Art works dont emerge in a vacuum. — Joshs

That is because the artist would suffocate.

Van Gogh’s paintings arose of of the milieu of impressionism and pointed the way to post-impressionist directions in art. If we think of the impressionist artists Mamet, Monet, Renoir, Seurat and Degas there is no question each of them had their own unique style and contribution to make to impressionism. — Joshs

IF you can't see that Van Gogh's paintings are brilliant outside of their historical context, then you have no eye.

How can a work of art be great if its greatness is always relative to some other work, either that produced at the time or earlier? You will be off on a regress and will have to conclude either that there are no great works at all and can never be, or that there is in reality an infinite number of works of art. Neither of those views is true, of course.

Although Van Gogh had a tremendous amount of knowledge of the history of art, he did not need that knowledge to know that the art he was producing was brilliant, or to produce brilliant work.

As a post-impressionist, Van Gogh was among the first to show how inner feeling shapes what and how we see the world. — Joshs

You are mistaking what might have contributed to making his works great, with their greatness itself. The greatness of a work of art is not reducible to the particular properties that make that work great. That is, to have produced something is not to 'be' it, and so those qualities in a van gogh that make it great are not what the greatness itself is. Another work that has the same qualities - that is, a work that is trying to capture the feelings a scene evokes could be utter rubbish.

If a Van Gogh or Monet were to emerge today for the first time, they would be seen as belonging to larger artistic movements that are no longer fresh, even if their version of it is unique. — Joshs

What's that got to do with anything? At the time of production, Van Gogh's works were considered unfiinished childish rubbish by virtually everyone. But they were not. By your lights they would be, given that you think that the fact they would cause similarly dismissive judgements if produced today is evidence that they would not be graet if produced today. Some people do not learn, it seems.

The sunflower flower series, if produced today, would be received with teh same indifference it was at the time. And it'd be just as great.

You can see this for yourself if, that is, you genuinely discern their greatness. For you can simply take a well illustrated history of art book, break its spine, and rearrange the paintings in it so that Van Gogh's works appear at a quite different point or distributed throughout. Now, the sunflowers will stand out as great works wherever they happen to turn up in this now random collection of reproductions. (The same will be true, I think, of the other great works contained in that work).

But even if that's not true and the greatness of a work of art is partly a function of the context in which it is produced, that does not affect anything I have argued in the OP. Everything said there remains true, or at least unchallenged.

You didn't mention any basis in your previous arguments. — javi2541997

Yes I did. It's in the OP. The great recognize their own greatness by discerning it. That's why they're not being epistemically irresponsible in believing themselves to be great, even when no-one else recognizes their greatness. (Just as, by analogy, I am not being epistemically irresponsible when I believe myself to be alive, even if everyone else believes - and believes justifiably - that I am dead).

There were two inter-related points I was making. First, the great will believe themselves to be great, for that seems to be required actually to be great. Second, the great will 'know' that they are great - not simply unjustifiably believe it - for their belief in their own greatness will be based on their having discerned it. So they have available to them evidence of their own greatness that others - most others, anyway - will not have access to.

That's also why they are not necessarily guilty of any arrogance just by virtue of believing themselves to be great. They are analogous to the doctor who believes that the mole is cancerous and is unfazed and dismissive of the fact all of your friends believe it to be benign. Their judgement about the mole is informed in a way that the judgement of your friends is not. Likewise, when a van gogh judges himself to be great, that judgement is that of an expert on greatness, a kind of expertise that very few others have. And thus when he was unfazed by and dismissive of those who thought his work incompetent, he was not thereby being arrogant.

Sometimes it is going to be hard, from outward behaviour alone, to distinguish between the arrogant and those with relevant expertise. The point, though, is that whether one is arrogant or not is not determined by other people's judgements about the matter. That the friends judge the doctor to be arrogant and themselves not to be, does not mean that the doctor is indeed the arrogant one.

Van Gogh believed himself to be a great artist and was very dismissive of the work of others, others who, at the time, were lauded as great. He was not thereby being arrogant. For he really was great and was discerning this, and the work of others really was rubbish, and he was discerning this as well.

