I have to go to work, so I might respond in more depth later, but doesn't it appear that a lot of these types of arguments are circular?

"Rationality and determinism are incompatible. Why? Because you require free will in order to be rational. Why? Because if you lack free will, all you choices a determined i.e. determinism is true."

It appears that the conclusion is inserted into the premises of the argument.

I agree that as you say Brennan thinks the non-consequentialist arguments fail. The idea behind this thread is to test that view. — Cuthbert

Alright, so what is the non-consequentialist argument? Consider that political power requires justification. States have a monopoly of violence which is considered legimate to use. When the state dictates a law, disobeying that law can result in the loss of my life, liberty, and property through violence. Consider why we don't allow children to vote. You could make a strong argument for allowing people much younger than the current age to vote, but there is still going to be some age which is universally considered too young to properly assess facts and ideas related to politics. I'm sorry, but if a group of people are learning how to do basic addition and subtraction, then they don't deserve to vote on how our society is set up.

I have a right to a fair trial. If a jury is obviously imcompetent, unfair, corrupt, utterly unconcerned, and/or demonstrably biased, then my trial is not fair. I require a competent jury. I require a competent jury even if having a incompetent one would lead to a better overall outcome in the end. It is unjust for a police chief to pay off a jury to find me guilty, even if the consequences of said action would greatly protect and save many lives. So, let's assume that epistocracy is shown that is produces overall better outcomes in terms of policy and justice compared to democracy and that many of the criticisms against epistocracy are unfounded or mitigated. For what reason must we maintain democracy over epistocracy?

As for the consequentialist arguments - one of the outcomes that the mere proposal of epistocracy has is the prospect of protests from people like me who are threatened with exclusion from the democratic process to which we have a right. Not a good start for a consequentialist project, I submit. — Cuthbert

I agree that epistocracy currently lacks the empirical rigor that we desire. I do think that we need a lot more discussion and research on the subject. I can point out several flaws and weak arguments in Brennan. And I do think the major potential benefit of democracy, less violence within the state, is probably the strongest potential objection. Perhaps the sacred cow of democratic thought is needed both as a practice and an idea to help prevent violence, a benefit that would outweigh the gains made in any epistocracy.

However, I do not think the situation is totally against epistocracy. Democracy and universal suffrage were not exactly empirically verified (and still have problems) when their early supporters argued for it. The same arguments for suffrage for certain groups were lobbied as being dangerous to society and risky. So, we need to first present arguments in favor of epistocracy to gain ideological traction. In order to do that, we first have to actually get down to Winston Churchill's statement. Democracy is not desirable in and of itself; there is nothing worthwhile in the idea of "one person, one vote" besides the pragmatism behind it. It is not romantic at all. If we want democracy, it is because it is the least of all the evils. Only then can we actually compare the two. After that, I would start setting up experiments to see if epistocracy even has a chance of working. We can go from there if the results are positive.

I'm attacking Brennan and Estlund who argue for that exact policy. — Cuthbert

Brennan (I cannot speak for Estlund) is arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with restricting suffrage based on the notion of political intelligence and capabilities, or knowledge in general. His point is that the nonconsequentialist arguments for requiring democracy fail, the general electorate is incompetent, and, as a result, if we can devise a system in which we restrict the electorate based on some standard of knowledge (and obviously produces overall better outcomes), then we ought to do that. Heck, his overall thesis for the book is just "if epistocracy produces better outcomes than democracy, then we ought to use epistocracy.

What that exactly entails is up for debate. His example of 80 percent of white voters is just that: an example. I could be an epistocrat and maintain that we devise a system that effectively excludes the bottom one percent of the population, or even less than that. The barrier can be so low that practically no one fails to meet the requirements. Education level does not have any necessary connection here.

Who gets to vote and how many votes they get would does not need to be tied to education level, but some other metric that anyone could do to show competency. Someone does not automatically get more votes under an epistocracy. I wouldn't do it. I've been to college and seen some of the people who get degrees; I would not automatically assume they should vote just because they have a piece of paper for no-name university somewhere.

Regarding minors voting, Brennan actually makes use of minors in an intuiton pump. He asks why six year-olds can't vote and points out that we, in large part, deny the right to vote to six year-olds because they lack the mental capacity and knowledge required to make political decisions. We wouldn't accept the verdict of a six year-old on a jury, and we would not accept a six year-old making political decisions for us.

We can then go up the age until we get to the teenage years, like 16 and 17 year-olds. I mean, it is odd that someone who is 17 can't vote but is in the same peer group and shares the same general lifestyles of an 18 year-old who can vote. But this seems odd. I mean, we could give them a chance to vote through some type of test, but then why do we allow everyone to vote without the test? We already acknowledge that certain people are not rational or capable, so why do we do things by age?

