about a human, in nature, if you are talking about a being that doesn’t include rationality. This doesn’t mean every human has to be capable of exercising proper intellect; but what this is essential to the human nature. — Bob Ross

First off, teleology and essences are no more empirically observable than is efficient causality, which is zilch. So one does not empirically investigate them: they instead get investigated metaphysically.

Secondly, and more to the point: This quote from you would entail that a human infant is not human—not until it gains rationality to some meaningful extent. It would also entail the same for those with very severe mental retardation, or mental handicaps, or however you’d like it best expressed. Also those in a coma. And the list continues. All of which is … patently wrong.

The essence of a chair is something which can be sat on. — Bob Ross

A bench is not a chair. (both can be sat on) To not mention beds and tree trumps, etc. So this too is wrong.

It is about looking at the teleology in a thing. — Bob Ross

On this we can agree, but see my comments to @unenlightened in this post as they regard both faulty teleological reasoning and faulty applications of the word "natural".

Personally, I’d very, very greatly dislike having sex with another man. It would be as unnatural for me as it would be utterly unnatural for a non-bisexual homosexual male to in any way like having sex with a woman. But!: These two facts in no way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality unnatural relative to Nature itself. To jump from the first notion of "natural" for one's own constituency as persona to the notion of "natural" in the sense of Nature at large is to do far more erroneous reasoning then merely equivocate semantics and contexts. Nor does the aforementioned in any way make either homosexuality or heterosexuality intrinsically unethical—this irrespective of the mores of a society--this such as via relation to the Good per se, which ought to be pursued by all (or at least so some of us uphold). In contrast, it can be readily construed unethical, i.e. unaligned with the Good, to condemn a loving couple who has sex that leads to no harm but instead much psychological good for both—this either by accusing them or their sexual activity of being in any way degenerate or else by acting upon this condemnation. Jesus Christ sure as hell didn't--and he lived in a time of what by comparison were massive amounts of homosexual behavior in the societies that surrounded him.

Is it against our real nature to travel by motor car? Is it perhaps the real nature of horses to be ridden and pull carts for us? — unenlightened

A Benny Hill joke I remember from my childhood: God, in his all-knowing wisdom, gave us ears for the purpose of having something upon which to attach our eyeglasses on. (It's humor of teleology gone wrong, if it needs being explained, and its funny as hell to me.)

But yea, there can be a cline of sorts: from functional two-headed animals being unnatural (though an occasional, rare, aspect of nature), to diseases being unnatural (though a staple aspect of nature), to anything that does not bring me optimal health or eudemonia or immortality of existence being unnatural (though all these are natural aspects of life), to anything that gives me the heebie-jeebies being unnatural (though its natural to sometime get them on account of natural aspects of reality), to anything I say "boo" to being unnatural (though its perfectly natural to dislike things and for these things to be).

Mostly just wanted to mention that joke, though. :razz:

Yes, Sufi’s have developed a good language for expressing these things. I remember the first spiritual book I read when a teenager, Autobiography of a Yogi. On reading it, I had an intuitive understanding and familiarity with what was being described. — Punshhh

It's nice to hear.

“Truth signifying “Conformity to that which is real” is an appropriate way of using the term truth in this area of discussion. And yes, I agree that there are people who have this deeper understanding. But there is a subtle distinction to be made here, which is I think the cause of confusion when addressing this topic. It might not be appropriate to describe it as an understanding, yes there is an understanding. But an understanding which does not entail thought as produced in the brain. It is a more subtle understanding in which, communion (presence), witness (to bear witness to something), recognition and familiarity play more formative roles. It is the thinking in the brain which attempts to articulate this experience, in our “dualistic” world. Hence when the experience is conveyed, it is done via thinking, language and intellectual understanding. Which is quite different from how understanding manifests in the subtle realm. — Punshhh

I think I fully agree. I’ll share something with you and would be grateful for your general feedback.

In my attempts at analytically approaching this issue among many others, in my own writings I make the distinction between “allo-understanding” and “proto-understanding”. Allo-understanding is the “grasping the meaning of” that which is other relative to you as transcendental ego—and is thereby a dualistic understanding. Examples include the understanding of any concept, idea, or paradigm (all of which are other than one as transcendental ego which is aware of these other). Proto-understanding, which is far more difficult to properly articulate, on the other hand, is fully non-dualistic comprehension. Difficulties in articulating it stem from the fact that the moment it becomes contemplated via concepts or else analyzed via language it is no longer pure proto-understanding but, instead, becomes a potential allo-understanding of that which in fact is proto-understanding—this since here one thinks via a duality between the transcendental ego as the subject of awareness, one the one hand, and its concepts, etc. as the objects of its awareness on the other. That briefly mentioned, possible examples of proto-understanding include immediate awareness of momentarily being, for one example, psychologically certain or else in any degree psychologically uncertain as a transcendental ego, this among many other possible experiences of the transcendental ego per se. These "states of being" being that which one as transcendental ego momentarily is. Importantly, such that there is no duality whatsoever between the transcendental ego as the subject of awareness which is aware of its very own being as the object of its awareness: both subject of awareness and object of awareness are here perfectly unified into an undifferentiable, non-dualistic whole. And this non-dualistic (auto-)awareness is perpetual to the transcendental ego. More complexly, all humans will typically hold a proto-understanding throughout our adult life of being a human earthling—rather than of being, for example, an extraterrestrial alien (to not specify even more absurd alternatives)—hence, will hold this very understanding in manners fully devoid of conceptualizations of it, verbalization, or any form of thought whatsoever. Not until this issue is brought into explicit conscious awareness—such as by being asked what one is or else by reading a science fiction novel or seeing such movie wherein one can’t help but associate with human earthlings over extraterrestrial aliens—that this constantly held proto-understanding can become an allo-understanding.

So roughly expressed, the mystic does not gain an allo-understanding of what I’ll here again term “ultimate truth” but, rather, a very profound proto-understanding of it, at which juncture everything more or less clicks into place in terms of the transcendental ego’s (and not necessarily the empirical ego's) understanding of being and of the existence in which being per se is embodied. A profound proto-understanding which, to here make use of traditional western shamanistic poetry, then serves as the bone upon which all flesh and skin of the mystic (to include all thoughts and allo-understandings) becomes attached.

