kinda missed the point spectacularly.

I am not a Christian and haven't read the bible. But as I understand it, the bible says both that God created everything, and also that God created all things that have been created. The latter is consistent with God not having created us. The former is not, but is also incoherent as it means God created himself (which seems impossible). It seems that christian theists typically split the difference and say that God created everything apart from himself. That's inconsistent with us not having been created, but it is also not in the bible (so far as I know). So as long as one takes 'God created everything' to mean 'God created all things that have been created'then there's no inconsistency.

Those are states of mind or processes involving minds. Obviously. You do not divide water by freezing it, even though that changes its state. Likewise you do not divide a mind by changing its state from thought to desire or whatever.

Yes, it is also the most well known as both Plato and Descartes made it (though the latter only to establish the immortality of the mind, not its aseity - probably because if he'd explicitly drawn that conclusion he'd have been burned as a heretic as it contradicts the idea that God created us).

I believe in reincarnation on philosophical grounds.

There are at least three distinct mutually compatible cases. First, a case from indivisibility.

Our minds are strongly indivisible. Half a mind makes no sense. As our minds are strongly indivisible, they have no parts. An object that has no parts does not come into being - for there is nothing from which it can be formed - and thus if it exists, it has always existed. Thus our minds have always existed. As our lives here had a beginning, we - the minds undergoing them - must have existed previously, for we have always existed.

Second, a case from free will or retributive moral responsibility. To be retributively morally responsible for one's behaviour one needs to be its ultimate originator. One will not be its ultimate originator if one has come into being, for then the causal chain extends outside of oneself to external antecedent causes. Thus, to be retributively responsible requires existing but not having been caused to exist. We are retributively responsible, thus we have not been caused to exist and must always have existed.

Third, a case from God. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being - God - exists. Life here is dangerous and we who are living such lives are ignorant of most things. God, being all powerful, let that be the case. But God, being omnibenevolent, would not have subjected innocent persons to such a life. Thus we are not innocent. But when we are born we have performed no actions in this life. Thus the moral crimes for which this life is a punishment must be ones we performed in a past life. Thus we must have lived previously.

I believe all of these arguments are sound, though only one needs to be.

Yes, the argument is deductive and logically valid, but it is not necessarily sound. Premise 2 is not axiomatic or self evident as it is a contention within metaethical discourse which we are taking part in. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, don't be silly. It is self-evident. If Tim approves of raping Sarah, that does not entail that it is morally right for Tim to rape Sarah, does it?

Moral norms and values obviously transcend our own, both individually and collectively. That's why moral philosophy exists. If morality appeared to be individually subjective, then a course on moral philosophy would be as stupid as a course on 'are you in pain?' And if morality appeared to be collectively subjective, then sociology would solve moral problems and we would recognise this and would not need to bother with normative theorising.

Anyway, individual ethical subjectivism and collective ethical subjectivism are demonstrably false. Nobody defends them. They're only mentioned for the purposes of rejection. If you want to get good at metaethics the first thing you need to do is understand why those views are false, not continue foolishly trying to defend them.

When you say that subjectivism is a theory about what something is 'made of', are you saying that morality (according to subjectivism) is made of our attitudes, feelings, or other psychological states? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Not 'ours' necessarily (that's individual subjectivism specifically), but if you drop the 'ours', then yes.

If so, is individual moral subjectivism not a form of individual moral relativism wherein moral values are relativized to the individual subject? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes. But one could be an objectivist relativist too. So although subjectivism entails moral relativism, moral relativism does not entail moral subjectivism.

Confusion here is easy as most moral objectivists reject relativism. But nevertheless, moral objectivism is compatible with relativism.

I understand that realism is a family of theories about what exists and im not debating that, but rather I am trying to understand how something must necessarily exist in order to be considered true. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I don't think you do properly understand this, as you keep conflating subjectivism with realism, even though they're different claims. One is a claim about what makes moral statements true, the other is the claim that some of them 'are' true.

I understand that subjectivism/objectivism and realism/ relativism are orthogonal to each other, — Cartesian trigger-puppets

This is confused. The opposite of subjectivism is indeed objectivism. But the opposite of relativism is not realism, but absolutism.

Incidentally, Joyce is just once philosopher who works in this area and his coining of the term 'minimal' realist to denote a subjectivist realist is grossly misleading. There's nothing minimal about the realism.

Again, take my example of pain. If I am in pain, does my pain exist? Is it real? Yes. It's as robustly real as anything. Yet it exists subjectively. And anything that exists subjectively is mind dependent.

