Again, just gibberish. Employ your reason, and show that omnipotence - so, being able to do anything - is incompatible with being omnibenevolent - so, being fully morally good. (Psst, you're not going to be able to. Why? Because a)an omnipotent being will be omnibenevolent - that is, omnipotence implies omnibenevolence. b) an omnipotent being can......do anything. That includes being able to be morally good and do anything. See?

Just to be clear: you think the belief in God and God himself are one and the same? Okaay. Presumably I can eat my belief in a ham sandwich and drink by belief in a cup of coffee.

What in the blue blazes are you on about? Present an argument that demonstrates omnipotence and omnibenevolence to be incompatible. And it is one's mind that thinks, not one's brain.

emotive nonsense. How is there a contradiction between omnipotence and omnibenevolence?

It is a privilege to live in a time when someone knows God's mind and can explain it to the rest of us. Or is this just a confused and confusing expression of the human limit of what can be known of or about God or His motives? That is, an obscure way of saying not only do we not know, but we cannot know? — tim wood

You can't refute an argument with a sarcastic tone of voice, to paraphrase David Lewis.

Morality requires God, not belief in God. No intelligent theist thinks belief in God is necessary for moral behaviour. It's a straw man position.

Do I hold belief in God and God to be the same? Er, no, because I'm not incredibly dumb. One is a belief. The other is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person. Big difference.

Note too that if belief in God and God are one and the same, what exactly is the content of the belief? A belief that a belief? A belief that a belief that what?

And note as well that if belief in God and God are one and the same, then God exists even by your own lights, for presumably you accept that some people believe in God.

And then you'd have to think there are lots of Gods. But that makes no sense, given that there can only be one omnipotent being.

This is why good reasoners don't confuse beliefs with their objects.

I will say, however, that this God you now believe in consists of a formless quality that you attribute to a certain language structure of three letters. How you might describe or define ‘God’ is then a matter of taste. — Possibility

No she isn't. Nothing I've said gives you any ground for thinking such a thing. She's not a language - languages don't issue instructions, people do. So Reason is a person - a mind. So, one of us. Just she's also going to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, by virtue of being the one among us whose attitudes constitute reasons. And thus she will qualify as God. So the exact opposite of what you said. She - God, Reason - is a personality. And nothing stops her having a flesh and blood body too, if she so wished.

I get that you’re trying to ‘follow reason’ — Possibility

And a bloody good job I'm doing too, if I do say so myself. And why is 'follow reason' in inverted commas? You show already that you're not interested in doing so, not seriously, and that you've already made your mind up about how things are with Reason.

but I’m afraid we’re really not as rational in word and action as we might assume. We only appear rational by projecting affect or emotion outward as ‘logical’ judgement or evaluation. — Possibility

Speak for yourself.

Logic would insist that only one of these can be true, and yet nothing but ignorance or judgement either way would tip the scales. My philosophy, therefore, must allow for both possibilities, even as I’m aware that my words or actions at any time will always be interpreted as if only one is true. — Possibility

You do realize this argument proves God, right?

1. Imperatives of Reason exist
2. Existent imperatives require an existent mind to bear them.
3. Therefore, imperatives of Reason are the imperatives of an existent mind
4. A mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
5. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are impertatives of Reason - Reason - is a mind who exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
6. An existent mind that is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent is God
7. Therefore, God exists.

You don't think it does, because you don't follow reason. If you did, you'd know the conclusion follows and the premises are all true far, far beyond a reasonable doubt.

I’m not really interested in an argument about the existence of ‘God’. — Possibility

Yes, because you're not really interested in following Reason. (And again with the inverted commas).

No, I'm saying that God can make a square circle. For we suppose such things are impossible because the idea involves a contradiction. But the law of non-contradiction is a law of Reason and thus it is in her gift to change it, to allow exceptions to it, and so on.

There is no non-question begging way of arguing against this claim, for all you're going to be able to do is point out the contradictory nature of the idea in question. Yet that is not in dispute. And nor is it in dispute that the law of non contradiction is true. All we are talking about is what an all powerful being 'can' do. And the answer to that is easy: anything. And what my theory shows is just how that can be: God is Reason and thus God and God alone has the power to rewrite Reason's rules, for Reason's rules express her will.

Yes, you don't have an obligation to maximize happiness because you happen to want to, but irrespective of whether you do.