In parallel, be it addressed as Nirvana, the divine simplicity of God, a complete henosis with “The One”, etc., I verbally then interpret this ultimate reality yet to be actualized to be constituted of limitless and, hence, infinite proto-understanding that is perfectly devoid of all allo-understanding (more broadly, infinite pure being that is perfectly devoid of all existence, i.e. that which stands out)—thereby being pure bliss which is divinely simple and hence utterly nondual (I’ll add to this, in which one comes to fully know oneself as pure being (this in a non-JTB sense of knowing)).

Though I’m not sure whether what you intend by “subtle understanding” translates into the roughly sketched appraisal of what I’ve just outlined as "proto-understanding", I’d again like to hear your input on the matter.

Nice imagery. — Punshhh

Thanks. :smile:

Very much so, although “eureka moment” implies some kind of strained, extreme moment. It is not always like this, it might be a subtle distinction meeting a memory, met with a sigh, or seem to always have been that way, with no real knowledge of when it became so. Or knowing through doing, in which the mind is not really all that involved. — Punshhh

The "eureka moment" doesn't to me necessarily imply a straining so much as a revelation, a realizing of new deep understandings regarding what has always been which, as such, could effortlessly come about unexpectedly. (Archimedes was reputedly casually taking a bath when his eureka moment struck. :smile: ) But, yes, I fully agree that there are a vast array of paths toward this same possible outcome.

Cool. :up:

I don't take such implausible, merely non-contradictory, possibilities seriously. — Janus

I get that. Neither do I. Nevertheless, that is the problem of other minds in philosophical circles. Back to the point though, there is no currently known logical or empirical means to prove that another entity which looks and acts like a human actually has a mind. The same exact problem becomes more prominent in the bizarrely persisting issue of whether non-human lifeforms have minds. Chimps? Rats? ... Ameba? And as a few others do, I do maintain that if its a lifeform, it has a mind - this as per the book Mind in Life.

You have claimed that you can't imagine it being ergo it can't be. — javra

No I haven't claimed that at all. — Janus

OK. I might of been a bit unfair. In which case my bad. You have however claimed a parallel to this for satisfactory explanations of what mystics understand, which is what the analogy of beauty was all about to begin with, basically saying that if it hasn't been done so far, then it just can't be done. Here's the quote:

The "deep inner understanding" is not really an understanding at all but a heightened feeling. To qualify as an understanding it would have to be capable of precise articulation, which thousands of years of documented attempts show cannot be done. — Janus

Notice, also, that you affirm it not to be an understanding but a heightened feeling as though this were fact, rather than best current presumption.

The so-called "problem of other minds" is something else. — Janus

The problem of other minds cannot be resolved by looking at other humans face to face. This due to Cartesian doubt which Descartes introduced: e.g. if something looks like and acts like a duck, it might be an elaborate automaton. Same with something that looks like and acts like a human. Etc.

You misunderstand—I'm not trying to convince you of my felt convictions. — Janus

Well, truth be told, neither am I.

Reasoning, if it is good is simply valid. Valid reasoning can support all kinds of whacky beliefs. You also need sound premises. Premises based on accurate empirical observation are sound——they can be checked. Premises based on mathematical or logical self-evidence are sound. If you see how some other method for determining premises can be demonstrated to be sound I'd love to hear about it. — Janus

Of course. Start with optimal but yet fallible certainties and then build them up until you obtain a coherent outlook that also has optimal explanatory power. As to examples of such sound premises: Can you in any way evidence via justifiable alternatives that you as an aware being are not ontically occurring as such whenever you are in any way aware of anything? Not a logical tautology but a mere observations that, in the absence of justifiable alternatives, become rather difficult if at all possible to rationally doubt (and emotional doubts don't count for much here). So, if no justifiable alternatives can be found to the veracity of this proposition, then this is one small (even if bedrock) example of a sound premise that's neither based on empirical observations via the physiological senses nor based on maths or formal logics.

I have nowhere claimed to be the measure of all things. If someone else can imagine how a precise measure of beauty can be achieved, or even what such a purported method would look like, then I'm open to hearing about it. In all my reading and discussion I've never encountered any such thing. — Janus

You have claimed that you can't imagine it being ergo it can't be. Which directly implies that your current imagination is the measure of all things that can be fathomed. Besides, I never stated "measure of beauty" but a "satisfactory explanation of beauty". We have a satisfactory enough explanation of physiological pain but no idea of how to accurately measure it; e.g., whose pains are greater in an objective means of measurement.

You can believe that if you want to—the point is that you cannot logically or empirically demonstrate it. — Janus

I cannot logically or empirically demonstrate that you are human (rather than, say, an AI program). Its called the problem of other minds. That mentioned, do you mean to tell me that all you experience are intense emotions and no moments of eureka where something novel clicks with you? I'll believe you if you so say, but most humans are not like that and know it.

That shouldn't matter if you feel a conviction—why do you need to convince others of it? — Janus

It's called philosophy. Same reason you're bothering trying to convince me of your felt convictions.

I don't see how new terms are going to help support something which cannot be logically or emprically demonstrated. — Janus

It's called reasoning. But OK, you don't see how.

I cannot even begin to imagine how a precise measure, or actually any measure, of beauty could be discovered. — Janus

You are not the measure of all things (nor I, nor anyone else). Contra Pythagorean mindsets. EDIT: Besides, I did not mention "the measuring of beauty" but its "satisfactory explanation"; we have a satisfactory explanation of physiological pain (sorta - since it can be far more psychological then physical in at least some) but don't have the foggiest notion of a "precise measure" for it - e.g., as in whose pains are in fact greater.

The "deep inner understanding" is not really an understanding at all but a heightened feeling. — Janus

Nope. When we get something, when something clicks with us, there may be emotions also experienced, but the thing that clicks--the deep inner (to the transcendental ego) understanding--is not the emotions that accompany. And it cannot always be easily articulated via the words currently available to us. It, however, is one of the more potent ways in which new insights make sense to us. It is one very important and pivotal type of understanding.

