I am here to learn and discuss, so being forceful is not a bad thing. The very aspect of choosing a form of idealism for the reasons you give, is interesting, so at least I got to see that. — Manuel

I'm glad to hear. Thanks for the meaningful discussion.

I don't think intentions or purpose are touched by physicalism for good or ill. We have intentions and give purposes, I don't see any contradiction. — Manuel

Can you point out any physicalist philosopher that accepts even so much as the possibility of teleological processes in the world? I so far can't. Rather, from to my knowledge, physicalism denies the very reality of teleological processes in the world - such as any that might occur in biology. Hence, it very much does address the issue.

The contradiction I see is in considering the teleological processes we term intentions to either be a) illusory aspects of the world (this being inline to considering our own mental faculties acknowledged in "folk-psychology" to be illusory aspects of the world via epiphenomenalism or else eliminative materialism) or b) real aspects of the world, in which case the world at least in part consists of teleological processes.

The two options are in direct contradiction and result in different ontological perspectives - this having virtually nothing to do with the reality of the physical world as we know it.

But I don't mean to be too forceful on this issue. Just wanted to affirm that, to me, there is a substantial underlying contradiction, as I attempted to illustrate.

Ah. I see. It's an interesting perspective though the question soon arises, is mind alone without anything else (meaning beside the minimum conceivable experience) sufficient to make evaluative claims about morality? I mean, if non-mental (physical) stuff is primary, does it make morality less important even if its a subjective thing? I don't think so.

But to your point: we see plenty of examples in animals that don't seem to have such moral notions when they act. It kind of begins to arise somewhat vaguely in higher mammals, some evidence hints at a kind of moral instinct, in certain apes. Maybe dolphins too, but it's hard to evaluate the evidence.

It's harder to say that ants or meerkats, by acting in a group, have these notions in mind. — Manuel

It’s funny to me how the far more instinct-driven lesser animals are outcompeting us humans in terms of ethics regarding environmental sustenance, leaving aside the fact that no lesser animal has ever come close to producing any of the myriad atrocities we humans have (cf. Hitler and Stalin, as just two examples). But this fact can serve one view of this issue just as much as the other.

Be that as it may, it may not be of philosophical interest to you, but the issue isn’t one of culture-based morality so much as that of what our terms of “good” and “bad” existentially reference for one and all - if anything at all. This issue exceeds morality. For it can apply to which flavor of ice-cream one deems good and addresses the motivational reasons for why one deems the notion of a physical world to be good - this just as much as it applies to the reasons why saving another life might be deemed good. It addresses the very notion of value, as @Constance has mentioned.

At any rate, the empirically known physical world and its study via physics - which so far seems to be your primary interest - indeed has nothing to say on this matter. Whereas materialism can well be argued to imply an existential value-nihilism via its stance of fundamental purposelessness in the world. (As I previously said, materialism / physicalism cannot allow for the reality of intentions - hence, the reality of purpose - in the world without undermining its own stance.)

In short, non-physicalism might not be a sufficient condition for the existential reality of the good as a universal applicable to all particulars that so intend, but it is a necessary condition.

Apropos, as (mutually) altruistic as they are, meerkats are mammals with complex cognitions that require a lot of learning to be functional, and biologically shouldn’t be grouped in the same category with ants any more than primates should.

I'm unclear on what you mean. We attribute identities to rocks, but when we speak of rocks usually, we tend to speak of "rocks" and related common-sense uses, not of the properties that make it up. Like if we see a sheet of limestone, we don't speak of "calcium carbonate", unless we are geologists speaking about limestones from a technical perspective. — Manuel

What I meant was that every physical entity we know of we deem to be constituted of other physical entities. I can’t think of any example to the contrary (other than the quantum vacuum, but this is an exotic issue). Changing the examples in a more common parlance way, a rock is constituted of rock fragments which we could obtain by hitting it with a hammer. In turn, if we’d grind these down, we’d get very small fragments, like grains of sand. We pulverize these, we get powder. Thereon out, we use microscopes and theory to figure out what the physical constituent stuff of the powder is. But we always infer before inspection that it’s made up of something that’s smaller yet still physical. So when we look at a rock, we know that it is made up of other physical things, and this without breaking the rock open so as to validate our inferences.

Yet, at each stage, there is a unique identity of what is observed and of its inferred constituents. Each identity being other than its makeup's identity.

I mean, what difference is there between effete or "ineffectual" mind and matter as discussed by current physics? If all is mind as opposed to physical stuff, what's the difference? The reason I use "matter" and not "mind", is because I think there is a world out there, independent of us, not dependent on mind. — Manuel

In addressing the first question: none whatsoever (but see the parenthetical caveat below).

In addressing the second question: If all is mind then, for one example, it's conceivable and logically coherent that good and bad could existentially be objective attributes of reality (rather than whatever anyone says they are) - bringing to mind possibilities such the Neo-platonic notions of "the Good/the One". If all is physical stuff, then the reverse holds true: good and bad are relative to just about whatever individuals and collectives care to think about - but they have not existentially objective standing. Point being, there are quite significant differences between the two worldviews, but they have nothing to do with what the empirical science of physics says about the world (This when one excludes certain un-testable hypotheses which current physicists often enough make, such as, for example, that the universe will end in a heat death (also called the Big Freeze) ... these hypotheses being utterly different from the data gathered from physics as empirical science; and they hold alternative, competing, physicist-produced, non-testable hypotheses to boot: e.g. the Big Bounce, the Big Crunch, and the Big Rip).