1. Democracy has a purely instrumental value- that is, democracy is good only so far as it protects the basic rights and promotes the general welfare of the populace.

2. Democracy appears to behave problematically.

3. Epistocracy, a system in there is unequal political power between people based on knowledge, may lead to better outcomes.

4. If epistocracy does lead to better outcomes than democracy, then we ought to favor epistocracy over democracy.

5. We ought to, if we can, experiment or find ways to test epistocracy to see how outcomes go.

That's all the argument really is. A large part of the argument is based on the idea that we tend to idolize democracy. We treat democracy as if it is above reproach. All that is required for epistocracy to gain ground is the idea that political liberties (namely the right to vote) are not basic liberties (freedom of speech, right to life) and that we can justify discriminating against certain people based upon some standard of knowledge.

Brennan has some issues. Some of arguments he makes are weak and need to be fleshed out more, and it feels like he spent a lot of time on one argument and needed to cut out sections of other arguments for editing and page length. He does gloss over some of the issues the author of the article brings up. But the book's thesis seems less about progressing epistocracy directly on consequentialist grounds and more about attacking democracy on non-conseqeuntialist grounds, while also attacking some common arguments put forward for the positive effects of democracy.

The objections raised in the OP are less objections to epistocracy proper without some empirical backing and more considerations that need to be considered.

Yes, some people who are educated are not exactly wise. But it seems odd to argue that somehow that the uneducated are able to properly make decisions (and by uneducated, I refer to general level of intelligence, not by official education). It doesn't matter how good-intentioned you are; if you lack basic knowledge about politics (or anything relevant to the issue at hand), it becomes hard to see how you can put your wisdom to use.

Yes, there is the potential for violence if people take issue with a political inequality. But, that is a potential. There is a possibility for violence because of real political inequality within a democracy. There is potential for violence simply for a major disagreement in a political democracy. What matters is if a non-democratic system can have the same actual results of violence. That said, I do think a variation that this particular question is probably one of the strongest objection to Brennan. One of the potential strong benefits of a democracy is that it handles shifts in power relatively well compared to other systems. Democracies can undergo change much better and will not break down into violent revolution everytime a paradigm shift happens to society. However, I am not sure if and how we could test this, or whether an epistocracy with an emphasis on avoiding discrimination (or a plural voting system in which some people get more votes) would solve this issue.

Lastly, I think the technical and specific aspects and issues on how to frame a form a government is no different than what one might face when trying to do it with an epistocracy or a democracy. So, I don't really see the objection.

reputable authors and reputable publishers. — LD Saunders

But that's the entire issue, isn't it? Who counts as the reputable author on a given subject? Lots of people read lots of different authors. Some people think Jordan Peterson is good, but others do not. Some people think Noam Chomsky is good, but other do not. Some people think religion is bogus, other people do not. Some people think modern radical feminism is a force for good, while others think it is a force for bad.

To share a personal anecdote about reputable authority figures: I know someone who had an potential eye problem, and went to three doctors. He got three answers. For example, one doctor said that surgery wasn't worth the risk and the issue would probably amount to nothing, while another doctor said he should go for surgery aa soon as possible. Assuming that every doctor appeared as reputable to him as the next, which should he go with?

OK. Say ,for example, regarding Pinker's Claim #2, I wanted to provide evidence that gender feminism in the US, is, and always was - as a "celebrity" academic like Jordan Peterson observes - sheer madness that has, over the past 50 or so years, bought an unspeakable universe of grief and suffering to bear on countless millions of American individuals and families. There is SO MUCH hard , official, high-quality, objective, empirical ( you name it) evidence of this fact that to be perfectly honest with you, I would scarcely know where to begin in setting it out! — Dachshund

@Maw is asking for actual evidence (not anecdotal) that there is widespread communist sentiment across college campuses in the US. I mean, if anecdotal evidence counts, I can dismiss the claim, as I didn't get that vibe from college I went to. Yeah, we had Marxists, but I don't recall them going around with hammer and sickles. There were people who were very pro-capitalist. Maybe the college was left-leaning, but whatever; it's not like none of the professors leans towards the right. The students didn't seem all that Marxist- some were, but some were vocally not.

You could make the argument that it is more left-leaning, but I don't think it reaches pro-Stalin, pro-Mao levels and that I think it mostly suffers from selective reporting. In my local news, a college let a group (I assume one of the Christian churches in the area) to go protest LGBT stuff on their campus. Some of the students went out and said that they didn't like them. One of college officials said that the college supports free speech, so the group was allowed to speak on campus, but that the campus community overall welcomed everyone, regardless of their sexual orientation. It didn't make headline news nationally because, well, it really wasn't that remarkable of an occurrence. When a professor goes off and publishes a book that gets national attention for being radical, there are bunch more college professors who don't care.