In the case of the murderer a the door he was, and this has been referenced on TPF numerous times. Best you look it up and satisfy yourself. — tim wood

Once more: Kant is unclear on who or what Reason is. As you'd know if you'd read him.

'Course he was, and the world has waited about 260 years for Bartricks to straighten him and us and all of it out. Thank you Bartricks. — tim wood

You'd have adopted the same sarcastic tone towards Kant himself if you'd lived 260 years ago. Oo thank you Mr Kant for coming in and straightening morality out for us.

None of that follows. First, nothing stops God from telling some people to do one thing and others to do another. Second, it is conceptually confused to think God could be confused. God is omnipotent and omniscient and thus is not confused. Third, as God is omnipotent he could have given us perfect knowledge of his attitudes if he so wished. As he has not, this tells us something, namely that he isn't particularly bothered about what we get up to or that we know what his attitudes are.

The title of the thread states it. And you stated it too, for why else did you make this observation:

Some people have moral norms and values despite not believing in God. — creativesoul

Do you think those of us who believe morality requires God would disagree with that? Do you think it presents some kind of a challenge to the view that morality requires God? Or were you just saying stuff?

Just answer the question.

Yes, a subtler mind would have understood the dialectic.

You asked me to explain why God's prescriptions and values would not be arbitrary.

I did that. God is Reason and Reason's prescriptions and values are the opposite of arbitrary for arbitrary means without reason.

You then repeated your criticism as if the problem was that I hadn't understood it.

I then asked you how exactly anything Reason does can be arbitrary, given what arbitrary means.

You then asked me to define Reason (Reason is the source of all reasons). And then you told me your own view. A view that, as well as being bonkers, would be subject to the same arbitrariness charge you levied at mine. I asked you to explain how prescriptions that emanate from a platonic form are less arbitrary than those that emanate from a mind. You haven't answered yet

It wasn't a real question. It is not possible for the attitudes of Reason to qualify as arbitrary given that arbitrary means 'without reason'. Her attitudes are the exact opposite of arbitrary. To insist they are arbitrary is obviously question begging.

Your own view is easily refuted. 'The good', whatever that may be, is not a mind on your view else your view is just my view differently expressed. But that is sufficient to sink it, for if 'the good' is not a mind how the hell does it issue imperatives and value things?

Also, even if it could - and it can't- how, exactly, would its imperatives not be arbitrary given you are so insistent that if it was a mind they would be?? Hard to fathom why what emanates from a platonic form would not be arbitrary whereas what emanates from a mind is. And no good you insisting that what emanates from the good can't possibly be arbitrary given this is the good we are talking about, for that was my point in respect of Reason. Perhaps you will accept it now that you see you must make the same point about your own view

How can Reason's attitudes possibly be arbitrary when arbitrary means 'for no reason'? Her attitudes 'are' reasons and thus they can never be arbitrary. To think they could be is to refuse to acknowledge that Reason's attitudes are reasons.

You are just describing an epistemic vice in yourself and projecting it onto others, it seems to me.

My philosophical views do not reflect my tastes. I had no desire to believe in God, and no vested interest in doing so, yet now I do due to philosophical reflection. Lots of my views are like this. Don't you change your views when you encounter arguments for views you do not yet hold yet cannot refute?

Of course, many are not like this and decide approximately what's true in advance of philosophical investigation and then look to philosophy to provide them with rationalizations of their convictions. But those people are not really doing philosophy. For they are not trying to follow reason but trying to get reason to follow them.

I think you are confusing different issues.

The moral law is situational in that it applies to all agents. So, if one is not an agent - that is, if one does not have a faculty of reason - then the moral law does not apply to you.

If you do possess a faculty of reason, then the moral law does apply to you.

All can agree to that, including utilitarians and particularists (particularists being those who think morality is very context sensitive to the point of rendering all attempts to distil a principle or principles misguided).

Kant also observed that the moral law does not depend for its rational authority upon one having any particular desire or end. So whereas imperatives of prudence make mention of our ends - if you are thirsty, then get yourself a drink - moral imperatives do not. For they are addressed to us all as agents, rather than to us as individuals with our own particular projects.

But even this is something that utilitarians and particularists can agree on. For these points are more metaethical than normative.