In addressing the third sentence: Sure, from this vantage, both worldviews work equally well. It's why I make the distinction between mind and matter as well, even though I can best describe myself as a non-physicalist monist.

we persons are nothing more than our constituency of this and that material causes which, as material causes, efficiently cause things — javra


Yeah, I mean, I do it sometimes too, I try not to, but using the term "nothing more", or "merely" or "just" is very misleading and can be taken to imply one is playing something down. I do do this at times, but one should be careful. — Manuel

Well, from my pov, we persons are more than our constituency of this and that material cause. Again, this going back to the theme of the OP. But yes, one could reword the statement to read “we persons are identical to these and those material causes which constitute us” and thereby remove the implication previously provided via the words “nothing more than".

I question that this can make sense in any immediate sense of experience. A seen rock is thereby conceptually identical to a bunch of unseen subatomic particles, themselves constituted from an amorphous quantum vacuum, this in the vantage of materialism. But, experientially, we don’t inhabit that world which this material-cause concept of identity entails; we inhabit this world wherein we both agree that the seen rock is only identical with itself as rock, its constituents holding their own unique identities. No?

EDIT:

Yes but, according to Peirce's idealism, he says that "matter is effete mind", rendering the distinction between mind and matter kind of moot. — Manuel

In terms of physicality's reality, yes. In terms of ontology, certainly not. If matter is effete mind then all is mind in various layers of complexity: our own individual minds being themselves constituted of what would then be aspects of a universal effete mind which, as per Peirce, itself manifests via the interactions of individual minds as global habits ... here having paraphrased a bit and possibly made the issue simpler than it ought to be. Point is, here, all is mind. In so being, this thesis then holds possible implications which materialism / physicalism (everything we take to be mental is in fact fine tuned physicality) outright rejects as metaphsycially possible. Confer, for example, with Peirce's notion of agapism.

Again, you can label the world whatever, it's a monist postulate, not more. The idea that experience is physical was mind-boggling to me. But as he says clearly, his physicalism is not physicSalism. These are very different.

[...]

What something "really" is, is honorific. You can say I want the "real truth" or the "real deal", that doesn't mean there are two kinds of truth, the truth and the real truth nor the deal and the real deal.

[...] — Manuel

What position would you hold in relation to this view intending a more precise, philosophical definition of materialism?

In sum: In metaphysical essence, materialism is Aristotelian thought when fully divorced from formal and teleological causes.

In so being, it only acknowledges material causes and, as a subsidiary of these, efficient causes - such that it is not forms (like a person as an Aristotelian form) which engage in efficient causes (e.g., we persons as forms do not here efficiently cause things) but, instead, it being matter itself which so does (e.g., we persons are nothing more than our constituency of this and that material causes which, as material causes, efficiently cause things).

This differentiation between Aristotelian notions of formal cause (the uncle as person) and material cause (the uncle as a plethora of central nervous system cells) to my mind being of direct pertinence to the OP.

Again, the idea is that the implications of this absence of formal and teleological causes in a world strictly comprised of material causes and their efficient effects thereby results in materialism / physicalism as its currently known.

(Btw: Here acknowledging that the scientific method - which in truth historically emerged in rough parallel to this change in metaphysical perspectives - can be founded upon the metaphysics of materialism but that, if we agree as your former writing seems to suggest, it can just as validly be applied within non-physicalist worldviews such as Peirce's notion of objective idealism.)

Ya, OK, recommendation still stands.

For me the telos rests with what I see as simply without doubt, the most salient part of our existence, which is value. I've said it before, but it always bears repeating: value is by far the strangest thing in all there is. — Constance

Yea, my thoughts precisely. You hit the nail on its head.

So "zombies" would say too. Again, merely anecdotal. The 'problem of other minds' remains. — 180 Proof

Dude, like, in your decent into Cartesian doubts regarding other minds (given that the belief in other minds is not infallible on grounds of it all being anecdotal to you), do you then presume yourself to thee solipsist? (Because if what you wrote is sincere that's the only logically alternative to "other minds".)

One, how does this - logically, coherently - evidence the unreality and/or physicality of consciousness again?

Two, if indeed it is you that is responsible for the simulation of the world the rest of us “zombies” inhabit, some of us zombies might get displeased with you on account of the unpleasant conditions we’re living in … then one might get into a zombie apocalypse scenario. A one against all kind of picture. Not saying you wouldn’t survive but it might be an altogether unpleasant experience for you – this solipsistic nightmare you might precipitate upon yourself. So, in conclusion, stop it with suggesting that we’re all numbskull zombies on account of your inability to accept that we’re not!

Don’t worry about 180. I hold a non-infallible but inexpressibly strong justified-true-belief that you are conscious. And there’s a whole bunch of others that also know it as well as I do. Just saying. :smile:

Thus, the coordinated communication among brain, body and environment constitute what consciousness is. — Joshs

I fully agree with this statement and your argument for in, but find that it pertains to only one of two equally valid interpretations of what consciousness is. The other equally valid, but inconsistent, sense of consciousness being linguistically represented by the "I" in statements such as "I perceived X (in my environment)" and "I chose X (this irrespective of whether choice is illusory, for it would yet be an aspect of consciousness). In the latter sense, consciousness stands apart from percepts (etc.) which are experienced by consciousness, whereas in the former consciousness and percepts (etc.) are necessarily entwined and codependent in order for either to be.

For me these are two disparate possibilities in respect to what consciousness is. Curious to know how you'd address the distinction between these two senses of consciousness.

It's not easy to talk about something that can't be expressed in words. Good luck. — jgill

Perhaps it's the denizens of philosophy forums, as opposed to philosophers, who perform such wonders.