Yet again, the responses seem indicative of the climate. What Pinker said was true. Is it that folks really don't believe the claims are true? Or is it a lack of trust regarding the conclusions others might draw from the truths?

I suspect it's the latter and I suggest it's bad strategy to shout people down, shame, or otherwise silence them pre-emptively. — Roke

My problem with the whole "anti"-political correctness crowd is that, well, they're often responsible of the same sort of stuff that they accuse others of doing. Being called "politically correct" or an "SJW" is just as much a shut-down tactic as being called "racist" and "sexist" is. I can't help but feel that if the current trends of the times favored their ideologies over those of their opponents, then they would be doing the same sort of thing they accuse others of doing- shutting down discussions on topics before they even began.

Political-correctness is merely just another way of shutting down conversations. I'm not sure if it's even inherently bad. I mean, I don't think there is really anything wrong with public backlash and social condemnation if someone posted "Hitler did nothing wrong," on the internet. If the KKK wants to do a demonstration in town, they are legally allowed to do so, but when the general public decides to show that the KKK are not welcome in the town, then I see nothing wrong with it. If an intellectual said he was a Holocaust denier, I'm not going to get angry when a bunch of other intellectuals social condemn and ostracize them. The very hyper focus on mudslinging distracts us from actual discussions, both on what topics ought to be treated with social taboos and from genuine people seeking to have actual discussions about the necessary and relevant topics of today.

If we consider the first case for example, the meaning of "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" changes if the person "the man who will get the job" refers to. This is what Lukasz Lozanski used in an article I found to solve the Gettier problem. — BlueBanana

Alright, so what does it matter? So long as I can derive the proposition that Gettier uses for his conclusion from the earlier beliefs, then the problem stands.

That should be done by coming to those conclusions from the definition alone. Taking one's own conclusion as a premise doesn't prove anything. — BlueBanana

Not all arguments require a super in-depth look into each premise. Gettier is assuming we will find b to not count for knowledge in the same way that we do not need to show that merely having belief as knowledge. I can define "knowledge" as "whatever I would like to be true," and you can't really show that definition to be false. As you note, it's a definition. We reject the definition because it clearly doesn't conform to how we use and think about the word. In the same way, b doesn't really conform to our understanding of knowledge and no one has presented a convincing argument as to why it should count.

I know all this to be true, but for either JTB-definition to be shown true or Gettier to be shown correct it should be proven that b is not knowledge, not only under JTB. — BlueBanana

But my argument is that if we accept b to be knowledge, then that means one can have knowledge purely through luck. If one can have knowledge purely through luck, then the TB (true belief) theory of knowledge is true, as the main reason we want justification and rejct TB in the first place is to avoid merely being lucky in our beliefs. Therefore, the JTB theory is false because the "J" part is not needed. And, obviously, if we do not accept b to be knowledge, Gettier stands. So, either way, JTB is finished.

And, honestly, I don't think we should really have to argue why having unjustified beliefs being luckily true count as knowledge. It's so prima facie wrong that it's not worth discussing unless someone brings out a really good case for it.

But where is the line drawn? Are logical fallacies enough justification? Is any amount of evidence enough or is proof required? This is all further evidence against JTB. How can knowledge be defined as a justified true belief when the word justified itself is so unclear? — BlueBanana

What counts as justification and whether or not it is what is really needed is a major point of discussion in epistemology, so I am not really sure that it matters. JTB could be true, but no one actually meets the requirements for justification for most beliefs, so therefore no one has knowledge. I do think that Gettier is within his bounds, however, to assume skepticism to be false and show that, even if we assume normal, everyday parameters for justification, JTB is fundamentally flawed.

Should it be socially acceptable to call someone racial slurs in a clearly demeaning way?

I don't really know what you mean by it was interpreted in some other way. What other way is there to interpret the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford"?

2) is assumed to be true by Gettier because, as you mention, JTB is just a definition. A person could technically bite the bullet and claim b is knowledge. However, the entire point is to show that the definition leads us to accept conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, are false.

I think I can show why you could not accept b as knowledge under JTB. Smith got lucky; his JTB in b is only true by chance as his justification is disconnected from what actually makes b true. Smith is no different than someone with an unjustified true belief, in that they do have a true belief, but only luckily so. The difference between someone luckily obtaining true belief and Smith is that Smith actually has justification. Smith only has "knowledge" because he is lucky, but still meets the criteria for JTB. If the virtue of luck is enough to carry someone and make their beliefs count for knowledge, then someone with TB also ought to count for knowledge. If we accept that, then JTB is false because it collapses in on itself; one does not require justification for knowledge, only true belief. It's similar to the last statement you made.