So note a silly implication of what Joyce has said - it means that pain is only real 'minimally'. Now, that's just silly. Offensive, even. Tell someone who is in pain that their statement "I am in pain" is only 'minimally true' and see what they say!!

Here's another silly implication. It would mean that a divine command moral realist such as myself, only thinks that morality is 'minimally' real. No I don't - I think it is as real as anything!!

In terms of how 'real' I take morality to be, there is no difference between me and a realist objectivist.

So Joyce, much as I respect some of his work, is being unhelpful here in advising us to use the wholly unnecessary and misleading term 'minimal realist' (a term, incidentally, that no-one else uses in this area) to talk about that which exists subjectively.

Pain is real. It is not 'minimally real'. It is as real as the room I am sat in. But the room I am sat in does not exist as my subjective states, whereas pain does. See? No difference in degree of reality, just location of constituents. So, again, attaching 'minimal' to 'subjective' when the subjectivist is a realist is grossly misleading.

Note too that Joyce is not contradicting anything I have said, all he is doing is misleadingly and unnecessarily appending the word 'miminal' to realism when the realist is a subjectivist.

I understand and this helps, but what am I getting wrong about subjectivism as a form of relativism, or as a type of anti-realism? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Moral subjectivism entails moral relativism. Moral relativism is not a form of anti-realism. It is not a form of realism at all, any more than subjectivism is.

Subjectivism is a theory about what morality is made of.

Relativism is a theory about how morality 'behaves' for want of a better word.

Realism is an existential theory about whether or not something exists.

Subjectivism entails relativism, but relativism does not entail subjectivism.

This is where I would say Tim's approval (not sure why his approval must be universal rather than particular here) — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I was just being kind to the individual subjectivism in attributing to them a slightly more plausible view - a characteristic of moral norms seems to be that they are universal, and so it would be slightly more plausible for an individual subjectivist to identify attitudes that are universal in their scope with the truth makers of moral statements rather than other attitudes. So, there is a difference between disapproving of Tim doing X, and disapproving of 'everyone' doing X, and we might find it useful to come up with a way of quickly conveying to others that we have the latter attitude and not the former - and thus we have this word 'wrong' to do so (whereas when our attitude of disapproval is more particular, we can just say "I disapprove').

When attacking a view it is best to address yourself to the strongest version of the theory - that is, the most plausible - and that's what I was doing.

This is where I would say Tim's approval (not sure why his approval must be universal rather than particular here) of rape is an expression of individual relativism (meaning it is right insofar as it is approved by Tim) but seeing that society does not operate on such a premise —be it true or false—but rather on a culturally relativistic premise with deontological installations such as social contracts, human rights, and other such normalized standards for conduct that stigmatize and denormalize such individualized moral standards. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I do not understand what you mean.

Which premise is false in this argument:

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "Raping Jane is right" will necessarily be true if I say it.
2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it
3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X.
— Bartricks

It depends on which metaethical semantics we interpret these statements under. That is the point of metaethics is it not? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Waffle. That first sentence - "It depends on which metaethical semantics we interpret these statements under" - is nonsense. I said stop trying to be clever.

It is a deductively valid argument, yes? So you need to deny a premise. Like I say, don't try and be fancy. Stop using words like 'semantics' and 'metaethics'. Plain English.

Now, premise 1 is true by definition - it just describes a kind of individual subjectivism. So you can't deny 1 .

It has to be 2 then.

Yet 2 is self-evidently true.

There are reasons why philosophers don't defend individual subjectivism. That argument being one of them.

I would replace "Jennifer" with "house plant" because personhood issues muddy the water. — RogueAI

It doesn't muddy it, so much as clarify it. I'm an immaterialist, but I'm still talking about the same person when I talk about Jennifer as someone who is a materialist. We differ radically in what we think Jennifer - the object - is made of, but we are talking about the same entity nonetheless. If we were not, then materialists and immaterialists would not be disagreeing with one another, but talking past one another.

If I think the distant object is cylindrical, but you think it is square, we are still talking about the same object, even though if it is cylindrical it is not square and vice versa.

If we were looking in different directions, 'then' we would not be talking about the same thing, but just mistakenly thinking we were.

The same person, yes. A shared sense of perceptions that we label "Jennifer", yes. The same thing, no. To get to "thing", I would have to unpack what you mean by "Jennifer", and there would eventually be a disagreement, I think. — RogueAI

No, it's the same thing. We just disagree about the nature of what we are perceiving.

