but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, — Banno

Yes, he was one of the folks that discredited teleological and formal causes. (Not that I support him on this.) But it is due to him that we have a much firmer understanding of what efficient causes are to begin with. He defined their properties

As to this

Javra agrees, and adds that these customs or habits may arise from the evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviours via genotypes. — Banno

Whatever metaphysics one subscribes to, we, genetically, phenotypically, consciously, are part and parcel of the metaphysics of the world. So no, while I maintain what I said, I don't agree with your interpretation of causation being unreal (metaphysical though it always is be definition).
.

How did you go from this:

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. — Ludwig V

to this:

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. — Banno

?

I couldn’t follow your question. Are you asking me to successfully define “the good” as something physically real and beyond the collective pragmatic narrative? Or what exactly? — apokrisis

Well, again:

The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. — javra

In other words, a metaphysics that via falliblist means rationally justifies the objective truth of meta-ethics in manners that account for all value systems: hence including the values held by those who willfully engage in activities which the average person might likely deem evil-doings but also including the neo-platonic value system of "The Good".

The question being, how does the metaphysics you subscribe to rationally justify the objective truth of such a meta-ethical reality? (Something, btw, which my "mushy" or such objectively idealist metaphysics, something yet in the process of being formally concluded in written form, is quite adept at. ((To illustrate this ain't posturing: You're free to check it out and try to falsify any part of its fallible conclusions. Link provided in my profile. The basic gist to meta-ethics is presented in Chapter 14. No pressure though; just if you're curious.) But I am asking you how your fundamentally physicalist metaphysical system does account for the objective truth of meta-ethics - this, maybe needless to add, in a manner that cogently accounts for all conceivable value structures present and past.)

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. He provided an account of causation as the result of an association of impressions and ideas that leads us to believe in causal relationships through "custom or habit". The issue about this account is that it seems to assert that we have this custom or habit but not to justify it. — Ludwig V

I'll go further, but again nothing conclusive. First, you have to place him in his time-period, a time-period of heresies and the maybe yet occasional burning for such. Hume does mention and relies upon what he in his lexicon termed instincts. If I remember right, at one point or another even briefly alluding to lesser animals having the same as man, this in terms of considering causal relations (?). Kant replaced this notion with categories. When i read Hume, I thereby deemed his overall thesis regarding causality as being non-contradictory and thereby consistent with evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviors via genotypes. Operant and classical conditioning in animals (and in humans), for one example, would be impossible without such innately held means of association. To me also interesting, Darwin did read Hume prior to his books on evolution, including his "On the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals". But, no, nothing philosophically conclusive in any of this.

Yes. I used to be reassured that governments lied routinely but that also the truth would eventually be declassified. Wait 20 to 40 years and history would get written.

[...]

It used to be the case that life lived as truth seemed just commonsense. Now maybe life lived as conspiracy theory is what is and always has been real. Or life lived as a reality show. A juicy topic. Debord in the age of the accelerationist. — apokrisis

I can see this … and can develop it a bit more. As our technology progresses, AI included, we will (granting that by then we don’t become extinct) eventually arrive at a future wherein everything knowable once again becomes for all practical purposes nothing short of oral tradition (as was generally the case for the Celts, the Dacians, the Native Americans, and so forth, to not here start on a long list of past cultures worldwide). For instance, it’s quite conceivable to me that at some future point of our technological evolution we’ll devise a way to indiscernibly mimic carbon dating. That Torah there can be carbon dated to, say, 300 BCE, but it was manufactured just yesterday; or else this dinosaur fossil here, carbon datable to some 100 million years back, was likewise manufactured via nano-technology this past week. And so forth. Add in the moral relativism of “might makes right” and you could easily end up with both an epistemological and ensuing ontological nightmare for our global species of life.

Seems to me that is precisely one of the pivotal reasons for why a metaphysics' rational justification for there in fact being objective truth(s) becomes so enormously paramount to our future survival as a species. And this, maybe obviously to some, in non-infallibilist manners of justification. The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. Things I so far find lacking in the metaphysics you subscribe to, what I take to be the many good features it has aside—and fundamentally physicalist though it may be. But, as always, feel free to demonstrate otherwise.

BTW, in keeping with both my last post and the theme of this thread, Hume can be interpreted in multiple ways, one of which is that we was, in fact, a staunch causal realist—this being how I myself interpreted his writings when reading them—his only issue being with rationalism’s (at the very least to him) false presumption that particular instantiations of causation could be infallibly known (to emphasize, this epistemologically) via sound deductions. But, as facts go, Hume never once claimed that causation was in fact illusory … hence, that there was no objective truth to causes (not in these or any other words).

Answers to 'Why' questions all end up the same way, sooner or later— "Because I said so!" or the less responsible version, "It's Godswill!". — unenlightened

Some will resonate with this sentiment, no doubt. All the same, it’s a bit Orwellian in its nature, even if unintentionally so. This being the notion that there is no such thing as an objective (i.e., utterly impartial to all egos everywhere) truth to be had and thereby pursued—very much including to questions of why. Why can 2+2=5 in addition to equaling four? Because Big Brother says so; and, therefore, so it can be.

Why did the avalanche happen? Because I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did. There is no objective truth to its reason for happening—that is, none other than that it happened because “I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did.”

Orwell said a lot in favor of objective truth and the perils of this commonsense notion’s destruction by tyrants—including that he unfrivolously feared its loss in society more than he feared bombs of any kind—but here’s a readily obtainable and easy to understand short quote of his:

The very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. Lies will pass into history. — George Orwell

(And yes, I’m saying this via the lens of objective idealism, one to which objective truths thereby very much pertain. Point being, one need not be a physicalist to uphold the reality of objective truths via rational justifications for this common sense notion.)

I'll accept that, if you will accept that the explanation is no more than a more usable description. :wink: — Banno

Help me out with that.

I take explanations to answer question of "why" and descriptions to answer questions of "what". Each then pertains to two different contexts of inquiry. Describing what a rock is does not explain why the rock is. But, yes, to explain why a rock is does necessitate some form of description of what a rock is.

Maybe of interest, in Romanian the term for "why" is "de ce" which literally translates into "from/for what". This too can illustrate that explanations of why are of a completely different nature than descriptions of what.

Likewise, to provide an explanation for a given description can make sense. Conversely, to provide a description of a given explanation doesn't, at least not at face value (unless, for example, one seeks to represent a given explanation via different words than the given explanation itself).

How do you differ?