The problem with claiming that something is ineffable is, of course, the liar-paradox-like consequence that one has thereby said something about it. — Banno

On a hunch, are you trying to distill the semantic difference between “God” (effable by one and all) and “G-d” (written so as to not be effable) via analysis of ineffability?

If so, my best hunch so far is that “God” presumes the rational human intelligibility of the referent specified via certain qualifications; whereas “G-d” presumes that the referent intended is beyond rational human intelligibility despite being endowed with same said qualifications. One can describe its qualifications - but not that referenced as endowed with these qualifications, other than by saying that it is beyond intelligibility, hence indescribable, hence inexpressible.

It’s not that one can’t say “Gd” or describe the referent by asserting that it’s not a rock or dog; it’s the human unintelligibility of the referent as specified by its descriptions that the term “ineffable” intends to those who use it. At least as I so far best interpret the term’s use in this context.

But maybe this thread has nothing to do with the context in which the term is tmk most often employed … In which case, never mind then.

Instead, to change subjects: Any instantiation of beauty as direct experience is ineffable in its emotive particulars, but can only be described indirectly via conceptual generalities and perceptual details of that to which the beauty applies - which of themselves do not ever identify the instantiated experience of the aesthetic. One can say the words “this is beautiful”, but without a commonly shared experience - which can only be verified via back-and-forth interactions regarding that referenced as beautiful - the word “beautiful” is utterly meaningless. (When a certain Trump declares that “coal is beautiful” I for one don’t have any idea as to what he’s referring to. And it’s not too hard for me to presume that neither does he – other than that the term can hold some instrumental value or other.)

But instantiated experiences of the aesthetic - though impossible to accurately articulate (other than by poetic language such as metaphor to so indirectly describe) - are not nonsense. Else no one would sense their reality, instead being a beetle in the box that no box contains. Nor are they irrational. Beyond the scope of reason, sure, but not irrational. Those concrete instantiations from which the abstraction of “beauty/the aesthetic” is formed are nevertheless ineffable. And quite clearly dwell beyond the rational intelligibility of humans … with over two millennia of ineffective investigations into the matter as evidence.

Making this more concrete, Faith No More had a song, Epic, which addresses something ineffable.

The ineffable which the song addresses is described in myriad ways but not linguistically identified, other than by the nonspecific statement, “it’s it”.

But, judging by the song’s former popularity, a ton of people were able to relate to - to get - what the song was about. Which goes to show that not everything needs to be articulated - nor be rationally intelligible to us - in order for a sensible, shared cognizance of it to occur.

But then, “What is it?”

“It’s it.”

I never fully related pantheism to Hinduism simply because they seemed like polar opposited. — Michael McMahon

Though I acknowledge this will all be somewhat biased, in hopes of somewhat clarifying this issue philosophically:

Some premises first. If granting the occurrence of Divinity, either:

a) Divinity = Nature (i.e., anything stipulating that Divinity is natural and that Nature is divine)
b) Divinity ≠ Nature (i.e., anything stipulating any kind of substance dualism between Divinity and Nature)

Pan-theism (all-theism) can then be deemed defined by category (a). If there’s agreement, then:

Polytheistic animism, Hellenism. and Hinduism are just three examples of polytheistic systems in which Nature is identified with Divinity. To my knowledge, all polytheisms are (unless one plays around with words and thereby comes to conclude that a plurality of archangels and lesser angels constitutes a polytheism). If so, then all polytheisms would by default fall into a more generalized category of pantheism (which also includes "naturalistic pantheism" wherein nothing we think of as spiritual occurs, as can be exemplified by Spinoza's philosophy).

This distinction between (a) and (b) can then differentiate between subtly contradictory notions, such as that of the super-natural: If entertained within (a), the supra/super-natural is by definition that aspect of Nature which supersedes the aspects of Nature we experience in everyday life - including both known and unknown natural laws and, here relative to cosmology, deities when they are all interpreted/understood as “non-omni-this-and-that”. If the notion is however entertained within (b), then the supra/super-natural is anything that doesn’t pertain to Nature.

Interrelated with the aforementioned, as one example, Aristotle’s notion of a first (teleological) cause can easily enough be argued to itself be fully part of Nature at large in Aristotle's worldview; whereas, to most, the Abrahamic God, as the first (efficient) cause of all that is, is not deemed in any way a part of Nature or the natural world.

-------

But then, to unfortunately make things complex again for the sake of an honest appraisal, to my knowledge neither “divinity” nor “nature” has any precise definition that is beyond question. So, when granting the reality of divinity, the distinction between (a) and (b) might simply be a matter of looking at the same thing from discordant perspectives.

As one example pertinent to Hinduism, Brahman can be understood to be beyond space and time and, hence, can be seen as being beyond Nature; i.e., can be understood as transcendent relative to Nature. On the other hand - since, for example, Brahman is taken to be the material, efficient, formal, and final cause of all that is - all reality/Nature could be understood as the manifestations of an imminent, rather than the creation of a transcendent, Brahman. This would thereby make Nature an aspect of - rather than that which stand in opposition to - Divinity. Point being, here both categories (a) and (b) could be argued for Brahman depending on perspectives taken - and this without changing the essential properties ascribed to the metaphysical concept of Brahman.

you are not entitled to anything by virtue of being in this world — introbert


Universal basic income provided by the state? Is this part of the "truth"? — jgill

As to entitlements:

A man said to the universe:
“Sir, I exist!”
“However,” replied the universe,
“The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation.” — Stephen Crane

This too can be deemed to depict a fundamental truth of existing. Personally, I duly acknowledge this truth. But it must be taken universally in order to be honestly held, neither the autocrat nor the democrat being exempted. The richest of the rich is thereby on the same standing as the poorest of the poor. And in so seeing the nature of things, we all bring into being - individually and collectively - our own sense of what we are and are not entitled to: property, free water to drink, understanding, rulership over lesser beings including other humans, the rights to pursue eudemonia and truth … whatever entitlements we might be capable to conceive of. These entitlements aren’t the universe’s obligation toward us but, rather, our own obligation toward ourselves - always manifesting with some conscious and/or unconscious goal whose fulfillment is, again individually and/or collectively, wanted. As one example of this, there can occur the personal goal of a) becoming as supreme a being as possible relative to all else (other humans, nature at large, etc.) which then would become inferior to one’s own being or, else, the contradictory goal of b) becoming in harmony with as much of the world as is feasible (other humans, nature at large, etc.). Here, goals (a) and (b) result in different values held in respect to what oneself and others are to be entitled to.

