I have done. You can lead a horse to water, but you can't shove its muzzle into the water and say "drink it you stupid horse!!" You can fail to follow an argument - and that's because arguments give you normative reason to believe what they show, but they do not describe what you will, in fact, believe.

Okaaay, if you say so.

Look, there can be directives about directives: 'do what he told you to do' for instance.

But anyway, if you're just going to ignore the arguments I give in support of my claims, there's not much I can do for you.

Yes, if you say it is 'false' (unsound?) then it will be. That's definitely how reality works. Enjoy listening to yourself.

The problem you have with my argument is twofold: a) you don't understand it, b) it's a proof of God.

If you 'ought' to draw the conclusion, then you are bid draw it - that's what the oughtness 'is'.

If you do what you ought not to do, then you are doing what is forbidden - that is, what you are 'bid' not do.

Look, this is silly, the existence of norms of Reason is not in dispute. If you want to talk about something different - descriptions of norms of Reason - then that's fine. But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the imperatives of Reason themselves.

The imperatives of Reason are imperatives (hence the name). And they - not something else - require an imperator. And, well, the rest follows.

And yes, obviously the instructions of Reason are not conveyed to you in English (not by Reason, anyway) - where, oh where, did my argument claim otherwise??

I explained. The laws of Reason are prescriptive laws, not descriptive. That's why you can flout them.

A directive requires a mind to issue it. Take this "give me all your money!" If I'm a bot, is that a directive? No. If I'm a mind, then it is. If I'm not, then it isn't.

And what, pray, are philosophers talking about when they talk about the imperatives of Reason?

And what are you following when you reason, if not some kind of directive?

So you are denying that you ought to draw the conclusion of a sound argument?

That was a prescription given in a language. Reason is surely descriptive. — InPitzotl

No. A description of an imperative is a description, of course. And if by 'Reason' you mean 'a description of all of Reason's imperatives" then yes, that's a description. But I am clearly referring to the imperatives themselves.

There are different ways to express the same point. Reality has a normative aspect to it, yes? That. That's what I'm talking about. The norms of Reason. They're norms, right? Directives, prescriptions, commands, instructions.

Those require a commander.

I didn't understand the rest of what you said

I'm certainly an a-theorist about time, but I don't think I'm a presentist, as I think past and future events exist. But I'm waiting on Paul Hollywood to confirm this.

I don't think you fully grasp what i've done. The existence of God is what the argument 'concludes'. It is not asserted in any premise.

I defined God, as a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. But that definition does not assert the existence of such a being.

I defined laws of Reason as imperatives and/or instructions. And I showed how there is no reasonable way of denying their reality. And I noted that imperatives and instructions require a mind to issue them.

And then I showed how the mind in question would satisfy the definition of God and would, in addition, exist.

That's a proof of God's existence. The problem is that you have a dogmatic belief that there is no such proof, yes? Plus you think that all valid arguments are just bunches of assertions and they prove nothing, yes? That way you get to believe whatever you want and you don't have ever to revise your views in light of reason.

Anyway, enough analysis of your foolishness: how about you actually address the argument I made rather than make false accusations?

That does not follow. I believe there is a yellow crayon in this box sticking out just to the left of an orange crayon, and I use reasoning to believe it, but it's not clear that I followed an instruction. I tend to think I just looked at the box. — InPitzotl

It does follow. If commands express the desires of a mind, and there are commands of Reason, then those commands express the desires of a mind.

As for your example, it's an example of something else. For what you describe is a visual experience causing in you a belief, without any inferential activity on your part. So you did not 'use' reason to acquire the belief. That doesn't stop the belief from being justified, of course, for Reason, God, may still favor you having acquired the belief in that manner.
If, however, you have 'reasoned' to the conclusion, then you would have considered yourself favored by Reason believing that there is a crayon sticking out of the box.

Sorry, but you didn't answer my question. That's a nice hypothetical example of your issuing a prescriptive imperative using the English language to another sentient entity who speaks English over a virtual medium via text, but how does a mind create a law of reason? — InPitzotl

Sorry, but I did. You accept, I take it, that I did what I did: I, a mind, issued an instruction to you. I'll do it again "Give me all your money!" That's a command, yes? And I - a mind - created it.

So now we know that minds can create commands and that they can communicate this fact to other minds, like wot I did.

The imperatives of Reason are commands. That's just what an imperative is. They're not my commands or yours. But they are commands. And we know how imperatives get made: minds make them. Therefore, they are the commands of a mind.

And we know that commands can be communicated, for I just communicated one to you. So, as we are aware - some very dimly, and some barely at all - of these imperatives of Reason, we know that the mind whose commands the imperatives of Reason are, has found a way of communicating them to us.

What means? Well, we call it our faculty of reason, don't we?

I repeat: where is the error? Don't just express your conviction that I have made one. Where is it? Have I reasoned fallaciously - if so, where? And if I have not, are my any of my premises false? If so, which one and why?