And is that better than "Be-cause it is the will of the Flying Spaghetti Monster"? — Banno

Well, without getting into the nitty gritty, the notion of gravity coheres into all other notions we hold without contradiction: as to simplistic definitions, masses attract masses, larger ones more so than smaller ones. No maths needed for this falsifiable little understanding of what goes on cosmically.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster, on the other hand, is no match for the will of the invisible and inaudible house fairy residing underneath my carpet. That aside, only unicorns can find any of these falsifiable. And I ain't no unicorn. So ... gravity is thereby a far better explanation in the JTB realm of things for me to give.

What makes gravity a better account is F=Gm₁m₂/r². — Banno

I was joking, yes, but in all sobriety, how would a child or most average adults be benefited by being given this equation? Rather than being told a more simple account of what gravity is, such as the one aforementioned. I very much like the quote, "make things as simple as possible, but no simpler," and this is very much context relative.

Besides, the point remains, gravity can serve as an explanation.

...happens a lot more then it perhaps ought, around these fora. — Banno

I gather that much. But there's something to not throwing out babies with their bathwater.

Now my point would be that it doesn't matter. What we get is a brilliant and useful way of working out what will happen - description or explanation, be damned. — Banno

I can deal with that. Just wanted to mention that you're looking at explanations for gravity and at descriptions of what it physically is. I was myself only addressing gravity per se as explanation (hence, even if I might not hold a true belief regarding its global properties and nature given what I know about today's physics, I yet know that it is). For me, then, if a kid asks me why does a ball thrown up into the air always come down - or else an adult asks why a human can't walk on water - I will yet answer with "be-cause of gravity". :wink:

there's a lot in that, a fair bit of it being quite agreeable, some less so. — Banno

cool.

Here's, I think, the first use of "abduction" in this thread: — Banno

Yup, I'm aware of it. (see my last comment)

Laws are descriptions, not explanations. — Banno

They can become so when entertaining Aristotelian notions: natural laws then here become formal causes (i.e., determinants) that effect (formationally determine) all that physically is, thereby serving as one explanation (which converges with other types of causes and, thereby, explanations) for what is. Nowadays, gravity is taken to be a universally applicable principle of the cosmos, so I find no reason not to deem it a natural law. We then use the notion of gravity to explain why an object thrown up into thin air will always come back down to earth (and, of course, a whole lot more: why do we have air to breath on this planet? One reason/cause/determinant for a breathable atmosphere is gravity.). And formational determinancy can conform to counterfactual theories of causality: e.g., without gravity, there would be no atmosphere; therefore, gravity is a partial cause/reason for the atmosphere on Earth.

Still, science addresses a heck of a lot more than natural laws. Cognitive science, neuroscience, biology, ethology (my strong points when it comes to science) for example all address aspects of what is via the scientific method which, though of course partly determined by natural laws, have practically nothing to do with them (at least not in terms of their study).

“Abduction” just papers over the real philosophical problem (Hume’s), instead of answering it. — Banno

Hey, at the very least in this, we see eye to eye.

:up:

Given posts such as these, seems that the only difference between us in all that’s been so far said concerns whether or not the word and corresponding conceptualization of “abduction” ought to be employed.

To put it in ways I think you might understand, I’m here simply utilizing the language of a given language game with that community which utilizes the language game.

In favor of its use, we do in part sometime reason about what is via use of creative heuristical concepts which, once spurred—in what I find to be great analogy to natural selection—then get culled such that only those most fitting to there given context of subject matter get to survive and thereby procreate within the (here implicitly addressed, scientific) culture of commonly accepted ideas of what is possibility the case.

In opposition to its use, it can (as can be found in this thread) be easily enough misconstrued as being something other than imaginative guesswork (namely, to account for some as of yet unaccounted for given), this since its proclaimed to be a form of reasoning.

I can see it both ways, so I’m impartial as to whether or not the term should be used. (I’ll likely use it among those that do and vice versa.)

As to likelihood, I find that this converges with epistemological issues of justifications for sustained beliefs regarding what is true. Although I differ in some ways from it (with these differences being relatively trivial), I so far find Susan Haack’s foundherentism to be adequate for the task. In a very imperfect summation of what I have in mind: the justification hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism works by means of noncontradictory, hence consistent, coherency between communally verified empirical data (all of which stems from knowledge by acquaintance which is, again, communally verified, and verifiable by all in principle) and the unfalsified theses (from grand theories to individual hypothesizes that are conceptually embedded with the former, all, again, falsifiable) regarding this data. When the theoretical / conceptual sum of falsifiable ideas cohere in consistent manners, this then increases the likelihood of the given sum being correct about what in fact is, hence true. Conversely, whenever there are found inconsistencies, then something somewhere is known to be amiss. This then is resolved by further communal experimentations and, on occasion, new theses / paradigms that better account for the accumulated data in consistent manners. At any rate, point being, a sum of experience-grounded justifiable beliefs regarding what is true (which within science must all be falsifiable) which, as given cohort, hold no contradictions within nor any contradictions with other cohorts of such beliefs gives no indication of being false, i.e. wrong, i.e. untrue. The greater such cohort of beliefs, the greater the strength of the cohort, and so the greater the likelihood of it being true. Hence, this ideal then exhibits the greater likelihood of both the cohort at large and all its individual parts being true. But, I will add, never infallibly so. A great case in point to this effect is the Theory of Evolution via natural selection; details still need to be ironed out, of course, and certain minor suppositions might eventually be evidenced wrong, but, overall, it is exceedingly likely to be true; and this due to the aforementioned justification.

This being a different topic but I thought it might be worth mentioning.

A neat example that supports the hypothesis that "abduction" - understood as accepting the best hypothesis - is central to scientific method. — Banno

Nah, I’m not claiming that. To clarify my position:

What is central to the scientific method of the empirical sciences (in contrast to what some term “the science of mathematics” and such, which have no such method) is communal verification via empirical means (aka, peer review and replicability of test results) that falsifiable hypotheses are not in fact false and, thereby, are likely to be true. No honest to goodness scientist ever claims in the conclusion of a scientific article that, because the falsifiable hypothesis empirically tested for is statistically evidenced to have a probability of error equal to or lesser than 0.000 (that’s that max that, at least in my days, gets to be reported), the given hypothesis has been “proven” true. Likely to be true, sure, but this then goes without saying.