All this, though, results form the inference that no one is intrinsically entitled to anything … by the universe, by God, or by anything other. Corny truisms but they work: “The All is fair in both love (any form of harmony) and war (any form of conflict)”, and “our freedoms are never free”.

So, were the above to hold, one could then inquire: When questioning that all people should be entitled to, in this case, universal basic income (could also be universal healthcare or something else), given that no one is intrinsically entitled to anything, on what constructed sense of entitlement would this questioning rest?

At any rate, from my pov, this issue of entitled rights is a complex (one might say, metaphysical :wink: ) issue.

Not clear as to why the notion of teleology helps this here. I mean, to me, it makes the matter complicated, as if now one has to reconcile the world with, not just impossible epistemological relationships, but an overarching logos that underlies all things.
Perhaps I am missing something? — Constance

Missing something in relation to the overall worldview that I hold? Nah, you got it about right.

Wasn’t aiming to argue for a particular worldview, though, so much as aiming to evidence one additional inconsistency of physicalism - this so as to further support the thread’s main thesis that there’s something wrong with physicalism. For instance, by pointing out the … well, inconsistency … in someone engaging in arguments for the sake of - hence, with the intent of - preserving the status quo of physicalism which, as worldview, upholds the nonoccurrence of teloi (such as those which take the form of the very intents to uphold the worldview).

It's a bit like placing the cart before the horse in truth-ville.

Certainly, a theory of everything might not be at hand at any point in our lifetime, but I take it that a philosopher should be honest with themselves in terms of what occurs in the world (e.g., they occur in the world, as do their intents). And then try to work out a coherent worldview from there. A quirk of mine maybe.

But yes, you're right, getting into what the implication are for intentions being real in the world would certainly complicate matters. Not what I intended to do, though.

[...] This acausal access between objects, like a brain and a sofa? — Constance

Nicely said!

In parallel to the issue of knowledge you address, one of my takes on this issue is that were physicalism to be reformulated to allow for the ontic (rather than the illusory) reality of intentions - such as one’s own and one’s uncle’s in any interaction between - then physicalism as worldview would inherently contain the reality of teleological processes. This would in turn entail that physicalism as worldview would then allow for possibilities such as Aristotle’s unmoved mover as ultimate telos. Which would in turn entail that this reformulated physicalism would then consist of a bunch of concepts that are outright rejected by, and contradictory to, the principles of physicalism as we currently know them.

Muddled reasoning in the just expressed (maybe all too implicit) physicalist stance that intentions are all illusory on account of teleology in no way occurring, yes. Then again, I’m not a physicalist.

Do you really think that whether the universe is deterministic or not can be solved by philosophers - not scientists - debating? — jgill

What I think is that the issue can neither be resolved by philosophers ignorant of science nor by scientists ignorant of philosophy.

But, place a whole bunch of philosophers knowledgeable of science and scientists knowledgeable of philosophy in the same room, and one might stand a chance.

... at any rate, not an issue strictly applicable to physicists.

The argument you've adopted is that physics in the eighteenth century did not rely on conservation laws therefore they are not essential to physics. — Banno

No, that wasn't the argument. That was one example of the argument.

Yet another example was how future physics might not rely on conservation laws and yet remain physics - (adding to what was previously said) this in a more advanced format via some novel paradigm shift.

But I won't be repeating everything I previous said.

But this discussion is a bit of a sideline to my main point, which is that what have been characterised as metaphysical assumptions or presumptions are better understood as methodological or social characteristics of physics. — Banno

Holding the "methodological characteristics of physics" as its rules of operation would presume that modern physics in all its complexity "just is" as a grouping of methods - this in manners devoid of a background in which these methods developed, and might yet develop still. On the other hand, presuming that the "social characteristics of physics" are its rules of operation appears to be, as you might say, language gone on holiday?

Though I hold very different views, I'll do my best to leave you to your own.

As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. — javra


As practiced by physicists, themselves. Without a lot of help from metaphysicians outside the science. — jgill

Because it is due to physicists that we hold our modern notions of causality and identity on which modern physics is contingent? Or else, is the issue of “God doesn’t/does play dice with the universe (translated as the choice between determinism and indeterminism)” constrained to how physicists interpret the metaphysical nature of reality?

Seems to me you have given your argument a self-inflicted injury. To maintain your definition of metaphysic you have to claim that a central, constituent part of physics is not physics. — Banno

To rephrase the - acknowledgedly poorly worded - claim I previously made: physics as empirical science is a specialized subset of metaphysics (as a philosophical study) at large.

As such, in a sense, "the (metaphysical) rules of the game" are always a part of the "game" which is played. In the sense I previously intended, however, the same game can be played with different rules: e.g. (American) tackle football and flag football are played by different rules while both are recognizable as the same general game: different versions of (American) football. In this latter sense alone, conservation laws are not that by which the empirical science of physics is necessarily defined, and so are not an intrinsic part of physics.

