Yes, do that. And be amazed.

What's that Dummo? It's true. It's not false. It's true.

Shall I help you out? I know what you're thinking better than you do. You're thinking "oh, but if he thinks it is true, then he also thinks it is false because he thinks it is possible for it to be false...and if it is possible for it to be false, then it is false....coz that's a thing....and if it is false, then a proposition can be true and false at the same time" - yes? Only that's not what I think, is it? I think that it is true, not false. I think it is possible for it to be true and false at the same time. I really do. But I don't think it is, do I? I think it is just good old true. Truey truingtons. True. Which is consequently what I think about all true propositions: they're true. Not true and false. Just true.

Anyway, this thread is not about the law of non-contradiction or necessary truths. It is about what it takes for a mental state to have representative contents.

Focus.

And what are you on about? OP. Address the OP. And stop joining Banno in being dumb and thinking that if something is possibly true, it is true. Sheesh.

I do not deny the law of non-contradiction. I think it is true. I don't think it has to be. That doesn't mean I think it is actually false.

And in case you think that somehow this stops me reasoning, note that the above was reasoning. And I did it better than you and Dummo.

What are you on about? First: relevance to the OP? Bugger off and stop derailing, amateur.

Second, I think the law of non-contradiction is true. True. Not false. True. I just don't think it is necessarily true.

Presumably you think if something is possibly true, it is true. That's dumb. ("Is it possible for me to be a billionnaire...yes....therefore I am a billionaire; Bartricks thinks it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false......therefore he must that it is false....yes, Banno is good reasoner"). Stop being dumb, Dummo. So a) bugger off and derail elsewhere; b) stop being dumb.

Subjectivism is fundamental to trans ideology. It is about feelings over biology. These feelings are deeply imbedded with sex stereotypes. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think that's true even though I do think that sexism and sex stereotypes and homophobia is implicated in a lot of this.

Subjectivism about sex seems false. Once we just focus on it as a philosophical position and ignore all the noises-off, it seems to have next to nothing to be said for it. We can show this without mentioning sexism. Sexism is, I am sure, the reason why many endorse subjectivist positions about sex (not the only reason - lack of reflection and tribalism too, no doubt). But subjectivism about sex - though often motivated by sexist commitments - can be assessed on its own merits. And when assessed in that manner it just seems false.

That also means that view C - the pluralist view - goes down too. Leaving A - physicalism - and D - historicism.

I think A is true, both because I think D is prima facie implausible (and A is the only other option, once B - and by extension, C - are knocked out), and that A is independently plausible, given that there seems nothing incoherent in me discovering that I am a woman, despite my belief that I am a man.

But A is entirely compatible with changing one's sex. If A is true, then sex is a feature of my physical body. Well, I am not my body. And so my body can be changed - it can be changed from male to female, or male to neither male or female - and it will still be my body afterwards, it is just that now I will be a female rather than a male.

So that's why I don't see subjectivism as essential to trans ideology. For one could be trans but agree that transitioning from one sex to another requires that one's physical body undergoes certain changes. And one could be trans and not be motivated by any sexist attitudes. So I think we need to be careful not to tar everyone with the same brush.

Where I was going with it was: could the evolutionist say that we are justified in claiming we are aware of the world (we have justified true beliefs about the world), because those whose beliefs about the world didn't map on to reality (those who had false beliefs about the world) were weeded out by natural selection. So the fact that we're here after that long weeding out process is evidence that we have an innate ability for our beliefs to correspond to reality, and this innate ability, arrived at through evolution alone, would justify the claim: we are aware of the world. — RogueAI

No, I don't think so because by hypothesis those 'beliefs' wouldn't be beliefs at all. A belief is a mental state that has representative contents. And I am arguing that the mechanisms by which such mental states are created have to be ones that have been designed to do so if the mental states in question are to have representative contents.

If blind evolutionary forces have built all of our faculties - including our faculty of belief formation - then none of our mental states will have any representative contents. And so our 'beliefs' will not be beliefs at all, they'll just be indiscernible from them.

The credibility of a view is not affected by who endorses it - so the fact many sexists endorse subjectivism about sex isn't, in itself, evidence that the view is implausible.

So ignoring entirely who does and doesn't endorse it, is subjectivism about sex at all plausible? I think the answer to that is a pretty clear 'no'.

There are a variety of subjectivist positions available, all quite implausible.

For example, the view that you are sex X if you think you are sex X is incoherent. For thoughts have content, and so the thought that you are sex X needs to have some content - that is, the thinker needs to be thinking something. What are they thinking when they think they are sex X? Well, whatever they are thinking - whatever content their thought has - will express a view about what they think being that sex involves. And thus it will involve more than just 'thinking' you are that sex.