All I’m claiming is that abduction plays its relatively minor part in the overall picture of the empirical sciences—a minor role that nevertheless sometimes is crucial enough. All falsifiable hypotheses (regarding what in fact is the case) are products of induction and/or abduction—imagination, creativity, and intuition are paramount to the process of arriving at good falsifiable hypotheses. And when it comes to paradigm shifts, such as was the case with both the Theory or Relativity and the Theory of Evolution when first presented, there too some abduction typically applies, this in addition to all inductions. Still, were these major theories not falsifiable via the scientific method and thereby empirically verifiable, they then wouldn’t be empirically scientific. M-theory, and string theory in general, is quite interesting for a great number of reasons. But until it becomes falsifiable empirically, as many others have stated, it just isn’t empirical science. Same can be said for Multiple World Interpretations. Lamarckian evolution which likewise emerged via abduction, at the very least in its crude original format (e.g., giraffes have longer necks because they continually strive to eat the leaves of taller trees and thereby pass down this striving in the physically manifested longer necks of offspring) on the other hand, was and remains a falsifiable scientific theory … one which has been falsified, and is thereby known to be false.

Abduction is basically trial-and-error heuristics produced via intuition (to which the non-conscious aspects of mind play a large role) that seeks to best explain some set of givens. Again, on its own it’s as good as imaginative guesswork—which isn’t saying a lot for it as a means of reasoning. It’s the explanatory power of certain abductions that give these certain abductions any merit in the empirical sciences. This, again, from testable hypotheses to relatively grand theories regarding how things work. And explanations, to hold any power (i.e., “ability to accomplish”, here, to accomplish adequate understanding of the relevant subject matter), will best account in valid manners for both what is and what is not there empirically. Hence no contradiction within the theory, yes, but more importantly nor between the theory and the best empirical evidence gained to date. For one example, once we obtained sufficiently strong telescopes and saw no Vulcan, the explanatory power of the “Vulcan theory” could have only crumbled, at least to all those who where honest with themselves. Your other two examples of Brownian motion and of previous accounts of astronomy likewise don’t take into account a) all the data known at the respective times and b) all the data which has been since then accumulated.

Going back to the ToR and QM, it is fact that—while both account for a lot and thereby produce great results—the two utilize fundamentally incompatible frameworks. There is thereby a fundamental contradiction between the two. Given all the data we currently have, do we then have any means of appraising which of the two is mistaken (here assuming that they’re not both in some fundamental way mistaken)? Same then with competing paradigms of the past when appraised from the perspectives of the past. Given a greater collection of data regarding the physical universe, say at the end of the next millennium, does it not stand to reason that at this future point in time we might then hold a theory of physicality that grants far greater understandings in noncontradictory manners—such that we at that point will look back to now as a time period with mistaken theories?

Notice that in each case, abduction leads to the confirmation of the accepted paradigm, where what was needed was a change to that very paradigm. Abduction as a counterproductive process. — Banno

As with all trial-and-error heuristics, most abductions are bound to be wrong. Yes, of course. Notwithstanding, for any paradigm shift to ever occur one must first conceive of a new paradigm from outside the boundaries of the old that better accounts for the known data. This will not be a process of deduction, nor will it typically be one of induction (generalization from particulars, for example), but instead will typically commence with what we in retrospect will then likely claim to be a flash of insight, as per the Eureka moment; this then yet being abduction. One which happens to eventually produce a better understanding regarding what is by newly devised deductions and inductions, which yet pivot on the given roundabout abduction. But again, without being falsifiable, it will not be science (not of the empirical kind).

What I believe is that science is a sceptical endeavour, that progresses by means of demonstration. which is to say, that I expect scientists not to put their trust too lightly in the work of others, but require experiments to be repeated, and findings to be demonstrated, and theories to be treated as provisional whenever their scope is extended. — unenlightened

:up:

----------

As to Peirce’s devised notion of abduction, I’ll butt in for a sec.:

Abduction is as worthless as pure guesswork when divorced from that ideal, else standard, by which that abducted is measured. That standard being simply the maximal explanatory power of the given abduction to account for those givens it seeks to explain—this especially in comparison to all other alternative explanations.

As a relatively well-known example in science, Einstein’s imaginings of traveling at the speed of light revealed to Einstein that something was amiss with Maxwell’s equations, so Einstein abducted a new explanation for how things worked, for which he then devised a new form of mathematics to properly express. None of this would have been of any scientific significance without the given abduction holding maximal explanatory power for the relevant known data. And field tests were done which empirically validated that light does indeed bend due to gravity. Yet the Theory of Relativity is as of today in partial conflict with the relevant paradigm of quantum mechanics: they each describe the physical universe using fundamentally incompatible frameworks. We hold onto both because each holds a tremendous, maximal, explanatory power for the data obtained within each branch but, because they are fundamentally incompatible, we already know that either one of the two or both are in some way(s) mistaken. The Theory of Relatively is, again, resultant of an abduction that currently has maximal explanatory power within its field of study. This is not to then say that new abductions could not eventually surface which will hold yet greater explanatory power than does the ToR. (the accumulated data, always empirical, remains unaltered, but the explanations for it can on occasion come in the form of paradigm shifts).

Same ideal standard of maximal explanatory power can, for another example, be applied to abductions regarding metaphysics, and not just the physical world which the empirical sciences study.

In overview: the explanatory power of ideas and theories is often enough an overlooked essential measure of an idea’s/theory’s worth. Same can be said for the Theory of Evolution via Natural Selection. Nothing comes close by comparison in terms of explanatory power as regards the diversity of lifeforms given all the data we know of. (I know, I know, it has that one contender of “The omni-creator deity did it” but, to be forthright, to many if not most this explanation for everything that exists does not come close to providing any understanding for what exists. So its explanatory power is very weak, if at all there. This even when granting the hypothetical of such a being.)

Abduction is no more rational than any imagining is. And I can’t fathom how Hume’s arguments again rationalism wherein sound deductions rule the land would in any manner be changed by it. It’s the explanatory power of that which has been abducted which reason states gives the abduction credibility in likely (but not necessarily) being true. This as is the case with ToR.

We don’t need epistemology to know; epistemology is an after-the-fact rationalization of what life already does. Epistemology is like a priest arriving after the festival, declaring rules for the dancing that already happened. — DifferentiatingEgg

OK, I can see how some out there want to pigeonhole everything into their own devised conceptual containers (i.e., schemas). For one among many examples: everything is physical (this being the devised conceptual container) so therefore all thoughts, intentions, passions, etc., too must be and thereby are purely physical. Yet there are also those whose main intent is to seek understanding via their studies and inquiries, such that first there is X and then there is understanding of what X is. Here, then, epistemology is simply the striving of greater understanding regarding an X that already is, an X taking the form of the epistemic, and this via its study. To better understand the ready-existent regulations by which something operates is not the same as pigeonholing everything into rules of one’s own creation.

Yes, this presupposes a great value to understanding. But that’s maybe a different topic.