It also seems absurd to claim that one cannot be justified by false beliefs. If Smith fakes their vehicle registration for a Ford, pays people to vouch for him about owning a Ford, picks me up in a Ford that he does not own, and shows me pictures on social media of him driving around in said Ford, then I am, by any normal means of the word, justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. The claims are all false- Smith fabricated everything- but I am justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. From the proposition "Smith owns a Ford," I can derive the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford." The justification from the first transfers over to the other.

I do recall saying that possession of a firearm for one's personal protection is a human right. In other words, it depends not on being a citizen of a particular state, having a particular status (non-grandparents do not have grandparents' rights), etc. In other words, it is a right that one has simply by being born human. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Should convicted violent criminals be able to acquire firearms for their personal protection? How about the mentally ill? How about minors?

Should I be able to acquire other weapons of war with no more restrictions than aquiring a handgun or rifle? In other words, if I find it necessary and can show that owning grenades could possibly save someone's life in defending themselves? Let's say that, if we never regulated hand grenades and allowed to public to buy them just like any sporting shotgun, one person per year since 1950 would be able to defend their life and their property that would not have been able to otherwise. However, as a result, the number of people who were killed by hand grenades since 1950 caused, on average, an additional 500 deaths per year. Is this grounds for heavily regulating hand grenades, even?

But if "you do not need to possess a gun, that's what the police are for" is going to be the spirit of reform, that is setting up the government for a lot of liability. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

But that's not the thrust of the anti-gun stance. Yes, a part of some pro-gun control argument is that, given the public protections offered by police officers, having firearms is not as vital towards your safety as they might have been in the past. However, anyone whose sane realizes the police will not always be there to protect you. The actual argument is that the evidence indicates that the current proliferation and use of firearms is not positive or nuetral. When, statistically speaking, more people get shot, commit suicide, and face other social ills like domestic disputes than guns are used to defend themselves, there is a problem. When owning a firearm makes you supposedly three times more likely to be killed by a firearm, it becomes hard to see why owning a firearm is a justifiable means of self defense that the state is obligated to protect. Even if we doubt the statistics the pro-gun control crowd use, I find it disingenuous to pretend that their argument amounts to "we don't need guns because we have cops."

So, on a scale of 1 to 10, how serious is this game in tone?

Okay, so collectively there will be greater safety.

Now what about an individual who, consequently, is killed or severely injured by a threat that he/she could have neutralized if the aforementioned gun control had not been enacted?

Is he/she collateral damage?

Collective public safety is greater than the safety of individuals?

We need honest answers to those kinds of questions before we can get any real traction on the issue. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I can easily imagine that there are individual situations that owning explosives could save someone's life- but we don't see that as a valid reason to allow everyone to have a grenade or a rocket launcher because the potential damage they can cause is so high that we accept the cost of those deaths that could have been saved. All decisions carry an opportunity cost. Money spent on the opioid problem is money that could have been spent saving lives elsewhere. Research into cancer is research that could have been spent looking to other diseases and medical problems. There is always a cost when it comes to social decisions. However, in this instance, I am not sure it really matters, because I can switch the inverse onto you.

People have a right to defend themselves, but this is just an extension of their right to life. Why do the lives of those who defended themselves with a gun count for more than those who died because of current gun laws? Consider an example. The following example is entirely hypothetical and in no way reflects actual statistics, and is merely meant to show a point:

Imagine that for every death that was prevented by a gun, 100 deaths occurred from current firearm policy from a combination of mass shooting and general gun violence. In total, 100 people are save by firearms, but 10,000 We can enact a different set of firearm policies- the new policy would save 10,000 lives in the upcoming year, but would prevent people from obtaining guns and, as such, would cause 100 to die.

Why do the lives of the 10,000 individuals count for less than that of the 100? You make it sound like the 100 individuals are being sacrificed for monetary gain or some indirect good, like one would do in some utilitarian calculus by speaking of social good and the public, but we are talking about individuals who are dying. Those 10,000 are people, too. Are the 10,000 just collateral damage for the 100? All else being equal- without consideration of rights or other uses- it makes semse to protect the right to life of 10,000 over the right to life of 100.

Well, I have never seen that point thoroughly, honestly evaluated, analyzed, debated, etc.

In the United States of America we are talking about a government that through murder and other violence removed the indigenous peoples from its part of North America, leaving only a small percentage of them alive, and continues this policy today.

