You are my example. :zip:

Of course, science cannot address non-scientific topics (and vice versa).

Thanks for proving my point that you have no idea what you are talking about, Pantagruel. :clap:

:sweat: Gotcha, it's so basic or fundamental to science that you can't provide a single example.

That's not my understanding of scientific practice. Science certainly does not "study itself". Again, you got examples? There must be countless many if, as say, "it's the basis of science".

Is a dualist ontology more than a misattributed dualist epistemology? — Fooloso4

I don't think so. :up:

Science is a process of selective limitation. — Pantagruel

Please clarify. Examples would be helpful.

180's approach to philosophy is dialectical. A mode of inquiry. It is antithetical to doctrines. It asks questions but a doctrinaire approach is based on the assumption that answers to these questions have been given. There may be some common ground here in undecidable. Socratic (but not Hegelian) dialectic is an examination of opinions ... — Fooloso4

Thank you for pointing this out. @FrancisRay is like too many others who traffic in "doctrines" and dogmas and take offense when someone attempts to cross-examine their so-called "truths". So now @universeness is taking a different approach but I suspect he won't get anywhere philosophically interesting with FrancisRay either because there is no there there – just :sparkle:

:up: :up:

... why disturb my peace? — FrancisRay

This is what thinkers, particularly philosophers, do, Francis: we disturb the peace (i.e. smug givens, unexamined assumptions, etc). You're right, though, I am "not interested" in unwarranted, or dogmaric, beliefs; I prefer to dialectically discuss speculative ideas. Go vegitate in an ashram if philosophizing disturbs you.

[A]ll organisms are reactive creatures. The physical world and the cosmos are causes to all organisms. The reactions of those organisms is in turn cause to the physical world, and the cosmos. It's all one system. Emotions more than thought, hardwire in the organism's measures and meanings of all things relative to the given organism. Our emotions are about the physical world relative to our security and well-being. Thoughts and feelings alter continuously the chemistries of our body relative to the organisms experiences. Organism is the source of all meanings through experience and projection [expectation, belief] applies its meanings and emotions to what it then calls its apparent reality. — boagie

:up: Well said.

Reminds me mostly of the ataraxia teachings of Epicureans and Stoics (which, no doubt, influenced Montaigne, Spinoza, et al).

Psychology wants to treat the thoughts and feelings of the individual, focusing entirely on the organism's thoughts and feelings, and little to nothing about how the physical world plays the organism like a violin. The tunes it plays can be life supporting or negative, undermining the vitality of life.

:up: :up:

Yes, I call this homuncular psychology "The Cartesian Fallacy". In contrast, Nietzsche (& Merleau-Ponty), for instance, focus on the interplay of the body and culture.

It is EXACTLY 180proof's attitude that resulted in the first T election. — AmadeusD

:rofl:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/855739

Do you not want to investigate further? — FrancisRay

:roll:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/859880

You say "Perennial Philosophy" explains but you do not give (or summarize) the explanation. You also say it "predicts"; but in the absence of any intelligible explanation, your "predictions" are just unwarranted claims (i.e. just-so stories). I'd hoped you would have answered both of my questions; apparently, however, New Age talking points is all I'm going to get. :yawn:

One has to prove God does not exist in order to prove that He did not create the universe, doesn't that follow? — FreeEmotion

Only semantically. :roll: Rather, we only have to show by the preponderance of the evidence that the universe observed is just as predicted by theory without a "creator". Deep time, deep space, initial conditions of low entropy, nucleogenesis, accelerating cosmic expansion, etc are features of cosmic self-organization which is, of course, inconsistent with "creation by divine fiat". There is no evidence of a "creator" and yet there must be (some) manifest in the observable physical universe iff the observable physical universe was "created". Also, "goddidit" doesn't explain anything. As Laplace told Napoleon when the Emperor had asked about "God":

Je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là.

:fire:

A cold girl'll kill you
In a
darkened
room

"Cars Hiss By My Window" (4:10)
LA Woman, 1971
The Doors

b. 8Dec43

When I hold you in my arms (ooh, oh, yeah)
And I feel my finger on your trigger (ooh, oh, yeah)
I know nobody can do me no harm (ooh, oh, yeah)
Because ...