To be honest, I doubt Van Gogh ever judged his own works as "masterpieces". — javi2541997

He did. Read his letters. He considered his first proper masterpiece to be the potato eaters. He fell out with his best and only friend at the time precisely because that person - also an artist, though a very inferior one - criticized it. Like I say, Van Gogh was acutely aware of the greatness of his own work (and acutely aware when a work fell short of meeting his own standards). When it came to those who did not perceive the greatness of his own work, he was condescendingly indifferent. It was only when those whose judgement he prized to some extent - that is, judgements of artists whose work he had some time for - expressed criticism that he would lose his shit.

I have made a philosophical case for the great being aware of their own greatness: to be great is to be able to recognize what is great - for how else would one go about producing great works or thoughts without exercising that ability? And to be great is to have done great things, which one could not do unless one attempted to do them - something that requires belief that one can do them.

But note too how psychologically implausible it is to suppose that these great artists were not confidently aware of their own brilliance. Van Gogh received almost nothing but criticism from others. Virtually nobody - save his brother (and even then, his brother was not overly enthusiastic about it until the final two years) and a clutch of other artists. To continue in the face of such a combination of indifference and outright hostility demonstrates the presence of an inner conviction that one is doing something important - that one knows that one is, despite not having any publicly verified evidence that one is.

If Kant or Van Gogh were to appear for the fist time today they would not likely be considered ( or consider themselves ) great because their creative content is now commonplace. — Joshs

Another ignorant assertion.

It doesn't even make sense. if Van Gogh didn't come into existence in 1853, then his art would not have come into being in the late 19th century and exerted the huge influence it did throughout the 20th century. And so his influence would yet to have made itself known, because it has yet to exist. Thus he could make it known by bringing it into existence.

Kant and Van Gogh thought they were brilliant. Kant wrote fast - ludicrously fast - precisely becuase he was worried he was going to die and wanted to get his ideas down for posterity. He was in no doubt about their importance. Likewise for Van Gogh. Van Gogh also worked insanely fast becasue he knew he was important and had an important contribution to make, but was also convinced he did not have much time and would be dead before 40. He was right about all of that.

Great people know they're great. And if Van Gogh turned up again today, he'd produce new masterpieces.

Thinking of being great after finishing something could be a sense of arrogance... — javi2541997

First, you're thinking that brilliant people are also virtuous people. There's no necessary connection. Brilliant thinkers and artists think they're brilliant. Whether that is consistent with being virtuous or not is beside the point.

Second, how is one arrogant if one believes that oneself is brilliant on the basis of discerning it?

For example, when I believe that I am alive - despite everyone else thinking me dead - on the basis of discerning my own existence, am I guilty of arrogance? Surely not. I'm dismissing the views of others, but I am not being arrogant in doing that, for I have access to evidence that they do not have access to (and that I know they lack access to).

From the outside it may sometimes be hard, sometimes impossible, to distinguish between the arrogant and those who are just accurately perceiving their own greatness, but that does not mean that both parties are arrogant. No, one is arrogant and one is actually brilliant and aware of it. They may both appear the same to you, but there's a big difference between them.

When a doctor judges that the mole on your arm is probably cancerous, and that same doctor is dismissive of the judgements of your friends, who all judge the mole just to be a mole, is the doctor being arrogant?

No. Your friends may judge her to be. But really it is they who are manifesting arrogance in that context. The doctor knows what she's talking about. Your friends do not. Yet your friends arrogantly assume that their ignorant views count for the same as hers and thus that her dismissal of them manifests arrogance.

It doesn't. They're the arrogant ones. So, when Van Gogh judged his own works to be masterpieces and dismissed the views of those who judged them to be childish and silly, he was not being arrogant. For his works were indeed masterpieces and he was perceiving this quality in them.

To say that something in inherently intuitive (such as morality in Moore's case) seems to indicate that what moral claims represent are at least very subjective states, that are commensurably agreed upon. Do you think that's something correct to state? — Shawn

How on earth do you get that from the quote above?

