• A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    IIRC, either Pythagoras or Plato has a stronger claim than Berkeley to being "the father of idealism in general" (in the western philosophical tradition). As for "misreading" what you actually wrote, Bob, I don't think so. And your attempt to clarify doesn't help.

    So, leaving aside Berkeley, you're not a Leibnizian? not a Kantian? not a Hegelian? ... but rather, an 'idealist' in the vein of Gabriel Markus? or Donald Hoffman? or Bernardo Kastrup? ...
  • God, as Experienced, and as Metaphysical Speculation
    ... another comment that made me think that the poster had not read anything in my essay [my entire, overly long, OP].Brendan Golledge
    :up:

    In a similar sense as @FrancisRay's question: How can we know that what we "experience as God" is in fact "God" (especially if "God" is not one discrete fact among all other facts)?
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    I can't follow your inconsistencies, Bob.
    I do not think that 'being' unfolds from a mind, as that mind would be 'non-being' then, which makes no sense to me.Bob Ross
    Mind is non-being?

    Instead, there exists, fundamentally, one mind (at-large) of which we are minds within it.
    Ergo, "mind (at-large)" is being?

    This is what I think objective idealist theories tend to purport, but of course there are theistic accounts that posit God as some sort of producer of even existence itself.
    This account reminds me of Berkeley's subjective idealism (or Leibniz's monadology).
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    I think both are distinctions without explanatory or ontologucal differences. The link provided, IMO, renders each functionally redundant in the 'cosmological picture' under consideration.
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    :chin: In other words,
    'the universe' is like a Möbius loop – an eternal cycle – wherein the topological 'twist' (ouroboros-like) corresponds to big bangs/big crunches (or white holes/black holes) Q-tunneling between bi-polar (i.e. positive-to-negative / matter-to-antimatter), quantum gravity manifolds consisting of strange-looping (or fractal-like) configurations (entropy gradients) of variable mass-energy densities ...
    Okay, as far as it goes; but it seems to me that Occam's Razor dispenses with ad hoc – unwarranted – notions like "panpsychism" and "super-nature" .

    @universeness
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    :100:

    Well, (your) mind is nonmind-dependent unless solipsism obtains (which, of course, it does not).
    —180 Proof

    I don’t believe that is true at all.
    Bob Ross
    Okay.

    All that is required for idealism ... is that existence itself is mind-independent
    A typo – don't you mean "mind-dependent" instead?

    ... not that there exists any mind-independent entities within it.
    Non sequitur

    ... idealism (and solipsism I might add: not that they are similar at all) ...
    I didn't imply or state that they were.
  • To be an atheist, but not a materialist, is completely reasonable
    completely reasonableBret Bernhoft
    Clarify what you mean by "reasonable" in this context. Thanks.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    It seems to me you both make valid points. I don't bother engaging directly with NOS4A2, I just ridicule his nonsense by linking him to posts wherein I update the latest facts – nails in the proverbial coffin – damning RICO-defendant1 & other MAGA morons. I rub NOS' denial in his cult's shitstorm which has been for years my way of both dismissing his self-deceiving bs and countering it. You're right, Clark, we don't have to waste time arguing with incorrigible – disingenuous – Trumpster idiocy but, like @Benkei, I don't leave that noise unchecked, using it/NOS like a rhetorical piñata whenever it suits me. :smirk:
  • Žižek as Philosopher
    And so on and so on ...

    "Post-subjective anti-capitalism" :eyes:

    I WOULD PREFER NOT TO.

    :sweat:
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    You aren't the only one here being stupid, but you are the worst offenderToothyMaw
    Your vacuous projection is duely noted.
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    No. I have strong affinities for Spinoza's dual-aspect ontology (though pragmatically I prefer property dualism) and so l'm neither a neutral monist nor a Kantian empiricist.
  • Public Displays of Mourning
    Why do you think this happens?Vera Mont
    For some, I think it's a proxy for grief in their personal lives, just like it can be easier to talk to strangers about personal troubles.

    Is it confined to a related group of cultures or is it world-wide?
    I don't know, but I suspect it's more wide-spead than not.

    Do you do this yourself - follow the procession on screen, or leave flowers and messages at the site?
    Nope.