To qualify as an understanding it would have to be capable of precise articulation, — Janus

When it comes to the understanding of what I previously poetically referenced as the jewel's core that all mystics are aware of, I agree that current English language (more specifically, current English terms) are insufficient to address it. But this can, or at least could, be remedied via the introduction of new terms into the English language--at least so far as philosophical enquiry is concerned. This just as a plethora of philosophers throughout history have done. Terms that could parallel what was saying about Buddhist language and terms. And, at such a juncture, the understanding can then well be articulated in precise rational/analytical philosophical means.

which thousands of years of documented attempts show cannot be done. — Janus

Never say never. For one thing, it prevents any progress being made in realms such as this. As one parallel example, same can be said of what beauty is--no one has yet satisfactorily explained it despite being investigated for millennia. To say it therefor can never be satisfactorily explained terminates all enguiries into it. I much rather prefer keeping an open mind in fields such as this.

I agree with what you say. Truths which can be questioned and knowledge in the form of JTB are things that only pertain to dualistic egos. And that which mysticisms world over point to is the culminating end of “being sans dualistic ego that is thereby in pure bliss”. It is not something that can pertain to any dualistic ego (aka empirical ego) but, rather, it can only pertain to the trancendental ego alone.

Take Sufism for yet another example. In most everything a Sufi does and says, the Sufi seems to have an understanding for this potential ultimate end which is simultaneously residing both within and without. In this, the Sufi hasn’t yet actualized this ultimate end for themselves, but retains a deep understanding of it and thereby an alignment to it. As a more concrete example of this, Sufis seek to actualize Fitra (roughly: the “innate nature” with which we’re birthed into this world of being one with the oneness (aka, divine simplicity) of God—again, with divinely simple being being non-dualistic). And—although Sufism and Buddhism rely on vastly different scaffoldings of language, tradition, conceptual understandings, etc.—the parallels between Fitra and Buddha-nature are striking. Both pointing to the same ultimate outcome and the same roundabout means of getting there.

To deny that at least certain Buddhists, Sufis, and many another all hold a deep, non-conceptual understanding of this ultimate truth (here, truth signifying "conformity to that which is real") regarding what is ultimately real—“Nirvana without remainder” for Buddhists, “Oneness with the divine simplicity of God” for Sufis—is, to my mind, to then construe all mystics world over to be utter charlatans. And although Buddhists and Sufis address this ultimate goal and awaiting ultimate end via different linguistic means and different cultural scaffoldings, it always amounts to the same thing: one’s complete conformity to, via which one perfectly becomes one and the same with, an absolutely non-dualistic wholeness of limitless being. And as per my previous post, this very same roundabout definition just as readily applies to (among many another idealized state of being) an absolutely objective awareness—which everyone seeking to be more objective (aka more impartial) approaches in due measure.

This ultimate end to me is, poetically expressed, like the very core of a jewel which can only be perceived by us dualistic egos via its many facets, each facet depicting just one of its many attributes, all of them in fact being perfectly unified in non-dualistic divine simplicity within the core. Here too one can find the same given jewel’s one facet of Plato’s “The Good”, to add just one more commonly known example.

To me, the mystic has understood the jewels core—not via debated conceptualizations but via a type of eureka moment applicable to the transcendental ego within all of us. But, in remaining a dualistic ego embedded within a specific culture which has its own ready existent scaffoldings, the mystic will then utilize the cultural and linguistic scaffoldings of his/her surroundings to navigate the waters of existence toward this very same end.

So yes, this deep inner understanding is neither a questionable truth, nor a debatable conceptualization, nor a JTB (all of which pertain to dualistic egos alone). Nevertheless, such an understanding is all the same one species of knowledge. Which again harkens back to the mysticism to be found in the dictums of the Oracle of Delfi, the mouthpiece for the god Apollo: "know thyself". (More analytically: come to understand the reality and implications of the very core to you as an aware being: that of a transcendental ego.)

Hence, the notion that the primary purpose of marriage is, or has historically been, to reproduce is a bit of joke in light of the surplus of evidence that presents itself. — javra


I'm not really sure what you mean here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I gave my justifications for it in the respective post. One can theorize something to be X and so maintain, but if it in practice is Y, then it is Y and not X. As much as the dictum goes that the #1 telos of marriage is that of having children, it isn't currently and has never been. To add to what i previously stated: People can and often enough do conceive and birth children just fine without marriage. The notion of "illegitimate child" is by no means modern. The issue is not that of having children but, instead, that of raising children to their desired purposes as adults. And for this, and only this, monogamous nuclear families are paramount.

Also, most people were peasant serfs (and earlier, many were slaves) and so not particularly focused on alliances and amassing generational wealth and prestige. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For the greatest portion of Western history post common era, marriages have been non-consensual, such as is the case in prearranged marriages. Serfs too had their economic necessities for survival. One quick reference to this generality:

The beginnings of consensual marriage

About 1140, Gratian established that according to canon law the bonds of marriage should be determined by mutual consent and not consummation, voicing opinions similar to Isaac's opinion of forced marriages; marriages were made by God and the blessing of a priest should only be made after the fact. Therefore, a man and a woman could agree to marry each other at even the minimum age of consent- fourteen years for men, twelve years for women- and bring the priest after the fact. But this doctrine led to the problem of clandestine marriage, performed without witness or connection to public institution.[54] The opinion of the parents was still important, although the final decision was not the decision to be made by the parents,[55] for this new consent by both parties meant that a contract between equals was drawn rather than a coerced consensus.[56] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_European_marriage_pattern#The_beginnings_of_consensual_marriage

Hence, till about 1140 consensual marriages did not occur. Nor did they predominate afterward. If you've ever read Queen Marguerite de Navarre's Heptaméron published in the mid-1600s, you'll find romance almost always being an extra-marital luxury (in the best of cases, as per a knight that devotes his life and eternal love for a perfectly married loved one while never having intercourse with her, though there's plenty of infidelity stories as well).

[edit: to try make this clearer: And all prearranged marriages are done for socio-economic reasons. Be it among nobility or among serfs. As long as one in not infertile, one can reproduce with anyone out there (and the act, regrettably, need not be consensual). But the formalization of marriage unites and unifies two households together. Reproduction here takes second place to which other household one as parent(s) ends up unifying with.]