Moore is not a subjectivist about morality.

A subjectivist about morality is someone who believes morality is made of subjective states.

What you're doing is confusing states of awareness with objects of awareness.

You're thinking "if we're aware of moral rightness and goodness via subjective states - intuitions - then moral rightness and goodness are themselves made of subjective states". Yes?

So, I'm aware of my partner via subjective states. I can see her. That is, I have a visual impression of her. That's a subjective state. Therefore - by your logic - my partner is made of subjective states. She exists in my mind and as states of mind.

That's the conclusion you're going to draw about everything, if you are consistent.

But you're just making a basic error. It's like confusing a book about Obama with Obama.

Moore is an 'objectivist' about morality. He - like most moral philosophers - believes that morality does not exist 'as subjective states'. At least not as 'our' subjective states. (Strictly speaking divine command theory is a form of subjectivism, but the standard objections to subjectivism do not apply to it).

Why?

Because the view is stupid. It means that if you approve of yourself raping Jane, then it is morally right for you to rape Jane.

It means Hitler did nothing wrong so long as he sincerely appproved of what he himself did.

It's a stupid view that has nothing to be said for it, which is why no ethicist - including Moore - endorses it.

You only think he's a subjectivist because you're confusing intuitions - which are subjective - with what they give the bearer an awareness of - which is not subjective, or need not be.

Note as well that subjectivism about morality is a reductionist view - it reduces morality to something else (in this case, subjective states). And Moore is not a reductionist. His whole point is that morality can't be reduced. He's wrong about that. But 'if' it can't be reduced, then clearly he's not a subjectivist, as that's a reductionist view.

Come on Shawn - you clearly think that something in that quote from the SEP contradicts something I wrote. What? Or do you not really know what the words in it mean?

Have you read Moore, Shawn? Or have you only read 'about' him?

It clearly states in the SEP entry that — Shawn

Like I said, Banno regurgitates SEP entries. Now I think neither your nor Banno actually know what that quote means.

Now, do you think I'm someone who a) knows nothing about Moore or b) knows a shit load about him?

You do realize, do you, that Banno doesn't know what he's talking about? What you get from Banno is half-understood regurgitated SEP pages.

Before Moore no distinction was drawn between normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction is a result of his work. The naturalistic fallacy involves conflating the question at the heart of normative ethics - "what is moral?" - with the question at the heart of metaethics - "what is morality?". Those distinct areas of inquiry grew out of his work. That is, he drew our attention to the fact these were distinct questions and that how we go about answering one is not how we go about answering the other.

The naturalistic fallacy - to which the distinction between normative ethics and metaethics can be seen as the result - involves confusing answers given to the first with answers to the second.

That's not how he himself would describe the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed, as he himself admitted, he provides no very clear explanation of what the fallacy actually involves. But that's actually what it involves, and that's precisely why these two distinct lines of ethical inquiry developed. They developed out of his work.

There's the destructive part of Moore - the part that involves highlighting (which, note, he does quite badly and confusingly) the mistake I have just described. This part lands us with a puzzle - if what we have been thinking were answers to the "what is morality?" question were, in fact, no such thing (they were answers to the "what is moral?" question), then what is morality? We thought we knew, but now we find we don't.

Then there's the constructive part in which Moore attempts to tell us what morality is. And his answer, which he assures us we'll find unimpressive, is that morality 'is what it is'. He arrives at this conclusion fallaciously. Ironically, he's committed his own fallacy. For he sees the failure of other answers to be evidence that morality is indefinable. But of course, if those answers were not answers to the 'what is morality?" question, but a quite different one, then one is not licensed to draw this conclusion.