The empirical science of physics can and has been engaged in in manners devoid of conservation laws.
For instance, the empirical science of physics predates the closing of the eighteenth century, when conservation laws were first proposed, by a few centuries.

So conservation laws are not an inherent aspect of the empirical science of physics.

One can for example furthermore hypothesize a future science of physics wherein at least some conservation laws currently employed are done away with.

The same can then also apply to other metaphysical notions that serve as "rules to the game" of physics as an empirical science. As an example, the notions of causality and identity which we currently accept culturally as self-evident truths - despite, or else exactly because, there being a long philosophical history to their so being conceptualized today - could in time become modified ... so that what physics currently assumes could itself becomes modified - and this without in any way modifying the empirical science of physics as a method of knowledge acquisition. Again, one of hypothesis, test, data, and inference/conclusion.

In sum: As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. But, as an empirical science, physics is not contingent on any particular metaphysical notion being itself set in stone.

All this being a lot more verbose but also a far more correct interpretation of the view I hold.

The aforementioned should then better clarify this:

What I've posited is a reductio, that proceeds by assuming that we can differentiate between physics and metaphysics, taking the strongest example, falsification. I then show that this has as a consequence that stuff that is central to physics - conservation laws - are not actually part of physics. — Banno

Conservation laws are not central to physics as an empirical science for reasons previously provided.

What is central to physics as an empirical science is the notion of a physical world - which can itself be justified by any number of different metaphysical notions and perspectives. Those provided by Aristotle, by Peirce, and by many others aside.

so i am not convinced that we are even disagreeing. — Janus

:grin: Sounds about right from my side as well.

OK, then it does comes down to rhetorical posturing rather than substantive philosophical discussion. Sorry, not interested.

So we count the conservation laws not as physics but as metaphysics? Think on that for a bit. These are the core, fundamental rules of physics, and yet not part of physics? — Banno

Because they are not empirically falsifiable, they are not part of physics as an empirical science, no. As an empirical science, physics follows the precedent of hypothesis, test, results as data, and best inference of results as conclusion - and of inductive/abductive theory that best accounts for results and conclusions just mentioned.

Conservation laws are instead the empirically non-falsifiable, metaphysical "rules of the game" (to do my best to use Witt's vocabulary) which grounds this empirical science of physics (as it is currently applied).

It's common to claim that all scientific statements are falsifiable, and to add that the demarcation between physics and metaphysics is this falsifiability.

If that's so, then conservation rules are not part of physics, but of metaphysics. — Banno

That is so, and conservation rules are indeed metaphysics on which modern physics is founded.

This also demonstrates the absurdity of ↪javra
's attempting to force physics and metaphysics into a hierarchy. One does not "sit" on the other. — Banno

How so, given examples such as that you've just mentioned?

I don't see how my Peircean-Wittgensteinian "stance" relates in any (non-trivial) way to Joshs' p0m0. — 180 Proof

OK, granted. But that reply doesn't answer what the (non-trivial) differences are.

... or is all this boiling down to rhetorical stances devoid of substantive philosophical discussion?

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"? — javra

Your original question confusedly suggests so the way you'd formulated it. That's your fallacy, not mine. — 180 Proof

To the way your mind works? Fine, granted again. Glad you now get that's not what my "original question" intends. The issue remains unchanged: how does one justify anything physical without use of metaphysical notions?

Your original expression, javra, suggests 'reifying the abstract category' in the question raised which is nonsensical. — 180 Proof

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"?

By analogy, then, one could affirm that the ontic reality of any animal is the reification of the abstract category of "animals".

Not sure this is where you want to take things ...

What "justifies physicality's occurrence", in other words, are the discursive practices within which "physicality" is used. — 180 Proof

You sure you want to maintain this? How then do you distinguish your stance form what @Joshs maintains. Or, for that matter, from what you term p0m0isms?

How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics? — javra

What do you mean here by "justify ... occurrence"? — 180 Proof

To justify:

(This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.) — javra

As to "occurrence" in the context specified:

-- The ontic reality of (in contrast to the illusory notion of) - in this case - physicality.

Put together:

"How does one make rational sense - via the provision of acceptable explanations - of physicality's ontic reality (and thereby, as one prominent example, establish that physicality is not an illusory aspect of consciousness) ... without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?"

Well put. Yes, that's a good question. — Tom Storm

I'm still a little apprehensive of the potential replies I might get from the so called "skeptics", but thanks!

If you're saying metaphysical physics is the necessary pre-condition for physical physics, then how do you explain away the physical brain observing the physical earth being a ground for not only the discipline of physics, but also the ground for cerebration populated by metaphysical notions?

[...] I smell the presence of idealism herein. — ucarr

The concepts presented in this question are to me very muddled. They could be seen to equivocate between studies (that of metaphysics and of physics) and ontological worldviews. In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? (This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.)

-------

Once justified, physicality can then be applied to a number of mutually exclusive, ontological worldviews, each of them being in turn further metaphysically justified: physicalism, Cartesian dualism, neutral monism, and Peircean-like notions of objective idealism all being examples of such mutually exclusive ontologies that each acknowledge and make use of physicality.

Yet other ontological worldviews, such as Berkeleyan immaterialism, make use of metaphysical concepts to denounce the notion of physicality (more correctly worded in the case exemplified, materiality) as invalid.

It bears note that all these mentioned perspectives can in their own ways justify - however imperfectly - the relation between what is commonly termed mind and body which you make mention of.

So again: How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?