[JTB type of] Knowledge is always in terms of concepts and can be passed on by means of words or other symbols. Understanding is not conceptual, and therefore cannot be passed on. It is an immediate experience, and immediate experience can only be talked about (very inadequately), never shared. — https://www.anthologialitt.com/post/aldous-huxley

It depends what you mean by "shared". We can both understand how to drive a car, even though I cannot understand on your behalf, nor you on mine. It's a bit like eating in that respect. — Ludwig V

To better illustrate A. Huxley’s views via a more extreme example: a mystic’s understanding of reality at large (which can be presumed gained via some form of, say, ecstatic experience or some such) cannot be shared in the complete absence of JTB knowledge regarding this understanding, via which the understanding could then be convincingly communicated to others. Notwithstanding, the given understanding nevertheless occurs, as then does the respective knowns-via-understanding regarding reality at large. As to possible examples of this, both Jesus Christ and the Buddha could be deemed to have been in possession of some such understanding which they did their best to impart, to not here get into William Blake and many another. More mundanely, though, most understandings among adult humans in a society are commonly held by all individuals (e.g., the understanding of which side of the road to drive on). But consider how kids learn language: they must come to their own understanding regarding what words in their proper contexts signify. One cannot impart this understanding to children directly (in contrast to how a JTB can be directly imparted among adults), but can only lead the way toward it via affirmations and negations regarding what is correct. This until the understanding clicks.

I don't see any reason to suppose that list is complete. But much depends how you distinguish a species of knowledge from knowledge of different kinds of subject-matter. — Ludwig V

Right. Never say never. Which is why I’m asking a broad community for examples that exemplify knows which are neither JTB, nor understanding, nor awareness (and the acquaintance it entails).

As to distinguishing species of knowledge from knowledge of different kinds of subject-matter:

Awareness of does not require either understanding or belief. So knowledge by acquaintance is distinct from the other two as a species of knowledge.

Understanding does not require belief of what is understood, and, though it does require awareness, it is additional to pure knowledge by acquaintance. So knowledge by understanding is also a distinct species of knowledge.

JTB, on the other hand, will require a) belief (that is both true and endlessly justifiable in valid manners in principle), b) some measure of understanding, and c) awareness. So it too is distinct from the other two.

That briefly addressed, each of the three types of knowledge can apply to vastly different kinds of subject-matter.

:up:

In agreement with much of your post.

To come at this from my own perspectives, in the examples frank provided I only see three differing types, or species, of consciously held knowledge addressed:

-- Knowing-that, which seems to always be knowledge-via-JTB.

-- Knowing-how, which I find is one subset of the more generalized category of knowledge-via-understanding (which I take can slightly bifurcate so as to apply both to conscious apprehensions as well as to consciously engaged in behaviors). Examples of this species of knowledge include: knowing (consciously understanding) the meaning of (e.g., of a word); knowing (behaviorally understanding) how to catch a ball; knowing (consciously understanding) another’s motive(s) and thereby knowing the other in this regard (i.e., holding a conscious understanding of who or what the other is); and the more philosophically renowned “know (consciously understand) oneself (as in: consciously understand what oneself as being is)”. This is what to me the butterfly question, for one example, would most likely addresses: how does a butterfly (granting it is in some way sentient even though not sapient) behaviorally understand how to navigate their way toward Mexico. Yes, many a conscious understanding can of course be justified, but an understanding is not quite a belief, being instead that upon which all beliefs are founded.

And, as your JTB+U maybe indirectly specifies, knowledge by understanding can be an utterly different beast in comparison to knowledge by JTB. For one example, one may not know (consciously understand) how to justify that which one knows via understanding (e.g., one’s knowledge via understanding of what is/being is) much less know (understand) how to convey it via words to oneself or to others. Even so, one’s known via understanding nevertheless so remains a known via understanding (e.g. no competent adult can claim with a straight face not to know/understand what is/being is, certain US presidents aside, even though we’re all at a loss for how to define it). Same with any skill one knows how to put to use so as to accomplish some end (and thereby behaviorally understands how to put to use so as to accomplish some end). Knowing (behaviorally understanding) how to ride a bicycle as an example of this. And, maybe needless to add, many an understanding can be non-conscious: e.g., someone with amnesia that discovers they yet know / behaviorally understands how to play piano, although they did not know (hold knowledge-by-acquaintance) that they so knew / behaviorally understood. Same could then be theoretically said of an amnesiac not knowing by acquaintance that they know by understanding what a complex scientific theory signifies (e.g., the theory of relativity or the theory of evolution) until coaxed into providing answers to certain theory-related problems. And “A doesn’t know his ass from a hole in the ground” is basically stating that A lacks satisfactory discernment (which is just saying that A lacks knowledge-by-understanding regarding differences which are otherwise commonly understood). Aldous Huxley’s Knowledge and Understanding gives some great insights into the uniqueness of understanding. For example,

[JTB type of] Knowledge is always in terms of concepts and can be passed on by means of words or other symbols. Understanding is not conceptual, and therefore cannot be passed on. It is an immediate experience, and immediate experience can only be talked about (very inadequately), never shared. — https://www.anthologialitt.com/post/aldous-huxley

-- All other provided examples to me consist of knowledge-by-acquaintance, of which knowing-of is a subset. An example of this type of knowledge I haven’t yet mentioned in the thread is that when one as a consciousness (aka, as a conscious being) is X, one as a consciousness knows this via a non-dualistic form of knowledge-by-acquaintance regarding oneself as consciousness: e.g., when one is angry, tired, sad, joyous, pleased, confident, in pain, etc., one knows one is so via direct and non-dual acquaintance with one’s one state of conscious being (such that there is no distinction between the subject of awareness (oneself) and its object of awareness (one’s momentary state of being)). Here, “to know” and “to be aware of” can be fully interchangeable expressions of the same. Hence, for example, knowing (being aware of) what it feels like to X. Or, “I love you more than you’ll ever know (i.e., more than you’ll ever be aware of)”.

At any rate, I again so far can only discern three types of knowledge in the examples provided: 1) knowledge by JTB, 2) knowledge by understanding, and 3) knowledge by acquaintance.

And I agree that the three can easily become, at least at times, indiscernibly entwined. This can, again, for example jive with your proposal of JTB+U (to which could also be technically added “+ knowledge by acquaintance”, for nothing can be otherwise known in the compete absence of any awareness, and all instances of awareness grant some form of knowledge by acquaintance, such as in what beliefs one upholds).

But my main reason for coming back to the forum to post this post is as follows:

I’m very curious to see if anyone can discern any other species of knowledge via the way “to know” is used within language that would not fit into any of the three categories just mentioned. (I haven’t yet found any.)