Anyway, Moore's positive view is original, even though it doesn't enjoy the support he thought it did. His view is that as morality exists - we clearly have moral obligations - but has resisted (it hasn't) our best attempts to say what it is, it is itself and not another thing. That is, it is among those basic elements of reality, the raw ingredients, that cannot be broken down any further. It might be thought to be analogous to time and space, which are also candidates for that status. Time is time and not another thing and space is space and not another thing. Yet things are 'in' time and have temporal properties. The things that are in time do not constitute it. They just have temporal properties. Likewise then, we and our actions and the states of affairs around us are 'in' morality and have moral properties. Happiness is sometimes good. But happiness and goodness are not the same, just as some events occur at 3pm but are not thereby constitutive of 3pm.

That's Moore's view and it is known as 'non-naturalism'. It's a misleading name. But it is basically the view that morality is morality and that we make a mistake when we assume it must be made of something more basic than itself.

Non-naturalism is a form of what's known as 'objectivist' metaethical theory. 'Objective' in this context means 'exists as something other than subjective states'. Moore positively rejects the idea that morality could be made of our own - or someone else's - subjective states, for that would be to reduce morality to something else.

And Moore himself was a realist. A 'realist' about morality is someone who thinks morality exists. That is, moral objects and relations are real.

Many non-naturalists are not realists, however, but often endorse 'nihilism', the view that nothing is right or wrong in reality.

No. I’m saying what I find to be intuitively true. Which is that when 1 and 2 are met, — khaled

1 and 2 are refuted by this argument:

1. If one is obliged to do that which would promote good when doing so is easy, then someone possessed of talent who can exercise it with ease would be obliged to exercise it, other things being equal.
2. Those possessed of talent are not obliged to exercise it, even if they can do so with ease
3. Therefore one is not obliged to do that which would promote good when doing so is easy.

Now, this thread isn't actually about whether 2 is true or not. It is intuitively clear that it is. This thread is about how best to explain this, given that we are obliged not to destroy anything that is beautiful and already in existence.

Again, why do you post here if you don’t want your premises to be doubted? — khaled

One wants intelligent criticism, not mindless naysaying. That's not intellectually challenging. It's just tedious.

Maybe the reason you (and I) cannot find a good explanation for both statements to be true is that they’re not both true. — khaled

Er, I can explain it and did. Jesus. Read the OP.

What do you mean?

1- Have very good reason to think that his art will bring about much good before they produe it.
2- Be able to produce it relatively easily. — khaled

It is self-evident that those who are able to produce beautiful things are not obliged to do so.

if 1 is true - that is, if people are obliged to create something that will bring about a lot of good, other things being equal - then that self-evident truth would be false. But it's true, or at least we are default justified in believing it to be. So 1 is false until or unless you provide some evidence in support of it.

When it comes to 2, that too is clearly false. For Picasso could produce art with ease whereas Leonardo could not, but neither of them had any obligation to produce any art.

So, again, you are just making counterintuitive claims, not providing any kind of case against what I have argued.

To argue well you need to appeal to self-evident truths of reason and derive from them interesting conclusions (that do no themselves contradict self-evident truths of reason that we have no independent reason to think are false, or that are as strong or stronger than those from which your conclusion was derived).

You don't understand this. You think that any premise in any argument is as good as any other, yes? If I present an argument of this form:

1. 1+ 1 = 2
2. If A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C
3. Therefore 1 + 1 = 2 and if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C.

All you are going to do is make the following argument:

1. 1+ 1 does not = 2
2. If A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A is not bigger than C.
3. Therefore 1 + 1 does not = 2 and if A is bigger than B and B is bigger than C, then A is not bigger than C.

And you think your argument is as good as mine, yes? Even though it's not - it's stupid.

Why is it stupid? Because this claim - 1 + 1 = 2 - is powerfully self-evident. By contrast, the claim that 1 + 1 does not = 2 is self-evidently false.

Notice that my arguments appeal to self-evident truths. All you do is think "Bartricks is wrong......therefore those premises are false, and if I say that, then my claim that those premises are false is just as justified as Bartricks's claim that they are true".

Your claims contradict mine. But all you are doing is assuming that artists are obliged to produce art and taking that for granted, even though that's intuitively false.

Counterintuitive claims need support. That is, they need to be 'conclusions' of arguments, not premises.