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I’m asking this with the perspective that were this to not be possible (and I currently find that it is indeed not possible), then the very notion of physicality would be founded upon the study we term metaphysics – rather than on the study we term physics – such that the study of physics is itself contingent upon the study of metaphysics. This in order to be justified and thereby not be a bundle of “just-so” stories.

(Explicitly stated: This to not even get into the issue of physicalism’s relation to metaphysics.)

I don't know what you mean by "no moving image", because it seems obvious to me that we do see moving images, or if you want to phrase it differently, that our seeing consists in moving images. I also don't know what you mean by "freestanding visual data" since it seems obvious to me that there is nothing at all "freestanding" ( if I've understood what you meant with this term).

And again I'm not sure what you mean by "facts known from direct observation in the absence of awareness which observes". I do know we can drive on "autopilot"; that is, we seem to be able to process and respond to visual data without conscious awareness of doing so. — Janus

A lot of miscommunication here; always tedious, and sometimes unresolvable, but I’ll try to better explain where I'm coming from.

In the context of our discussion regarding the possibility of homunculi in relation to the workings of eyes and brain, your latest affirmation was:

the physiological study of vision tells us that there processes involving the eye the optic nerve and the visual cortex, and that like a camera the image formed is upside-down (which is "corrected" by the brain. This suggests that there is a "moving image" or visual data there prior to what we call conscious seeing. — Janus

As we both appear to agree, there can be no data in the absence of observation, which in turn does not occur in the absence of awareness. So the notion of visual data occurring prior to it being seen is misplaced. The last quoted sentence could well be interpreted to affirm this very misplaced notion just addressed. That said, in this interpretation consciousness would then be inferred to observe images that are produced by the camera-like apparatus of eyes an brain.

The alternative is to affirm that - as evidenced by blindsight and other examples - there occurs in us an "unconscious seeing of visual data" from which our functional conscious seeing of visual data is constituted. In this interpretation, there is no camera-like image produced by eyes and brain that is in turn seen by consciousness but, instead, visual consciousness is the very activity of seeing the external world. Such that visual consciousness is a unified compound of multiple instantiations of unconscious visual awareness, i.e. is a unified compound of multiple instantiations of unconscious seeing.

Recall that "an image" is commonly defined as a visual re-presentation of an actual object: in the sense of a picture, a painting, or a drawing; wheres seeing - be it conscious or unconscious - is understood to be a direct presentation of actual objects. We don't consciously see images unless we're looking at something like pictures, paintings, or drawings. What we consciously see is our personal truth of what the external world is visually.

Now, I very much acknowledge this can easily become very complicated by issues of indirect realism (where it's often enough worded that "we create images in our mind which represent some possibly noumenal reality") but if we take care not to equivocate our terms, the same issue would yet remain. We either consciously see a representational image of noumena constructed by the eyes and brain, such that there here are two items in relation to each other (that of a) image and of b) consciousness which sees the image) or, alternatively, the very activity of seeing - be it conscious seeing or unconscious seeing - is identical to the activity of visually representing noumena, such that here there is only one item concerned (the representational visual awareness which looks out at the world). But I don't want to enter into discussions/debates regarding indirect realism. The issues of indirect realism and of homunculi are to me utterly separate.

Perhaps the "unconscious non-visual awareness" in people with blindsight is the counterpart to the pre-conscious visual awareness in sighted people. Is the 'visuality" of awareness, or the consciousness of seeing, a step in the process of seeing that comes after the unconscious non-visual awareness? In other words do sighted people share this step with blindsight people, and blind sight people lack the next step of visual awareness? I don't know, but it seems possible. — Janus

I was addressing "unconscious visual awareness" not "unconscious non-visual awareness".

But in answer, it to me seems like the best inference to make given all the data we have.

This suggests that there is a "moving image" or visual data there prior to what we call conscious seeing. — Janus

To some, yes. Yet to others the working of the brain can be interpreted to suggest the presence of unconscious awareness of the external world which works (in obviously very complex ways) more or less in concurrence to conscious awareness – this in a parts-to-whole relation. Such that there arguably is no “moving image” (else, freestanding visual data that occurs independently of being witnessed) anywhere to be found, but only visual awareness at different levels of mind.

Can there be data ("facts know from direct observation" else "recorded observations") in the absence of awareness which observes? To me the answer is so far "no".

Have you heard of blindsight? — Janus

But of course I’ve heard of it. I find it very much in line with the inference of unconscious awareness just mentioned. As just one of many examples wherein the notion of “unconscious vision” can be found in relation to blindsight, see here. To me by far the most interesting cases are studies of split-brain patients in relation to conscious awareness. There’s the Wikipedia page, but also research findings such as this one, whose abstract nicely sums up some of what's going on in such cases and also interestingly maintains a “divided perception but undivided consciousness.”

Much of the info on split-brain patients, as one example, can be deemed to support the inference of different loci of unconscious awareness working in an overall mind (which in a healthy mind would thereby converge into a coherent consciousness).

Just so its said: The issue of how awareness – be it conscious or unconscious – manifests is nevertheless just as pertinent from this vantage point regarding unconscious awareness of the mind.

By in large agreed.

Going a little further:

Empirical sciences are founded upon metaphysical notions such as those of causality and of identity. The extent to which empirical sciences are effective is fully equivalent to the extent to which these (as of yet still obscure) metaphysical notions (aka, just-so stories of crack-smoking folk) are effective. Everything we gain from empirical science is then an added on, specialized category of story inevitably dependent on making use of “the just-so stories of crack-smoking folk” - with the latter serving as the former's quintessential foundation.

To invalidate this proposed state of affairs, simply present an empirical science in which no tacit use of effects or of identities take place. If not in practice, then in principle - taking into account that empirical sciences by definition make use of human awareness regarding the external world which, as such, is tmk not realizable in the absence of a presumed reality to causation and identity.