So that view - you are sex X if you think you are sex X - makes no sense and can be dismissed as incoherent.

Then there's what we might call the 'performative' view. A performative is where you make something the case by doing or saying it. So, "meeting adjourned" is a performative. For saying it will - if you are the chair - adjourn the meeting. Likewise "I promise to pay you $5" makes it the case that you have promised to pay $5. Sometimes, then, saying something makes it so.

Some subjectivists about sex take this idea and apply it to sex, arguing that sex is a performative (or that 'one' way in which you can qualify as a given sex is by performing a performative). Saying you are sex X is a performative (it is argued) and so just as saying "meeting adjourned" adjourns the meeting, so too saying "I am sex X" makes you that sex.

This view is not incoherent, but it doesn't seem to have anything to be said for it. Why on earth think sex is a performative? The brute possibility that it could be? That's not a good reason in any other context (the brute possibility you are a murderer is not good reason to think you are one). And in other cases of performatives - promises, marriages, meeting adjournments, pardons and so on - it is intuitively clear to virtually everyone that the saying of the thing makes it so. If being sex X is something that can be achieved via performative then we would expect it to be obvious to most reflective people that it is - that is, that saying "I am sex X" is away of becoming sex X. Yet it is far from obvious as the existence of heated debate over this matter testifies. And thus there just seems nothing to be said for this view. It has no evidence in its support.

Another version of subjectivism about sex would say that to be sex X involves having certain attitudes and dispositions. But it is quite easy to show this kind of view to be false: one simply imagines if there is something incoherent in the idea of a person of sex Y having those attitudes and dispositions. And if there is nothing incoherent about it, then the view has been falsified.

This kind of subjectivist might appeal to bundles of such attitudes and dispositions, but the same applies and plus such moves are always apt to look ad hoc.

So one doesn't need to appeal to any of the sexist motivations that lead some to endorse subjectivism about sex (and doing so is ad hominem anyway). We can just soberly assess it in the cold hard light of rational day and see that it turns out to have nothing to be said for it. (Which is, presumably, why it is the preserve mainly of the stupid and the sexist).

But still, the whole 'changing sex' issue is a red herring. FOr like I say, sex is only unchangeable if sex has an essential historical element - but it doesn't seem to. Different issues are being conflated here, then. Can one change one's sex? Well, yes. That seems metaphysically possible (and may well be practically possible too). But is sex subjective? Well, it doesn't seem to be. And thus changing one's sex requires something more than simply changing one's attitudes or thinking one has changed one's sex or some such.

you seem to be saying that position B is essentially sexist. Would that be correct?
— Bartricks

Yes.

The idea that you can become the opposite sex ignores biological reality and embodiment. Women are the main losers because men who have dominated women for millennia can now claim to be women by wearing a dress and lipstick and undermine them and win at their sports and get women of the year awards and invade spaces designed for the protection of women against male violence.

Being a woman is then reduced to the superficial not biological reality. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think subjectivism about sex is very plausible. But I don't see why it would be 'essentially' sexist to endorse the view (stupid, perhaps, but not necessarily sexist).

I take it that one way to be a sexist is to think that women 'ought' to behave in certain ways, have certain attitudes and so on (and likewise for men). So, it is not a view about what makes someone a man or a women, but about what you 'ought' to do and feel etc, if you are one or the other. So it is that normative element that makes it sexist.

But to think that you are a man or a women depending on whether you hold those attitudes, behave in those ways etc, though quite silly as a philosphical position, is not itself sexist, as it is not a normative view. It is descriptive, not normative.

It's just that many who hold the normative view are led by it to endorse the descriptive view. They reason, presumably, something like this: this is how women ought to behave.....I am behaving in that way......therefore I am a woman. It's fallacious reasoning and has a sexist premise. To make the conclusion follow one would need to put in a premise expressing the truth of B. And thus the slightly more reflective sexist will be driven to endorse B. But that doesn't make B sexist, for the sexism was expressed in the premise that said "this is how women ought to behave; or ought to think; etc".

So I think B may be quite a silly view, but I don't see that it is essentially sexist, even though many sexists (of a certain sort) may end up endorsing it.

B) Subjectivism about sex

One's sex is constitutively determined by subjective features (one's attitudes etc).
— Bartricks

That is sex stereotypes which is the foundation of transgenderism. It is about conforming to stereotypes to feel comfortable. Many women now wear trousers but if you go on reddit trans sub reddit's most of the men identifying as women wear skirts and say how great it feels.