People can argue that armed citizens have no chance militarily against a state with the military manpower and weapons like those of the United States, but "no longer makes sense in a modern context" is highly debatable.

I have never seen that debate happening, let alone in an honest manner. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I discussed this topic in another thread and you bringing up the indigenous population helps make my point. In one point in history, the disparity between what a civilian militia could bring to the table versus what the government could bring was relatively low. When the southern states seceeded from the US, the difference in terms of the power of each was there, but the South could feasibly hold off the North and could have won. Weaponry and capability between what the government can muster versus what the average person can muster is so great that it seems unlikely that someone could reasonably stand up against the state. If you had half the country rebel, similiar to the Civil War, then it begs the question of why you need guns when you can just get arms from the local military base.

This assumes an overt form of violence against the general populace is used. However, as history shows us, democracies tend not use overt violence against "normal" citizens. It becomes hard to stand for life, liberty, and the pursuit of hapiness when you attack the "average" person. Rather, the government uses a more covert form of oppression- you justify yourself and your actions by playing on people's fears and shifting public perception to see your actions as necessary or, at the very least, acceptable. No one- at least, the majority and those in power- cared about the natives and how they were treated as trash, so they effectively had no rights. Japanese Americans during WW2? Potential enemies. We had to intern them in camps. We were at war. So on and so forth.

The government can oppress those at the fringes of society and get away with it. That's not the question. The question is whether guns are going to help? The Native Americans? They tried violent resistance, and they lost outright. Japanese Americans during WW2? I can only see bloodshed and validating the fears of the public from an armed resistance. Blacks? John Brown and Nat Turner couldn't start a slave rebellion. Slavery was ended by a war and a vote to amend the Constitution. Even after the Civil War, whena group of black Republicans formed a militia to protect themselves, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment only applied to the federal government and the allowed the individual state to abolish the militia. I doubt the civil rights movement from then one would have done very well if it was an armed and violent movement.

I don't see it seriously discussed often because, well, it is not generally considered all too seriously. The government has already proven that it can take rights away- it just does so in the dark against people no one cares about. Firearms would either be counter-productive to small groups and would be irrelevant to anything approaching a civil war.

The right to self-defense is useless if one does not have the right to the means necessary to effectively defend him/herself from a threat. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I must be able to have military-level firearms, such as light machine guns and other full-auto firearms, because of the possibility of being attacked by multiple attackers wearing full body armor. The need for suppressing fire can help defend myself. Without said firearms, my right to self-defense is useless, as I do not have the means necessary to effectively defend myself from a potential threat. I also must be allowed to carry these weapons at all times (at least on state and public property, like public schools) because if I can't use them, then I can't effectively defend myself, making the right to self-defense useless. This applies even if I am a convicted violent felon, have been deemed mentally ill, or am a minor, as everyone has the right to self-defense.

Morally, the right to self-defense simply means that a person is, at all times, allowed to defend themselves from severe bodily harm, even if that defense involves lethal force. I am not morally wrong to kill someone in defense of my life and limb. Legally, self-defense is a just a legal defense to justify an action that is normally considered a crime, like killing someone or assualting someone. It does not mean that I must have access to an object that can greatly aid in my defense. A grenade can effectively defend me and might save my life in situations that a gun could not, but we do not see the need to legalize grenades.

It is not about "crime".

It is about the threat of being harmed immediately, or the process of presently be harmed. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

See above regarding self-defense. Part of your argument is an attack on the pro gun-ban position by mocking the idea that the police will adaquately defend everyone. I am saying that the reliance on police is not a needed premise of the pro-gun ban stance.

The argument for gun control does not mean that all guns must be illegal in society beyond special persons such as active duty police officers, security, and such. Nor does it mean that, even if one wants to ban guns, that the chief thrust of the argument for eliminating guns. The core of the argument is that 1) gun control, up to and including a ban of firearms, would reduce deaths, injuries, and increase social welfare, and 2) owning a firearm is not a right like free expression of ideals or freedom of religion. It is, at best, a civil right whose primary justification- arming a citizen's militia against the federal government- no longer makes sense in a modern context or is not strong enough to warrant the level of protection guns currently have in American society. If one wants to ban firearms, then one thinks the Second Amendment should be repealed somehow and that people, while having the right to self-defense, do not possess to the right to whatever weaponry they desire.

The police and their response to crime are ultimately irrelevant to the argument. The core of the argument is reduction in deaths per capita and the fact that owning a gun for either the purpose of either self-defense or defense against a tyrannical government are faulty.

