As an American I believe this observation is only true of less than half of the half of the population who bother to vote. :mask:The US is a very stupid country, you see. Or, better, extremely ignorant and desperate. — Mikie
:100: Yes, a being (even a nonbeing à la Meinong's "sosein") is whatever is not nothing.A being is anything at all. It can also mean exclusively sentient beings. The latter is not what’s used in ontology, whether Aristotle or Heidegger. Trees rocks and ideas are all beings. — Mikie
No. The "belief" implies that "immaterial data" is indefinite or without sufficiently definite parameters with respect to material data, thereby, in effect, comparing apples & oranges (or facts & dreams). I think both conservation laws and the principle of causal closure, however, imply that only material entities can have causal relationships with material entities. Btw, isn't "immaterial thing" an oxymoron? :smirk:Doesn't the {belief that eliminating immaterial data decreases a model's error} imply that immaterial things have no causal relationship with material things? — Lionino
I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.Regardless of your personal position, would you argue that a moral naturalist would find the science of morality useless? — Mark S
I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.I prefer morality for interactions with other people defined by a kind of rule consequentialism with the moral consequence being a version of happiness or flourishing and the moral rule being Morality as Cooperation. So the science of morality is not just helpful, it is critical to my moral philosophy. Would you claim I am being illogical?
All "science" says, so to speak, is that 'h. sapiens are a eusocial species with prolonged childhood development for intergenerationally acquiring homeostasis-maintaining skills (from natal, empathy-based social relations, not unlike all other primates and many higher mammal species which also care for their offspring so that they survive long enough to reproduce)'. The parenthetical part is a philosophical reflection, not mere empirical data, and thus significant for our moral reasoning.Are science’s explanations of why versions of the Golden Rule exist, are found in all well-functioning cultures, and are commonly described as summarizing morality of no interest to you?
I did not claim or imply this.↪180 Proof indicates his prejudicial opinion that there can be nothing outside of space-time. {how do he know?} — Gnomon
Well, I got the date right but the decision wrong: (maga-wingnut) SCOTUS is in the effing tank for (former) SCROTUS aka "Insurrectionist/Criminal Defendant/Fraudster/Rapist/Loser-1" ... making up stoopid ahistorical-ad hoc shit (like they did to overturn Roe v. Wade i.e. to jackboot curbstomp 'stare decisis') in order to further accelerate the bananafication of the US Republic.By March/April, SCOTUS will uphold the "states' rights" to individually decide whether or not to disqualify Insurrectionist/Criminal-Defendent/Rapist-Defamer/Fraudster-1 from appearing on the 2024 federal election ballot pursuant to the 14th Amendment, Sec. 3 (Insurrection Clause) of the US Consitution. — 180 Proof
Given that morality is an aspect of philosophy (i.e. ethics), a scientific "understanding of morality" seems, IMO, as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds.Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought tobe. — Mark S
:fire:What is hateful [harmful] to you, do not do to anyone. — Hillel the Elder, 1st century BCE
I.e. mere possibilia :smirk:possibilities that go beyond space-time — Gnomon
:up:↪180 Proof is much more knowledgeable of Philosophy than I am.
So then why do you think this "exercise" has any relevance to moral philosophy?— a[n] exercise entirely in the domain of science. — Mark S
Anthropological and developmental evidences suggest you've put the cart before the horse, Mark. For example, the so-called "moral sense" in human toddlers and many nonhuman animals is expressed as strong preferences for fairness and empathy towards individuals both of their own species and cross-species ... prior to / independent of formulating or following any "cooperation strategies".I said the existence of cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explainable as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S
:monkey:the myth of h. Sapiens being ‘just another species’. — Wayfarer
Agreed – a "different kind" of species that fetishizes its imaginary differences which do not make an existential difference – "h. sapiens" is, no matter the ontological stories we flatter our fleeting smallness with, fundamentally inseparable from nature like all other natural species.We’re of a different kind.