So stop thinking that if you think something then that's evidence it is true. Try supporting your claims with arguments that have self-evidently true premises.

Now try and focus on the OP and the relevant issue.

Here are two self-evident truths: those who are able to produce beautiful things are under no obligation to do so, other things being equal.

Don't question that.

Here's the other self-evident truth: we are obliged not to destroy any beautiful things taht are in existence, other things being equal.

Don't question that either.

The issue is why that would be the case.

What you mean is "shit, I don't actually know what I'm saying..." yes?

Stop trying to sound clever. It isn't working.

Now, once again, did you take yourself to be saying the same thing I was saying, or did you think you were saying something different?

Is a normative theory a theory about the extension of the word 'good' and a metaethical theory a theory about the intension of the word 'good'. Come along. Say what you think.

Isnt the question what it is they think they are trying to do rather than whether they are succeeding at it? — Joshs

No. It's this:

Do you think someone can sincerely try and do something that they at the same time believe - really believe - they will fail to succeed at? — Bartricks

Just sense and reference. — Banno

What do you mean?

Note, I provided a very clear explanation of the error that Moore was highlighting. The error involves confusing two very different questions that can be expressed with the same words (and thereby thinking the correct answer to one is the correct answer to the other).

Now, either what you're doing is trying to find a more obscure way of saying the same thing, or you're saying something quite different. Which is it?

What do you mean? What is the difference between the extension of good and the intension of good? In your own words. Is a normative theory a theory about the extension of good, and a meteathical theory a theory about its intension? Is that what you think?

Knowing you're a great artist =/= Knowing the next piece of art you produce will bring about much good. Similar to how a gold medalist, even though they (and everyone else) knows they're a great athlete, cannot know they will get a gold medal, or even do well at all in the next olympics. — khaled

What's that got to do with anything?

Is false. If it was obvious, you'd have denied my quote above. — khaled

Er, what? I did deny it. Read the OP. Clearly I believe that it is self-evident that those with the ability to produce beautiful things are under no positive obligation to do so.

You have provided no evidence to the contrary. All you've done is say what you believe. Namely that - for some stupid reason - you think that if an artist can produce beautiful work by cilcking their fingers, then this somehow means they are under an obligation to produce it, whereas if they produce their work by other means - no matter whether it is just as easy for them or not - they are not.

Look, you just have a silly view. You can't defend it. All you're going to do is repeat your belief - which, let's be honeset, you hold simply because it is the negation of mine - but you cannot show it to be implied by anything self-evident.

Its the same old story time and time again. I appeal to apparent self-evident truths of reason and show how they lead to some interesting conclusions. What you do is just deny the self-evidence of the self-evident truths of reason and then just insist "well my view is as good as yours". It's tedious.

Now, I am not interested in debating with those who can do no more than deny the obvious. That's not good philosophy.

If you can show how an obligation to produce beautiful things is implied by some genuinely self-evident truths about morality, then you'd have the beginnings of a case. But that's not what you're even attempting to do. All you seem capable of doing is saying over and over "my view's as good as yours, ner, ner, ner". It isn't. It's stupid. A stupid view is a view that starts with counter-intuitive claims and uses them to arrive at counter-intuitive conclusions.

If Kant or Van Gogh were to appear for the fist time today they would not likely be considered ( or consider themselves ) great because their creative content is now commonplace. — Joshs

You're just making random assertions. You're not arguing anything or engaging with the argument I made.

Let's take this in small steps. Do you think someone can sincerely try and do something that they at the same time believe - really believe - they will fail to succeed at?

Furthermore, you started this post about recognising greatness, but you didn't provide a definition of great. — javi2541997

You don't need a definition of great. They - the great - discern their own greatness. You, like so many, seem to think that understanding and awareness comes from having definitions. If that were true we could solve all philosophical problems by use of the dictionary.

Or I just want to do great things because I want to, without the aim of being considered by the rest of the people. — javi2541997

I didn't say otherwise. The point, though, is that you need to think you're capable of doing great things in order to try to do them. And you need to try to do them if you're ever going actually to do them.

