Don't be angry with me, but unfortunately my explanation has to end here. — Wolfgang

OK. I'm in no way angry, btw.

Do you know anything other than matter? Why are we always looking for something we have never seen before? Maybe because we want to solve problems that we have created for ourselves through category errors. — Wolfgang

Not quite. I'll be more specific. How is the paradigm of biological evolution via natural selection of itself material / physical? I for example certainly can't see, smell, touch, etc. this paradigm empirically, not to mention that is has no material or physical solidity or mass. Yet I know that it occurs.

Rather than taking my best attempts to answer for you, I'd like to hear your own explanations of how this paradigm of evolution is physical or materiel.

ps. Your answer in no way addresses any metaphysical grounding for your conviction in materialism. But that aside ...

OK, thanks for your views.

On what metaphysical grounds do you then hold such a strong conviction in "everything is matter", aka materialism?

If there were an ontological relationship, body and mind would have to be ontologies. That would mean that we are dealing with two substances or entities, a body and a mind. Descartes could not find a mind anywhere. His conclusion was that it must be immaterial. My conclusion is that they are descriptions of one and the same thing. Let's call it an individual, an organism, a brain, whatever you like. — Wolfgang

I think I get what you're saying and, if I do, then I agree. But this in and of itself to me still begs a question of ontology:

Is it all then a kind of mind-stuff, such as the objective idealism of C.S. Peirce would maintain? Is it then all a kind of physical-stuff, as the nowadays common enough stance of materialism or physicalism maintains? Or else - my own preferred outlook on the subject - is all stuff in the cosmos then of a neutral monism ontology: such that mind and body are in ultimate analysis just two forms of the same stuff which of itself is neither mental nor physical?

Your general thesis so far seems to me to possibly apply to any of the three ontologies just specified with equal force or plausibility. Yet, because these ontologies contradict each other, they can't all be correct at the same time and in the same way.

:pray:

This is the point then. If keeping one's eyes open is "generally" a matter of conscious volition, why would we conclude that the sense perception of seeing is unconscious? It would seem like "seeing" is something controlled by the voluntary act of keeping one's eyes open. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah. I can now understand what you meant. But this is a misattribution of what I claimed. My claim, again, was that consciousness (in at least humans) is dependent on processes of the unconscious mind.

So in terms of seeing things, my position is as follows: our consciously seeing via the use of our eyes whose eyelids are under our conscious control will all be in some ways dependent on processes of mind of which we are not conscious of, thereby being dependent on the workings of our unconscious mind. If these processes of the unconscious mind did not occur, we would then not be able to consciously see - with blindsight as one example of this. But because they do occur, we do in fact consciously see things.

Do you think that it would be the case that the neurological system is "seeing" all the time, unconsciously, regardless of whether the eyes are open or not? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think this is the case, not when one regards seeing as necessarily consisting of input from the retina. I think the way we see things in dreams is often a more vivid form of the way we see things when daydreaming or imagining. Only that when dreaming the unconscious mind assumes far greater agential control over what is in thus manner seen.

This might provide an explanation of dreaming as the unconscious continuing in its activity of seeing, after conscious volition has shut down, and the eyes are closed. — Metaphysician Undercover

It gets tricky here, in part due to often numerous ways in which terms can get understood. But, in principle, though we are not of a waking state consciousness while dreaming, we as a first-person point of view (as consciousness in this sense) are yet present in our dreams. Not only that but, as a somnio-consciousness (a term which I coined that I think nicely enough expresses our dreaming consciousness), we almost always yet have some degree of agential power (i.e., ability to accomplish) - hence, some degree of voluntary, rather than involuntary, volition. With one possible extreme of this degree of dreaming volition being that of lucidly dreaming.

Where do you think that the images which are "seen" in the act of dreaming derive from? Do they come from the eyes? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, though I haven't looked into it, I don't think they in any way derive from the eyes, the retinas to be more specific. But that they instead likely at least in part derive from those aspects of the sensory cortex which are active when we are willfully imagining or daydreaming things.

Depends on how reliable you think memory is. Seeing a house in a waking state is easy enough to verify. Having seen one not so much. Although that said, since memory is not often proven wrong, we might have good reason to trust it. — Janus

It's maybe subtle, but you missed the point I was making. Suppose you see a pink elephant and it in fact is an illusion. So there was no pink elephant in the external world you thought you saw. All fine and dandy. Now, is your experience of seeing a pink elephant which in fact was not there, in and of itself, just a belief ... or do you know that you had an experience of seeing a pink elephant.

As to verifiability in the walking state, it is quite impossible to fully verify every single thing ever seen. Indeed, quite impossible to fully verify every thing one sees at any one given juncture. Most things seen we accept on trust. And not due to empirical verification. It would be exceedingly bizarre otherwise.

But the point remains. When is one's personal experiences ever not knowledge of what one is personally experiencing? To be clear, not of the significance of what one is experiencing, but of the experience itself.

Fallible means possible to be false or else wrong. It does not mean possible to be falsified. So your affirmation is an utter mistake of interpretation in regard to what fallibility and fallibilism entails. — javra


That might be your apparently dogmatic understanding of the term; it's not mine. To be fallible in my lexicon means 'could turn out to be wrong'. If there is no possible way to determine if something is wrong, then it simply cannot turn out to be wrong, and I don't count it as either fallible or infallible. — Janus

Uhm. In short,

Originally, fallibilism (from Medieval Latin: fallibilis, "liable to error") is the philosophical principle that propositions can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified,[1][2] or that neither knowledge nor belief is certain.[3] The term was coined in the late nineteenth century by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, as a response to foundationalism. Theorists, following Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, may also refer to fallibilism as the notion that knowledge might turn out to be false.[4] Furthermore, fallibilism is said to imply corrigibilism, the principle that propositions are open to revision.[5] Fallibilism is often juxtaposed with infallibilism. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism

Of course one is free to idiosyncratically define terms as one pleases and then declare that thier quite commonplace usage is a "dogmatic understanding". I'm myself not one to do so.

This is nonsense as I see it. All evidence is material, meaning something we can observe, or logical, meaning something which can be shown to be necessarily true. If you disagree then present an example of immaterial evidence for anything. — Janus

OK: Consciousness, when strictly defined as a first-person point of view, occurs in others out there.

As far as I know, this proposition is neither verifiable via observation nor something which can be shown via logic to be necessarily true. But go ahead and either show me a consciousness out there or else logically evidence why the just expressed proposition is necessarily true logically.

I find this difficult to believe, but perhaps it's just that I love existing more than you do, and so cannot relate — Janus

No way to verify this, but perhaps you're quite wrong in this appraisal, despite the sincerity of what I previously expressed.