Yes, there is truth in what you've written. I would just say that for most decisions, it doesn't really matter what you decide, as long as any possible negative consequences are minor. Save your stomach aches for decisions that really matter and do what you can to recognize which ones really do and which ones don't. I have a default setting - if I don't have strong feelings, I decide no. I never get the extras - extended warrantees, extra buttons on the washing machine, a moon roof. When I vote on initiative petitions or referenda, if I don't really understand the possible consequences of the law and agree they are worthwhile, I don't vote on it at all. You have the power to limit the number of choices you have to make. — T Clark

I appended something to my last post before seeing your latest. If you’re interested; to clarify: The notion that actual (rather then intended) consequences ought to determine the rightness or wrongness of a decision made runs into difficult problems – problems I think @Andrew4Handel had in mind when writing the OP. For instance, a guy decides to do X for the good of all humanity; having so done, a sociopath gets pissed and kills off all of the guy’s family. Here, the intended outcome is “improved benefit to all of humanity” and the actual outcome is “the murder of all of one’s family”. Judging by the consequences of the choice alone, this choice was therefore wrong/bad/malevolent … and the person ought not have so chosen. But since there's always some risk of some sociopath doing something bad to someone who makes a virtuous decision, should no virtuous decision then be ever made?

One could argue along the lines of “the path to hell is paved with good intentions”. Here, more explicitly, the intentions intending to do good don’t take into account all the practical repercussions/consequences of so intending. But then, is one to be held accountable for one’s particular limitations of mind? As one extreme, does one hold a lesser animal accountable for it lacking the capacity of abstract thought as we humans know it. Or, among humans, does one blame, hold responsible, someone with a mental handicap for so being mentally handicapped? Currently, the only two possible answers seem to me to be:

Yes: in which case we can hold all sentient beings responsible for not being closer to omniscience than they are. In which case, we can use the saying of “the path to hell is paved with good intentions” as a genuine principle of ethics. (As though those with bad intentions never get to go to (this imaginary realm of) hell.)

No: in which case we cannot then judge choices based on how much a person knows before hand of all possible, actual, unintended outcomes resulting from the choice. In which case, we then only judge a choice based on what the person intended the outcome to be and their reasons for choosing the one alternative among many as the best means to so fulfill this intent.

Mostly thinking my thoughts out-loud while trying to work through the issue: I deem your example of not voting on something that you don’t understand the consequences to as a noteworthy counter example.

I suppose in sum: To what extent should a person be held accountable for not having taken into better consideration all the possible implications of each alternative one chooses amongst? This in the choice one makes … considering the choice to be of relative importance.

The ad absurdum is saving baby Hitler from drowning which seems admirable but saving his life would doom others. But my general point is that every choice we make is done in a situation of infinite possibilities and without anyway to know we have done the best or correct thing.

It is something that can lead to an existential crisis. — Andrew4Handel

If this helps:

Choice requires intent; it is intentional (rather than unintentional). We always choose one of multiple alternatives for the sake of fulfilling some goal (some as of yet unactualized outcome we aim to actualize). This goal can well be subconscious or unconscious – with that of optimal self-preservation as one possible candidate; others can well be fathomed – but it will nevertheless be a goal one pursues.

Secondly, choices are infinite only is some metacognitive conceptualization or other. In practice, choices are always limited to the finite alternatives one's finite mind can conceive of. Not being omniscient, our knowledge will always be limited.

Thirdly, who’s judging what you chose? You, others, some angels or devils? Whomever it may be for you, think of it this way:

If you can justify why you choose what you choose (as one possibility: "I deemed it the best means to accomplish goal X given what I honestly knew at the time, and I stand by goal X regardless") then you empower yourself to be responsible for your choices irrespective of what may befall. Like: to hell with what the judgers judge if they condemn me for rescuing a baby from drowning given what I knew at the time about it and what I held to be a noble goal (here, maybe, improving other’s lives even at risk to your own). So, the baby turned out to grow into Hitler/Stalin. You are not responsible for the outcome of the adult he became, for this was not of your choice; you are only responsible for saving the life an anonymous baby for a humanitarian reason/goal (rather than for money, for the vanity of fame, so as to sabotage some enemy, or some such).

So, if you can justify your choices based on what you knew at the time and your intents in so making them, this might be all that’s needed to break free of this angst you talk about. You could then in principle hold your own against your future self (given that the future-you judges the past-you fairly, I would think), others in society, and even some all-mighty being if that happens to be up your alley.

Then again, fact is bad things sometimes happen to good people. If one regrets one’s choices strictly based on outcomes rather than on former reasons for having so once made them, then this enters into a completely different ballpark. One where a person will then come to regret the most virtuous of deeds merely on grounds that they weren’t justly compensated, such that the person might then come to curse all virtuous deeds, choosing anything but. I’d disagree with this notion of ethics, and though I find the issues intertwined, its still a completely different matter.

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p.s.: In case this might otherwise lead to confusion, the “ethics” I was addressing in the last paragraph is that of consequentialism: in this case, a subspecies that upholds that the rightness or wrongness of one’s choices is determined by the consequences (outcomes) that result from one's choices.

Overall I agree with your comments.

Better: "It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving sight (else seeing) of the "external" is formed." — javra

I'm not seeing any significant difference in the way you've formulated it. I don't see it as an inference, but as an experience. — Janus

As to the distinction I wanted to make:

That the eyes and brain make the activity of seeing possible is in and of itself an inference, and a very good one at that given all our empirical data. Nevertheless, the activity of seeing is not contingent upon this conceptual understanding that “eyes and brain are required for seeing”: the experience of seeing can well occur without this understanding, as per toddlers and lesser animals for example.