    What do you think about the practice?
    I haven't given it much thought.

    How do you feel about it?
    Nothing expect I hope it's cathartic or helps those who need such public rituals.
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    Well, (your) mind is nonmind-dependent unless solipsism obtains (which, of course, it does not).
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    "Stand back and standby!" :point: 22 years for Seditious Conspiracy, etc.

    https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/sep/05/enrique-tarrio-proud-boys-sentenced-jan-6-attack

    Jack Smith's coming for you, Seditionist-1. 4March24 – "Be there. Will be wild!". :lol:
  • God, as Experienced, and as Metaphysical Speculation
    In a similar sense as @FrancisRay's question: how can we know that what we "experience as God" is in fact "God" (especially if "God" is not one discrete fact among all other facts)?
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    How is this not property dualism?Bob Ross
    Dual-aspect monism is ontological whereas property dualism is epistemological; I prefer the latter but I think it's more precise to characterize Spinoza by the former.

    Are you, then, a necessitarian?
    Spinoza certainly is. I'm a compatibilist and contingentarian.
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    Since I seem to be misrepresenting you, let me just ask for clarification: are you claiming that these promises are moral facts because (1) they are mind-independent (as biologically embedded into us as organisms) and (2) also obligations? Is that the idea?Bob Ross
    Yes, more or less ...

    In any group of sufferers, suffering engenders an implicit promise to reduce each other's suffering as much as possible; this implicit promise is a fact (i.e. human eusociality) and it is moral (i.e. optimizing human well-being) because it constitutes participation in soliciting help and being solicited to help reduce suffering.
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    So I am failing to see how I misrepresented you ...Bob Ross
    Well, your quote cherry-picks its emphasis (indicative of uncharitably reading me out of context again) by missing / ignoring the following...

    To suffer is also to desire help to reduce my suffering; but there are only other sufferers who can offer, and effectuate, (some) help. This desire, or need, for help, however, implicitly promises to help others to reduce their suffering. This promise is natally prior to reciprocity, contract, cooperation, etc; it's implicit, fundamental, and inheres in each of us being individual members of the same species with the same functional defects (re: physical & psychological homeostasis) which if neglected or harmed render an individual dysfunctioning or worse [...]180 Proof

    In this eusocial-existential context, the fact of suffering is not 'value-free' – it's the disvalue – and therefore Hume's guillotine does not obtain; thus, again I refer you to the following article on "promises" with my stated reasoning on moral facts* in mind:

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/

    *à la ecological facts & medical facts
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    I am misunderstanding what 'dual-aspect' means in your use of 'monism'.Bob Ross
    From my study of Spinoza, by "dual-aspect" I understand there to be (at least) two complementary ways to attribute predicates – physical & mental – to any entity which exhaustively describes its functioning.

    What is modal-ontological determinism?
    This is my shorthand for Spinoza's description of substance (i.e. natura naturans) that, among other things, consists in necessary causal relations and is unbounded (i.e. not an effect of or affected by any external causes – other substances – because it is infinite in extent).
  • To be an atheist, but not a materialist, is completely reasonable
    I prefer more descriptive terms like e.g. immaterial or disembodied or nonphysical or spiritual or magical ... to the umbrella term "supernatural".

    Btw, back in the day, my atheism had preceded my naturalism.
  • A question for Christians
    It seems clear to me that Jesus has anticipated the self-defense/just-war question: What if someone attacks me? Do not resist evil ... I don't know how you can read Jesus's teachings as anything other than total pacifism.RogueAI
    :100: :mask:
  • TPF Quote Cabinet
    'Spirit' comes from the Latin word 'to breathe.' What we breathe is air, which is certainly matter, however thin. Despite usage to the contrary, there is no necessary implication in the word 'spiritual' that we are talking of anything other than matter (including the matter of which the brain is made), or anything outside the realm of science. On occasion, I will feel free to use the word. Science is not only compatible with spirituality; it is a profound source of spirituality. When we recognize our place in an immensity of light-years and in the passage of ages, when we grasp the intricacy, beauty, and subtlety of life, then that soaring feeling, that sense of elation and humility combined, is surely spiritual. So are our emotions in the presence of great art or music or literature, or of acts of exemplary selfless courage such as those of Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr. The notion that science and spirituality are somehow mutually exclusive does a disservice to both. — Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    You take my usage of promise out of context and then object rather than engaging with what I've actually written. For example, there's nothing about saying "I promise", which you quarrel with tendentiously. Show me how my actual reasoning goes wrong (and the addenda too which follows in the rest of the post), sir, if you are interested in discussing these matters and not just scoring points shadowboxing with strawmen. Again for your reconsideration:

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    By ‘panpsychism’, are you referring to idealism? If so, then I think Spinoza can very easily be interpreted as an idealist.Bob Ross
    I do not see how Spinozism (i.e. dual-aspect monism + modal-ontological determinism) is consistent with panpsychism / idealism.

    I would like to hear more about your irreductivist approach to explanation.
    I've no idea to what you are referring or how the above is relevant to anything I've stated.

    ... could you elaborate on your theory of explanation here?
    I've not alluded to any "theory of explanation". Interpretively describing higher-order concepts or theoretical (or formal) discourses is what we/I do when we/I philosophize; I've not endeavored to "explain" anything.
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    My point is trying to examine whether self-organizing systems, accountable for self-organizing complexity, possess purpose. Are they instead automatons?ucarr
    No. "Automatons" are machines programmed by intentional agents (e.g. h. sapiens). Self-organizing complex systems are dissipative processes (e.g. cell replication, terrestrial climate, solar radiation, black holes).
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    "Colliding galaxies" are, in fact, merging macro objects (i.e. astronomically complex systems of event-patterns) – a process, IMO, not just a single, discrete event. Also, abiogenesis is a (macro) process rather than an "event" as you say.
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    Abortion is always wrong. It's not complicated.NotAristotle
    For you it's "always wrong", so don't do it. For others, it's not "always wrong". Live and let live, because "it's not complicated" except for a*holes. :victory: :mask:
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    Do environmental forces such as temperature, gravitation and radiation impact "events?"ucarr
    They are measures – self-organizing complexity (i.e. entropy) – of micro (quantum) events. Anyway, so what's your point?
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    You switched-up from "macro objects" to "future events" which I should have explicitly taken issue with.

    To clarify: I think "events" are micro phenomena (i.e. relations) and "objects" (i.e. asymmetric event-patterns aka "structures, processes") are macro – emergent – phenomena (i.e. ensembles, combinatorials); thus, "events" are a-causal, or random (i.e. noise) whereas "objects" are causal, or non-random (i.e. signals).

    More precisely, as you know, the universe is quantum (micro) and classical (macro) whereby the latter is, AFAIK, generated according to the law of large numbers (LLN) – averaging – of the former (à la Seurat's pointillism, pixellated images of LCD monitors, holograms, etc).
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    Macro, not micro
    — 180 Proof

    But macro objects are combinations of micro objects, are they not?
    universeness
    Yes. The dynamics of the latter are constrained by (the regularities-densities of) the former.

    If you believe that the macro universe is deterministic but the micro or sub-atomic universe is not, then is it size or the complexity of combinatorials or both, that makes all future events in the macroscopic universe, deterministic?
    Yes.

    Am I misinterpreting your meaning, again?
    Not yet ...
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    Yes, it seems you believe that minds are dis-embodied (i.e. dis-encephalized), Bob, whereas we know that minds are embodied (i.e. encephalized). Also, as a dual-aspect monist (i.e. Spinozist) who therefore discounts panpsychism, I do not 'equate life with mind' (e.g. bacteria, etc are mindless).
  • A Case for Objective Epistemic Norms
    A promise is not an ‘is that entails an ought’, for it is the obligation to fulfill one’s promises that furnishes one with a valid deductive argument for any obligation contained in the promise itselfBob Ross
    I don't understand your objection. Consider this SEP article ...
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/
  • Does Entropy Exist?
    Neither. I've no idea what you're talking about; do you?
  • The Complexities of Abortion
    Here's the problems I have with personhood arguments: [ ... ]Bob Ross
    :chin:
    A seed is not a tree. A sapling is a potential tree. A pre-26th week old unviable fetus is not a person. A viable fetus aka "baby" is a potential person.180 Proof