Insults devoid of rationality. Why is this not a surprise? (before you start on mathematical theses of entropy, its a rhetorical question).

And I am saying that if this is going to be a useful distinction – one that has dichotomistic rigour – you need to be able to tell me "as opposed to what?". How can I know what you think love is if you won't tell me what it isn't. — apokrisis

I'm not enamored with you shifting the responsibility on me - especially since you then were actively antagonistic toward something which you, by the aforementioned comment, have no comprehension of.

But before i take off, here's a working definition of what in English is termed "love": Love (in all its forms and variants) is equivalent, in the broadest sense of the phrase, to "unity of being" - irrespective of whether that which is, being, consists of psyches or physicality.- this, either in perfected form, this being "The Good", or as movements (including purely psychological ones) toward an ever closer manifestation of unity of being.

As to the "poetic evidence" you so humbly asked for, there's a song called "The Gravity of Love" whose lyrics might suffice.

But, your returning unsurprising insults aside, here the thing: I dare you, triple dare you, to define "love" in a way that conflicts to the just offered definition.

Ciao.

That’s why I don’t claim the idea of causality is useless in all situations. — T Clark

Right. So we can't survive, live, in a society without posing the question, at least implicitly, "who's responsible for what". But then, I find the same can be said of "what's responsible for what": what is responsible for my sink being clogged; what's responsible for my window not opening; and so forth. However they may be thought to do it, non-human animals too operate by discernment of the same, both in terms of who and what as being responsible for what. We humans just term this issue one of causation.

Is not-love = hate? — apokrisis

To you apathy, for one example, mild liking as another, are equivalent to hate?

(Who the heck am I debating here???)

And in social science, that would be competition and cooperation. Two forms of the good that go together splendidly. The basis of rational and civilised human social and economic order. — apokrisis

Back to the issue of the good, then. As in, what is it that make either competition or cooperation good Though it was quite apparent that your problem was with love. It is to the latter that your replied to me, after all.

So, as to the good:

As you ought to rationally know, fallible me is not now, has never been, and will never be an embodiment of perfect love nor of absolute good. Neither, I could argue, can be any other spatiotemproally occurring being. But I think this is beginning to touch on the nerve that might have been struck in you to elicit all those emotively hurt feelings, or so it seems: "The Good", which, as is no news-flash, some affirm to be perfected love (one that transcends the interpersonal but is nevertheless immanent in all interpersonal instantiations of love), cannot of itself occur spatiotemporally. It is not something that has a dichotomy, but simply that toward which, at least some, aspire to get closer to. Which, I take to you, gets into that whole transcendent, platonic mush that you abhor?

Still, this is all now awfully off this thread's subject.

Can you, like, give a rational answer to a simple, straightforward (and might I add not rude) question?:

So you find that "love is not a wrong" to be in need of justification? Before I start, first reply contra what so that I might see what all the opposition is about. — javra

Now, just so it said, I won't apologize for implying that love is good. But since you here also quite emotively express things such as this with a good deal of resentment:

But keep spluttering away in suppressed fury. Love! LOVE!!! I tell you. — apokrisis

What on earth do you interpret by the term love/agape?

A merely physical mythos cannot speak of such things. — Banno

My guess is that it would have something to do with entropy.

Apparently so. Weird, ain't it.

I simply point out the lack of any argument in your post. Not even any poetry as some kind of evidence. Just some mutterings about sex as rape and praise for Peirce's worst idea. — apokrisis

No, you pointed out gritty teeth speech. Now changing tune to something alluding to rationality, I see. So you find that "love is not a wrong" to be in need of justification? Before I start, first reply contra what so that I might see what all the opposition is about. Is it that the good can only be obtained via a balance between the good and the bad (to not bring in evil)? You want to uphold with a straight face that this is not self-contradictory?

Yep. The kind of facts one finds in Hallmark cards. And PF apparently. — apokrisis

You know, fallible me, but you seem to hold a grudge against what I said. As though you were insulted by it. Yet I still maintain that love/agapism is not a wrong. Your potential hurt feeling aside.

All this talk of love spoken through gritted teeth. Something's up. :up: — apokrisis

How do you know that I even have any, physical, metaphorical, or what not? :razz:

And no, replied to @unenlightened about what i so far find to be facts. That's what up. :up:

Love makes the world go round, which nobody can deny who is born of two parents. — unenlightened

Well, not all sex (child begetting sex included) is endowed with some degree of love. Sometimes, it can be pure hate and tyranny. But point taken.

Still, instantiations such as the latter cases of rape do attest to the fact that some adult humans become utterly immune to it. Love is to them a false promise, hence an utter falsity, hence a wrong reality to uphold, or, more simply, a wrong. Notwithstanding, duly agreed with the proposition: (universal) love is that which makes the world go round. And it can radiate from within individual humans as well, albeit always imperfectly. Or, in Peirce’s own terms, this would be agapism (his whole take on the evolution of natural laws and such makes no rational sense without the concept, but that’s Peirce for you).

That doesn’t change the primary question in this thread, i.e. is the whole idea of causality useful in most situations? My answer is “no” or at least “maybe not” — T Clark

Couldn’t resist. :razz: How can you, or anyone else, uphold responsibility sans “the whole idea of causality”?

I, and I can only affirm many another, find the notion of responsibility useful, as in, for one lighthearted example, I’m responsible for the contents of this post, not you or anyone else. And this because this post would not exist without my having caused it in some way or another (a partial cause, a sufficient cause, a necessary cause, etc., all these possibilities and more all being contingent on the occurrence of causation to begin with).

If you have time, take a look at at least the first few pages of Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. It elicited an interesting discussion. At issue is the extent to which a perlocution is separable from an illocution. — Banno

I'll try to check it out. Thanks.

EDIT: I agree that it isn't possible to claim 1 without also claiming 2, and vice versa. Perhaps that's all you mean by "Why not both?" If so, it's fine. — J

I’m trying to leave the forum for now. But, yes, claim 1 and claim 2 are semantically the same (with a possible semantic difference regarding emphasis). As to “why not both?” I gave an overview for why both will need to occur for JTB knowledge to obtain. Someone who is steadfastly certain in their belief that X (is true) without having any reason to believe it (this being synonymous with not having any justification for it) … ought to be trusted to in fact know what they’re talking about? If this were so, then, heck, planet Earth must be hollow and inhabited by sapient beings living in paradise. This then being a factual truth because others are so certain of it. I’ve encountered such. As to differing forms of knowledge, again, the knowledge-by-acquaintance and knowledge-by-JTB dichotomy I’ve previously mentioned showcases this. The first is had devoid of conscious belief; one doesn’t believe that one is seeing green grass but simply so does (and thereby knows one does, this in the knowledge by acquaintance sense of knowledge and not the JTB sense). But once belief is introduced, it must be both true and one must have (valid) reason for believing it so in order to count as knowledge. Some people want all knows to have the strength of knowledge-by-acquaintance. We can dream away all we like, but that is not the nature of the reality we’re living in. Else, again, the planet must then be hollow.