Thus, great thinkers and artists think they're great (and because they will them themselves great on the basis of having discerned themselves to be, they will also 'know' that they are great - that is, their belief will not be unjustified.

"Great" people don't know they are extraordinary. Never. — javi2541997

You make no case. Note: I made a case. You haven't addressed it. All you've done is express a view - one that is clearly false, as any knowledge of the lives of great artists and thinkers would tell you. But anyway, this is a philosophy forum, so you need to engage with the argument I made, not just express your unsupported view.

This is what happened to Van Gogh or James Joyce. A good example of masters in literature and arts. Their works are magnificent but with the eyes of modern generations. Van Gogh was poor because nobody really bought any of his paints and James Joyce was not well understood by the literature critics. — javi2541997

Again, you have not engaged with my argument and you also show your ignorance of the facts. Van Gogh did not paint for a hobby, rather he was a driven man who was (despite episodes of doubt - he was subject to extreme mood swings) convinced he was engaged in important work. He is famous in part for only having officially sold one painting in his own lifetime. What they don't mention is that he and his brother made no great effort to sell them and they charged a fortune for them, as they were playing a long game and didn't want to damage the brand by selling them cheap (he only sold one painting, but he sold it for a hell of a lot of money! 400 francs, to be precise. That's in the region of $10,000. (If you're wondering why anyone would give such a large sum for the work of an unknown artist painting in a very unusual style, it is because it was bought by the wealthy sister of a friend - Elizabeth Boch, sister of his friend Eugene - and so it was, in fact, a disguised donation. The important point is that 400 francs is the price he put on the work). He only sold one painting because his prices were ludicrously high - because he knew what he was producing was high quality work (he would give work away, but he wouldn't sell it cheap).

So, to become "great" needs a lot of facts than just thinking I am good. You (we) need the approval from the rest of the people. — javi2541997

Er, again, you haven't engaged with my argument and you seem utterly ignorant of the facts. Once more: Van Gogh. He did not receive approval from the people and nor did he need it. And lots of the great philosophers were not recognized, or not properly recognized to be great, in their own lifetimes. Descartes was in no doubt about his own brilliance and was frustrated that he wasn't being lauded as much as he thought he ought to be; Hume was almost entirely ignored - at least as a philospher - in his own lifetime, and Berkeley too was not considered to be great, a fact that bothered him....because he knew his ideas were very important.

Again, I offered an explanation: if you don't think you're great, you won't try and do great things. And so you won't do great things. You need to think you're capable of doing great things to try and do them. You need to think you're great in order to deal with the fact that you're not going to be properly appreciated by those around you (unless they're as great, or nearly as great, as you are). Note, even those who are appreciated in their own lifetime are typically not fully appreciated in it and it often takes time - sometimes centuries - for the true value of their contributions to be recognized.

Interesting it is that disjunctive transcendental stupidity reigns in supervenient ways upon rebarbative reason concepts, don't you think?

Yes, I can disagree with a normative reason when it refers to a culturally influenced argument which is a belief about rationality. — introbert

No you can't, because the term 'normative reason' refers to a favoring relation, and one can't disagree with those for they do not have attitudes or beliefs with which one can be said to be disagreeing.

Now, if you're using the the term 'normative reason' to refer to whatever occurs to you at the time or at some other time, then you could disagree with a normative reason on those occasions when you're using it to refer to a person. But someone who uses the term in that way is a tedious idiot who doesn't know what he's talking about but isn't letting that stop him. So it depends....

Yes cultures do have beliefs — introbert

No they don't. So, to be clear, you think the Chinese culture believes things? Does it also get upset? Can all the members of a culture - now and throughout its history - have believed not-x, yet the culture believe x?

Shall I answer for you? Let's see "A culture is belief has when normative transcendent Galileo confers disjunctively on it, by prescription". Is that about right?