C'mon, Wayf, that's our limitation, not the dog's. :smirk:Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog. — Wayfarer
"Physical phenomena" and "the nature of reality" are tangental at best, different categories of being; IMO, it is fallacious to mistake them for one another. As I discern the topic, "physical phenomena" are real (i.e. very strongly correlative) only insofar as they comprise a 'way of talking about reality' (e.g. physicalism) and as such it is reasonable to surmise that "the nature of reality" includes (among whatever else) affordances for a 'way of talking about reality that is defeasible, fallibilistic and highly mathematically precise. In other words, QM is "fundamental" physics, not fundamental ontology (i.e. metaphysics à la Spinoza ... or Q. Meillassoux).You don't see the philosophical relevance attaching to physical phenomena raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality? — ucarr
"Not guilty!" like rasta bredren seh. :victory: :mask:You, 180 Proof -- a science-savvy commentator -- in seeking to distance TPF from science ...
It is like any self-organizing (i.e. emergent) whole system is more than its constituent parts (i.e. nested patterns of functional nodes, relationships & structural-environmental constraints). Based on overwhelmingly extant physical evidence, every mind(ing) is embodied in an ecologically situated, or conditioned, brain; other than subjective anecdotes (corroborated only in folk psychological / spiritual terms & customs), there is not any publicly demonstrable contrary evidence of (e.g.) 'disembodied cognition' or 'nonphysical minds'. Also, assuming that 'mind-body duality' is incoherent for some reasons discussed in this old post ...Is the mind more than the physical brain? — Corvus
No.Is this the end of physicalism?
On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts:Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity. — ucarr
We have no way of knowing what it feels like not to be alive – especially, whether 'not existing' is better than existing. It's as simple as that. Besides, suppose each of us only comes into existence in order to escape, as a brief respite, from (e.g. timeless torments of)...to the suicidal the grass is always greener on the other side of the abyss...
Philosophy might be "an art" insofar as it creates (i.e. imagines), as Janus says, "novels ways of" clarifying, interpreting, reformulating, evaluating and problematizing givens (which are either conceptual, perceptual or practical); if so, then the Philosophy of Art in "novel ways" ... problematizes as givens: artworks, making art, evaluating art and aesthetic responses to both artifacts & nature. For me, their respective aims differ, however: most distinctively, Philosophy attempts to clarify life's limits via 'thought-experiments' (aporia) of distinctions, connections, hierarchies ... whereas Art attempts to mystify – intensify – 'feeling alive' via 'representative examples' (idealizations) of craft, performance or participation.Someone claimed philosophy is art
[ ... ] If that's the case, though, what is the Philosophy of Art? — Ciceronianus
Really e.g. ... Plato?Philosophers aren't artists, and when they try to be, they fail, miserably I think.
:up: :up:For me the purpose of the arts is the creation of novel ways of seeing, hearing, feeling and thinking. The 'novel' part is where the creative imagination comes into play. — Janus
i.e. communicating (à la synchronizing), no?Language is not about sharing information so much as coordinating behaviour. — Banno
:brow: Yes disgracefully so.And it will continue indefinitely. With US support. — Mikie
:mask: ... even though the world has moved on, long covid still has me by the throat:Covid-19, probably a long-hauler (c4 months so far), with chronic fatigue and brain fog and minor respiratory issues ... — 180 Proof
I don't see why we would need – why it would be useful – to do that.OK, let's suppose we develop sentient AI. Do we then have to reevaluate sentience for all the computing devices we didn't think were sentient? — RogueAI
I'd gladly trade this 'glitchy' 60 year old husk for my peak healthy-fittest 25 year old body :strong: but only if my 60 years of memories, learning, understanding (i.e. maturity) remained. Granted that "wish", I'd relocate to a much more remote, physically challenging environment in a country in the global south where the hazards of climate change are, and will be for the foreseeable future, minimal. Such places, however, are no countries for old bourgeois men or women ... :fear:I wouldn't want to be 30. — Pantagruel
What do you mean by "sentient" & "mind of its own"? Do you believe these properties are attributes of human beings? If so, why do you believe this? And, assuming it's possible, would these properties be functionally identical instantiated in an AI-system as they are embodied in a human? Why or why not?Is it in principle possible or impossible that some future AI might be sentient or have a mind of its own? — flannel jesus