"Happiness is a Warm Gun" (2:43)
The Beatles, 1968
The Beatles

d. 8Dec80

If you mean the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy, as found in advaita Vedanta, Middle Way Buddhism and Lao Tzu's Taoism then I'd happily and confidently bet my life on its truth.and on the inability of scientists and philosophers to falsify it. — FrancisRay

i. What 'facts of the matter' do "the nondual doctrine of the Perennial Philosophy" explain?

ii. What 'predictions' can be derived from this "Perennial" explanation which can be experimentally falsified?

:up:
:100:

Denny Laine d. 2023

"Mull of Kintyre" (4:45)
A-side single, 1977
writers Paul McCartney & Denny Laine
performers Wings

:up:
:up:

Confusion =/= perplexity. 'Clarity of the latter' (inquiry) is not the same as 'more of the former' (word salad). :roll:

Anyway, I recommend reading Parts III & IV of Spinoza's Ethics for a philosophical examination on "emotions, feelings, passions" etc.

On the contrary, Jack, I make a distinction between philosophical questions and non-philosophical observations such as you've made. I find your OP confused is all and I'd like some clarity. My own references to Spinoza et al shows that I find psychology a worthy topic in philosophy (and vice versa); you just haven't yet raised a philosophical question about any psychological concept.

I guess one way in which I could phrase a specific question would be what are emotions made of?
— Jack Cummins

They aren't made of anything. In the sense that walking isn't made of legs. — fdrake

:up:

You've made some 'empirical observations' but still have not yet raised a philosophical question as far as I can tell.

I've noticed is that there is almost no reference to 'emotions' in classical texts, whereas there are very frequent references to 'the passions'. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is what a modern such as Spinoza means by affects – 'passions', or passive reaction – which is the focus in two sections of his Ethics: III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects and IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects. No doubt he was influenced by the Stoics (as well as the Epicurus). Antonio Damasio's neuroscience research surveys and largely corroborates much of Spinoza's speculations on "emotions" in the book Looking for Spinoza (2003).

Context.

Please be more precise: what is (your) philosophical question – perplexity – about "emotions"?

No "cool kids" here, just thinkers and blinkers.

I don’t know how to interpret this any other way ... — Bob Ross

Okay.

... could you please elaborate?

Elaborate on what?

For example, you say ‘species' defects function as moral facts’: wouldn’t it be accurate to then say that concerns about species’ defects [of natural beings] are equivalent to morality?

No.

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; ...

Okay.

... so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting?

Sorry my precis isn't clear enough, Bob; but I don't get anything out of spoon-feeding you (or @AmadeusD) further. FWIW, I'll refer you again to 'the influences' on my moral naturalism:

Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, C. Rosset, A. Murray, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, O. Flanagan, P. Foot et al — 180 Proof

I cannot keep up with you.
— tim wood
No doubt — 180 Proof

:up:

I cannot keep up with you. — tim wood

No doubt.

Educate yourself.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/856307

addendum:

Neither anti-Jewish nor anti-Israel, like (e.g.) R. Luxemburg, S. Freud, A. Einstein, E. Fromm, P. Levi Marek Edelman, I. Asimov, H. Arendt, I.F. Stone, N. Chomsky, H. Siegman, M. Lerner, R. Falk, T. Judt et al, I am also anti-zionist (i.e. anti-ethnonationalist).

So what have I written in my previous post is historically incorrect or worse? You make a few unwarranted assumptions about my rather conventional observations as well as me personally, tim, which reeks of special pleading and gassy ad hominems. :mask:

from 2021
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/650650

from 2021
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/650398

7 days ago
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/856307

addendum:

Neither anti-Jewish nor anti-Israel, like (e.g.) R. Luxemburg, S. Freud, A. Einstein, E. Fromm, P. Levi Marek Edelman, I. Asimov, H. Arendt, I.F. Stone, N. Chomsky, H. Siegman, M. Lerner, R. Falk, T. Judt et al, I am also anti-zionist (i.e. anti-ethnonationalist).

[deleted]

I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond! — Bob Ross

:up:

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are advocating that “concerns ...[about] species’ defects … of natural beings” is equivalent to moral concern/judgment because such concerns (about species’ defects) provide compelling reasons (“independent of that rule” which was formulated from them) for doing or not doing specific actions: am I on the right track here?

I do not recognize what I argued here in your 'paraphrase' above, so my guess is that you're not on the right track.

In short: I am not seeing how natural analysis about species’ defects contains within it any statements which indicate ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘correspond to reality [such that...]’.