I would call it belief, not knowledge, and it is not fallible because it cannot be falsified. — Janus

Is one's experience of having seen a house in an REM dream a mere belief of one having seen a house in the REM dream ... or does one know what one has oneself experienced? How about one's seeing a house during waking states?

Fallible means possible to be false or else wrong. It does not mean possible to be falsified. So your affirmation is an utter mistake of interpretation in regard to what fallibility and fallibilism entails. M-theory, for one example is fallible (not infallible), but it certainly is not falsifiable ... despite being fallible.

If you would really rather be annihilated and all the evidence, we can have points to the likelihood that you will get your wish (although you won't be there to enjoy getting it), then what possible incentive can there be for you to bother with the vague possibility of an afterlife? — Janus

Your presumption that "all the evidence points to ..." is founded upon materialistic premises. These are not the premises upon which my metaphysical, and hence ultimately physical, understandings are founded. There's no way to adequately address my own premises in this forum's soundbite form. If you are sincerely curious, though, you can always check out my profile wherein I've placed a link to my personal philosophy. What I've got uploaded so far amply explains why I don't believe in what you call annihilation upon death. Otherwise, the topic is beyond the scope of this discussion.

So back to the issue at hand ...

—who knows why they occur? — Janus

Precisely! But that they have and do occur is about as undeniable as is, say, the claim that REM dreams occur.

But many do believe that and believe it on the basis of some religious experience. Which I think just goes to show how deep confirmation bias can run, — Janus

Hey, I fully agree. The difference between experience as data and inferences regarding it, which is not data. Be this in the spheres of science itself or else in the sphere of comparative religions.

One could ask for a cogent reason to believe in an afterlife. I've never seen such a thing. I can't prove there is no afterlife, I've just never seen a good reason to believe in one. Also, it's easy to see that people would like to believe in an afterlife—the idea, hell aside, being more palatable than annihilation. So, it's reasonable to infer the role of wishful thinking. — Janus

This isn't about your beliefs and likes nor about my beliefs and I'll again reiterate that my own personal likes are by in large that of instant "annihilation' of all awareness upon my corporeal death: to me, instant "salvation" form all forms of suffering. It just that I don't believe this to be the case, on rational grounds. All this is, your views or mine, is utterly irrelevant to the issue at hand.

Other than via emotive biases toward the comfort of instant "annihilation" via any metaphysical paradigm that supports this ultimate end of being, how can one rationally disprove the metaphysical possibility of an afterlife?

Notice, I'm not claiming that an afterlife can be proven. I'm only claiming that the fallible knowledge of an afterlife can be as valid as fallible knowledge gets for those who've had near-death experiences.

OK, but in all this your are maybe unintentionally forsaking a rather important, if not essential, aspect of all possible experiences: the intellect's intrinsic understanding of that experienced. A person who honestly experiences a near death experience will be entitled to claim, and quite validly so, fallible knowledge of an afterlife. This can be in principle replicated by bringing (all?) people into near-death -- barring the grave ethical considerations of so doing -- or else not replicated thereby taking credence away from the claim to fallible knowledge. Furthermore, it hasn't been just one person in history who's claimed this, but numerous, over the span of both time and cultures.

To be clear, I'm not one to then believe in a Christian concept of Heaven as a place that's eternally divided from a likewise Christian concept of an endless Hell.

That personal observation made, what further validation can one ask for short of the category error wherein one insists that the afterlife must in and of itself be physical/material and thereby empirically verifiable by all in the here and now?

Else asked, given the surplus of near-death experience accounts, on what grounds can one maintain that none of these folk can validly claim fallible knowledge of an afterlife?

Your own personal believes aside, can you provide evidence that Witt was one to deny the metaphysical reality of the Good via his own writings? The quote which you again post sorta provides evidence that he in fact did support the metaphysical reality of the Good, and of the Beautiful to boot. And again, if so far know of no metaphysical reality greater or of more import that that of the Good.

You seem to be conflating knowledge with truth. I say that any claim to propositional knowledge from religious experience is unsupported. Say someone has a religious experience and on the basis of that claims to know that there is an afterlife in heaven. Say for the sake of argument it turns out there is a heaven. Did the person know that based on their experience? No, because they would have to actually die and go to heaven to know there is a heaven. — Janus

To chime in a bit, experiences such as those of religious ecstasy are in no way inferential, but, rather, experiences. One would determinately know what one experiences just as much as one determinately knows what one sees, hears, etc. in the everyday world. That what one knows oneself to in fact see (a pink elephant for example) is not an illusion, mirage, hallucination, delusion, etc. would, and can only properly be, inference of one type or another. But what one in fact experiences is determinate knowledge by familiarity.

No personal experience, personal knowledge though it is, is verifiable in an empirical sense by any other. What is verifiable is that all others will act in react in like manners to that which one personally experiences of the physical world - and that one's current experiences coherently conform to all of one's former now remembered experiences. But one has no way of verifying what any other's personal experiences are - save via inferences regarding their actions and reactions and trust in what they claim to be true.

As to "knowledge of heaven", suppose a person has a near death experience wherein they experience themselves to float over their momentarily perished body toward some white light (this being a fairly common report historically). This person upon reviving claims knowing that their is a heaven. Their knowledge will certainly not be infallible. But then, neither is any other type of knowledge out there. Can their experience-derived inference of a possible heaven in the afterlife be empirically or else logically disproven on grounds of inconsistencies? It cannot unless one holds an infallible knowledge of physicalism/materialism whereby such afterlife would be metaphysical impossibility.

So, were there to in fact be a heave in the afterlife, then this one person has valid claims to fallible knowledge of it. About just as much as you or I have valid claims to fallible knowledge of anything in the empirical world.

You would think that visual sensing could continue along, just fine, when the person is a sleep, if it is a feature of the subconscious mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

The significance of this again eludes me. And again, this readily happens when people sleepwalk. So it can and does, in fact, happen: Sleepwalkers can visually see the external world while fully asleep and thus not consciously aware.

Why then don't we all sleepwalk all the time when asleep? One relatively short answer is that natural selection tends to rule this out due to the perils of so doing all the time.

Or, does keeping the eyes open, in general, anytime, require conscious effort? — Metaphysician Undercover

Keeping one's eyes open is, generally speaking, fully voluntary - meaning that it is subject to our conscious volition. This unlike, for example, keeping our heart beating, or pangs of hunger/thirst, or the experience of physical pain, etc. To that extent, yes, of course.

Edit: I should add that, generally speaking aside, there are of course exceptions when keeping the eyes open occurs unconsciously: see for example sleepwalking with eyes open.

I see that just answered my last question before I posted it. Thanks, btw. :smile:

I'll submit my post anyway.

(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good
is more or less identical than the Beautiful.) — Janus

Interesting. Which is of course on par to asking if the Good is as darkly green as is the Beautiful. In short, a blatant category error, which, outside of some possibly rather refined or specialized poetic meaning, makes no sense whatsoever.