I'd imagine that many people who view homosexuality as a sort of imperfection could agree with this though, no? My extremely Catholic grandmothers were fine with civil unions, back when that was a thing. It's not like those who see gluttony as defect want to ban fancy food (and here "gluttony" traditionally referred not only to over consumption, but any undue focus on food).

The issue of "condemnation" is interesting though. Leaving aside homosexuality for a moment, there is the whole idea that any notion of gluttony is "fat shaming" or perhaps "consumption shaming." To speak of licentiousness is "slut shaming," etc. There are all "personal choices," and all personal choices are relative to the individual, so long as they do not transgress the limits of liberal autonomy and infringe on others, or so the reasoning seems to go.

I do wonder if the shift in moral language is part of the difficulty here. To say something is "bad" becomes to describe it as possessing a sort of specific "moral evil." But this is hardly what was traditionally meant by gluttony being "evil." It was a misordering of desire, although towards something that is truly desirable, and didn't denote anything "horrific." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm in general agreement with this. But here's the important caveat for me: No one, none of us, period, is or will ever be anywhere near to perfect in any sense of the word while we live, at the very least, this lifetime. Hence, heterosexuality too is a form if imperfection, this by entailment of the just stated. And, while we can of course agree that imperfections are bad, it yet remains the case that likewise is none of us perfectly good; ergo, we are all in our own difference ways and degrees bad. Some will then take this as entailing a condemnation. Some have taken this state of mind to the point of mortification of the flesh via self-flagellation and the like. I don't view it this way. I take it that the one way to incrementally purge our impure being is to do what we all know to be right, this most of the time, while on occasion splurging a bit in the kinks we all have (be it a love of sweets, a sexual fetish consensually engaged in, etc.) while nevertheless never overly deviating from what is optimally righteous / virtuous - all this so as to better iron out our kinks, and all this without condemning ourselves but by both acknowledging our relative imperfections and being forgiving of them both in ourselves as well as in others (of course, sans any significant deviations).

In parallel, all this bit like intelligence or wisdom: we all fail to reach our perfect potential in this department and so we're all stupid by this standard of perfection. But, while the self-righteous will deny being in any way stupid, their very self-righteousness will in due measure prevent them from becoming more intelligent and wise then they currently are. Can't learn anything when one already knows everything. And so one cease to develop and improve. Much like is said of common beasts.

Don't mean to be preaching here, but to me it directly addresses the issue of condemnation for the badness of being imperfect. In closer relation to this thread, this be one heterosexual, homosexual, or else bisexual. Or course, implicit in all this is the question of what the heck then is the ultimate telos of life, aka the meaning or purpose of life. A different topic of potential argument. But I don't find this telos - which does go hand in hand with teleology and which can be the only "is" that justifies our "oughts" - has anything to do with heterosexuality, to not bring reproduction into the very same issue.

So, to ↪Colo Millz's point, this is perhaps more an issue with liberalism. Liberalism has a strong sense of the "morally bad" as distinct, because everything else is personal choice, and so to say anything is bad, that it "ought not be done" or that it is "not ideal" become a sort of "condemnation." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I very much disagree. None of us, progressives, conservatives, independents, or whatnot, are perfect angels. And each forest has its own crocked trees. It's a bit of scapegoat to claim otherwise. Besides, folks such as Girolamo Savonarola, who's renowned for his mortification of the flesh among other things, thereby condemning his own imperfections, were/are anything but liberal/progressive.

But at this point, aren't we relying on more theological points? It's hard for me to see how this can be a purely philosophical argument. The procreative function of romantic relationships is too weak to justify a claim that homosexuality is a vice per se. To be sure, it might be better if, if one wanted, one could have children with one's spouse, but it hardly follows from this that it is somehow wrong to marry some who is sterile when one could marry someone who is fertile, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As long as we’re indulging in theological issues regarding the issue of marriage between men and women, maybe it ought not be forgotten that the English term “woman” etymologically can well be interpreted as stemming from the “wif” (wife) + (of) “mann” (a person/human being). So interpreted this semantics rings true to Genesis addressing Eve to be born from the rib of Adam, with only the latter being endowed with the Lord’s breath (anima, i.e. soul)—such that the women, Eve, is not soul-endowed (a theme recent enough to have been addressed even by Virginia Wolff); and such that women are thereby not fully developed “persons/human beings”. This interpretation also coheres fluidly with the historic Abrahamic notion of wives, and women in general, being the living property of men, second maybe to cattle and other domesticated beasts. Whether in monogamy or in polygamy (harems and such) makes no difference on this count.

This to bring to light that historically in many an Abrahamic tradition, wives were seen not as equals in personhood but as means, a vessel or vehicle, for men to reproduce their bloodline. And, in this specific light, for two men to copulate was an abomination on multiple levels, not just that of inability to reproduce one or the other’s bloodline.

But moreover, I also want to draw strong attention to the fact that marriage has not historically been about what we currently most commonly deem it to be: two people in romantic love, which entails agape for each other, who desire to so remain bound for the remainder of their lives and, in so remaining, who then hold the possibility of being functional—else proper, fitting, or good—caretakers for the children that might thereby result. Instead, historically, marriage was first and foremost about the property, territory, networking, and the general wealth of two cohorts, of two families, becoming entwined and thereby converged. Yes, offspring were important, but far more due to their instrumental value in further propagating this very same convergence of wealth. This by contrast to their being of mostly intrinsic value for the parents which thereby value their children as smaller, yet to be fully developed, fellow equals of human worth. (Quite obviously, I’m here addressing historical generalities and not absolutes.)

Hence, the notion that the primary purpose of marriage is, or has historically been, to reproduce is a bit of joke in light of the surplus of evidence that presents itself.

I’ll just end with this:

Homosexuals, just like Shakers, can well adopt those children that were unwanted by their own parents—this if they so desire to have children of their own. God knows there are far too many unwanted children in this world. And as has been evidenced time and time again, being raised by two gay men or two gay women does not in any way convert the naturally inborn sexual inclinations of the child come their adulthood. But maybe more importantly, if gay folk want to be monogamous for the remainder of their lives, then let them so be via marriage. They ought not be condemned to forced promiscuity or else celibacy or else in any other way punished for their monogamy-aiming aspirations (such as via lack of corresponding legal rights)—however implicit this proclamation might be.