I am disagreeing with your normative reason for acting which correspondingly is an argument about rationality that conforms to your culture's (I assume British) long standing belief. — introbert

Utter nonsense. First, you can't disagree with a normative reason. That's like thinking you can disagree with cheese. Do you disagree with cheese? You can 'have' a normative reason for doing or believing something. You can disagree with me, when I say that I believe I have a normative reason to do X. But you can't disagree with a normative reason. They're not little people.

Second, "which correspondingly is an argument about rationality". Well, putting aside that the 'which' there refers to some total garbage, it is not 'an argument about rationality'. An argument has premises (at least one) and a conclusion. Confused rubbish doesn't.

that conforms to your culture's (I assume British) long standing belief — introbert

Culture's don't have beliefs. People - agents - do (or can do). Cultures don't. They too are not people. A collection of people is not a person.

I referred earlier to Galileo as an example of rationality that defies normative reason. — introbert

Galileo was a person, not an example of rationality. A person may exhibit rationality. But a person cannot 'be' rationality.

And you can't defy normative reason. You can defy a normative reason. You can't defy normative reason.

That you are acting so ignorantly and irrationally in the face of argument against your culturally prescribed codes is further indictment of not only your argument but your society's beliefs. — introbert

Are you pulling sentence parts out of a hat?

You agree that it was not great?

Note too that I was not asking you what was okay, but what the concept of okayness is the concept of.

Note, that was nonsense too.

Rather than stringing words together and hoping the result makes sense, try understanding what you're talking about. That is, use little words - regular words - to say what you mean. What do you mean? Anything? Is there any coherent thought that you're trying to express with these linguistic burps?

What is "okay"?

The only thing I will give you credit for in this thread is that your rigid inability to render meaning from anything that slightly defies cultural prescriptivism is coherent with your mostly incoherent argument for normative reason. — introbert

And what do you mean by those words? It too was nonsense. "For normative reason". You don't learn, do you? Is are doing normative are consequential transcendental epistemologies. Reason is the conjunction of friendly Humean supervenience relations that disambiguate quietly.

Well, not that reply for one thing.

When I say 'a' normative reason is rational I mean having a normative reason. — introbert

Oh really. And when I said "is are being rational is are" I meant "I'd like a packet of crisps, please".

Again: you don't know what you're talking about. You're using words before you know what they mean and writing gibberish. Stop wasting people's seeing juice with such stuff.

Is are rational being is? Transcending Cartesian epistemology is what some rationalities are about is. But rational are is being is presupposing dichotomy if was are.

Er, you said this:

If 'a' normative reason is rational — introbert

That means you're presupposing that there are rational normative reasons - that the idea makes sense. Which it doesn't. Seems you know less about what you're saying than I thought!

If 'a' normative reason is rational — introbert

There's no such thing as 'a rational normative reason'! Normative reasons are what make actions rational. Jesus.

Stop using words you don't understand.

There is no such thing as 'normative reason'. You can have normative reason to do something. They 'are' reasons to do things.

So, this "John has normative reason to do x" makes sense.

This:

If normative reason is — introbert

doesn't.

As you'd know if you knew what the words 'normative reason' denote. And you don't. So you don't know how to handle it.

You have no case.

First, you clearly know nothing about art or artists if you think any of those artists I mentioned didn't know they were creating era defining work. Believe me, most great artists - most great anything - knew full well they were great at the time. It's typically others who do not recognize greatness at the time. The great typically know they are great, which is precisely why they continue doing what they're doing despite not being recognized or encouraged.

So we can use any number of actually great artists to refute your silly argument, or we can just as well imagine an artist who knows full well that were they to exercise their artistic ability, they would create great art (for there is no contradiction involved in the supposition). And it remains as obvious as ever that there is no positive obligation on the person to exercise their ability.

So, those with great artistic ability are self-evidently not under an obligation to exercise it. And that remains the case whether they can exercise it with ease or whether exercising it involves finger snapping.

Thus you have failed to provide a counterexample to the self-evidently true claim that those of artistic ability are not under any obligation to exercise their ability, other things being equal.

Yet we are under an obligation not to destroy anything beautiful that is already in existence, other things being equal.

So, there is no obligation to produce beauty. There is an obligation not to destroy any that exists.