Notwithstanding, implicit in this very assertion of, to paraphrase, “the Good’s quality of identity when looked at in comparison to that of the Beautiful’s,” is the rather blatant affirmation that both the Good and the Beautiful are to be considered metaphysical realities.

I personally do not know of any more a metaphysical concept than that of the Good per se, such that it supersedes all others. Which, despite being instantiated in all instances of goodness such that it is what gives goodness its meaning, is none of these instances individually. The Good by very definition cannot have any empirical identity, yet it is that which grounds all senses of goodness within the empirical world. Does one thereby take “goodness” to be a metaphysical claim devoid of any referent as term on grounds that the Good cannot be pointed to with a finger?

Is there any evidence that Wittgenstein did?

If not, he might have well been quite metaphysical in his personal beliefs.

-------

Again, something which 's latest post illustrates to me to have indeed been the case. :up:

However, I don't understand your use of "unconscious". I'm sure partly due to my ignorance of the topic. But also possibly because different people mean things in different ways. I'm wondering which, if any, of these you mean. And I'm seriously winging all this. [...] — Patterner

Fair enough. I’ll try to better explain.

To first reiterate, I take CNS processes to be that via which mind is in vertebrates. To use Aristotelian terminology, this via material causation and not via efficient causation. And, thus, that the immaterial mind supervenes upon material CNS processes. And, for a fuller disclosure, I then likewise take mind to be capable of changing material CNS processes (such as by eventually changing via neural plasticity the strength or else very occurrence of certain synapses) via formal causation or one type or another, but, again, not via efficient causation.

So the immaterial mind is what the material CNS does – this in the strict sense just outlined. And this in those lifeforms endowed with a CNS. But, again for fuller disclosure, myself subscribing to the idea of all lifeforms having some form of mind, this as per views such as those found in Mind in Life, I don’t take mind to be necessarily dependent on the occurrence of a CNS – such that, for example, an ameba or a bacterium will have its own lifeform-specific mind, which is materially caused by the organizations and behaviors of the organic molecules which constitute the physical cell. A bacterium then has a vastly, almost unimaginably simpler mind than any lifeform endowed with a CNS. But back to the issues of the human mind:

Thus understood, the immaterial mind can then be generally divided into two parts: a) the conscious mind, i.e. that which is consciously aware of anything, and b) the unconscious mind, i.e. all those aspects of mind in total as previously addressed of which the conscious mind is not in any way aware of.

This basic rudimentary dichotomy can become quickly complicated in any number of ways: e.g. a visually recalled memory is consciousness’s (the conscious mind’s) conscious awareness of that which the unconscious mind presents to it (here stated rather laconically).

In a bacterium, there will quite likely be no such dichotomy between conscious and unconscious mind whatsoever.

But in a highly complex mind such as that of a human’s, this dichotomy will always hold. Such that the conscious mind can never fully equate to the total mind that supervenes upon the CNS. As you’ve somewhat pointed out, we are unconscious of the active, CNS-dependent volition via which our heart beats, etc. Likewise are we unconscious of the active, CNS-dependent volition via which that which we consciously will to say ends up being oppressed and nullified via a statement we did not consciously intend, thereby resulting in a slip of the tongue.

We have no way of mapping the unconscious mind vs. the conscious mind onto the CNS because we have no way of mapping consciousness onto the CNS to begin with; see for the example the binding problem of consciousness.

Because of this, I can not cogently answer what the unconscious is by mapping it onto certain portions of the CNS at expense of others. Nor can I cogently uphold that the unconscious equates to CNS activity at large - for consciousness too is to be found in at least certain aspects of this same CNS activity at large. So I cannot then equate the unconscious mind in humans to any of the three possibilities provided.

Rather, again, I take consciousness to be a convergence of certain unconscious agencies and loci of awareness into an ever-changing non-manifold unity. Thereby, again, making the conscious mind dependent on the workings of the unconscious mind, this in any organism complex enough to hold any form of dichotomy between the two.

To use a common enough metaphor, consciousness is like the visible tip of a glacier whose remaining mass is submerged beneath water, the latter being the unconscious mind. The two are not divided masses, they are not separate, but are rather intertwined as parts of the same mass. This total mass then being equated to the immaterial mind in whole.

If the activity of the eye is part of the unconscious, why, in your opinion, do we need to close our eyes when we sleep? — Metaphysician Undercover

Barring exceptions such as those of sleep paralysis and sleepwalking wherein the individual can be asleep in part or in whole with eyes wide open, such that they actively take in visual information of the external world, I’m at a loss as to the significance of the question.

Usually, when our eyes are not closed, we persist in being consciously alert to the outside world and so do not fall into sleep, wherein our conscious awareness of the outside world momentarily ceases. Hence, we will willfully close our eyes when we intend to fall asleep to assist in so doing. This doesn’t always work thought, with insomnia as a common enough example.

Or maybe you're thinking that retinal input is necessarily and instantly consciousness? To keep things simple, it generally needs to travel through the occipital lobe and then into other lobes in order to become conscious. And, so, the activities of brain which occur in the retina alone are in no way consciously experiences and are therefore aspects of the unconscious mind. Somewhat more complexly, blindsight directly speaks to how some visual information originating in the retina is, or at least can be fully unconscious. Related to this, from what I remember being taught, is that we will sometimes reflexively turn our gaze to something moving in our extreme periphery of vision prior to being consciously aware of it.

Maybe my answer to Patterner will help out.

As far as the details of this go, it depends on how one goes about conceptualizing what “an eye” is.
Light detection is found in prokaryotes (like bacteria), single-celled eukaryotic organisms (such as ameba), and, of course, in plants. It would be odd in many a way to then claim that any of these then have eyes; e.g. that plants see light via their eyesight. On the other hand, animals such as flatworms are stated to have eyespots on their heads, this rather than eyes.

If an eye is taken to in any way consist of a lens and thereby be camara-like, common consensus is that eyes have evolved analogously, and not homologously, numerous times via convergent evolution. In other words, that not all (lens-endowed) eyes in nature have evolved from a single common ancestor.

As one example, although its difficult toward impossible to conclusively establish strictly via fossils and DNA, common consensus has it that cephalopods (like octopi and squid) and vertebrates have evolved their eyes independently via convergent evolution. A reference for this.

The human retina of itself has five different types of neurons. (Reference.) So the retina is not strictly composed of dendrites that extend from out of neuron bodies that are themselves located within the CNS, which again is the brain + spinal cord (in contrast to the fingers or toes, for example, which do only contain dendrites (and axons) in the absence of any neuron bodies). Instead, the retina is a part of the neuron-constituted CNS itself, not only due to development, but also due to of itself being constituted of neuron bodies. So the retina is a portion of brain that sends information to other portions of brain. This, in some limited ways, in parallel to the way the occipital lobe sends visual information to the temporal lobe and the parietal lobe.