It is just that Kant thought we can from these observations derive substantial insight into the content of the moral law. That is, he thought that a rational imperative that applies to us all as agents would have to have a particular content. And it was from that thought that he arrived at his conclusion that lying is always wrong.

Your analogy with the colour of an object confuses the above issues with another one, namely the objectivity or subjectivity of morality. That issue applies to colour too. That is, whether colour is objective or subjective is a matter of debate. And for this very reason it is not useful in casting light on the moral issue. For those who think morality is subjective will likely also be persuaded that colour is, and vice versa.

Kant himself was horribly confused on this, because he held that moral imperatives are imperatives of reason - indeed that 'the'moral imperative is the supreme imperative of Reason - yet was never clear about who or what Reason was. He sometimes seems to confuse Reason with our faculty of reason, and sometimes seems to identify ourselves as Reason, and sometimes seems to think that if he can show that all faculties of reason will tell their bearers the same thing, then this serves somehow to show that what it tells them is objective (which is patently false).

But anyway, you will not gain insight into the nature of morality by thinking about colour, as whether colour is objective or subjective is, if anything, more debatable than it is in the moral case.

Actually, do eat some.

don't eat yellow snow.

A reply worthy of a buddhist.

How is it a hindrance? To be intelligent is to be responsive to Reason. And to be good is to behave in a manner, and instantiate traits of character, that Reason approves of. Reason is not going to disapprove of being responsive to her, and the more responsive one is, the more likely one is to be someone she approves of. So intelligence will generally help one to be good, not pose an obstacle to it. It may not be necessary, but it isn't a hindrance.

I am not sure I fully follow you. But if you are asking why moral norms and values will not be arbitrary if they are the prescriptions and values of God, then the following explains.
First, let's be clear what 'arbitrary' means. It means 'without reason'.
Now note that moral norms and values are but a subset of the prescriptions and values of Reason.
Now note that Reason must be a mind, for only minds can issue prescriptions or value things.
Now note that Reason, being a mind, will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and thus will be God.
Now note that it is not possible for the prescriptions and values of this mind to be arbitrary, given that arbitrary means 'without reason' and these are the precise opposite, for they are the prescriptions and values of none other than Reason herself!

I have never met an intelligent buddhist. Indeed, 'buddhist' means 'bullshittist' I think. So that a buddhist thinks x is not in any way shape or form good evidence that x.

You are not getting it. Which is worrying, given the point is so simple.

The claim that morality requires God (which is demonstrably true) is not equivalent to the claim that belief in God is necessary for moral behaviour. Indeed, they are so obviously not equivalent that I think anyone who regularly conflates them is a total berk.

My house is made of wood. That claim is not equivalent to the claim that entering my house requires believing in wood. Were I to claim that my house is made of wood, would you respond 'but many people have managed to enter your house without believing in wood!'?

Or if I claimed water is made of molecules, would you reply 'but many people drink water without believing in molecules!'?

How exactly does that work? If a real God, what would he know, and why would he care, about the good - the good being a human conception? If not real, then an idea, but not necessarily an idea of a divine being, the good being approachable through reason and human spirit. — tim wood

How does it work? Water is made of molecules, yes? So, in order for water to exist, some molecules need to exist. And if some water does indeed exist, then some molecules exist. Likewise, for moral norms and values to exist, God needs to exist (why? Because moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of God). And if moral norms and values do exist, God exists.

But like most, you are profoundly confused about these matters and make an elementary mistake. And that mistake is to have confused a concept with what it is the concept of. Humans - most of them - have the concept of morality. That does not mean that morality is a concept. Morality itself is that which answers to the concept. But like I say, there's a subtlety of mind needed to recognize this that few here possess.

That's a metaphor. You think of it as a stuff, right? And that generates actual infinities. And that should tell you that that's the wrong way to conceptualize it.

The thread addresses a straw man because the claim is not that morality requires God (which it does). The claim is that moral behaviour requires 'belief' in God. That's absurd - a total straw man. For example, the view that water is made of molecules is not equivalent to the absurd view that to be able to drink water requires believing it is made of molecules. Atheists prefer to attack these crazy invented views than the real deal partly, no doubt, because they are often too dumb to be able to distinguish them.

This whole thread is a straw man. What respectable moral philosopher has ever argued that belief in God is necessary for doing good? It's just stupid. You might as well have a thread 'belief in God as necessary for eating cheese'. Just silly. Really silly.