They don't say anything that reminds me of my three sisters and their experiences as being women. It just comes of as a fetish. — Andrew4Handel

I think I am sympathetic to what you're saying. For like I say, I do think that at present this debate offers a way for a certain kind of sexist to express their sexist attitudes. And this particular kind of sexist is going to endorse position B as a way of doing this. That doesn't mean position B is sexist or that anyone who endorses it is a sexist. But many sexists are going to endorse position B, and be doing so for sexist reasons (rather than apparent epistemic ones).

1. If you're a sexist (of a certain sort), then you'll find position B plausible (if P, then Q)
2. I find position B plausible (Q)
3. Therefore I am a sexist (therefore P)

That's clearly fallacious. So one could defend B and not be a sexist, but many sexists will defend B.

There are different ways to be a sexist, and in saying that position B will appeal to a sexist of a certain sort, I am not suggesting that those who endorse A or C or D are not capable of being sexists too (many will be).

It seems to me, though, that you're endorsing a stronger position: you seem to be saying that position B is essentially sexist. Would that be correct?

I don't personally think subjectivism about sex is the correct view. I think A is correct. My sex is a feature of my body, not of me (for I am not my body). But as such I think sex can be changed. I think only D would result in a 'sex can't be changed' conclusion. (And I think D isn't all that plausible).

I certainly agree with you that this is a debate where a lot of ugly sexist and homophobic attitudes have found a way of expressing themselves without being called-out for what they are.

But which of A, B, C or D is true is a philosophical matter. It is just that position B - subjectivism about sex - is a position that is going to be especially appealing to a certain sort of sexist (not all -there's more than one way to be a sexist!). That doesn't mean B is false, of course. It just explains why many support it - there are a lot of sexists out there. Though one could endorse B and not be a sexist, of course.

It seems to me that whether it is metaphysically possible to change one's sex depends on whether one's sex is determined in part by a historical property.

It seems to me that we can distinguish four broad views about sex (scope for lots of disagreement within these):

A) Physicalism about sex

One's sex is constitutively determined by sets of physical features.

B) Subjectivism about sex

One's sex is constitutively determined by subjective features (one's attitudes etc).

C) Pluralism about sex

One's sex is constitutively determined by bundles of features that include - or can include - both subjective and physical properties.

D) Historicism about sex

One's sex is constitutively determined at a particular time and is fixed thereafter. So, on this view, there is a 'baptismal' point at which, due to satisfying the conditions of one of either A, B or C, you are sex X, Y, or neither. And that's what you are thereafter.

To clarify: take a genuine Leonardo da Vinci. What makes it a Leonardo da Vinci? Well, it possesses a historical property: Leonardo da Vinci painted it. And that's why an exact replica won't qualify, no matter that it possesses all the same current-time-slice properties.

If either of A or B or C is true, then one's sex can be changed. Exactly what it would take to change it would, of course, be determined by the substance of A, B or C.

But if D is true, then changing one's sex would require undoing the past. And that seems like something only God could do.

So, does sex have a historical component? I have to say, my own intuitions say that it doesn't. "I used to be a woman, but now I am a man" does not sound confused (whereas "this used to be a Leonardo da Vinci, but now it is a Rubens" does).

No, I don't think so.

I am an idealist who believes in many minds, not one. For clearly my mind exists and clearly so too does God's and clearly I am not God. And I think other minds besides my own and God's also exist, as I seem to have good evidence they do.

There is a type of idealism that posits one mind/cosmic mind exists. I thought it was called monistic idealism. In any case, suppose this cosmic mind is God. What would omnibenevolence be like in a reality of just one godly mind existing? How does morality even exist if only one mind exists, except as factual statements about morality? — RogueAI

I don't endorse that view - it is an idealist form of solipsism and it is patently absurd. But if it were true, then morality would still be what it is - the imperatives and values of God - it is just that the only person subject to those evaluations and imperatives would be God herself.

Anyway, it is not my view and it is indefensible.

Idealism is not the view that one mind alone exists. It is the view that minds and their contents exist.

It is monistic not because it posits one mind, but because it posits one 'kind' of thing - immaterial minds - and then seeks to understand everything else in terms of them.

Morality exists as the imperatives and values of Reason. And Reason is a mind and she's omnipotent and omniscient due to being Reason and we can infer that she will be omnibenevolent because being omnibenevolent involves being valued by Reason and she's going fully to value herself becasue she has the power to change anything about herself that she disapproves of.

An omnipotent being can do anything and thus they can commit any immoral act. Why do you think she would not be able to commit any immoral act?

What on earth are you on about?
Here's my claim: our faculties need to have been designed to provide us with information before they can be said to generate states with representative content.