These details aside, (maybe as you yourself imply (?)) I so far don’t find all this much mattering though when it comes to basic appraisals of the unconscious mind and consciousness’s dependence on it.

are the signals generated by the toes when something brushes against them an event of the unconscious mind, just as signals generated by the retina when struck by photons are? — Patterner

Nearly forgot:

Once the signals from the dendrites reach the CNS, I uphold that they then, and only then, become the first constituent aspects of one's unconscious mind. This, naturally, together with all other most basic, constituent portions of one's unconscious mind (other sensory inputs, sense of balance, etc.) which, I'd again uphold, converge into greater levels of agency and awareness till some such portions become our lived consciousness. All this very succinctly expressed.

EDIT: As an example, as far as feeling something brush against one's toe(s), dendrites in one's toes are always active; but one is not always consciously aware of what one's toes feel in tactile manners (it seems that never is one consciously aware of what all portions of one's skin feels in tactile manners at any given time: from the toes to the scalp) . That one becomes conscious of something brushing up against one's toes is then inferred by me to be determined by one's unconscious mind.

This explains it more succinctly that I could in my own words:

In vertebrate embryonic development, the retina and the optic nerve originate as outgrowths of the developing brain, specifically the embryonic diencephalon; thus, the retina is considered part of the central nervous system (CNS) and is actually brain tissue.[2][3] It is the only part of the CNS that can be visualized noninvasively. [my input: and that occurs outside the cranium] Like most of the brain, the retina is isolated from the vascular system by the blood–brain barrier. The retina is the part of the body with the greatest continuous energy demand.[4] — the last paragraph in the wikipedia introduction on the retina

Whereas the retina is a part of the central nervous system (CNS), more specifically the brain and not the spinal cord, dendritic outreaches into one's toes, for example, are part of the nervous system at large, but not of the CNS proper - which strictly consists of brain and spinal cord in at least vertebrates.

Thank you for your response. I'm understanding it a little more with each reading. But I'm not understanding this:.
Just as its your unconscious mind which produces that which you are conscious of during waking states.
I am conscious of the temperature, various sounds, my hunger, things that I see, itches and pains, symptoms of illness... How is my unconsciousness mind producing all of that? I would have thought it's role is in different areas. — Patterner

To take visual perception as one relatively well studied example, the retina of the eye is technically a portion of one’s brain. Most retinal Information crisscrosses from the eyes into the occipital lobes, and from there into other lobes of the brain.At the very least, retinal brain processes and occipital lobe brain processes occur before conscious sight takes place of that which the eye takes in.

I take it that the brain itself, be it the retina, or the occipital lobes, or other regions, is not an inanimate object that causes mind as its effect - such that first there is inanimate brain, or portion of it, as efficient cause and then at a subsequent period of time there is a corresponding state of mind as effect. Instead, I take it that the mind is the top portion of a largely bottom-up non-causal process, one which could be termed supervenience. Save for the mind’s top-down non-causal process which I then associate with what is commonly considered free will (e.g. repeating the conscious decision to cease smoking can alter one's physical brain into one that eventually no longer craves nicotine).

In so understanding, there is then nothing that I visually see of the external world which is possible in the absence of unconscious mind processes. In terms of my visual perception, these basically being those aspects of mind which emerge via superveneience on physical brain processes regarding visual sight, specifically brain process that occur prior to the moment of me consciously seeing X: these, again, being retinal brain processes, occipital brain processes, etc.

Of course, the brain isn't just one specialized mode of perception. It does many things simultaneously. Most of which is done unconsciously, i.e. without conscious awareness. And, in my view, many of these unconscious processes of mind end up converging into one's conscious mind, aka consciousness.

BTW, if its of interest, the lapse between retinal input and conscious sight is measured in milliseconds. Here is one article addressing certain aspects of the general concept as regards both conscious and unconscious vision.

I’m glad that the general view I presented makes some sense to you. The part you quoted, written in haste, is in truth a generalized hypothesis I make given my best understanding and interpretations of the current data. When I wrote it I forgot that some might find it a controversial notion.

OK. Thanks for the answer.

But I'm also sure the orientation to the Good, or the 'will to truth', is not a matter of preference, of like or dislike. — Wayfarer

Ah. OK. I see things differently here. There's the "good" of not suffering, which I take all to consciously or unconsciously be oriented toward without exception (this as you here say, and as typical Buddhism upholds), but then there is also the Good as ultimate, existentially fixed telos. Skipping the rational to this, which is not readily expressible in soundbite form, I then find that many are, consciously or not, quite adverse to the Good: holding fear for it rather than love/affinity toward it. When a person indulges in the tyrannical pleasures of raping another, this, as one example, is not done with a "will to truth".

But I'll for my part leave this disagreement of opinion as is.

Agapē, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented any any person(s)? — javra


Matt. 5:45 'He causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good'. Doesn't that underwrite the Christian attitude of brotherly love, charity to the dispossessed and despised? — Wayfarer

The passage could be interpreted in various ways. I still don't understand by it what you interpret as an agape that pays no regard to persons.

Since what was addressed were aspects of the Abrahamic ethos, loving thy enemy (holding agape / compassion for one's enemy) is yet, to me, relative to person(s).

Whereas the Buddhist 'karuna' or 'mudita' is perhaps closer to the Christian agapē, which 'pays no regard to persons'. — Wayfarer

I neglected this part, Can you unpack what an agape that pays no regard to persons signifies to you?

Agape, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented at any person(s)?

Then I don't know if that is seeing the point! This is something often grappled with by Zen Buddhist aspirants - on the one hand, they are constantly urged to make a supreme effort, and the effort demanded of Zen students is arduous in the extreme. But at the same time, they're told that any effort arising from wanting some result or getting somewhere is mere egotism! The theory is that renunciation includes complete detachment from oneself, from trying to be or to get. That is the 'gordian knot' of life in a nutshell, and the reason that Zen Buddhism in particular is well-known for being a highly-focussed discipline. Krishnamurti would often say 'It is the truth that liberates you, not the effort to be free'. — Wayfarer

My honest hunch is that Zen Buddhism is somehow often misconstrued, even among certain self proclaimed Zen Buddhism teachers/masters/experts which further the misconstrued. I've of course no facts to this effect, but it's certainly not beyond the realm of possibilities.

"It is the truth that liberates you, not the effort to be free" could be interpreted in myriad ways, some of which might be on track. But embedded right into this is the implicit and quite stringent affirmation that "liberation is good". Hence, the attachment/bias/favoring of that which is good - here, namely liberation from illusion - by any Zen Buddhist, and this irrespective of what is said, and the disfavoring of remaining "un-liberated" from, or enslaved to, illusion.