I would assume by using force? What other way is there? Currently a quarter of Americans own guns, approximately 81 million people. The American military stands at about 1.5 million so even a tenth of those people protesting at different times around the country would be pretty alarming. The success of their revolution isn't really important, it's the causalities involved. Would the government be able to imprison or kill such a large amount of people to maintain power? How would that look to the rest of the world? What about those that aren't fighting? Wouldn't they scream out in horror making the oppressive governments control of power even harder to maintain? In this world of social media and cameras? No doubt they would probably lose the war. But at the very least America would have the people and enough guns to force the hand of their government. No other country could come close and would be easy to control in our current climate. — yatagarasu

Alright, let's go into detail of why this is scenario does not make sense.

In order for a government to function, it requires the de facto (matter of fact) consent of an overwhelming majority of its population. By de facto consent, I mean that one must, no matter how begrudgingly, accept the authority of the government. The laws and institutions that comprise the government must both be recognized as the legal authority of the land and its citizens must accept, to some degree, the basic legal authority of the government. One could find the government completely morally bankrupt at a conceptual level, but so long as one accepts the government as the law of the land and generally follow rules, you consent to the government. The part about not accepting the entire government's rules is rather important for two reasons. Everyone has a gripe with the government and certain laws, but respects the authority of said laws anyway. I do not think the electoral college should exist, as the entire system is screwy and seems to serve no purpose but to serve as an unnecessary fail-safe against the masses, but I accept when the president is elected to office, even if said president only won via the electoral college.

When one establishes oneself as a open, democratic society, it means that overt uses of unjustified violence are not approved of and risk losing de facto consent. Fear of violence only works on marginalized and socially dismissed sections of society. You cannot use overt violence in a democracy without some sort of justification that can stand to a basic degree of public scrutiny. The threat of an overt police state with North Korea levels of oppression is so minimal that if it ever reaches that point, the guns will not help much anyway.

So, we really have two options: overt violent authoritarian government who gains consent primarily through direct fear or subtle maniplulative government that gains consent through acceptance. If the government ever decided to become, say, a dictatorship and rule primarily through fear, they would cease to really care about public opinion. They would still have limits, but I doubt that North Korea really cares about how the outside world views it or how its citizens fear it, so long as they can gain general acceptance. At this point, armed resistance would have to engage in such asymmetric warfare that I doubt having a handgun that the government probably knows about anyway is going to help.

Much more likely, the government would simply normalize the oppression. It would not be obvious. It would most likely be years in the making and involve shifting public opinion, at least enough to make it accepted as just a part of life. You make the majority either agree with the oppression or accept the oppression as a valid mode of life. One of the potential upsides of a democracy is that power and paradigm shifts tend to produce less violence because the responsiblity is always ultimately placed on the population. This means that people are going to be more accepting of political victories and, more importantly, that governments have a legitimate reason to squash violent resistance. It becomes hard to justify your cause by shooting up an army base when you can just use democratic institutions to enact change. The government does not need to worry about human rights violations when the party in question is has a gun and is shooting at people.

So, either you have guns and are overwhelmed by a government that doesn't care, or the government would make anyone who rebelled with a gun appear as a criminal. If the population reached the point that no one cared if the government was oppressive, then you already lost, and no amount of rifles, shotguns, and handguns is going to change that. The best safeguard against tyranny is a system of checks and balances and a population that cares enough about rights that a government is worried to cross those boundaries. The amount of support a rebellion would require is about the same amount to vote someone else in.

Not many. That is why the founders of America were so ahead of the curve. Making sure those values stand the test of time and the test of authoritarian leaders is something they payed close attention to. Something other countries completely missed out on, either for not seeing the importance of it, or because they are corrupt. Lets be real, what government would want to make sure it's quest for power could be threatened by their citizens by establishing those laws? lol — yatagarasu

I don't want to go super in-depth in terms of history, but I tend to think the framers of the Constitution get more credit than they deserve. Some of them wanted a stronger federal government, but political realities prevented them from doing so (Hamilton had to play politics just to get people together to draft the Constitution). They put many measures in place that were barriers in-between elected officials and the people they represented (senators were not originally elected by the people directly and the Electoral College for the presidency). Hell, they didn't even protect your basic rights. The Bill of Rights was designed to limit the federal government and protect the states; it did not apply to the people themselves at the state and local level. The 2nd Amendment wasn't incorporated and guaranteed at the state level until the 21st century!

How would one realistically overthrow an oppressive government in the 21st century? Is the modern United States government really scared of a few people with firearms, given the immense power and scope of their military might? Why are we ignoring both the technological advances made with guns and the advances within the security of society from militias to modern police and emergency services? How many countries feel the need to have laws protecting guns in order to protect the population from the government?