How does a mind create laws of reason? — InPitzotl

By wanting us to do and believe things and by ordering or instructing us to do so.

Here's a law of Bartricks: if you have money, give me money. Not one many know about, and it doesn't have any authority over people, because most people recognise that Reason does not tell everyone to obey my rules. But that's a law of mine, it is just one that nobody obeys. How did I create it? Well, I wanted everyone's money and I just told everyone - or did my best by writing it above - to give me their money.

What does an omniscient mind do? It would be pointless for example for such a thing to think. — InPitzotl

Well, clearly one of the things he wants is for us to do and believe things, hence the instructions of Reason exist. As for it being pointless for him to think - I don't see how you get to that conclusion. Indeed, it's confused - for what is it for something to be pointless except for there to be no reason to do it? Whatever Reason thinks, there is reason for Reason to think, for a reason to think something is no more or less than a desire of Reason that it be thought.

A mind not bound by the laws of reason cannot be reasoned about. — InPitzotl

Yes it can. See above. I am not bound by what I say, but I can nevertheless tell people about myself. Likewise for Reason. Think it through!!

I just gave you some. Their precise content is a matter of debate, but their existence is not. You can't do philosophy without having to accept their existence, for in doing philosophy we are wondering what Reason bids us believe. I mean, obviously very few people here 'are' doing philosophy. But I am.

Plotinus did not make the argument I just made.

If you think there's a problem with the argument, use your extensive knowledge to highlight it.

An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. God. There's only one.

God. Reason is not strong in this one.

Your premise of "God" is very similar to that of Plotinus and his "One": — Gus Lamarch

God is in the conclusion, not a premise.

I see no real similarity. I think you're seeing Plotinus everywhere. Just because you have a hammer, that doesn't mean everything's a nail.

Thems is rules such as "do an act if doing so will serve your ends and won't violate another rule of reason" and "be nice" and "believe in the truth of the conclusions of sound arguments" and so on.

Well that's 2 minutes I'm not getting back.

er, God. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Blimey, I'm not anticipating a good objection from this one!

I am not a dualist. I'm an immaterialist.

Note, whether materialism or immaterialism is true is a philosophical matter, not a matter of scientific investigation. Science investigates the 'sensible world'. But whether that place is material or immaterial is not itself something science takes a stand on (many scientists do, of course, but that's because nothing stops scientists from overstepping the bounds of their expertise and doing incompetent metaphysics......then people like you (and many others on this board) think that science investigates metaphysical matters and that what a scientist says about a philosophical matter establishes the truth of it).

Personally I'm looking forward to when the baking age begins and it is bakers, rather than scientists, who start to be seen as authorities on all things metaphysical. Yes, that maybe what philosophers think time is, but what does Paul Hollywood say?

That too made no sense.

That made no sense.

Listen boyo, I started this thread and it's a place to discuss whether God can do anything, not discuss the bible. It's not my fault my arguments are so good no-one can refute them.

Question begging and absurd, as I keep emphasizing.

Being able to do anything, doesn't mean 'able to do some things and not others'. It means being able to do anything. Make a square circle and then carrot it. Anything and everything.

Can God commit a fallacy? Yes. Can I? Yes. How absurd would it be for me to be able to do what God cannot? How could you, with a straight face, describe as 'all powerful' a being who couldn't do something I can do?

If you try and restrict God's abilities in anyway, then you are positing something over and above God that binds him. That's incompatible with him being God. That's incompatible with him being all powerful. You're positing some higher God, some higher power, that restricts God's movements. Again: that's conceptually confused, given that by God we mean someone who is 'all' powerful.

I think you're missing my point. The word 'necessary' is ambiguous on everyday usage.

If I say "it's necessary for you to buy me some butter" what do I mean? Do I mean that it is a necessary truth that you will buy me some butter? No, clearly not. I mean that it is urgent, important, imperative, that you do so. That's typically what words such as 'must' 'always' 'never' and so on mean when we use them.

So, the language of necessity is used in everyday life not to describe the world, but simply to emphasize things - that is, it functions 'expressively'.

But philosophers - most, anyway - think that there is this weird thing 'metaphysical necessity'. It's a strange glue that binds things immovably. So, a 'necessary truth', on their usage, is not a truth it is extremely important that you believe (which is what it'd be if the word 'necessary' was functioning expressively), but a truth that cannot be anything other than true - so a proposition that has truth bonded to it so strongly that it can never come away.

Now, 'that' kind of necessity - metaphysical necessity - is the kind that I am suggesting we can dispense with. It is really just a case, I think, of us taking language that normally functions expressively, literally. As such we can dispense with it.

I dispense with it - I don't believe in metaphysical necessity - yet I seem able to reason just as well as everyone else. It's just when I draw a conclusion, I think the conclusion 'is' true, whereas others will think that it is 'necessarily' true. But there's no real difference. It's not like there are two grades of truth. There are just true propositions and false propositions and a story to tell about how they got to be that way.