It's important to distinguish what is beyond reason from the merely irrational, which is not an easy distinction to grasp — Wayfarer

Of course. The very occurrence of being (else Being with a capital "B") is arational. Just about the only exception to the law of sufficient reason. And the occurrence of being is experienced, of itself experience, not something rationally derived or alternatively inferred.

Isn't he saying here that 'attachment' is what introduces 'bias'? — Wayfarer

"Attachment" is not expressed in the passage, but "biased toward" is. To reiterate what I previously expressed, I'm all for the ideal of a mindful (as in "mindfulness"), compassion-infused detachment (aka lack of bias toward). Yet, again, when one loves, one is necessarily attached - and compassion devoid of all forms of love is ... not compassion.

Yes, under the philosophical microscope, love too is a bias. One that can be quite egotistically limited to specific others (my child, or parent, or lover only, and fu*k the rest) or else which can extent to humanity, the world in this sense, at large. And, often enough, one can hold varying extents of both forms simultaneously. But I gravely doubt that the Dalai Lama is claiming that such love-resulting favoring of those which one loves is a vice.

It is a complex topic. Charles Manson, given as an example of extreme vice, did undergo far more childhood abuse than many of us want to comprehend. There can then be compassion for him as an adult in this. But, notwithstanding, though this would preclude any feeling of glee in his suffering while incarcerated, it would not equate to either a) not wanting him incarcerated or else b) feeling compassion for him in the vice filled deeds, murdering, which he orchestrated. Here there is attachment, bias, to the ideal of equitable justice for all, for example. Something which all religions I can currently think of uphold in their theorizing (though not in uniform practice, lets say). An "attachment/bias" which I likewise gravely doubt the Dalai Lama would in any way denounce.

What being unbiased signifies is not being devoid of favoring equitable justice for all, but in keeping true to this by not favoring one individual other others when the same deed is done. For example, not excusing the billionaire when they double park on account of his status when holding average joe shmoe accountable for the same deed.

On a less mundane level, I'll uphold that the Dalai Lama, as with the original Buddha, is extremely attached/biased toward what some in the West term the Good. And that, in so being, he then becomes detached from / unbaiased in relation to all direct and inderect forms of nepotism, etc.

Again, its what "detachment" / "attachment" is being proposed to ideally be that I'm currently questioning - and not the favorably of detachment/attachment in general when understood to necessarily entail compassion (something that we so far seem to see eye to eye on).

That passage from the Dalai Lama makes the same point! — Wayfarer

Same point as?

As for compassion - it might be recalled that part of the Buddhist mythos is that, after realising supreme enlightenment, the Buddha was inclined to retreat into anonymity and say nothing further about it, but for the intervention of Brahma, who begged him to teach 'out of compassion for the suffering of the world' - which the Buddha then agreed to do.

But it also might be added that later Buddhism put a greater emphasis on compassion, in that the aim of the Buddhist aspirant was not for his/her own liberation, but that of all others. I think it's also a generally understood fact that seeing through one's own illusions and self-centredness naturally gives rise to a greater sense of empathy which begins to spontaneously arise as a consequence. — Wayfarer

Ah, I see you've just added the last sentence, which does go toward answering my question regarding detachment from the world in conjunction with compassion toward it.

To comment, as to the particular mythos of the Buddha just quoted, it should be held in mind that all mythoi are known to us via mixture of oral tradition over generations (in which the mythos told can undergo a good deal of plasticity and change) and writings which were not the subject's (in this case the Buddha's) own. The authenticity of the mythos is hence authored more by the characters and dispositions of those who told it than it is by the original Buddha himself. I much prefer the current Dalai Lama's underlying tenet that Buddhism is a faith grounded in reason. This over a potentially unquestioning acceptance of what mythoi have to say (which, after all, often diverge and conflict when taken as a whole in regard to a particular subject). In keeping with this, one can find the Dalai Lama's thoughts expressing that "a biased mind (which fully equates to a lack of psychological objectivity or else lack of psychological impartiality) cannot grasp reality" - which, to my best understanding, then equates detachment to an unbiased mind, hence to psychological objectivity/impartiality (not to be confused with physicality or else physical objects). This rather than lack of any outlook - outlooks which, as your examples illustrate, the Buddha indeed had - or else lack of being moved by the sorrows or joys of others.

I'm not disagreeing on the benefits of mindful, compassion-infused detachment (else unbiased-ness), but do want to question the attributes of it which were previously mentioned in your post, maybe in haste (?).

That said, I find myself having a great affinity toward the view that a Buddhist's calling is not personal salvation from suffering - this with unconcern for others' well-being such that one is not moved by their sorrows/suffering or joys/happiness - so much as the liberation of all.

And, since the first step on the Eightfold Path is samma ditthi, ‘right view’, it turns out that ‘right view’ is no view, in the sense of not holding to opinions or arguing for philosophical positions. — Wayfarer

Now you may ask what this detachment is that is so noble in itself. You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honour, shame or disgrace, as a mountain of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. …

(the second being from an Eckhart quote and not your own words)

It so far seems to me that to have compassion for others and the world at large one must necessarily hold opinions of what is right and wrong, of what is just, etc., and, furthermore, that via compassion one must become moved - if not into action then at the very least into personal sorrow - by the injustice-resulting sorrows of others in the world.

Going back to what was previously mentioned in relation to detachment and compassion:

If detachment is taken to equate to a) a lack of views being the "right view' and b) immovability (be it regarding physical action or psychological sentiment) by joys and sorrows, etc., then how do you understand a detachment from the world to coincide with a compassion for the world (and, obviously, hence for those from which the world is constituted)?

(To be clear, here with an explicit understanding of “the world” as “the subjective human experience, regarded collectively”.)

How do I make a character in my dream do and say everything it does and says, and still be surprised by everything it does and says? — Patterner

My way of explaining this is that it is not that you (i.e., that I-ness) which is the agential first-person point of view (i.e., which is the conscious intellect during waking states) that devises the given dream which one as first-person point of view experiences – no more than it is you as an agential first-person point of view which produces that which you see, smell, hear, etc. during waking states. Rather, it is that you (that I-ness) which consists of one’s total self or being (more specifically: one’s total mind, the unconscious aspects of it included) which produces the REM dream which is experienced by you as a first-person point of view during sleep. Just as its your unconscious mind which produces that which you are conscious of during waking states.