You're trying to show this is false with an example of something that has been designed to give us information and is successfully doing so!!

"Oh, but, but, but, bots - bots are designed and you used bots to make your case. Bots. Garmin. Bots. Bots."

Bots are not designed to give information. They are designed to randomly generate 'messages'.

But anyway, that will do nothing whatever to help you. For my case is in defence of a necessary condition for representative content, not a sufficient condition. And, once more, you cannot challenge my premise with a case that confirms it.

Shall I help you? You need a clear case of representation generation that is NOT the product of anything designed.

kindly note that you have offered no argument for your conviction that the omni properties cannot be borne by the same person.

You - you - mentioned a supposed problem with time after it became dimly apparent to you that you weren't able to say why omnipotence and omnibenevolence weren't compatible. I mean, you are going to just keep saying there's a problem, right, even though I have shown you time and time again that omnipotence leads to omnibenevolence and you have raised no criticism. You've just gone 'what?' a lot.

I can't understand what you have just said about time. But an omnipotent being can do anything including divesting themselves of omnipotence. So they are not determined always to be omnipotent. They most likely will, of course, but your assertion that if one has omnipotence one always does is false given that an omnipotent person can cease being so whenever they like. So I don't know why you think otherwise.

No, obviously.

I do not know what you are asking me.

Once more: evidence is made of epistemic reasons. Those are attitudes of Reason. So, that means..........she's got control over what there's evidence for.

Truth is the property propositions have when Reason asserts them. So that means......she's got control over what's true.

There's no greater control than the control Reason has.

If you think there is, then either you think there's reason to think there is greater control possible - in which case you're appealing to Reason and just being dumb - or you think there's no reason to think there's greater control possible.

Now, answer my question - what's the problem with Time Timmy? It's looking like you dun don't know.

Once more: how does your example challenge my case?
I am arguing that faculties need to be designed if they are to be capable of generating representative contents.

Note: that's a necessary condition not sufficient.

You are trying to challenge that with an example of something that is designed to impart information.

How the hell is that going to challenge my case?

Think about it....

I have explained time and time again. Reason determines what's possible and what's what and what exists. Evidence is made of epistemic reasons. What are epistemic reasons? Attitudes of Reason. And on and on we go.
Now, Timmy Two Planks, what is the problem with God and time? Come on Planks, what is it?

You should learn to listen to your betters. An omnipotent being can do anything. To be able to do anything requires being Reason, for otherwise one will be constrained by Reason.
This isn't hard.
I am still waiting for a puzzle. You haven't shown that there is the least problem with the omni properties. I indeed,I have shown how they flow from omnipotence.
But anyway, sensing that you were out of your depth and unable to comprehend how someone was so easily dealing with what you were convinced were serious problems (despite being unable to say precisely what they were), you flailed about and guffed a lot of hot air about God and time. Now, what is the problem with time supposed to be, Planky?

Garmin is designed to give you information. So how the hell is it a counterexample? I am arguing that our faculties need to have been designed to do what they do in order for them to be capable of generating states with representative contents. You, to challenge this, then appeal to something that is designed to do something! How, exactly, does that work?

Has Garmin been designed to give you information?

I do not understand you. You argued that there cannot be more than one omnipotent being.

Bu there can be more than one. There is no reason to suppose there is more than one, for adding another will not explain anything that could not be more efficiently explained by one. But there can be more than one.

No you're not. See argument.

Where did I say that God was infinite? Quote me saying it.

You seriously think you're in a position to tell anyone they don't understand something? Nothing you say makes any sense.

Where did I say God was infinite?

Right! Top marks. It doesn't have a mind. It isn't 'trying' to communicate, because it doesn't have a mind - so it doesn't have goals, purposes, desires.

So.....the message won't be a message at all. It won't have any 'representative contents'. It isn't functioning as a medium through which you are being told something. It just appears to be, but isn't.

Now just apply that moral more generally and you get my position.

You were doing so well! But I would say that to be able to do anything, you have to be able to do everything; as you say, omnipotent. The requirement of anything else undercuts the omnipotence. And I see no need of reason as in any sense constitutive of the omnipotence. After all, He is already omnipotent without it. And must be, because reason itself bestows no power, much less omnipotence. — tim wood

Er, what? I mean, what are you on about? Reason can do anything, because Reason constitutively determines what's possible. Thus the omnipotent being would have to be Reason because otherwise the omnipotent being would be constrained by the laws of Reason (Reason and Reason alone has the power to make contradictions true, and to make anything true, for what it is for a proposition to be true is for it to be being asserted by Reason).

Anyway, that's all way above your intellectual pay grade, clearly.