As to pedophiles, it’s a far more heated subject, at least for me, than your posts make it appear. This because the issue too easily converges with that of child molestation and child sex trafficking (currently on the rise in the West). I do get many of the nuances (not all pedophiles are child molesters nor vice versa, etc.) but, to my ears, to casually place “homosexuals” and “pedophiles” into the same sentence or paragraph via comparisons is grossly unesthetic, to here keep thing superficial.

I do have more to say, but, as you've mentioned, all this tends to depart from what it seems we both take to be sincere philosophical questions and topics. And I’m not overly interested in debating non-philosophical issues at the current time.

Maybe I overly conflated your views with those of Count Timothy von Icarus, who from what I've so far read at least alluded to homosexuality being either unnatural or an illness — javra


What exactly left that impression? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’ll acknowledge that it might be due to an improper reading in-between the lines of the posts I’ve so far read from you, this given my own biases picked up from lifelong experiences. I take it you lean heavily toward the Christian conceptualizations of God. Historically, a great portion of Christendom has repeatedly labeled homosexuality to be both unnatural (un-God-given) and a mental insanity. Maybe more importantly as applies to my biases, having grown up in a generally Orthodox Christian community, I have been repeatedly bombarded by these very same dogmas: homosexuality is both unnatural due to being contrary to God’s will and a mental insanity that needs to be purged from humanity. Nor did you take time in what I’ve so far read to explicitly claim that homosexuality is, to you, both natural and sane; this so as to distance yourself from what I continue to take to be the significant if not majority opinion—sometimes far more explicit and sometimes more hidden—of today’s Christian populaces, at least those dwelling in the West.

Having acknowledged my biases, and in light of you not taking this stance, I’ll apologize to you as well.

But, presumably many people do think in the case of those with something like an exclusive and "inborn, innate" attraction to children or adolescents that they should in fact go their whole lives without ever giving into such desires, regardless of if they were "born that way" or that such desires and interactions are "natural" in the sense that they are ubiquitous in human societies and can be found in brutes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As regards biology, as far as I know, there is no evidence to indicate that pedophilia is inborn at birth. Furthermore, the molestation (which often enough equates to rape) of children is immensely harmful, if not physically then psychologically. While, on the other hand, there is evidence to indicate that homosexuality is inborn at birth. This such that those homosexuals which are in no way bisexually disposed cannot be altered into holding heterosexual drives no matter the culture or any imaginable attempt (such as that of “conversion therapy”, aka "sexual orientation change efforts" – which, btw, is commonly acknowledged today to be very harmful). And, there is no harm that results from consensually homosexual activities.

Having said that, as I’ve previously mentioned, to consider that which is natural to be that which is inborn—this as per the Latin “natura” which itself derives from Latin “nascor” and which back then fluidly applied to what the Greeks specified as the Logos at large, both in terms of the physical and of the spiritual—gets very complex. So reducing the notion of "nature" thus interpreted to the one simple term of “inborn” does not do the notion justice.

So we can infer that one of the theses I was arguing for was: <differences between males and females do flow out into the social lives of human beings>. — Leontiskos

Ah. Again, my bad for my specific reply to you.

Maybe I overly conflated your views with those of @Count Timothy von Icarus, who from what I've so far read at least alluded to homosexuality being either unnatural or an illness.

It's a complex issue. In my cognitive sciences and anthropological studies of human sexuality while at college, for instance, I was taught that humanity can be divided into fifths on a sexual preference spectrum. The two extreme fifths are 100% either purely heterosexual or homosexual. The middle firth is perfectly bisexual. With in-betweens on either side. Can't find a quick reference to this, but I continue to maintain this perspective in light of both history and current human culture(s). And, as per my previous post addressing the animal kingdom for example, I find homosexuality and bisexuality to be both natural and just as potentially healthy as any heterosexuality. (utterly heterosexual though I myself am).

I do find this pertinent to the discussion. But, if it doesn't contradict your own views, once again: my apologies for my previous posts to you.

Right, and as I already pointed out, I have no idea how your response is supposed to be a response to the quote you quoted. It's as if you were responding to a post that I never wrote, but that you created in your head and then imputed to me. — Leontiskos

Not having read the entirety of this thread, its quite possible that i could have misinterpreted your stance. In which case, my bad.

To clarify: Do you uphold that genders are necessarily tethered to biological genitalia of the body or do you not uphold this? Thanks for the reply.

I already quoted you in the post I gave.

As to:

how can you claim that "group tendencies in no way determine individual proclivities"? — Leontiskos

No quibbles there. Hence the ancient Greco-Roman world, for just one example, being replete with homosexuality. ... Without it being either unnatural or indicative of insanity.

Yea, I think you missed the whole gist of my post to you. To sum things up: (healthy) sex ain't about the begetting of chidlren.

As to the whole burgeoning homosexuality vs. naturalness issue:

Scientists observe same-sex sexual behavior in animals in different degrees and forms among different species and clades. A 2019 paper states that it has been observed in over 1,500 species. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexual_behavior_in_animals#

The natural world as unnatural? Or maybe just sick and in need of the latest pharmaceuticals to clean it all up.

The fact that males can fertilize ova actually does bear on what individual males do. It means that more males fertilize ova than females (because females can't do it). Contrariwise with pregnancy, more females than males get pregnant (because males cannot get pregnant whereas females can). To deny this, one would need to deny that even though X can do Y and Z cannot do Y, nevertheless an individual X is no more likely to do Y than an individual Z.

Then in an evolutionary or teleological sense, hormonal and strength-based differences between males and females flow, in part, from their procreative natures. — Leontiskos

A little head’s up: Many (quite many, actually) of us men and women do not engage in sexual behaviors with others with the intend of procreation in the form of begetting offspring. Especially since many of us consider overpopulation to be very problematic for all of humanity, and hence for ourselves as well. And, unlike most if not all lesser animals, we nevertheless joyfully engage in sexual activities knowing full well consciously that they could serve a the one and only means of so begging children.