This can be illustrated quite easily. Just imagine two people in exactly the same perceptual state. They both get the identical impression of a person, and they both label this person Jennifer. However, one has got to be in this state via a drug and the other by sensibly encountering Jennifer. Are they both talking about the same person when they talk about Jennifer? No. One is talking about a drug induced hallucination ,whereas the other is talking about Jennifer. The fact the perceptual experience is identical does not entail that they are talking about the same thing, then.

Now imagine two people in quite different perceptual states - one is only hearing Jennifer (via a phone) whereas the other is only seeing her. Are they perceiving the same person? Yes.

There's a famous thought experiment - designed by Hilary Putnam - partly to illustrate this point. Imagine a twin earth in which there is a substance that has all the same surface properties as water - Twater - but that has a different chemical composition (XYZ, not H2O). Well, are those on the twin earth talking about water when they talk about twater? That is, if we could somehow bring a denizen of the twin earth to ours and they spotted some water in a lake and said "water!" would they be talking correctly? Surely not. For they use 'water' to refer to a substance that has a chemical composition XYZ, not H2O, whereas the stuff in the lack is H2O.

If I am a materialist and you are an immaterialist, we're still talking about the same person, Jennifer - the same object - even though we have radically different ideas about the nature of this object.

So, you and I have quite different ideas about Jennifer - I think she's an artist and you think she isn't - yet we're both talking about the same person.

This is why materialists and immaterialists can be said to be 'disagreeing' about the nature of water as opposed to talking about quite different things.

I don't think they refer to the same thing. "Water" can refer to a physical substance or an immaterial one (think of "water" in an idealistic universe- it refers to an immaterial thing, an idea). H2O only refers to a physical substance. — RogueAI

What do you say about my example of Jennifer - are we both talking about the same person?

I take it the answer is an obvious 'yes'.

Now does it make any difference if, despite my belief that Jennifer is an artist, she's never painted anything in her life? That is, she's shown me paintings and told me she has painted them, and on that basis I have formed the belief that she is a painter, but in fact she was lying the whole time and has never painted a thing?

I take it that the ansewr is obvious: we're still talking about the same person. I (falsely) believe she is an artist; you correctly believe she is the director of a bank. That my belief about Jennifer is false makes no real difference, so long as it was through interacting with Jennifer that I acquired it.

Well, a scientist who has examined water in a certain way and formed the belief that it is H2o is still talking about the same substance as I am, even though I am an immaterialist and believe that no material substances exist in reality and thus that water is not composed of tiny molecules.

They're not different 'things'. They're one and the same substance. But one does not need to know everything about a thing in order successfully to be talking about it. And two people can know quite different things about something and be talking about one and the same thing and not realize it.

Perhaps I know Jennifer as an artist. Whereas you have no idea about this side of Jennifer and know her as the director of a bank. You had no idea that Jennifer paints, and I had no idea that Jennifer is the director of a bank. Nevertheless, we're talking about one and the same person.

I am doubtful that the second claim is true because im not entirely sure what im committed to by saying that some moral statements are true. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

You're missing the point. Subjectivism and realism are different kinds of theory. Subjectivism is a theory about what something - in this case, morality - is 'made of'. It's not an existential theory. Realism is an existential theory. They're different kinds of theory.

Once more: there's no logical inconsistency between being a subjectivist and a nihilist. This seems to be something you're not grasping. You think the issue here is about truth and what it consists in. No, that's not the point. The point is that subjectivism is not a theory about what exists!!

This: 'banana cakes are made of flour and bananas and eggs' is not a theory about what exists, right? I have literally just expressed that theory. Do you now conclude that I own a banana cake? No, that'd be nuts. Why would it be nuts? Because saying 'banana cakes are made of flour and bananas and eggs' is not equivalent to saying "i have a banana cake" or banana cakes exist. I mean, how can I make this clearer? I used Dodos earlier, precisely because no-one thinks they exist. We can still talk about one is, right? How do you not see this?

Likewise, subjectivism is a theory - or family of theories - about what morality is made of. it is not - not - a theory about what exists. So you are like someone who, when asked about the ingredients of banana cakes, keeps replying "banana cakes are made of bananas and flour and exist".

I literally do not see how you cannot see the difference. Theories about what exist: morality exists (realism); morality does not exist (nihilism). And morality isn't in the business of existing, as it's a practice we engage in (expressivism).