This inference that “eyes and brain are required for seeing” can, then, take the conceptual form – such as via analogy to the workings of a camera – that the eyes and brain make possible an image that we then witness via our sight. Alternatively, we can conclude that eyes and brain make possible our very capacity of sight.

The distinction between these two inferences might be subtle, but it’s important, for the former (eyes and brain make possible a moving image which we then see) introduces a conceptual differentiation between consciousness and body wherein the body has its own distinct agency whose outcomes (in this case the "ever-moving image" which the body produces) are then witnessed by the separate agency of consciousness – and, here, a homunculus argument results: a “little person” within the person.

Whereas in the latter inference (eyes and brain make possible our capacity of sight, our seeing per se) no such distinction between consciousness and body results in relation to our ability to see stuff. Here, where the issue is that of physiological sight of the external world, the agency of consciousness and the agency of body are one and the same. Remove a human’s eyes or brain and the human’s capacity to see ceases to occur. With functional eyes and brain in place, the human’s capacity to see occurs. Here, there is no homunculus that sees the outcomes of what the body does. Instead, here physiological sight and body are concurrent and interdependent – in at least one sense, such that physiological sight as process is the whole that is being addressed and the body’s functional eyes and brain are themselves complex process that serve as parts from which the whole is constituted.

Now, this speaks neither in favor of physicalism, neutral monism, nor objective idealism – to list just three worldviews – instead simply addressing the relation between a) our awareness via physiological sight and b) our body’s workings. Biased thought this may be on my part, I’m maintaining that the latter inference addressed ought to be maintained regardless of worldview held – and that the former ought to be done away with.

At any rate, the aforementioned is in attempts to clarify my previous post in terms of differences that, as apo would put it, make a difference.

It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving image of the "external" is formed. — Janus

This in itself is a conceptual inference given a) the occurrence of our awareness in general and b) our empirically gained awareness regarding the mechanisms via which our visual awareness is formed, and I disagree with its wording. Hence, with what the inference is saying.

Better: "It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving sight (else seeing) of the "external" is formed."

What we consciously hold is not a movie ("an ever-moving image") we are looking at but, instead, an innate activity of seeing, this activity being termed by us sight. And this activity of physiological sight that pertains to us as conscious beings is as unified with our body as is the activity of physiological tactile feel.

To my mind, imaginations - e.g., the sight we hold via the mind's eye (or the hearing of ourselves inwardly think/question via the mind's ear; etc.) - get weirder, but we are here addressing our awareness of the external world.

Who is it that sees this image? — Janus

This then becomes, "Who is it to which the sight/seeing pertains?" ... doing away with a question already set up so as to be responded to only in terms of homunculi looking at images.

If we cannot get our heads around the act of seeing, then how could we feel justified in purporting to use the fact of the act to support some preferred worldview or other? — Janus

For my part, I'm not getting into preferred ontological worldviews here, although physicalism isn't it. I'm only disagreeing with the inference that a seeing agent/consciousness entails the occurrence of a homunculus. Here concluding that the first in no way entails the second ... and that the notion of homunculi is a fallacy.

But maybe that's part of the issue: homunculi are conceptually palpable ideas that one can with some ease mentally manipulate; whereas consciousness is not.

Of course there is no "homunculus' inside the camera to view the image. — Janus

Couldn’t the camera have a blind homunculus? :joke:

Couldn’t resist - and the question is not to be taken seriously, other than to illustrate the absurdity of the homunculus argument.

Or does the quoted statement mean to affirm that the occurrence of a consciousness is in and of itself equivalent to the occurrence of a homunculus? Just in case: if so, I'd like to understand on what grounds.

Got it. Thanks for the background info. I think I agree with the case you've just made, because ...

I am looking to use the a priori analytic truth: "If A is necessary for B (and B is not necessary for A), then A is necessarily either logically prior or both logically and temporally prior to B in time (in terms of the absolute first possible occurrence of B), as a foundation for a new modal method which is based, not in the concepts of necessity and possibility (as antitheses), but the concepts of necessity and contingency (antitheses). — TheGreatArcanum

Since you use "or both" I so far don't find any problems in this a priori analytic truth as expressed.

Good luck to you.

If entity A is necessary for the existence of entity B (and B is not necessary for A), then does it necessarily follow that that entity A is also logically prior to entity B, and if entity A is logically prior to entity B, does that not also mean that it is temporally prior to entity B as well (in terms of the first possible occurrence of entity B), or does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority? — TheGreatArcanum

If mathematics are not illusory, and if the occurrence of geometric points is necessary for the occurrence of geometric figures, then this would be one example of logical necessity devoid of temporal priority: the geometric figure logically necessitates geometric points thought both are fully concurrent.

I believe other examples of conceivable relations wherein temporal priority is not implied in the given logical necessity are possible, but nowhere as easy to articulate. Backward causation is one such (and it presumes a block universe). Even more complexly would be “top-down” and “bottom-up” constraints (as they’ve been often enough termed on this forum). Were Aristotle's causes to be viewed as metaphysically occurring rather than as merely being "explanations to why questions", the same could be argued to apply to some such, like material causes.

Out of curiosity, if this happens to make a difference: Are you addressing this issue in regard to what does or can ontically occur or, else, in regard to our human capacity to conceptualize various forms of logical necessity (whether or not our conceptions be illusory)?

Wait a second. My take so far is that, as of yet, there isn't a settled philosophical definition of what "rational" means. Mine fully included.

Thanks, though, for the tentative approbation.