There is 0-point to both oral and anal sex (yes, this, here, among heterosexuals) were procreation to be the sole purpose to sex—this as one might quite telling find in the society expressed by Orwell in his book 1984 (to not bring into this past religious motifs). Yet we quite willingly with a lot of ardor and amore long for at the very least oral sex to be given and taken. And, no, it need not be a prelude to anything else. It doesn’t even need to lead toward an immediate orgasm. Being given oral sex with gusto by one’s adored partner however does provide one with a great deal of worth (fully psychological in its nature) in addition to the physiological pleasures involved. Why else do we nowadays term it “getting/giving head”.

As to men being the (natural) procreators/begetters. Physically, materialistically, yes. But then we are and have always been a bit extra. Psychologically, spiritually, women historically have and are well able to yet procreate and beget ideas, cultures, paradigm shifts, etc. into the minds of biological men just fine. And the power of cultures always tends to outweigh the power of individuals within them.

Masculine being to penetrate, i.e. as per the yang of things; feminine being the penetrated, i.e. as per the yin of things. And conceptions can either be physical or purely psychological. Is a men's gaining of a novel concept from a woman, his conceiving the concept till fruition and then his giving birth to it into the world, to be deemed unnatural? I deem it rather sickly, and hence very unhealthy, to so consider.

To affirm that there is no teleological scope to the evolution of minds per se, this via their penetrating and being penetrated by other minds, toward the Good is a bit too bogus for me to take seriously. And to consider only men able of penetrating due to our physiological biology is just too damn materialistic.

:up:

One might go a step further and puzzle over how anything could be unnatural, given that presumably nothing can occur that is against the will of an omnipotent, omniscient being. That is, equating the will of god with what is natural carries the problem of evil into the problem of the natural. — Banno

True. Add to this notions of the Devil, in parallel notions of the flying (not yet slithering on Earth) serpent whose will to awaken all to right and wrong was contrary to the will of the so-termed "lord" of genesis 2 onward, and one sinks neck-deep into inconsistencies if not worse. This as part and parcel of equating the Elohim of genesis 1 to the lord of genesis 2 onward. Heretical to say they couldn't have rationally been the same, so I won't here say it.

I'm not sure if I understand this. How could one be "utterly ethical" and at odds with Goodness itself?

The basic idea here is not unique to Christian thought. One can find it all over the Pagan philosophers, in Jewish, Islamic, etc. thought (this is indeed the broader tradition I was referring to). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. I generally agree with this, as previously alluded to. But one would need to grant that such is the traditional interpretation of many a major Abrahamic tradition, more specifically of many a major realm of Christendom, as well enough documented for at least the past 500 years in Western Europe. It's naturally feasible to go through spiritually ecstatic experiences (as long as they are not devil-governed) but it is utterly unnatural to cast spells and be in communion with the spiritual worlds via such means (especially if you happen to be a woman, even one that thereby serves as healer, i.e. medicine man, within the community). Take Joan of Arc as one well enough known example of this. And when did she become unethical? Never; quite the contrary. But she was accused of and killed for her devil-worship as soon as the authorities no longer benefited and thereby liked her life-long doings. And this specific mindset of natural vs. devil-business is, to my knowledge, in fact unique to Christian thought.

"Natural" here is conceived of in its original context, as relating to the phusis by which mobile/changing being changes (i.e., acts one way and not any other, the principle of cause and intelligibility in change). Man changes, but is rational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can have a general feel for this and sympathize with it, but it yet doesn't resonate with me in a lasting way. For the spiritual folks amongst us, the supra-natural (same meaning as supernatural) is merely the many realms of spiritual being which subsist in manners tethered to the natural, physical world without being as constrained by the physical limitations which humans (and all other physical life) find ourselves bound to.

Then, just as there are some humans that are generally ethical and some that are generally not ethical, so too in "the above". In Christian realms, hence the angels and devils. Or, as an example from different spiritual realms, hence the enlightened incorporeal Buddha-spirits (each a deity) on the one hand and those incorporeal beings which are ignorant and thereby bring about wrongs and unrighteous calamities.

My main intent to all this being that there is yet a partition between the corporeally physical world and the incorporeally spiritual realms of the cosmos - both subject to the cosmic logos but in different ways. Saying that everything ethical is natural whereas everything unethical is unnatural would then greatly alter this partitioning beyond any recognition.

I much prefer associating "nature" with "inborn-ness". But that can get very complex to properly express. Still, at the end of the day, in appraising that all sentience has the Good inborn into its very core, one can yet then arrive at the perspective that the Good is our true, ultimate nature. (Of which we dualistic egos often enough stand in the way of.)

↪Count Timothy von Icarus
If I've understood all that, you are saying that what is natural is what god wills? — Banno

Not sure what the Count holds in mind, so I'm not commenting on his behalf nor am I commenting to him. But if "The Good" were to be interpreted as equating to "a singular deity which wills all stuff into being" (to god in this sense of the term), then all westerner neo-pagans (most of which are either nature-worshiping polytheists or pantheists) would be contra the will of god and hence utterly unnatural, as too would be all Buddhists, all Hindus, all Inuits, and so forth. Even when they are utterly ethical (maybe especially by comparison to all self-proclaimed Christians who don't give a rat's ass for what JC said and wanted but only crave that their cultural traditions rule the entirety of the planet.) Witch-burning times, basically.

All this not being an understanding of the natural which I uphold, lest it wasn't clear. And I do uphold what gets to be termed "the Good".