Theories about what morality is made of: subjectivism (morality is made of subjective states); naturalism (morality is made of natural objects, properties and relations); non-naturalism (morality is made of non-natural objects, properties and relations).

On your view:

Are beliefs considered to be a part of an individual's subjective states? If so, can such beliefs be cognitive? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, beliefs are subjective states. Only subjects - minds - can believe things. A belief is a state of mind - a state of a subject. Beliefs are subjective states.

I do not know what you mean by 'cognitive'. Can you ask the question again without using the word cognitive?

Can there be facts about an individual's subjective states? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, of course.

Philosophical theories about the nature of morality generally divide into assertions that moral truths express subjective states and assertions that moral truths express objective facts, analogous to the fact, for example, that the sun is more massive than the earth.

So-called subjectivist theories regard moral statements as declaring that certain facts hold, but the facts expressed are facts about a person’s subjective states. For example, the statement “It is wrong to ignore a person in distress if you are able to offer aid” just means something like “I find it offensive when someone ignores a person in distress….” This is a statement about the subject’s perceptions of the object, not about the object itself (that is, ignoring a person in distress).

Do you find anything wrong with this author's description here? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes and no. Those two paragraphs do not say quite the same thing.

First, however, some philosophers would classify non-cognitivism as a kind of subjectivism. That author may be one of those, however the way they have expressed themselves is actually quite clumsy.

There is a difference between describing a subjective state ("I am excited") for instance, and 'expressing' a subjective state ("Yippee!").

Now, what does it mean to say that "moral truths express subjective states"? If the claim is that moral truths are 'about' subjective states such subjective states will operate as their truth makers, then the claim is correct. However, then 'express' wasn't really the right word (why not 'describe' or 'are about' - that would be clearer). If, on the other hand, the author is saying that 'moral truths' (and the inverted commas are now needed) are disguised expressions of attitude, then no. For now their definition of subjectivism would make expressivism a form of subjectivism - which, like I say, is not objectionable in itself, it is just not how I and many other philosophers would use the term).

What the second paragraph says is approximately correct, although again, poorly expressed.

For example, the statement “It is wrong to ignore a person in distress if you are able to offer aid” just means something like “I find it offensive when someone ignores a person in distress….” This is a statement about the subject’s perceptions of the object, not about the object itself (that is, ignoring a person in distress). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

The statement in question, if it means what the author has just said it means, is not "about the subject's perceptions of the object", but the subject's 'attitudes' towards it.

Anyway, I have already said what subjectivism means. Subjectivism is the view that a) moral propositions are truth-apt and b) their truth makers are subjective states.

I remember you offering one such objection that went something like: 'If moral subjectivism is true, then my belief that raping J is good would make raping J a moral thing to do. Raping J is not a moral thing to do. Therefore moral subjectivism is false.' Forgive me if I have misrepresented your argument here. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That was an objection to individual subjectivism. (Subjectivism is the name of a family of views, that includes my own - divine command theory). So, I am a subjectivist. My objection was to 'individual' subjectivism.

If individual subjectivism is true, then the truth makers of any moral utterance you make is some of your own subjective states. That's just true by definition.

So, let's just say - for the sake of argument - that 'wrongness' describes a certain attitude of disapproval (perhaps universal disapproval) and rightness approval (a certain universal approval, say).

Okay, well then by definition if Tim universally approves of rape, it will be right for Tim to rape.
That's clearly not true. Therefore that kind of subjectivism is false.

And we can run the same argument for any other of an individual's subjective states.

The problem with the above argument is that it fails to acknowledge the metaethical semantics of subjectivist moral theories (such as Dwayne H. Mulder acknowledged in his article). With this in mind, the statement, "Raping J is good," simply means something like "I find it morally acceptable to rape J" which is simply a description of the authors subjective states. This description seems to be truth-apt, and at least a psychological fact, but I suppose im uncertain whether or not it is true. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I haven't the faintest idea what you're on about. You're clearly confused - you're confusing non-cognitivism and subjectivism. Stop that.

Which premise is false in this argument:

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the staement "Raping Jane is right" will nessarily be true if I say it.
2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it
3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X.

Don't try and be clever. Just say which premise is false.