But this gets bound up in the philosophy or else psychology of what a self is constituted of. To use William James' basic dichotomy, which mirrors that of Kant’s and of Husserl’s, the first-person point of view is the “pure ego” which is that I-ness that experiences and thereby knows the phenomenal aspects of one’s total self; i.e., the “I” as knower of the experienced self; e.g., I see; I choose, I remember, etc. All aspects of selfhood that are experienced by this same pure ego is then broadly classified as the “empirical ego”; i.e., the “I” as the self which is known via experience (this by the pure ego); e.g. I am tall/short (or: I have two hands); I am stupid/smart in relation to some topic (or: I have an unconscious mind); I am of this or that nationality, etc. The first consciously experiences phenomena; the second is constituted of the phenomena experienced. So, during a dream, the agential first-person point of view (the pure ego) can well be surprised by that which agencies of its total unconscious mind present to it. To further complicate matters, the pure ego can in certain dreams hold an empirical ego quite distinct from its empirical ego during waking states. But this is a very broad and possibly very different topic.



Apropos, to add to the anecdotal accounts, some years back I’ve had a series of REM dreams (rather than daydreams) that were as coherent as any waking reality, in which I interacted with others in a coherently stable town and environment. In this series of dreams, it was always the same town, the same environment, and the same general cohort of people. What tripped me out upon awakening from these rather vivid dreams was that, in the later portion of these dreams, I’d while dreaming remember as vividly as any waking memory events that had occurred during previous dreams in this series. These dreams where clearly distinct from waking reality, but they were not distinct from each other and certainly not inconsistent.

If I interpret you correctly, we then are in general agreement on the key issues. (My intention was not that of championing Humean philosophy: to me, he got some thing right and others not. As to asceticism, my personal view is that if it does no harm, then to each their own.)

Our wants are not unanalyzable primitives that the intellect must figure out how best to accommodate, but are in fact shaped by the intellect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To what extent, if any, would you then agree with the following:

At minimum, no spatiotemporally occurring intellect (stated to differentiate from the hypothetical of a non-spatiotemproal intellect, commonly termed "God" in the West) can ever be other than fully unified in non-manifold manners with it own intrinsic wants, desires, intentions, and therefore passions - via which reasoning becomes implemented.

------

This to me is the other side of the same theme I previously mentioned: that all passions (emotions, desires, wants, etc.) are bound to and unfold via reasoning: namely, minimally, teleological reasons for being that which they are.

Maybe interestingly, wants are not all of the same nature in terms of whom, or what, they pertain to - even when all wants can be validly stated to pertain to the same self or being: To express a relatively straightforward example, there's a maybe subtle but extreme difference between being envious oneself and shunning as best one can pangs of envy which one senses withing one's own total being. I use envy because its telos is relatively simple and universal: roughly, that end or aim of becoming in sole possession of something which pertains to someone else. Envy is the emotion addressed, and it holds a clear want - itself bound by teleological reasons and hence reasoning. If one is envious, then one is actively intentioning the telos/aim/end of the envy. If, on the other hand, one is rejecting one's felt pangs of envy, than one as, I'll here say consciousness or intellect, is antithetical to becoming envious. The first envy pertains to the conscious intellect, is that which the conscious intellect momentarily is. The second however, does not pertain to the conscious intellect but to that intellect's total workings of mind at large. Yet it will be the (to me, always passion-possessing) intellect which via its capacities can choose and thereby determine whether it converges with the felt pang of envy to actively become envious or else denounces it so as to remain devoid of that given emotion. And, in this example, if the conscious intellect decides to not become envious, it will then hold a desire, else passion, antithetical to that of envy: in a sense, here, the intellect passionately endeavors to remain un-envious despite the felt pangs of intruding emotions (these emotions, wants, intentions, then, not pertaining to the conscious intellect itself).

Thought I'd mention one example to try to better clarify my previous statement.

-----

Edit: To complement what I've just expressed, on the one hand there are emotions for which we have no terms for in English; on the other, states of being such those of serenity, calmness, being focused, psychological objectivity or impartiality, and the like (which the intellect might strive to maintain in ideal conditions) are all emotive, of themselves sentiments or passions - and not products of deductive reasoning. The intellect might reason, deductively or otherwise, that these emotive states of being are beneficial and ought to be maintained or acquired, but these states of being which the intellect might potentially find itself in are yet emotive (loosely, facilitating certain, non-physical, motions of the intellect) - and so fall under the umbrella category of the passions or else sentiments.

If the Humean is committed to all issues of value ultimately stemming from wholly irrational passions, then this applies just as much to all questions of truth. Hence, the foundations of reason, logic, etc. would themselves be irrational (some are indeed willing to accept this).

The second counter is to claim that all notions of goodness ultimately stem from some sort of kernal of irrational preference. [...]. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find that words and their connotations often get in the way: in Hume’s arguments against moral rationalism he wasn’t arguing or concluding that morality is grounded upon irrationality:

To paraphrase Hume: Hume, from my readings of a considerable time ago, in his “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals” basically argues that morals are founded on wants (which are experienced sentiments or passions) rather than on a priori deductive truths (which constitutes the rationalism which, if I remember correctly, he was critiquing in his writings). And wants do not ubiquitously equate to pleasures: e.g. the want to go to the dentist when one finds doing so unpleasurable.

On a personal note, I’m by no means one to support the view that wants are by their very nature irrational or even arational: regardless of how irrational or arational we might deem our emotions, of which wants are an intrinsic aspect of, they all have their teleological reasons for being/manifesting—i.e., they all want to accomplish some not yet actualized end—and I thereby take them to thus be rational (aka, reason-bound) in the strict sense just mentioned. But the reasoning they pertain to is certainly not that of the a priori deductive truths which rationalism traditionally upholds. To be clearer, I just briefly checked and moral rationalism is indeed commonly defined as purporting that metaethical values can be known a priori, and, thus, devoid of any experience—something I find utterly nonsensical so far.

I get that Hume did not anywhere explicitly claim that wants/emotions/passions are themselves reason-bound, this as I myself just did. Nevertheless, regardless of critiques regarding his arguments and views, the fact remains that Hume’s perspectives culminate in a form of virtue ethics, one replete with altruistic concern—and not in simple utilitarianism or the naïve sentimentalism in which the “boo” and “yay” fully relative and idiosyncratic to individual person(s) grounds that which is morally wrong and right If it were otherwise, he could not uphold what he in fact upheld, e.g.:

As a result, certain character traits commonly deemed virtues by the major religions of the time are deemed vices on Hume's theory. Hume calls these so-called "virtues", such as self-denial and humility, monkish virtues. Rather vehemently, he writes:

Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices... (EPM, §9, ¶3) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Enquiry_Concerning_the_Principles_of_Morals#Virtue_ethics

These so called "monkish virtues" are after all both pleasurable and of utility to many of the implied monks concerned.

I have noticed in Mahāyāna Buddhism, there is a lovely expression, that emptiness and compassion are like the two wings of a bird - that realisation of emptiness leads to detachment, but that detachment without compassion (Karuṇā) is meaningless. — Wayfarer

Thanks for that!