I have no idea what 'a new tag on his slope' means. I am wearing a new watch while skiing?

So, you think if one says "bachelors are by definition unmarried men" one is asserting bachelors to be fictional? Okay, good point 70IQ.

I agree with Kant if the point is that there cannot be any actual infinities and thus there cannot be an infinity of past events.

But I think there is no problem with an event becoming ever more past for infinity. For that's a potential infinity, not an actual one.

The mistake most make when it comes to time is to conceive of it as a kind of extended stuff, and that immediately generates actual infinities. For now any region of time, like any region of space, can be infinitely divided. And thus we have to posit actual infinities. Which can't exist.

One also gets other absurdities, such as a past-most event that nevertheless cannot become any more past (even though clearly all past events are getting more and more past all the time).

Intuitively it seems like there is no limit to how past an event can become, and no limit to how far in the future an event can be. Time is boundless.

What this teaches us is that time is not an extended substance. It's a category error to think of it that way.

Another quite different way of thinking about time is to think of it as a set of attitudes. As an analogy, take hate. It is impossible to hate an infinite amount of things. But there is nothing impossible in one hating something more and more without limit. There seems no upper limit to how much one can hate something, yet we do not have thereby to suppose the existence of some kind of infinitely extended stuff - hate - that we acquire ever more of. It's just an attitude. And though attitudes cannot be divided, they can be of infinite potential intensity.

Thus for an event to be past is for it be being 'past-ed' more and more intensely. In this way the first event or events can 'recede' forever into the past, for the past is no longer a strange endless zone, but an attitude that is growing in intensity.

Yes, and if you had read what I said carefully and had sufficient powers of understanding, you'd realize that I did not say "God exists by definition", I said "God is by definition an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind".

Here's a slightly adjusted version of this thread:

OP: Douglas Adams wrote a short story about how a bachelor knowingly uses his wives to find out if he has a wife. Perhaps that's what we all are: wives of a bachelor who is knowingly using his wives to try and find out if he has a wife. It's an interesting idea, no?

Me: That makes no sense; indeed it is doubly confused. FIrst, a bachelor doesn't have a wife by definition. And second, if he's knowingly using his wives to try and find out if he has a wife, then he already knows that he does. So it's just silly.

70IQ: Semanticals! Linguistimisation! The fallacy of semantical linguistimisation. You can't define a bachelor into existence. I'm laughing so hard I am crying and defecating and urinating.

Me: I didn't say that you can define a bachelor into existence. I have argued that you cannot: that whether a bachelor exists is not something we can draw a conclusion about by mere examination of the concept alone. I simply pointed out that a bachelor is by definition wifeless. And thus to propose that there might be a bachelor who is knowingly consulting his wives to find out if he has a wife, is a thoroughly confused proposal that reflects conceptual incompetence on the part of its originator and, indeed, anyone impressed by the idea.

Yes, you are refusing to discuss - refusing to acknowledge that your argument does not work. We are not agreeing to disagree, you are running away, ok? No agreement. You. Running. Away.

why do people keep saying that? No! You're wrong. I don't agree to disagree. You are wrong.

That's not true. God is by definition a mind, for God is just shorthand for 'an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind'.

Minds do not have parts. That's why you can't have half of one.

God could destroy himself if he wished. To think he couldn't is to think him constrained. Yet by definition he's omnipotent and so unconstrained.

What's confused about Douglas Adams's proposal is the idea that God might be lacking in some knowledge such that he would need to do X to acquire it. This is doubly confused for a) God knows everything and b) God doesn't 'need' to do anything to acquire anything, for he's omnipotent.

It is painful to look directly at the sun, Dunbojones. Turn back to the cave wall and watch the shadow puppets. Oo, what's the Dawkins puppet going to do next? He's going to read an SEP page while having his hand held by his big friend Dennett.

Eurgh, the usual suspects: Terribly-Condescending Clark joins the 'arguer, not the argument' party. Focus. On. The. Argument.

Er no, that doesn't follow. And what do you think calling someone an obnoxious douchebag makes you, DumboJones? Focus on the argument, not the arguer. And note that calling someone something does not militate against you being that thing.

No, I don't agree to disagree at all. I mean what, exactly, do you disagree with? Do you think my demonstration was not valid? Or do you think it had a false premise? What are you trying to get to me to agree to disagree about?