Can someone define what exactly is meant by de-platforming? How exactly does it work? What justification can be given to de-platform racists while not de-platforming other groups?

In terms of the paradox, I'm not entirely sure that the paradox exists. First, I'm not sure that the extremes of rationality or irrationality required for the argument to work hold true. Some people are more prone to rationality in some areas of their life than others. Second, I don't see how de-platforming becomes irrelevant if people are rational; "you might find an argument stating on the Dark Web" doesn't seem like that strong of a position. Third, rational argument may be "best" for reasons other than pursuading opposition, which it seems to be operating as. I may use rational arguments in educational settings in order to shut down and redicule the absurdity of racist claims, for example, preventing the spead of ideas that way, making it "best" in my eyes.

Lastly, the paradox only potentially exists for specific subgroup of free speech advocates. Not everyone holds the two statements to be true. I can weaken the statement to, "I believe that de-platforming a racist position can cause a small but sizable number of people to garner sympathy and potential support and I also believe that rational arguments against racism is a good way of stopping the spread of these beliefs." With that, I'm not sure the paradox exists.

First, it's not. If it was, it would be only symbols with no words.

In C1, what does "because" translate to in formal logic? Does it signify a conjuction, like "and" does? Does it signify a conclusion, like "therefore" does?

But your missing the crucial detail: the "because" part is just an explanation of how and why Smith arrived at his belief "p v q." It's not the belief itself.

For example, I believe the government should legalize pot. Why? Because of various arguments I've seen for it. My belief is legalizing pot is the conclusion of arguments. But I still believe the proposition "the government should legalize pot."

Again, please write your proposition out in formal logic or explain how the word "because" functions in logic.

1. If P, then Q.
2. P.
Therefore,
3. Q

If I say, "I accept Q because of the argument is valid and sound," it is equivalent to saying "I believe Q is true." Q follows from the argument above.

Now, it is well worth mentioning here that nowhere in any of this(the above direct quotes from Gettier) is anything at all about Smith's believing Q — creativesoul

"Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f)."

Gettier literally just says that Smith accepts (g), (h), and (i) as true propositions. In other words, Smith believes they are true; Smith believes (g), (h), and (i). These propositions are Q in this quote:

S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction...

S is Smith. P is (f). Q is (g)/(h)/(i) (they all work). Gettier wants to emphasize that Smith's beliefs are all justified. Smith is justified in his beliefs and makes valid inferences from these beliefs towards different beliefs.

Smith believes C1. From C1, we know that Smith also believes C2: (p v q)- its the conclusion in Smith's internal argument, an argument indicated by "because" in C1. Smith's C1 is false because (p) is not true. However, Smith still believes C2- (p v q)- and is justified in that belief. And, it turns out, that (p v q) is true, as (q) is true. Smith has justified true belief, but he does not have knowledge.

The above quotation is about justification, not about the truth value of the statements. Smith doesn't say anything about Smith's beliefs as he is explaining Smith's justification because he already showed Smith's beliefs by saying Smith accepts (believes) the propositions (f) and (f)'s entailments: (g), (h), and (i).

Thanks. Fixed.

That's a quote from Gettier explaining why Smith believes (g), (h), and (i). Smith believes (f) and Smith recognizes (g), for example, is entailed by (f) and accepts (g) as true. Therefore, Smith believes (g) on the basis of (f). Therefore, Smith believes (g).

Put another way, Smith believes the P. Smith recognizes (P v Q) follows from P. Michael is correct: Gettier says that Smith believes (P v Q). And what does Gettier say is Smith's reasoning for his belief? Smith believes P and recognizes (P v Q) is entailed by belief in P.

"Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f)."

(P v Q) is the conclusion to an argument. "Because" operates the same as "therefore." Smith believes (P v Q). Why? Because P and the rule of addition.

But Smith believes (P v Q) as a proposition.

I believe I am not adopted. Is this a belief? Do I believe the proposition "I am not adopted?"

I hate to ask this, but this symbol "∵" means therefore, correct? I thought the triangle was inverted. Or is that simply to seperate the two propositions?

You arrive at true belief. The justification aspect is not a current concern of mine. — creativesoul

Am I justified in P and can I use my justification in P and basic rules of logic to arrive at (P v Q). I am justified in believing (P v Q). I do not care about the actual truth values of these various propositions. I currently only care whether I would be justified in (P v Q).

(p v q) is true because (p) — creativesoul

You still haven't explained what this proposition in formal logic. What does "because" translate as?

Let's change P: I am not adopted.

I think I am fairly justified in this belief. No one said anything, I look like a bit like my father, and such.