I meant that Wikipedia cited these authors. The citations are right there on the page if you don't believe me. I'm not being dishonest, perhaps I could have written that a little more clearly. Wikipedia clearly cited these authors, whether or not these citations are accurate representations of what these authors actually said is another issue — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Well, you're clearly very sloppy: the authors are referenced for claim 3, not claim 2. And if you'd taken the trouble to read the relevant quotes from the authors that were given in support of that claim, you'd have noticed that they in no way make realism a commitment of subjectivism. Why? Because it isn't. And I've explained why umpteen times.

'Accurate'? No it certainly isn't. See previous post above.

You are basing your definition on a misreading of one - one - philosopher's definition. Oppy is not saying what you think he is - he is not making possession of causal powers a defining feature of naturalism. But even if he was - and he isn't - that doesn't mean his definition is orthodox.

It is absurd insofar as you'd then have to describe substance dualists and monist immaterialists as naturalists! What use is the term 'naturalist' in philosophy if virtualy everyone - including those who differ profoundly over what they think reality consists of
- are nevertheless all naturalists?

What's wrong with my definition?

Where causality is concerned, those - such as myself - who believe in non-natural entities, do not thereby disbelieve in causality or disbelieve in the causal powers of non-natural entities.

Your definition would have the absurd upshot than any and all who believe in entities with causal powers are thereby naturalists.

No, you've misunderstood Oppy.

Some of our mental states appear to be 'about' things. Perceptual states 'represent' something to be the case; beliefs are 'about' things; desires are 'for' things.

Of course, such talk is profoundly confused. Philosophers talk of mental states having 'representative contents', meaning they 'represent' somethng to be the case (and thereby become capable of being accurate or inaccurate). But no mental state can 'represent' anything to be the case, for 'representing' is an activity. So it is something one does, not something one - or something - is. A mental state can no more 'represent' something to be the case than it can walk somewhere or go on holiday. I can represent something to be the case; and can do so 'by' being in some mental state, but the mental state itself does not do the representing. To think otherwise is as confused as thinking that thoughts think things.

Minds can represent, minds can desire, minds can believe. But representations do not represent, and desires do not desire, and beliefs do not believe. Representing, believing, desiring: these are all mental activities, not mental states. They are done by a mind being in a certain state, but the state in question is the means by which the mind represents, believes, or desires; the state represents, believes or desires nothing.

I understand that Wikipedia is not academically peer-reviewed, but those particular statements were cited by two academic sources:

1. Richard Brandt (1959). Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

2. Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That is incredibly dishonest of you. They did NOT say such things. Someone who wrote that wikipedia entry said those things - someone who is clearly NOT a professional philosopher. It is not something anything either of those philosophers said. Christ! I just went to the shoddy wikipedia article from which you seem to be getting your information (again: wikipedia is not written by professional philosophers....it's written by people like you, who lack any concern to get things correct!)

This is the quote from Brandt:

"[Objectivism and subjectivism] have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something."

Okay? Nowhere there does he conflate subjectivism with realism.

This is the quote from Harrison:

"A subjectivist ethical theorist is a theory according to which moral judgements about men or their actions are judgements about the way people react to these men and actions - that is, the way they think or feel about them."

Same again. No conflation of subjectivism with realism. So a) stop dishonestly pretending that what you're quoting is coming from professional philosophers. It isn't. It's wikipedia - which is shite where philosophy is concerned because virtually everything on it is written by non-philosophers who only half understand what they're saying.

And how does this not contradict you: "To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality," — Cartesian trigger-puppets

How on earth does that contradict what I said???

Moral subjectivism is a view about the truth-makers of moral statements. It is the view that they are subjective states.

It is NOT the view that some moral statements are true. That's a distinct claim.

There's what would make "Here is a live Dodo" true, and then there's whether it is true.

I do not know how you can not see the difference.

As for what to replace these views with: divine command theory. Which is a form of subjectivism, but one that does not succumb to the criticisms that refute individual and collective forms of subjectivism.

When we judge an act to be wrong, we are not simply describing our own negative attitude towards it. After all, if we were, then if I approved of Xing, it would necessarily be right for me to X. Yet it isn't.

Our judgements are not, then, about our own subjective states. Our subjective states are 'not' the truth-makers of our moral beliefs.

Nevertheless, when we judge an act to be wrong we are judging that there is a proscription against doing it; and when we judge an act to be right we are judging that there is a prescription enjoining us to do it.

Only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and proscriptions.

Thus, the subjectivist is correct in thinking that subjective states are the truth makers for moral propositions. But the individual and collective subjectivists are wrong in thinking that it is 'our' subjective states that are those truth makers.