Incidentally, if one thinks necessity does exist, then what I want to know is what the truth-maker for 'necessarily' true is.

I do not really understand what you're saying, but it smells false and beside the point.

Can there be a being who can do anything? Yes, although we need to be clear that doing anything means what it means - it means anything at all.

How can there be such a being? Well, there are laws of logic. These laws tell us that some things can't happen - such as that no true proposition can also be false. But that is our only basis for thinking that no true proposition is also false. Indeed, when it comes to any aspect of reality whatsoever, our only source of insight into it - that is, into whether it truly exists and what is possible in respect of it - is our reason, yes?

So, if those laws of logic - and the other edicts of Reason - were the edicts of a person, then that person would be all-powerful. That is, he'd be able to do anything at all, including things that he forbids. For if their being impossible is itself determined by his will, then they are not impossible for him.

Thus, there can be - and is - an all powerful being. And that being can do anything.

I wondered how long it would be before the bibleos came along and started discussing the God of the bible rather than thinking for themselves.

This thread is about whether an all powerful being can do anything - which is a philosophical question that can't be settled by appeal to the bible or anything else.

This has nothing to do with materialism. Let's assume immaterialism is true (I do think it is).

The problem is that the future can't cause the present or the past. Genuinely to perceive the future - which is what you think happened - an event that had not yet happened would need to have caused an event that was happening.

So, what actually happened is that your mind (not your brain - I'm not assuming you're your brain) created a false memory of you anticipating the event that you experienced. That event - the event of your mind creating that false memory - will either have happened at the same time as your experience (just as a mirror simultaneously reflects what is in front of it) or a short while after it, like an echo. Either way, introspectively it would seem to you as if you saw the future.

Many here are going to give you materialist explanations and see in this some kind of support for materialism, but that's because they're horribly confused. The problem is, so are you.

Er, no. You're being tedious and you're out of your depth.

Here's the argument again:

1. If you can fail to follow a law of logic, then the law is prescriptive
2. You can fail to follow a law of logic
3. Therefore, laws of logic are prescriptive.

Which premise is false? Or is it sound? It's sound, yes?

Prescriptions are relations. The premises are related to the conclusion by the prescription constitutive of a law of logic. We are told - instructed - to believe that if the premises of the above argument are true, then to believe the conclusion is true. The premises are not the instruction and nor is the conclusion or our act of believing it. The law of logic is the instruction. And it relates the premises to the conclusion and to us.

But you're not listening at this point, are you? I'm just soooo confused, yes?

No, that's what 'you' are doing. The relation is a 'favoring' relation. And it is not between the premises and the conclusion, for premises, being propositions, can't 'favor' anything.

Which premise in the argument I gave you do you deny? Or is the penny dropping that you might just not know what you're talking about and I might, just might, know exactly what I am talking about? "My confusion" indeed!! I am not remotely confused, I assure you.

Shall I help you? A 'premise' is not a law of logic, right?
Nor is a conclusion. When we say that the conclusion 'follows' from the premises, then we're appealing to a law, yes?
The conclusion 'follows'......what does that mean? How can a conclusion 'follow'? Does it trail around after the premises? No, what we mean is.....that we are told to believe in the truth of the conclusion if, that is, the premises are true.
That's a command. An imperative. When you make an inference you are attempting to follow such an imperative. Follow. Imperatives can be followed or flouted. The laws of logic are imperatives. Instructions. Prescriptions. That's why we try and 'follow' them. Sigh!

Which website did you copy and paste that from? You don't actually know what you're talking about, do you?
Here's my argument again:

1. If you can fail to follow a law of logic, then the law is prescriptive
2. You can fail to follow a law of logic
3. Therefore, laws of logic are prescriptive.

Which premise do you deny?

Saying god cannot do what is logically impossible is not putting a restriction on his omnipotence. — Banno

Yes it is.

If it is restricting anything, it is restricting language. — Banno

No it isn't.

This comes back to your "Can we dispense with necessity?" thread. You showed there that you have not read much about modal logic. You are just a bit confused. — Banno

No, I'm not at all confused. I think necessity does not exist, so what could I learn from people who just take for granted that it does? That would be like telling someone who's made an argument for atheism "oh, why don't you just go to church and learn a thing or two about the bible before becoming an atheist?"

It's good to see you thinking about this stuff; it would be good to also see you learning a bit about it. — Banno

Thanks Pops. Wise as ever.

no, that's what you've just done. You just made the vague assertion "logic deals in propositions" (what does 'deals in' mean, exactly?).
Then I replied with an argument that you are wrong. Here it is, in case you missed it:

1. If you can fail to follow a law of logic, then the law is prescriptive
2. You can fail to follow a law of logic
3. Therefore, laws of logic are prescriptive.

So, you - you - are the one who does not understand the subject they're confidently pronouncing on.

No, they're instructions.
Can you fail to follow a law of logic? Yes, of course one can - this is what happens when one reasons fallaciously.
One 'follows' an argument. You can't follow a proposition. You can follow an instruction.