Since ancient times, both Eastern and Western philosophies have prized detachment as a virtue. — Wayfarer

Like the ‘nothingness vs. no thingness’ divide which we’ve agreed upon in previous threads, “detachment” is a term which in at least the English language doesn’t find a readily interpretable meaning for the spiritual (or spiritual-like) contexts in which it is employed. In other words, it doesn’t translate well from its metaphysics-relative, intended meaning in Eastern languages.

I. for example, know of no Buddhist who advocates for the abolishment of compassion, this while upholding the ideal of we in English translate as “detachment” with the same breath. Compassion, in our English lexicon, however, can only be obtained via attachment: not only the occurrence of empathy (i.e., the sensing of what the other senses, something that one can hold for a disliked rival while in battle with them so as to best act and react to their actions) but also the occurrence of sympathy (i.e., earnest caring for what the other senses). Love of parents, children, romantic partners, the world at large, etc., is always a compassion for the X addressed. And, in common English understanding, this always then equates to an attachment toward that loved.

I believe that the full scope of “detachment” when explicitly expressed is “detachment from maya (illusion)”. And maya, to my awareness, in either Hindu or Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy is never that which is considered the core aspect of subjectivity: the atman in Hindu philosophy; the anatman in Buddhist philosophy. The latter constituting that which is nonillusory reality per se in an ultimate metaphysical analysis of things.

Thought I’d mention this given how common it is for westerners to associate “detachment” to utter unconcern, including relative to the welfare of other beings in general. In contrast to what many would think, and as you indirectly mention, detachment is not callousness. But, I think, rather the very opposite. Such that the Skeptic epoche and Stoic apatheia can make no sense, at least to me, in the absence of earnest compassion and its satisfaction with the conditions of not only oneself but of others which surround.

----

Ps. None of which is to say that objectivity does not matter or is else unimportant.

-----

Pps. Written as a footnote to what you were saying. Hopefully nothing significantly controversial about it.

Me too, thanks for clarifying. — J

:grin: :up:

And notice what happens when we ask whether the doubt being expressed is about the thought or what the thought is about. I can be absolutely certain that, right this minute, I am having the thought "I think I did" concerning some previous action I'm not too sure about. Again, the ambiguity of "thought" as mental event (yep, definitely happening) and "thought" as that thought's intensional content (not too sure). — J

Yes, very much agree. Though I wouldn’t use the word “doubt” to express this but “(psychological) uncertainty” instead:

I find doubt to necessarily be “an uncertainty regarding an already affirmed, or else held, certainty - be it affirmed or else held by oneself in the past or else by someone other”. As one example, this can become very transparent in the two propositions: “the future is uncertain” and “the future is doubtful/dubious”. The first merely and strictly stipulates that future events are not yet determined. The second proposition, however, stipulates either a) that the heretofore upheld reality of the future as a whole might in fact not occur or b) that some heretofore upheld specific set of realities which are to occur in the future might in fact not occur.

So one can be uncertain about the object of one’s thought - e.g., I'm thinking that I left my wallet in the room (this while being fully certain that one’s current thought as process is occurring). And this uncertainty can be maintained without necessarily doubting the given object of one’s thought. As can again be exemplified by some future even one is uncertain about but does not doubt. For example, a person is uncertain of whether they will see a movie latter on in the day but - because they have not previously held the psychological certainty that they would see a movie later on - the person does not come to doubt this future event, even as they are uncertain about it.

To say “I think that […]” is to then express some degree of psychological uncertainty about that which one thinks is the case, but rarely if ever is it to affirm that one doubts that that given which one thinks is the case is in fact actually so.

The semantics of “uncertainty” and “doubt” being an utterly different issue to that of the thread, granted, but I do find interest in it. (A pet peeve of mine: unlike Cartesian skepticism - which is about doubting everything - ancient skepticism was about ubiquitous, and hence radical, (psychological degrees of) uncertainty …with no doubt of this position or of anything else required. This being what in modern parlance can be termed the stance of “fallibilism”. This doubt-independent ancient skepticism being something which the ancient skeptic Cicero for example nicely exemplifies. All this as an apropos regarding the difference between uncertainties and doubts.)

For my part, this issue boils down to what one interprets by the term “thought”.

If one holds that cognizance (a fancier way of saying “awareness”) is in itself a form of thought, then there can be no apprehension of p in the absence of thinking p. — javra


Thinking p requires thinking p. No one disputes this. The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p." — Leontiskos

I take most of this thread to be about the befuddlement of language in attempting to articulate that which ontically is or else occurs in regard to at least human cognition.

Going back to the OP:

This follows up on some issues in recent threads about Descartes, Sartre, Kimhi, and the nature of philosophical thought.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.” — J

@J can correct me on this, but from my own reading of the OP, the primary question was: is the (Cogito-style) actuality of “I think” requisite for all instances of “I think (proposition) p” without exception? And the only way I can find this to apply is if the concept of “thinking” is expanded to include all cognitive processes, very much including cognizance. Otherwise, the stipulation that “I think” as a proposition always accompanies the proposition “I think (proposition) p” is, for my part, utterly absurd: it would entail that for each and every explicitly stated “I think that […]” there would necessarily be implicitly expressed “I think that I think that […]”, which is absurdity—in part because it would allow for if not imply an infinite regress of “I think”.

The semantics of words we use in modern times do not always hold a one-to-one correlation to the semantics of words that were used in the past—even when not translated from other languages. This especially when it comes to the more nuanced interpretation of terms which past philosophers on occasion made use of. This being something that, though maybe obvious, often eludes discussions of what others in the distant past meant to express by the words used.

As to modern semantics, in adding to this :

To answer “I did” and “I think I did” to some question is in no way and at no time equivalent: the first expresses a fact one is confident about regarding what one did, this while the second expresses something along the lines of a best presumption based on one’s best reasoning (i.e., thinking) regarding what one in fact did (presumably about a past deed one does not hold a clear recollection of). The second does not however require doubt of what one thinks is the case, but only allows for certain degrees of uncertainty.

To say, "I'm thinking (i.e., pondering) this is the case" is likewise not equivalent to, "this is the case".

Hence, to say, "I think (i.e., I best judge as a subject that) Paris is crowded" is not equivalent to saying, "Paris is crowded," with the latter, unlike the first, affirming what is to be taken as an objective fact (something that does or else should hold equal weight to all subjects irrespective of their biases).

... All of which would make "I think I think p" translate into "I best reason that I best reason (with a possibly infinite extension of this) that [...]". This being something that arguably is never done by anyone.