No, the subjective states that are the truth makers of moral propositions are the subjective states of someone other than any of us.

That subject - the subject whose subjective states are the truth-makers of all moral propositions - would be God.

Note, that too is not a form of moral realism, for it is once more a claim about what it would 'take' for any moral proposition to be true and does not incorporate the additional claim that some 'are' true.

Obviously some are true and thus God exists. But one could agree with everything I have said above and conclude that as God does not exist, no moral propositions are true.

Let's define a mind as an object that has mental states.

Let's define a material object as an object that has extension.

Let's also stipulate that my brain is an object that has extension.

And now let's stipulate that my brain has mental states.

My brain is now my mind, but it is also a material object.

I take it that we would both agree that my brain is a 'natural' object and thus that - under these circumstances - my mind turns out to be a natural object.

If we now imagine that everything in the universe apart from my brain disappears, then everything that exists is now natural - naturalism is true - and everything that exists is also my mind.

This kind of situation is one with which, I take it, my definition of naturalism would be unable to cope. For I have said that naturalism is best understood as the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are mind-external entities. I agree, but it is easy to fix by simply changing 'mind external' to 'not essentially mental entities'. It would remain the case that everything that exists was also my mind. But what exists - my brain - does not have its mental states as an essential property (for it could cease to have any mental states and yet still have extension). And so what exists could continue to do so without there being any mental entities in existence. This would then permit there to be naturalists who maintain that everything that exists are minds, and immaterialists who maintain that everything that exists is essentially a mind or mental states.

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism.

Note too that even if there are some positions that operate to blur the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism, that doesn't mean that this is not what the terms mean.

But now you're just using 'real' and 'natural' as synonyms.

That's not how they're used, not in philosophy anyway.

Two philosophers can agree that, say, morality exists - and thus is real - yet one might be a naturalist about morality and the other a non-naturalist.

So naturalism shouldn't be used as a synonym for 'real' as that makes such debates misguided by definition.

So, these sources are wrong?

Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.

2. Some such propositions are true.

3.The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.
—Wikipedia — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That source is wrong, yes. Wikipedia is not peer reviewed. It's written by people like you: non-experts who only half-understand what they're writing about.

Ethical Subjectivism holds that there are no objective moral properties and that ethical statements are in fact arbitrary because they do not express immutable truths. Instead, moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of the observers, and any ethical sentence just implies an attitude, opinion, personal preference or feeling held by someone. Thus, for a statement to be considered morally right merely means that it is met with approval by the person of interest.
—Philosophybasics — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That one is a bit confused (the bit where it talks about immutable truths is the confused bit). Note, though, that it does not assert that realism is an essential component of moral subjectivism. That you think otherwise doesn't bode well for your comprehension skills. So, ignoring the first sentence - which is confused - the second and third sentences just say what I said, namely that subjectivism in ethics is the view that the truth-makers of moral statements are subjective states. It doesn't say that subjectivism is the view that some moral statements are true. Learn to read more carefully!

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent; here I shall use the term “non-objectivism.” Thus, “moral non-objectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent (in the relevant sense), while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. (Note that this nomenclature makes the two contraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the noncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor non-objectivists
— Joyce, Richard,
—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I have no issue with what Joyce has said there. It's absolutely right. And he has not contradicted anything I have said or confirmed anything you have said.

If one is not a non-cognitivist and not a moral error theorist, then one is a moral realist.

That's correct. Another way to put it: if you think moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true, then one is a moral realist.

What you seem singularly incapable of grasping is that one can be a moral subjectivist and an error theorist. Once more: that would be impossible if 'realism' was an essential commitment of subjectivism. Yet it is possible. I have described how. If one is an individual subjectivist, then the systematic absence of the relevant subjective state would suffice to make one a moral error theorist; if one is an inter-subjectivist, then the absence of the relevant community would make one an error theorist; and if one is a divine command theorist - so, one identifies the truth-makers of moral statements with the subjective states of a god - then one would be an error theorist if one thought the god did not exist.

So, once more, metaethical subjectivism is 'not' a form of moral realism. One can be a subjectivist and a realist, but the two are distinct: one is a view about morality's ingredients, the other is a view about whether morality exists.

The picture of philosophy that Bartricks is working with can be seen as monolithic, stereotypical, and homogenous. In a word, boring. — Banno

You realize you've just dismissed philosophy. You find philosophy boring. B.S. is much more interesting to you. For that, after all, is all you deal in, right?