Let's change Q: Michael lives in New York City.

I have no idea whether this is true or not. I suspend judgement. I can't be justified in believing Q.

Now, we look at (P v Q).

I am justified in believing (P v Q) is true on account of my justification in P.

Is this correct?

Ready?

P: My username is Chany.

I think I'm pretty justified in believing P is true.

Q: There are currently 300 billion flying pigs on the earth.

I think I'm pretty sure this is false.

P v Q.

I arrive at this by the addition rule of logic. I am justified in believing it is true. I believe it is true. It has to be, because P is true. If I were taking a test and I was asked, "is (P v Q) true or false," I'd answer true and be absolutely correct.

Is this wrong in any way?

(p v q) is true because (p) is true — creativesoul

Could you write this out in formal logic, or, at least, explain what it is the formal relationship between the two propositions: [(p v q) is true] and [(p) is true]?

You are correct that is what Smith believes. But why does that mean the Gettier case is wrong? Smith does not need to believe q or use q as a point of inference to arrive at (p v q). The propostion q can be anything that is not ~p. It can even be something Smith does not really have any opinion on. All Smith needs to be justified in believing (p v q). And if Smith is justified in believing p is true, then, by extension, he is justified believing (p v q) is true, as only one of the propositions in a disjunction is required for it to be true.

In this case, Smith is justified in p and believes p. By extension, he is justified in believing (p v q) is true, though Smith is indifferent to q's truth value or thinks q is false (he might even be justified in believing q). Therefore, Smith is justified in believing (p v q).

Smith has justified belief in (p v q). He is two thirds the way there.

It turns out (p v q) is true, but not because p; p is false and q is true. Smith has a justified false belief that p, so he is still justified in (p v q). It's just that his grounds for justification are false. However, q is true. Therefore, Smith believes a true proposition (p v q) and is justified in believing (p v q). Therefore, Smith has knowledge under the traditional account of knowledge: he has justified, true belief. But this seems wrong. Smith does not have knowledge of (p v q). Therefore, the traditional account fails.

Let me take a stab at this. Be warned I did not read the entire thread (I'm not reading through multiple lines of thought and arguments about philosophy just to reach this point):

I am on the jury of the trial of Mr. X. Mr. X Is accused of killing Bob. I sit in the courtroom and see all the evidence. Everything points to Mr. X- he has no alibi, he was seen in the area during the murder, he owns the murder weapon, and all the forensic evidence indicates he killed Bob. He has a motive and multiple witnesses confirm his motive and the other facts surrounding the case.

Would you say I am justified in believing Mr. X committed the murder and killed Bob?

So the consequentialist answer to this question, is it moral to have hobbies, is really context-dependent. It's basically what Parfit would have called "blameless wrongdoing". — darthbarracuda

The issue is that, given the way calculating consequentialists (such as utilitarians) evaluate the cost-benefit analysis, there appears to be a lot of context specific reasons to believe giving a lot more to charity. If you are literally saving people's lives, the loss of utility from losing the hobbies is negligible to the positives gained through the charity donations. If you are literally saving people's lives with your donations, then the pendulum swings clearly against hobbies. In fact, it can be argued that your morally obligated to give in much the same way a person is morally obligated to save a drowning child, even if the person gets their clothes ruined. When the choice is between the vinyl collection and people's lives and you pick the vinyl collection, then it becomes hard to say it was not the immoral choice.

Everything happens for a reason. Say what you will about it, but it is what it is. — Nils Loc

That reminds me: people who say cliche lines right out of a book in response to negative situations. Bonus points if you just opened up to them or asked them for personal advice.

Oh boy, do I got a long list.

To name a few:

Being interrupted in certain situations. If I'm having a casual conversation with friends, it doesn't really bother me as much. In other scenarios, however, it pisses me off. In some cases, I will wait five minutes to say something and let others talk. I give a second to pause, then I start saying my piece. Second or third syllable in, someone continues on with their conversation as if it wasn't obvious I was talking. Apparently, it is okay when I have to wait a minute to speak, but it is not okay when they have to wait. It really bothers me, especially when it occurs multiple times in a row.

People who are extremely dismissive of intellectuals as being this elite and snobbish class.

People (including some popular philosophers) who think they are being clever with some special insight no one thought of before that everyone has thought of before. Bonus points if its a wordplay type "insight".

Optimistic, happy extroverts who are pushy. You happy and positive. I get it. Now get away from me.

Determinists still believe one makes choices and decisions, they just don't believe the ultimate outcome could have been otherwise.

I don't really get what is so contradictory about saying "determinism is true" and "we ought to do X", as there is no contradiction here.