So now, this seems to me, would not be a political discussion but is a moral/ethical one. — Fire Ologist

I’m baffled by your once again separating politics from ethics/morality. For one thing, you previously agreed the two are entwined. This would mean not separate.

Not sure I am following here. — Fire Ologist

You previously brought in the notion of Orwellian issues. Orwell wrote two political fictions: “Animal Farm” whose dystopia can be boiled down to the dictum that “some members of the community are more equal than others” and “1984” whose dystopia could be epitomized by the slogans of the Ministry of Truth: “War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is Strength” … to which could be added something along the lines of “Hate is Compassion”. All these could be argued for. For example: it is war that makes peace possible, to aspire to states of freedom is to be enslaved to an ideal of freedom, to be ignorant of what the powers that be do is to remain safe and sound and immune from external forces and harms and thereby be strong, and, as to my add-on, to actively hate “the other” is to maintain compassion for the in-group and oneself. Nonetheless, all these—both when looked at at face value and when inquired into deeper—are absurdities that, in one way or another, require double-think to be maintained. The same applies to the Orwellian thoughts I addressed in my previous post. But to engage in justifications, and potential ensuing debates, for why this is so is not something that I currently have the free time for.

But you are right. Political correctness is akin to simply being polite. If we took away all sense of political correctness, we would descend into verbal war, and likely incite violence. — Fire Ologist

Given the general statements you made, in relation to the topic of this thread, we then don’t disagree on anything of much importance. We’re both on the same page when it comes to the following: hate speech is bad for society, it is dangerous to criminalize, and the preservation of free speech should bring about a system of checks and balances within society to mitigate it.

For my part, I’ll leave it at that.

I appreciate your continuing with this thread, Javra. I'd given it away, as on a par with the discussions of gun law and transgender issues - too fraught with high dudgeon to progress. — Banno

Well, thanks. I appreciate that. Cheers. Yup, going about to doing other things is on my current list of things to do.

Do we say that, since the act of shooting was not constitutive of the utterance of the first man, that the utterance was not a violent act? Well, is the issue here whether the utterance is violent, or whether the utterer is culpable? What part does the man giving the order have in the death of the woman? — Banno

As with the example you've given, when a mafia boss, or Charles Manson, tells others “I want them dead” and these others then commit murders, of course the mafia boss / Charles Manson / Hitler / anyone who so says and thereby influences, really, will be culpable for the murders that ensue. In one train of thought wherein causes are defined counterfactually, because no murder would have occurred were it not for the given person so saying that it should, the person so saying that it should can well be deemed a partial cause for the murder. Otherwise Charles Manson should have remained a free man.

But the statement doesn’t need in any way forceful in order to so be a partial cause. And if the statement is not forcefully aggressive, I so far don’t find that it could be described as a violent statement and thus an instance of violence. That said, or course, the statement does cause violence to take place.

You presented an interesting argument earlier, in response to assertions that utterances could not injure. You asked if Hitler injured people through his utterances. I don't think you received an answer,. — Banno

Nope, I didn't receive an answer.

Perhaps the account I gave, from Searle via Langton, avoids the offence while maintaining the point. Can we sidestep the rhetorical deflection, and focus on the function of language in the action described. Do we hold the speaker responsible for the killing, despite his not having pulled the trigger? — Banno

Sure. Sounds good. Maybe the issue of whether Charles Manson should or should not have been incarcerated would likewise help out (Like Hitler, the guy never committed any murders with his own hands. He just said stuff).

Till next time.

Before I reply in any detail, let me be sure I understand you. Are you saying there are ontological truths about the future? — J

Yes.

That is, the future exists now in such a way that statements about it are, at this moment, either true or false? — J

No.

Future actualities that are not yet actual int he present will happen. If one's belief of what will be a future actuality conforms/correlates to what will in fact be a future actuality, then one's current belief in the present is true by definition of truth. Hence, the "sun will rise again tomorrow" is either true or false, this being contingent on whether or not it will.

TB seems to be saying, "You can only know something if it's true." Or wait . . . maybe it's saying, "You can only know something if, right now, you are sure it's true." Which is it? — J

Why not both at the same time? The first by entailment. The second only due to the valid, and hence non-contradictory, justifications one could provide for its ontological truth granting one the sureness that it is true. As far as I can tell, both are necessary for any JTB form of knowledge.

I have a few questions up above, so, I appreciate your time. — Fire Ologist

As always, no problem.

Do you think speech IS violence when it is hate speech? — Fire Ologist

No. It can be quite harmful depending on subtext and context, but not all harm is violence. So, again, no.

I am curious if you agree that “dehumanizes” is superfluous to how a proposed hate speech law would be enforced. — Fire Ologist

Yes. But since we are not talking about laws I find this to be quite superfluous to the issue. To communally deem another people to be subhuman is a) unethical because it is b) harmful and can furthermore readily result in physical violence against them. And, as always, subtext and context matter in what is expressed: If I cordially tell a close friend, "f*ck you, you dog" in reply to a comment they make, this is in no way dehumanization. The same thing told to a complete stranger I detest would most likely be.

Or that giving the government the power to adjudicate what is hateful and what isn’t creates the dystopia you just referenced. You agree with those two things? — Fire Ologist

Again, yes: as always, I agree.

But you said speech “which dehumanizes and incites violence”. Why do you keep bringing up “incites violence”? If it “incites violence” it’s a legal issue again, and we already have a system to put the violence in check. — Fire Ologist

Because I'm not talking about laws. I'm talking about what is right and beneficial. Should I begin to justify why a person dehumanizing another person is wrong and detrimental? (a rhetorical question on my part)

I think you are worried about this: “speech that dehumanizes and could possibly incite terrible violence”.

Is that more accurate? — Fire Ologist

No. I'm partly concerned about speech that dehumanizes, in and of itself.

I think that about covers all the non-rhetorical questions you've asked.