Real philosophers aren't trying to be clever, or have an interesting discussion: they're trying to close discussion down. You don't see that, do you? Because you're not a real philosopher. If there is overwhelming evidence that theory X is true, then there's nothing further to discuss.

No, I am saying that the form of subjectivism that I have subscribed to is committed to the statement, "At least some moral statements are true," and that does not necessarily entail that I am a realist. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

And I'm telling you that if you include that claim then you are a 'subjectivist realist' about morality.

Two points then, that you seem incapable of understanding.

Point 1: nobody, but nobody, uses 'subjectivism' about morality to include a commitment to realism. It is 'compatible' with realism, but it does not include a commitment to it. Of course, you are free to use words however you like, but it is misleading and silly to use the term in the way you are and it just makes you seem confused (and you are, clearly).

Point 2: if you think some moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true, then you think their truth conditions obtain. And so you are therefore a moral realist. For you believe morality exists. For by your own lights, morality itself is the truth conditions of moral statements.

You don't think that if you're a non-cognitivist. But you do if you think moral statements are about the world. Which you do if you're a subjectivist. They're 'about' subjective states. They don't 'express' them, they 'describe' them.

And the view is patently absurd, as I have already explained to you using arguments you have said nothing about and don't seem to understand.

As for your attempts to defend the view - you presented two arguments, both question begging and clearly unsound, and one not even for your kind of view!

That can't be correct, for that would mean that immaterialism - a view that is as far from naturalism as it is possible to be - would turn out to be a form of naturalism (which makes a mockery of the term). It would also mean that the debate over whether the non-natural can causally interact with the natural is misguided by definition (which it isn't).

Naturalism is best understood as the view that the ultimate constituents of reality are extra-mental entities.

↪Bartricks

Why do you keep conflating subjectivism with realism?
— Bartricks

I'm not conflating anything. Subjectivism, like realism, can be a form of cognitivism. Just as you describe subjectivism here:

Subjectivism in metaethics is the view that moral statements are truth apt and their truth makers are subjective states.
— Bartricks — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes you are, because you are saying that a commitment to moral realism is part and parcel of moral subjectivism. That's false. It's no different from, say, conflating incompatibilism about free will with libertarianism (libertarianism being the combination of incompatibilism and realism about free will).

Subjectivism in ethics is a view about what truth-makers of moral statements are. It is 'not' a view about whether those truth-makers exist.

Realism in metaethics comes in a few different forms, each with a different set of commitments. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Well, actually no. But you're missing the point. The point is that realism is distinct from subjectivism.

There's a theory about what Dodos are. That's a theory about what the truth-maker of "that's a real live Dodo" would be. Then there's whether there are any Dodos. That's a theory about whether any statements of the "that's a real live Dodo" kind are true.

Subjectivism is a theory of the first kind - it is a theory about what the truth maker of "that's immoral" would be. Realism is the view that "that's immoral" is sometimes true. Again, you are just conflating these two kinds of theory

You can be a subjectivist and believe no moral statement is true.
— Bartricks

I'm aware of the non-cognitivist forms of moral subjectivism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Er, what? That's really confused. I am not talking about non-cognitivism! I am talking about subjectivism. Why are you not getting this? It's simple.

I gave you the example of pain to try and show you how painfully simple this is.

Subjectivism about pain is uncontroversial, right? Pain 'is' a subjective state.

Does it follow that it exists? No. It is entirely possible that no-one is in pain right now. In which case pain does not exist and no statement of the "I am currently in pain" kind would be true.

Thus, subjectivism about pain does not entail that pain exists.

The same applies to subjectivism about morality. It is NOT equivalent to realism. If it were it would be logically impossible for subjectivism to be true, and yet for nihilism to be true. Yet the two are compatible.

This has nothing - nothing - to do with non-cognitivism. Nothing.

This may be true. I am certainly capable of being wrong and it would not surprise me if, in fact, I was in error somewhere within this meta-ethical theory I've constructed. This is precisely why I have given my arguments to support my view as being the case, so that others may analyze my arguments and bring to my attention any inconsistencies found therein. You have done a miserable job at pointing out where my logic has failed because it is not persuasive to simply assert that I am confused, in error, wrong, insane, making a rookie mistake, etc, without providing any elucidation as to where the error is. If you wish to do so then, first accurately represent my views and then, if it is a logical problem, next show me which propositions form the contradiction. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Okay, sod you then. If you find yourself unable to follow my criticisms, then I'm afraid you're simply not very good at metaethics.