That, note, is the starting point of my discussion, not its conclusion.

Why did you quote me without comment? Are you suggesting that the sentence you quoted -

To behave 'rationally' is to behave in ways that you have overall normative reason to behave in — Bartricks

- makes no sense?

Show your working. Explain why you think it makes no sense. Shall we go through it word by word?

I don't really care to talk to you, you're not a civilized person. — introbert

No, it is because I keep calling you on your nonsense.

This:

If normative reason is "when in Rome do as the Romans do" and that is rational then being deemed a heretic for espousing science in a catholic country can't be. But science is more rational than religion. — introbert

doesn't begin to make sense.

And note that we once more have 'normative reason' and not 'a normative reason' (not that the addition of the 'a' would make the sentence any more coherent). So again, it isn't the case that you left off the a, rather you did not know that it needed it at all.

I think people should be called on their nonsense, don't you? At least in a philosophy forum they should. I mean, that's part of the point of philosophy. Anyone can just string big words together

Most people on the forum would agree that you talk nonsense, — introbert

Yes, and who are they?

If 10 of your dumb friends think that the mole on your arm is nothing to worry about, but one medical doctor thinks it looks suspect and you should get it checked out, are you a total idiot if you a) think the judgement of your friends trumps the judgement of the doctor or b) think the judgement of the doctor trumps your friends?

Now, you and I both know that you don't know what you're talking about. None of your sentences make sense. Nothing you say is getting by.

Distinguish for me the different meanings the word 'reason' can have. Let's see what you know.

Something is not incoherent because it is missing a single letter. — introbert

What you were saying was incoherent. It was not missing a single letter. For you didn't intend to say "a normative reason' and accidentally left off the 'a'. No, you didn't have a clue what you meant to say and so just stuck some words together. You didn't leave off the a. You had no idea it needed to be there for the sentence to make any sense at all. Correct?

Back on topic, is taking the blue pill rational? I would say the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian. If the blue pill pays homage to Platonist and Cartesian traditions then it is not in the spirit of rationality to take it. The common spirit of rationality in these cases is to overcome illusions. — introbert

How can you get back on topic when you don't even know what the topic is? You don't know what you mean by ratonality, do you? And now you're at it again - you're throwing in big words in the hope that you're saying something meaningful. You're not.

"the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian". What does that mean? What are you on about? It's gibberish. Do you know what utilitarianism is? No, clearly. (It's a view about what it is rational to do! And it is not the blue pill that is rational, but the act of taking it. So it's just nonsense.

And we are not on a date so stop throwing in 'Platonist' and 'Cartesian' to sound clever. I know you haven't a clue what they mean. Say what you mean.

No, I don't see. You have your own ideas about it, but they seem to be mostly semantic traps rather than philosophy. — introbert

No, they're called conceptual truths. It's a conceptual truth that 'rationality' is only something an agent can exhibit.

Look, you don't really know what the words you're using mean, yes? For example:

reason to act is not in itself rational — introbert

That's incoherent. So's this:

Rationality can transcend normative reason. — introbert

It's just a combination of words that you think sounds impressive, but actually makes no sense.

There's no such thing as 'normative reason'. There are normative reasons. You can have a normative reason to do something. But there can't just be 'normative reason' simpliciter.

Now, no such incoherence attends anything I am saying. That's because I know what I'm talking about.

Normative reasons are reasons-to-do things. That is, they are one and the same. A 'normative reason' is just fancy for 'a reason to do something'.

Only an agent can be rational. If you think that things that are not agents can be rational, then you're a crazy person. That is, if you think that 'the sun' can be rational, or that the colour green can be, then you're nuts. Yes? Can you see that it makes no sense to ask "is that sunset rational or not?"?

Take it from someone who knows: only agents and their actions can be rational.

An action is 'rational' when it is an action that the agent has reason-to-do. That is, to get technical, when they have a normative reason to do it.

And an action is fully rational when it is an action that the agent has overall reason-to-do (for there are different sorts of reason-to-do things and they can compete).