This ain’t no place for me to expound on my own philosophical views which I’m working into a treatise
(which could be labeled as analytically philosophical mysticism), but as to this quoted conclusion:

The deepest illusion, the most profound nonsense that needs to be expunged is the idea that enlightenment consists in finding the Absolute Truth, coming to know the Ultimate Essence of Reality. — Janus

If “Absolute Truth” signifies one and the same with “complete conformity to the Ultimate Essence of Reality” (and what else could it cogently signify), then:

There is, first off, a glaring difference between 1) gaining a deep understanding of what Absolute Truth is as that which is to be forever pursued as the imperfect being you will forever be till the time it is obtained in full (together with the deep understanding that it in fact is) and 2) having gained it in full such that it becomes actualized. To illustrate via just one possible path toward it: in Buddhism, wherein Nirvana is just this so-called “Absolute Truth” of perfect and literally selfless being, and wherein all existence is but illusion (maya), there is a massive difference in having actualized an understanding of Nirvana (being Nirvana-actualized in this sense) and actually actualizing Nirvana (being Nirvana-actualized in this later sense). No body-endowed Buddha could ever have been Nirvana-actualized in the later sense while yet embodied within maya (yet needing to eat and drink to sustain one’s life, for one example of desires and attachments yet had), yet all were and are reputed Nirvana-actualized in the former sense (the Dalai Lama as one example).

That given, it ain’t like the understanding of the Absolute Truth is linguistic or else composed of thoughts one puts together. Instead, it is composed of nonlinguistic cognizance which mediates all possible thoughts one might have after the understanding is obtained (and the given human devised linguistic expressions utilized to communicate these thoughts). And, as with many another, once the understanding is had, it can’t be let go of (at least in no easy to conceive means). Even if one can find no practical way of conveying it to others than by means of artistic manifestations within the given culture one finds oneself: William Blake as one non-Eastern example of this.

Thirdly, for the more physicalist beings out there, damn, devoid of any earnest desire upon understanding what Absolute Truth as defined above is, there would be no empirical sciences to speak of. Perfect objectivity of awareness—often mocked as “the view from nowhere”—is precisely being at one with the Ultimate Essence of Reality, is thus Absolute Truth as previously defined. Take away all earnest desire toward a closer proximity to a perfect objectivity of awareness and what remains of the sciences but quackery and snake oils sold for personal material gains without any concern for what in fact actually is. And, here again, there is a mammoth difference between a) the desire to be objective which is requisite for b) being more objective relative to what you would otherwise be, and which would both be utterly impossible to steadfastly maintain with a straight face where complete objectivity to in fact be “the deepest illusion, the most profound nonsense that needs to be expunged”. And no, there can be no dualistic ego, no self, in a state of complete objectivity—for it, conceptually, would completely obliterate all possible senses of otherness, or otherwise it could not be—but then, neither could there at such a conceptual juncture be any “views regarding otherness”. Making the mockery of objectivity a complete stawman, to not say bullshit. To then deny the absolute truth that awaits to be found in a complete/absolute objectivity is to be one's own worst enemy in upholding the validity of scientific knowledge (that of climate change as no exception).

And fourthly, what physicalist out there maintains anything other than that “the Ultmate Essence of Reality” is, in fact, physical matter—thereby maintaining their having already obtained an understanding of what Absolute Truth is. With doublethink to boot if they then go about denying this very state of their convictions.

Imperfect as I am, I find the statement quoted in this post too detrimental to not succinctly comment on it.

I can live with this. Can you? — javra


Yep. — Banno

That's cool

See the musings added to the previous post. You've got me rethinking my reply to Un.

Is there a problem? — Banno

I have a problem with this part:

Do we end with "Becasue godswill" or perhaps "Becasue triadic thingumies"? — Banno

Neither of these present an ultimate end as the teleological reason for what is. Godswill is a mouthful: what is this "god" supposed to be to begin with, for example; is it supposed to be an omni-creator deity which created everything, including right and wrong and truth and falsehood, in line with the "His" own whims. If so, then this god cannot rationally equate to the divinely simple unmoved mover of everything that is as teleological ultimate end, for whims and creations are aspects, parts, of His being - which cannot be rationally said to occur within divine simplicity. ... A rather expansive subject. In a roundabout manner same with "triadic thingness": it is a supposed explanation for what is that cannot serve as an ultimate teleological end of what is: for starters, it doesn't predict that the cosmos's ultimate end is that of triadic thingness.

I know, these can be argued back and forth. But I think I'll be leaving that to others. Still, I can't find either to be that ultimate end which teleologically determines all that is, was, and will be - our myriad intentionings very much included - till the time this ultimate end is actualized.

That'd be more a "how" than a "why". — Banno

Not when it's an explanation for why the avalanche happened. Quite obviously I would think.

Why questions all presuppose purpose — javra

Yep. — Banno

OK then. Point being that not all purposes are intentions or else intentional. The rock's movement ended in there being an avalanche. In this very affirmation, there is a presupposed background of teleological reason in the form of "something's movement toward an addressed as of yet unactualized end/telos resulted in the actuality of the end addressed" and thereby caused the given effect. There's two glitches, though. The rock is devoid of intentions it wills to accomplish, for it it devoid of sentience and thereby will. Debatable within panpsychism contexts, true, but more importantly, to so consider all whys dependent on purpose in one way or another is to claim that all inanimate physical givens nevertheless do what they do sans intentionionality for the sake of accomplishing some ultimate end. Otherwise, there'd be nothing purposeful to it.

I can live with this. Can you?

Especially when you state that:

Saying that causes are unreal would be a misrepresentation. — Banno

"Why" questions presume intent, in some aspect, and so all that goes with intentionality. — Banno

As in the rock intended to start the avalanche that happened by intending to pursue gravitational paths of less resistance down the mountain just so?

That would make a rather extreme animist of you. Not even the spiritualists I've encountered hold such views.

Why questions all presuppose purpose, ends toward which things move physically or otherwise, and hence teleological causation - of which intents, and hence intentionality, is just one relatively minor instantiation of within the cosmos at large. The reason why leaves flutter is not because the wind so wills it. Lest we loose track of what are poetic truths and what is objectively real.

But I guess none of this matters much when causes are taken to be unreal. No objective truth to them to speak of - only the invented illusory truths of those who domineeringly subjugate the minds of others. What tyrant wouldn't approve?

(Still very much concur with Orwell's perspective.)

but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, — Banno

Yes, he was one of the folks that discredited teleological and formal causes. (Not that I support him on this.) But it is due to him that we have a much firmer understanding of what efficient causes are to begin with. He defined their properties

As to this

Javra agrees, and adds that these customs or habits may arise from the evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviours via genotypes. — Banno

Whatever metaphysics one subscribes to, we, genetically, phenotypically, consciously, are part and parcel of the metaphysics of the world. So no, while I maintain what I said, I don't agree with your interpretation of causation being unreal (metaphysical though it always is be definition).
.