To reemphasize my position:

I, again, fully sponsor that the possibility of Orwellianized thought can occur at any time and in any way: physical defense against a physical assailant can become deemed physical violence and hence criminal; and vice versa: for instance, a mass murderer shooting people on the streets from building tops can be deemed to have only been engaging in legally protected self-defense against those who’d take away his/her human rights. Both are perverse interpretations of what is ethical: The victim becomes “the victimizer” and the victimizer “the victim”. Something quite common in authoritarian systems and mindsets. And it is how tyrants gain power. All these judgments which attempt to influence others in terms of what-is-what and what should be done about it being first and foremost speech. And the issue of hate speech is by no means an exception.

Having reaffirmed that about Orwellian speech, is it anyone’s belief hereabout that more hate speech will mitigate the hate speech that might otherwise occur?

Here’s an analogy that I so far don’t find faulty: one rotten apple will spoil the bunch; the remedy to this so as to have a healthy group of apples is to add more rotten apples to the group. Replace “apples” with “humans” and “healthy” with “ethical”. The same conundrum results. The end result is the absence of health/ethics in the given cohort.

If you anyone sees it otherwise, can you then explain how hatred toward a dehumanized other (and an increased occurrence of it in opposing directions) can bring about greater equality of rights for all within the given community? The latter, as I think at least all Americans agree, being a necessarily upheld value in any functional democracy/republic.

To be quite clear: does anyone hereabout endorse the use of hate speech as beneficial? Rather than merely endorsing the absence of sanctioned laws against it.

So back to non-legally sanctioned systems of checks and balances. A lot of people have turned the term “political correctness” from one signifying “politically ethical conduct” into meaning something more or less along the lines of “our tyrannical oppression by those with opposing political views”. Granted, this can well be the case in any Orwellian society: within a self-labeled fascism or communism, what is politically correct will be that which is, at least for the most part, unethical, and it will tyrannically oppress those who strive for an ethical society. Well, to not re-ask the same thing in different terms, I will here simply repost what has so far not been directly addressed:

[...] I’ve heard a lot of disparaging in my life of political correctness. The tyranny of such and so forth. So if we take away all political correctness, what checks and balances remain to prevent speech that can easily lead to mass murders and genocides? — javra

Your time in replying to the non-rhetorical questions posed would likewise be appreciated.

And just as a reminder, this thread and its OP is pivoted on the idea that the very notion of hate speech is in and of itself detrimental and, thereby, unethical. It is this which I disagree with.

Here’s a related issue:

Ought we take all affirmations of “I/you/they/etc. did, are, or will do X”, “X happened, is happening, will happen”, “X was, is, or will be Y”, and so forth to implicitly affirm mere beliefs regarding facts or statements of JTB knowledge regarding facts?

Certainly, depending on statement and its conceivable justifications, to differing degrees any such statement could be theoretically wrong. If one assumes that JTB must be absolutely devoid of any possibility of being wrong, then we all communicate all the time via beliefs which we don’t know to be true.

How would this not then result in a societal chaos of sorts wherein most all trust goes down the drain?

That said, when you tell me, “this person went there,” I always take this to be a statement regarding your knowledge of events. This unless you preface the statement with, “I believe that,” or else “I think that,” which would both, each in their own subtly different ways, convey that you cannot gather sufficient justification for the affirmation to maintain psychological certainty in its truth and, thereby, uphold it as knowledge.

Can this knowledge be mistaken? Of course. But at least here you implicitly convey that, to your own best appraisal, you can justify its ontological truth to me were I to so inquire (maybe needless to add, this without any contradictions).

Does all this then mean you approve of the political correctness which societally, though not legally, mitigates hate speech as previously defined, this as the optimal mode of societal checks and balances?

Would I also claim knowledge? This is where it really starts to get murky. According to JTB, I can't, since I don't (yet) know if "I will eat something tomorrow" is true. — J

Why not?

As I and others have pointed out in previous posts, ontological truths occur, i.e, ontological correspondence/conformity to that which is, was, or will be actual do occur. Implicit in every belief is an assent to that which is true. So when one's belief of what is true is one and the same with what is ontologically true, one's belief is true. Justification then comes into play in the following manner: if my justifications for X being true are contradictory, then they are invalid. If they are not contradictory in any way, then, irrespective of how strong or weak, there will be no reason whatsoever for me to presume my belief to not be true. This then implies that one knows in a JTB sense that one will eat something tomorrow.

I so far presume implicit in all of this an emotive desire to obtain a state wherein all possible risks of being wrong are 100% avoided. And this state of an absolute guarantee of being in no way wrong about what is ontologically true is technically termed infallibility. I don't believe that an individual ego's omniscience is possible - a different issue to this thread which I won't pursue to justify. But I do find that the only way infallibility of anything could hypothetically be obtained is if the individual ego in question happened to be omniscient - thereby having perfect awareness of all past, present, and future events in all aspects of the cosmos. And no human is.

It may suggest to us that a "one size fits all" construal of knowledge is misguided. This doesn't mean that Total Chaos is now rampaging. It just means that the question is nuanced, and often depends on interpretation. — J

Fully agree. For one example, the proposition "I know that I know X" can at least be interpreted to specify two utterly different types of knowledge at play: knowledge-by-acquaintance of having JTB knowedge regarding X.

If you haven’t yet caught on to what I’ve been saying in my posts, I agree that making laws against hate speech in the US can easily become utterly dystopian. It then follows that laws against hate speech in the US ought best not be made.

So we agree that hate speech is bad, that it can lead to mass murders and genocides, and, hence, that ideally it should not occur. And we agree that government sanctioned laws against hate speech in the US would also be bad due to their quite plausible potential to become perversely interpreted. Where we’re not yet clear on is the following:

Should there be a system of checks and balances within society to mitigate speech which dehumanizes and incites violence against others? And, if so, what ought these checks and balances within society be?
For example, I’ve heard a lot of disparaging in my life of political correctness. The tyranny of such and so forth. So if we take away all political correctness, what checks and balances remain to prevent speech that can easily lead to mass murders and genocides?

I agree hate speech is morally wrong even if it isn’t spoken as a prelude to murder. But if you want to make it legally wrong, it needs to be more directly connected to things like murder and legal badness. It needs to be connected to harrassment, or obstructing the right of way, or trespassing, or fraud or libel or slander and leading to physical measurable harm. It can’t just be offiensive to my ears and heart. We have to be able to say anything we want when the adults are talking about policy and laws and priorities and what is crime, and who is good for political office. The only way to protect that type of speech is absolutely - in a political debate context, absolutely anything and everything must be allowed. If it sounds like hateful shit, great, we call it hateful shit and tell the speaker now that they are done to piss off.