I don't see this either, which is why I did not make such an argument. If you're interested, Bob, go back and re-read the second paragraph (4 points), and then the parenthetical note on 'following a rule', and lastly the Derek Parfit quotation.

:up:

as one united species — universeness

'A counterfactual ideal projection' for which, like "God" or utopia/paradise, there aren't – never have been – any compelling grounds to believe or expect. 'Your Roddenberryesque fantasy' is, my friend, "incorrigible" – even, I'm sad to say, religious. You seem to forget: we are primates, not ants or angels. :mask:

I am not saying that the thoughts and fables of the ancients have no value, but I am saying that they are not good enough to form the basis of our moral codes or human rights or global constitution or prime directives, in our spacefaring future as one united species. — universeness

:up: :up:

Historically, IMHO, it's been a hallmark of realpolitik conservativism (e.g. neoliberalism) to support oppressive regimes and repressive policies in the name of geopolitical "stability" and/or economic exploitation – the caste / class status quo. Thus, as an example, for over a half century the US-NATO hegemon militarily and economically has supported the zionism-über alles, settler-ethnic cleansing ("lebensraum"), apatheid state of Israel. Both Jewish and Palestinian religious extremists – US-backed "Likud" & Iran/"Likud"-backed "Hamas", respectively – are far more invested in maintaining this internecine status quo than in any progressive alternative.

Call me Derek. — Tom Storm

Me three.

If "consciousness" is semantic nonsense, — Lionino

... is not my statement.

If you say so.

I'm saying that philosophy cannot solve a scientific problem because the latter concerns 'simulating some specifiable facts of the matter' whereas the former concerns 'interpreting concepts'. The folk concept "consciousness" has yet to be demonstrated to correspond to a specifiable fact of the matter, so prematurely declaring (how "consciousness" emerges?) "is a hard problem" is only semantic nonsense.

Born, raised & educated in NYC, I currently live in the Portland, Oregon metro area, USA.

(Formerly of Atlanta, Georgia and Chandler, Arizona and St. Paul, Minnesota in the last thirty years. If I ever relocate again, I hope I land somewhere in British Columbia, Canada.)

A moral realist who doesn't accept ordinary language philosophy will offer a different argument. — Michael

:up:

:up: :up:

I prefer moral naturalism to "moral realism", Bob, because the latter concerns 'the meaning of moral statements about states-of-affairs' (semantics) whereas the former (a subset or kind of moral realism) more precisely concerns, in effect, 'defeasible reasons for moral statements about natural beings' (pragmatics). These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective. No doubt just as one can use mathematics or chemistry subjectively, one can also use 'moral statements about natural beings' subjectively; however, such unwarranted subjectivization (or relativization) tends to be incoherent and vacuous.

Anyway, simply put: (1) it is a fact of the matter that every natural being is inseparable from the natural world; (2) natural beings capable of normativity require reasons (i.e. facts/evidence-based claims) for doing things as a rule and for not doings as a rule; (3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ – take care of³ – (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.

(NB: A rule itself does not compel compliance, however; 'following a rule' is usually a habit acquired through practice for which, at best, there is a compelling reason independent of that rule.)

We can have reasons to believe something, to do something, to have some desire or aim, and to have many other attitudes and emotions, such as fear, regret, and hope. Reasons are given by facts, such as the fact that someone's finger-prints are on some gun, or that calling an ambulance would save someone's life. It is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the phrase 'a reason' means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But 'counts in favour of' means roughly 'gives a reason for'. The concept of a reason is best explained by example. One example is the thought that we always have a reason to want to avoid being in agony. — Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1

re: Some of h. sapiens' defects (which are self-evident as per e.g. P. Foot, M. Nussbaum): vulnerabilities to

- deprivation (of e.g. sustanence, shelter, sleep, touch, esteem, care, health, hygiene, trust, safety, etc)

- dysfunction (i.e. injury, ill-health, disability)

- helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, or fear-terror of being vulnerable)

- stupidity (i.e. maladaptive habits (e.g. mimetic violence, lose-lose preferences, etc))

- betrayal (i.e. trust-hazards)

- bereavement (i.e. losing loved ones & close friends), etc ...

... in effect, any involuntary decrease, irreparable loss or final elimination of human agency.

This sketch (influenced by Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, C. Rosset, A. Murray, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, O. Flanagan, P. Foot et al) supports only one type of 'moral realism', Bob, and rejects error theory / moral nihilism (etc) as well as all forms of moral supernaturalism (e.g. divine command theory).