What is it to be all-good? It is to be fully approved of by Reason.
— Bartricks
Interesting. But it makes the good logically prior to reason. Which is nonsensical on your terms. — tim wood

No it doesn't. They're equivalent properties. It's like saying 'that makes cheese prior to fromage' or some such nonsense.

Oh. It appears that the good is in the being and not in the doing. But even so still prior to reason. If the good is what is approved by reason, then what is the good before it is approved by reason? — tim wood

No, the issue is what is it to 'be' good. And to 'be' good is to be such that Reason fully approves of you. Slow. Did you repeat these things 30 times to yourself like you were told? I hope you didn't try and understand it all in one go.

Where did I say she was infinite? I didn't. I don't know what that means. Strawman.

Where did I say she was infinite? I don't know what that even means.

And there is a further difficulty, raised but not on every occasion. We may suppose that god is a-temporal. He does not do this and then that, but rather that everything is in some sense always already done. Either that or he is temporal, and is at all times doing and being good. However it goes, it's messy, and the mess due, imo, to the omni- and the paradoxes it generates. — tim wood

What one earth are you on about now? You're just flailing around trying desperately to find problems. Shall we recap: omnipotence implies omnibenevolence in that an omnipotent being will also be omnibenevolent. No problem there, then. They're not incompatible properties. You think they are, for goodness knows what reason. But they're not. Omnipotence positively implies omnibenevolence, as I keep explaining over and over and over again.

Now what you're doing is trying to raise an entirely different challenge - this time to do with God's relation to time. You vaguely remember hearing or reading that there is some kind of a problem. Well, what exactly?

I have a God too. I take it out for walkies three times a day. It loves the walkies. It shits all over the place, and I collect its leftovers in a plastic bag. — god must be atheist

It is good to know that you spend part of everyday picking up the excrement of others. This world is a prison, and you've taken it upon yourself to punish yourself. Well done: God would approve.

Oh, this really isn't hard. What is the correct analysis of why this 'message' would not be a message if I am a bot?

'But it is a message' is not an answer to that question, is it?

So, what is the correct analysis of why this 'message' will not be a message if I am a bot?

I can disprove arguments for God. — Gregory

Really? Well this should be good. What are you going to do for an encore? "I jump grand canyon on peddling bike"

The world is either:

1) necessary

2) contingent

3) neither

4) or something else

3 and 4 are correct. — Gregory

Er, no. Just no.

I accept that as a possibility. — tim wood

It's not a possibility. There's no question you're finding this bewildering.

You ask why an omnipotent being would be omnibenevolent. I tell you. I take you through it in baby steps. But you're already so determined that you're right, you can't understand what I am saying, right?

Shall we do it again? (It's said the average person needs a new idea explained 7 times before it'll sink in. And that's an average person).

An omnipotent person can do anything.

That's what omnipotent means.

So an omnipotent person can do anything.

Repeat that, ooo, 30 times so it sinks in.

To be able to do anything, you need to be Reason, the source of all norms and evaluations.

Therefore, an omnipotent person will be Reason. Repeat that 30 times too. And don't change the wording into Wooden nonsense (reason is an aspect of God, or whatever). An omnipotent person will be Reason. Not 'a reason'. Reason.

What is it to be all-good? It is to be fully approved of by Reason. That's why, if you're all-good, you have no reason to be any different. Which is another way of saying that if you're all-good, then Reason doesn't favour you being any different to how you are. Which is what would be the case if Reason fully approved of how you are. Which is what being all-good consists in.

So, again, repeat 30 times. "Being all-good, and being fully approved of by Reason are one and the same"

Now.....will Reason fully approve of how she is? Yes. Why? Because she's all powerful, remember? And so if she disapproves of anything about herself, she can just change it. So......she'll fully approve of how she is.

And she's Reason. And what are you if you're fully approved of by Reason? You're all-good, that's what.

So, an omnipotent person will also be omnibenevolent.

That's called an 'explanation'.

It's beautiful. It's elegant. You should be in absolute awe of it.

I am sure I have told you before: I am not religious. Reason. I listen to Reason. Is that so hard to understand?

Psychoanalysis would simply view your arguments as a confidence in yourself — Gregory

Psychoanalysis is not a person - it doesn't have a view. And don't focus on me, focus on the arguments. You Buddhists are so self-absorbed - I'm not.

No. Why would I do that?

Your God sounds like that God. — Gregory

It's not 'my' God. It's God.

Your God demands complete non-freedom in submission because your are islamic in your understanding and want a unbeatable super-figure to justify and restrain yourself — Gregory

Not anything I said. Just gibberish.