And instead of regulating speech, we regulate harrassment, obstructing the right of way, trespassing, fraud or libel or slander. If hate speech is a prelude to more badness, it is conspiracy to commit a crime, it is evidence of a criminal enterprise, it is incitement to criminality. So in that case, it is not the content of what is hated in the hateful speech that should matter to the government, it is the criminality of what the speech directly leads to that should matter to the government. We don’t want the current administration judging speech for criminality. Right? — Fire Ologist

Well, I agree with this.

I also so far take it we're in agreement on the other two points I previously presented: that hate speech is ill defined and there there should be checks and balancers within society to mitigate it.

I've previously mentioned this, and I'll mention it again, maybe here more explicitly: I would rather that hate speech, however re-coined if so, be defined as speech that dehumanizes others and incites physical violence against them.

At this point, this has nothing to do with laws or other social means of mitigation but with definitions, So how do you take speech so defined? Do you yet find the definition vague?

"So, we come full circle via a strange loop. Every experience of every entity including ourselves engenders expression which contributes to ongoing conceptual construction.

That feedback is philosophy - the way whose truth is our life. It is inseparable from a human, being. "


I found this part odd because humans seemed to have survived a long time before philosophy so I wouldn't say it's truth is our life. — Darkneos

Not that I'm in full agreement with the quoted remark, but my take on the issue of "Is there a purpose to philosophy":

Yes: improved eudemonia … obtained via greater wisdom … toward which one supposedly has an affinity. Hence, "philo-sophia". Or at least that’s the traditionally maintained view. In contrast, a significant portion of the modern view holds it that wisdom in all its forms (artistic, analytic, scientific, etc.) is worthless, replacing its esteem with esteem for ever greater cash wads and power over others … which are also esteemed in the name of the very same end of improved eudemonia. And something tells me that ethics has something to do with this general bifurcation. One does on occasion hear a child being praised for being wise beyond their years, but I’ve never yet heard praise in the form of “loaded with cash beyond one’s years” or else “domineering beyond one’s years”.

I also as of yet don’t see why the same generalized dichotomy of means toward the very same end of improved eudemonia would not have been around since the dawn of mankind: same brains throughout, just different outfits and such.

Hence, in most ordinary circumstances, one will affirm knowledge of what one will do later on in the day (or else of when one’s airplane will arrive), this serving as one example among many. — javra

Knowledge of what one will do later in the day is not quite the same as having intentions or plans for what one will do later. — Ludwig V

@Banno kindly already replied. But to make it maybe less tricky an issue, I’ll change the example to knowledge of a future event that is not mostly contingent on one’s intentions or plans.

Suppose one watches a regular TV series that always starts at 6pm. Does one merely believe that the series will air later on during the day at 6pm or does one know this? In commonsense speech, if one says “I believe it will air at 6pm” in reply to a question, and this without any sarcasm, one then communicates that, although one assents to the reality that it will, one nevertheless does not have reason (this, here, being sufficient justification) to be psychologically certain that it will. And why not?

On the other hand, when told that the series starts at 6pm and replying to this “dude, I know” or something to the like, one conveys that one is psychologically certain (notice that I’m not here claiming being epistemically certainty) that it will, and this because one can justify that it will via any number of means without there being any credible alternatives to the contrary. This doesn’t then imply that its impossible for this upheld knowledge to be mistaken and, thereby, to in fact not be knowledge. Maybe there will be a city-wide outage at 5:55pm that prevents the show from being aired, maybe this and maybe that, but, nevertheless, one will have no reason to find any such alternative (whose possibility could be theoretically justified) credible and thereby plausible. So one then knows the show will air later on in the day at 6pm. And when it does, one's knowledge is confirmed by factual events.

If one instead prefers to remain on the safe side, one can instead simply declare it as a belief one has. — javra

There is no safe side. One may prioritize avoiding believing something false, but that raises the risk of failing to believe something true. — Ludwig V

True. I’m guessing it should come as no surprise that the living of life is risky, even when we’re not consciously aware of it, and irrespective of how risk-adverse one might be. Every choice we make has its potential opportunities and potential costs and, hence, its risks. This is where I take personal responsibility steps into play (and maybe why making reasoned decisions we can justify given the contexts of what we are aware of during the moment of choice if often best … but hey, spontaneity sometimes is also good). With this personal responsibility then including our choosing what we deem to be knowns and what we don’t. We take our risks in life and reap the consequences, but are the risks justified? At least that's how I look at it.

I have trouble with that; surely the justifications matter? Can we act like P is true -- that is, assert that we have the T for JTB -- if the justifications aren't strong? — J

I so far take it that justifications always come in degrees of strength. And that this corresponds to the strength of knowledge had.

For knowledge that “one rock and another one rock will equate to two rocks” the justification is, or at least can be, extremely strong. Such that one cannot find any justifiable alternative to the contrary, much less any credible alternative to the contrary.

For knowledge that “one will exercise later on today (because one so intends to exercise)” the justification is by no means as strong as the aforementioned. (Or else knowledge that one’s airplane will arrive at such and such time.) For this knowledge claim there are alternatives which can be justified, only that one does not find any such alternative to also be credible. (For example, the alternative that one possibly won’t on account of spraining an ankle can be technically justified, even if one doesn’t find it in any way credible.)

Yet they both are, or at least can be, knowns in the JTB sense. Just that the first is a much stronger known than the second, precisely due to the justification for it being of such nature as to far better assure the truth of the matter no matter what.

BTW, I get that the first known doesn’t address a future event in the same way the second does. These varying degrees of knowledge are not strictly limited to future events though. Consider that the same can be said of knowing that a certain memory one has is true rather than being, at least to some extent, a false memory—this even when two or more people share the same memory.

The ontological truth of the matter involved yet remains determinate, fixed, this even if the given truth hasn't yet occurred. It’s the justifications for this truth that provide the structures needed to epistemologically validate the truth maintained via belief.

The only time that knowledge doesn’t come in degrees of strength but instead is a strict binary is when one considers there either being absolute knowledge or else no knowledge at all. The latter being an outlook I disagree with.

As to why a weakly justified true belief can be deemed knowledge rather than mere belief: it depends on the amount of risks one is willing to take in assuming a weakly justified belief to be ontologically true and thereby knowledge. If one is OK with the possibilities (but, again, not the plausibility) of being wrong and the consequences of so being, one then can choose to declare this weakly justified belief to be a known one is endowed with. If one instead prefers to remain on the safe side, one can instead simply declare it as a belief one has.

Hence, in most ordinary circumstances, one will affirm knowledge of what one will do later on in the day (or else of when one’s airplane will arrive), this serving as one example among many.

--------

p.s. For example, it would be odd for a typical westerner to say "though I believe it, I don't know whether I will eat anything tomorrow".