I’m of course on board in upholding that language is extremely important (crucial in this sense) to the uniqueness of human intelligence. But I don’t deem it necessary (essential in this sense). I wasn’t there when it happened, but Einsteins reported epiphany about the speed of light was reputedly non-verbal, instead being strictly imaginative. Another renowned example is that of Archimedes’ eureka moment. I interpret these, and many other, examples to be instances of non-verbal thought - with a great deal of intelligence to boot. For those who uphold the possibility of a perennial philosophy or some such, the same might be said for at least some people’s epiphanies regarding the nature of being: these being non-verbal insights (which might provide profound understandings that are difficult, if at all possible, to put into propositional format in any cogent, or else non-poetic, way). These examples of non-verbal thought then entail the occurrence of non-propositional thought (unless one wants to affirm such a thing as languageless propositions). Hence, while I deem language vastly important to intellect, I don’t deem intellect (or thoughts for that matter) to necessarily be dependent on language use.

And yes, though a bit off topic, I’m in full agreement with the Cosmos consisting of Heraclitean or else Stoic Logos - which we are embedded in. Unlike Aristotle’s dichotomy of humans as the rational animal versus non-human animals all being non-rational, however, I instead interpret humans as being the current zenith of comprehension regarding the Cosmos, and hence of the Cosmos’s rational order. Such that there is a quite significant partition, or else chasm, between the human intellect and the intellects of all other known life forms. Yet this I appraise as nevertheless being an aspect of a gradated and ever evolving spectrum, or cline, in regard to comprehension-ability (an ability which, again, language tremendously benefits) - this rather than any kind of metaphysical divide between humans and all other life forms. Otherwise expressed, they too are aware subjects that are part and parcel of the Cosmos’s Logos and which likewise behave via its properties, but they lack our human ability to comprehend it (imperfect as our human comprehension nevertheless is).

The key cleavage seems to be whether thought is meant to be essentially sentential or propositional, as opposed to "representational". — J

Some thoughts in considering this:

Were thought essentially propositional, a person who for example ponders and arrives at conclusions solely via use of mental images (and, hence, not via use of any internal monologue) would then not be engaging in any thought. Which seems quite odd to affirm as far as commonsense understandings of thinking go. Or are propositions meant to be understood as sometimes being languageless? (Sentences certainly can’t be). If so, then plenty of non-human animals give all indications of using propositions all the time. But this doesn’t seem right either.

On the other hand, were thought to be essentially representational, then the faculty of understanding could not be an integral aspect of the faculty of thought—this even if understanding will always accompany thought. This will be so because, while one can of course understand representations, understandings will not of themselves be representations of anything. And, hence, will not of themselves then be thoughts.

But in either of these two scenarios regarding what thought is taken to essentially be, many if not most will at least at times be able to hold an awareness of some thought p without thinking “I think p” (without either forming a proposition regarding p or else forming a mental representation of p that is thereby other than p).

As one example: Suppose a person is daydreaming of p, and thereby holds an awareness of thought p. Doing so neither requires that the person forms a proposition regarding p nor that the person forms a representation of the p they are aware of.

Because of all this, I’ll yet maintain that for “I think” to be interpreted as accompanying all thoughts, the thinking which the “I think” addresses must be other than either propositional or representational.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.”

This has some obvious relevance to the debate about the force/content distinction in Frege, which we discussed at length in an earlier thread, inspired by Kimhi. But for now . . .

Suppose my friend Pat replied as follows:

“Sorry, but I don’t have this experience. When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Please don’t misunderstand me as saying that I’ve never had such a thought, or wouldn’t know what it was to experience such a thought. There are indeed circumstances under which I may additionally reflect ‛And I am thinking thought p at this moment’ or ‛Thought p is my thought’ or ‛I judge that p’. But I disagree that this characterizes my experience of thinking in general.”

Which of these responses do you think would be appropriate to make to Pat?:

1. You've misunderstood. The thesis of the ubiquity of the “I think” is not based on empirical observation. It’s not about what you experience; whether you are aware of having such an experience is not decisive either way. Some people are aware of it, some are not. But we’re not relying on personal reports when we claim that the “I think” must accompany all our thoughts.

2. The “I think” is an experience of self-consciousness, and requires self-consciousness. When you say you are “not aware of it,” you are mistaken. But you can learn to identify the experience, and thus understand that you have been aware of it all along.

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

For my part, this issue boils down to what one interprets by the term “thought”.

If one holds that cognizance (a fancier way of saying “awareness”) is in itself a form of thought, then there can be no apprehension of p in the absence of thinking p. For one must cognize p in order to in any way apprehend it. And, since cognizance is here taken to be one form of thought, one must then think p in order to apprehend it.

And, in this interpretation, it is possible that one simultaneously has a meta-cognizance of cognizing that which one immediately apprehends, say, though one’s physiological senses. In other words, it is possible that one can hold an awareness of being aware. Conversely, some might at least at times be aware without being aware of so being.

Apropos, this first interpretation can be in harmony with the more ancient understanding of intellect (one in keeping with the original Latin): namely, that of the intellect being the faculty of first-person understanding via which one understands anything which is other (be this other a concept or a concrete reality). One’s understanding of a concept (say, the concept of biological evolution) will always be necessarily but insufficiently contingent on the depth, or else nonquantitative magnitude, of one’s ready occurring body of first-person understanding. Otherwise exemplified, an adult human holds the potential to thereby understand what (the concept of) a mathematical variable is, but neither can a human infant nor an adult dog ever understand what a mathematical variable is, and this irrespective of how much they come to experience. This, in short, due to their own intellect being far smaller as both faculty and body of content by comparison to that of a typical adult human’s. Hence, if understanding too is deemed to be an aspect of thought, then here too there can be no apprehension of p in the complete absence of an understanding of p—and, thereby, in the absence of thought of p. (Interesting to me, in ancient interpretations, there also at times seems to be an equivalency between understanding and knowing. One cannot know that which one does not understand, nor can one understand something without knowing that which is understood. This being a knowledge other than that of JTB.)

Yet, in stark difference to all the aforementioned, wherever thought is interpreted to be the “representation created in the mind without the use of one's faculties of vision, sound, smell, touch, or taste” then there certainly will be times when one apprehends p without in any way thinking p. For instance, at any given time, one will always apprehend things in one’s peripheral vision which one in no way thinks about (this when thought is interpreted as being representations created in the mind which one can then in any way manipulate at will).

In this latter interpretation of thought, (4) will be valid.

But when considering the former interpretation of thought, a hybrid between (1) and (3) might likely be upheld. Maybe as follows: You misunderstand. Thought—when understood to necessarily consist of both cognizance, i.e. awareness, and understanding—is a precondition for any thought in the sense of “representation created in the mind”. Hence, the “I think” when interpreted to mean “I am aware (of)” is a condition for anything one might think of in the latter sense.

But then, so construing would endow even bacteria with the reality of being a first-person thinking creature—this IFF bacteria happen to be in any way aware (such as of what is and is not food, and how these differentiate from predators)—for then they too will hold some form of, acknowledgedly miniscule, cognizance and understanding.

Again, the issue is contingent on what one interprets the term “thought” to signify.