How did you go from this:

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. — Ludwig V

to this:

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. — Banno

?

I couldn’t follow your question. Are you asking me to successfully define “the good” as something physically real and beyond the collective pragmatic narrative? Or what exactly? — apokrisis

Well, again:

The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. — javra

In other words, a metaphysics that via falliblist means rationally justifies the objective truth of meta-ethics in manners that account for all value systems: hence including the values held by those who willfully engage in activities which the average person might likely deem evil-doings but also including the neo-platonic value system of "The Good".

The question being, how does the metaphysics you subscribe to rationally justify the objective truth of such a meta-ethical reality? (Something, btw, which my "mushy" or such objectively idealist metaphysics, something yet in the process of being formally concluded in written form, is quite adept at. ((To illustrate this ain't posturing: You're free to check it out and try to falsify any part of its fallible conclusions. Link provided in my profile. The basic gist to meta-ethics is presented in Chapter 14. No pressure though; just if you're curious.) But I am asking you how your fundamentally physicalist metaphysical system does account for the objective truth of meta-ethics - this, maybe needless to add, in a manner that cogently accounts for all conceivable value structures present and past.)

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. He provided an account of causation as the result of an association of impressions and ideas that leads us to believe in causal relationships through "custom or habit". The issue about this account is that it seems to assert that we have this custom or habit but not to justify it. — Ludwig V

I'll go further, but again nothing conclusive. First, you have to place him in his time-period, a time-period of heresies and the maybe yet occasional burning for such. Hume does mention and relies upon what he in his lexicon termed instincts. If I remember right, at one point or another even briefly alluding to lesser animals having the same as man, this in terms of considering causal relations (?). Kant replaced this notion with categories. When i read Hume, I thereby deemed his overall thesis regarding causality as being non-contradictory and thereby consistent with evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviors via genotypes. Operant and classical conditioning in animals (and in humans), for one example, would be impossible without such innately held means of association. To me also interesting, Darwin did read Hume prior to his books on evolution, including his "On the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals". But, no, nothing philosophically conclusive in any of this.

Yes. I used to be reassured that governments lied routinely but that also the truth would eventually be declassified. Wait 20 to 40 years and history would get written.

[...]

It used to be the case that life lived as truth seemed just commonsense. Now maybe life lived as conspiracy theory is what is and always has been real. Or life lived as a reality show. A juicy topic. Debord in the age of the accelerationist. — apokrisis

I can see this … and can develop it a bit more. As our technology progresses, AI included, we will (granting that by then we don’t become extinct) eventually arrive at a future wherein everything knowable once again becomes for all practical purposes nothing short of oral tradition (as was generally the case for the Celts, the Dacians, the Native Americans, and so forth, to not here start on a long list of past cultures worldwide). For instance, it’s quite conceivable to me that at some future point of our technological evolution we’ll devise a way to indiscernibly mimic carbon dating. That Torah there can be carbon dated to, say, 300 BCE, but it was manufactured just yesterday; or else this dinosaur fossil here, carbon datable to some 100 million years back, was likewise manufactured via nano-technology this past week. And so forth. Add in the moral relativism of “might makes right” and you could easily end up with both an epistemological and ensuing ontological nightmare for our global species of life.

Seems to me that is precisely one of the pivotal reasons for why a metaphysics' rational justification for there in fact being objective truth(s) becomes so enormously paramount to our future survival as a species. And this, maybe obviously to some, in non-infallibilist manners of justification. The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. Things I so far find lacking in the metaphysics you subscribe to, what I take to be the many good features it has aside—and fundamentally physicalist though it may be. But, as always, feel free to demonstrate otherwise.

BTW, in keeping with both my last post and the theme of this thread, Hume can be interpreted in multiple ways, one of which is that we was, in fact, a staunch causal realist—this being how I myself interpreted his writings when reading them—his only issue being with rationalism’s (at the very least to him) false presumption that particular instantiations of causation could be infallibly known (to emphasize, this epistemologically) via sound deductions. But, as facts go, Hume never once claimed that causation was in fact illusory … hence, that there was no objective truth to causes (not in these or any other words).

Answers to 'Why' questions all end up the same way, sooner or later— "Because I said so!" or the less responsible version, "It's Godswill!". — unenlightened

Some will resonate with this sentiment, no doubt. All the same, it’s a bit Orwellian in its nature, even if unintentionally so. This being the notion that there is no such thing as an objective (i.e., utterly impartial to all egos everywhere) truth to be had and thereby pursued—very much including to questions of why. Why can 2+2=5 in addition to equaling four? Because Big Brother says so; and, therefore, so it can be.

Why did the avalanche happen? Because I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did. There is no objective truth to its reason for happening—that is, none other than that it happened because “I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did.”

Orwell said a lot in favor of objective truth and the perils of this commonsense notion’s destruction by tyrants—including that he unfrivolously feared its loss in society more than he feared bombs of any kind—but here’s a readily obtainable and easy to understand short quote of his:

The very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. Lies will pass into history. — George Orwell

(And yes, I’m saying this via the lens of objective idealism, one to which objective truths thereby very much pertain. Point being, one need not be a physicalist to uphold the reality of objective truths via rational justifications for this common sense notion.)

I'll accept that, if you will accept that the explanation is no more than a more usable description. :wink: — Banno

Help me out with that.

I take explanations to answer question of "why" and descriptions to answer questions of "what". Each then pertains to two different contexts of inquiry. Describing what a rock is does not explain why the rock is. But, yes, to explain why a rock is does necessitate some form of description of what a rock is.

Maybe of interest, in Romanian the term for "why" is "de ce" which literally translates into "from/for what". This too can illustrate that explanations of why are of a completely different nature than descriptions of what.

Likewise, to provide an explanation for a given description can make sense. Conversely, to provide a description of a given explanation doesn't, at least not at face value (unless, for example, one seeks to represent a given explanation via different words than the given explanation itself).

How do you differ?