It is egotistical to think Western linear logic is the only possible logic. It is not. — Athena

What on earth are you on about?

This argument is valid, no?

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

Does it matter where I am? If I'm in China right now, is it not valid?

Someone who thinks this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore R

is an idiot, correct?

Or do they have a different 'logic' and their view is as good as anyone else's? If they reasoned that way in an essay, should I give them an A, or fail them? It's fail them, yes? Or should I not be doing that. When someone reasons like a total spanner, should I give them an A? Should I give everyone an A?

In other parts of the world, the word Philosophy has never existed. It was always Religion or Rules of How one should live based on their religions and political ideologies. Then they have wrongly called them Philosophy. Their interest is not about how to argue, analyse and know the world, God, freedom, self identity etc critically like the many Western philosophical tradition. Their purpose was how to live for the regime or their Religious principles or their Gods or get enlightenment or saved from this material worldly problems, just like Western Religions and Mysticism are about. — Corvus

Yes, that sounds correct to me. It is an abuse of language to refer to such practices - that is, the practice of just describing a worldview uncritically - as 'philosophy'. It suggests some kind of equivalence between those who do that - those who just describe - and those who follow evidence.

But you don't have any expertise. You're not really getting this are you? You have no expertise when it comes to philosophy. I do. You are confident that everything I say is philosophically crap, yes? But that's the judgement - the alarmingly confident, self serving judgement - of an ignoramus about about an expert's arguments. That's exactly what Dunning and Kruger's research predicts. What would happen if a professional philosopher came on this site without anyone knowing that they were an expert? What would Dunning and Kruger predict, Banno? Would they predict that all the ignorant people would recognize the philosopher for the expert they were? Or would they predict that the philosopher would quickly be judged a total idiot by virtually everyone?

Your assumptions are wrong. Academics have loads of arguments that they don't send out for publication or take on the road to conferences or discuss with colleagues. It takes a long time to turn an argument into a publishable paper, and often the more innovative the argument, the less likely it is to get published. Thus one focuses on more banal nit-picky stuff that will get past peer review and one puts the better, more original and daring stuff on the back burner.

As for what I said about teacher training - no, it's not 'plain false', it's 'true'. (You teach in a university do you? Or were you being confidently wrong about a matter you know nothing about? Hmmm). University lecturers learn to teach on the job. Ask one. They do not have to have a formal teaching qualification (they might be made to attend some tedious and pointless lecture about teaching - as I was at my first appointment - but that's it). I am one. I do not have a teaching qualification. None of my colleagues do either. So again, stop being confident about matters you know nothing about.

And as for your charming comment "all of your posts are trash", all I can say is: Dunning and Kruger. I feel the same way about yours. The difference is that's an expert's judgement of a fool, not a fool's judgement of an expert .

Anyway, all this is by the by. I mean, you're not going to believe that you are the one demonstrating the Dunning kruger effect. And it doesn't matter - if you just stuck to trying to argue something I wouldn't mention it.

You played, matey. You don't have any expertise. We both know it. Yet you've been confidently telling an expert - me - that his arguments - all of them - are shite. A text book case of the phenomenon known as.....the Dumning-Kruger effect!

The topic is not 'me'. You are the one obsessed with me. The topic is expressed in the OP. Address it or go away.

What makes you qualified to make that judgement, Isaac?

You're expertise to judge that please? What level of ability do you think I have?

See answer to Banno above. The numbers don't count. It's the actual level of expertise that matters. Do you have any? (Why am I asking - we both know the answer).

Your doctor: hmm, I think your arm is fractured in 3 places.

You: But 10 of my workmates down at domino's pizza say it isn't broken, it's just gone a bit wobbly. So there, you gobshite!!! In your face!! You're wrong. It's wobbly, not broken. You ought to be struck off! If my arm wasn't so wobbly I'd strike you myself.

Ah, your refusal to answer confirms what I already knew - you have no expertise at all.

You think the numbers count? You think that if 10 people with no expertise whatsoever think a highly qualified person is talking shite, then it is the highly qualified person who is most likely manifesting the effect and not the 10 thickies?!? That doesn't sound very clever. Sounds thick.

Anyway, go away Banno, you've nothing philosophical to contribute, just bile.

what makes you think you're a good judge of replies to criticisms? Do you have any expertise? For again, that's crucial to determining who is most likely manifesting the effect.

Was Socrates a physicist?

Explain.

Address my previous reply. In English.