You just keep putting the word 'necessary' in.

I think you are confused about the kind of thing the rules of logic are. The rules of logic are instructions. They don't describe how we think, they 'tell us' how to think. So, we are told to believe that the conclusion is true if the premises are.

Here's an instruction: if they have any butter, but me a pad of butter. That's an instruction and you can follow it. There's no necessity invoked. I am just telling you to do something under certain conditions.

What if I said "if they have any butter, you must buy me some"? Well, that 'must' doesn't indicate the presence of necessity, but rather just serves to emphasize how much I want you to buy me butter.

That's how things are with logic. We are indeed told that if the premises of a valid argument are true, then we 'must' believe the conclusion is true. But this does not indicate that necessity exists.

To return to the point though: "if they have any butter, buy me some" and "if they have any butter, you must buy me some" are both instructions that one can follow. As such one does not need to be told that the conclusion of a valid argument 'must' be true in order to follow logic; that would be akin to thinking that you could only do as I say if I said "if they have any butter you 'must' buy me some" as opposed to just saying "if they have any butter, buy me some".

He can make a flying pink democracy too. He can do 'anything'. Not hard to grasp really. And he can make anything a thing, and then do it. That's what being 'all powerful' involves.
Whereas if you say that being all powerful involves only being able to do the logically possible, then God won't be able to do a ton of things that even I can.
Here:

1. If P, then Q
2. Q
3. therefore P

I just drew that conclusion, but God couldn't. What a weed.

no, that's not made anything clearer. But I am not confused and in need of enlightenment. I don't need to keep being told about necessity. I know it is invoked left right and centre and I know that the laws of logic are said to be necessary. I am saying that it adds nothing, isn't real and can be dispensed with.

er, no. If you can do anything, you can do anything.

Another way to say that would be that I have ideas none. Is there an SEP page on it that will enlighten me?

I don't need to demonstrate that there are no necessary truths to show their dispensibility.

But I can anyway:

1. If God exists then there are no necessary truths
2. God exists
3. Therefore there are no necessary truths

Yes. Which is just an exotic way of saying triangles 'necessarily' have three sides. But Banno thinks it somehow proves the reality of necessity.

Contrary to your assertion you do not agree with me. There are no necessary truths; but that is not a necessary truth, it is just true.

because if he can't do them then he can't do all things. If I can do everything you can do, but I can also draw square circles then I have more power than you.

I think you misunderstand. You are just begging the question.
Look, you are saying that if x presupposes the truth of y, then if x is the case y must be the case, yes?
What I am saying is that the word 'must' does no work. If x presupposes y, this means that if x is the case then y is too.
So all you are doing is just inserting necessity claims needlessly.
I won't just save breath by dispensing with necessity, I'll also be more open minded. I mean, how would you recognize a true contradiction were one to show up given you've closed your mind to their possibility?

let me assure you that I care about maintaining validity.

er, no I haven't. I didn't say it was necessarily true, did I?
You think contradictions are necessarily false; I think they are just false. So we will both reject the same propositions, it's just that you will add this mysterious word 'necessarily' to your claims of falsehood whereas I won't. What are you adding?

Question begging. If an argument has that form then it's conclusion will be true if the premises are. That isn't a necessary truth, it is just true. That's what I think and I will reach the same conclusions you do except that I will save myself some breath because I won't say 'necessarily' whereas you will. So I will live a tiny bit longer.

no it isn't.
I think that if a proposition is true, then it will not also be false.
You agree, I take it?

The conclusion follows, yes. Which is just another way of saying that it will be true if the premises are.

You're just adding - entirely needlessly - that it will be necessarily true.

I can do something similar. Here: I stipulate that a valid argument is one that, if the premises are true then the conclusion is Potter true.

What's 'Potter' true? you may ask. Well, a proposition is Potter true when it is true in all Puddleduck worlds.

Think that's nonsense? Think adding a special category of 'potter' truths to the realm of truth adds nothing? No, reject Potter truths and you reject the validity of this argument:

1. If p, then q
2. P
3.therefore q.

What's that? You say you 'don't' reject it's validity you just reject that the conclusion is 'potter' true rather than just true? But no, I just told you that 'valid' means 'is Potter true if the premises are'

So I will do you a deal - I will accept that there are necessary truths if you will accept that there are Potter truths.

Again, I reject - reject - Benatar's argument for that conclusion. You don't seem to grasp that there can be different ways to arrive at the same conclusion.

Well obviously I think the moral sums come out against procreation - it's a new argument for 'antinatalism'! A new argument for antinatalism is still an argument for antinatalism. Presumably you think otherwise and will not deem it original unless it reaches a natalist conclusion!? Bizarre.

It's not the same as Benatar's argument. I reject his argument.

Not sure I follow.
I reject determinism because the notion invokes necessity. But that leaves open whether we have free will or not (which is what one would expect if necessity is doing no real work) as it leaves open whether we are originating causes of our decisions or mere links in a chain. It's the latter that seems to preclude our being free.

Yes, I know. I'll settle for it being true.

That's obviously question begging. Triangles have three sides. That's all you need to say.
Saying 'they have three sides in all possible worlds' is just another way of saying 'it is a necessary truth that triangles have three sides'. It's not a case or demonstration of the fact anymore thansaying 'triangles necessarily have three sides' in Latin would be.

Be assured that I am as certain as you are that triangles have three sides. I just don't think it is a necessary truth. But I'll be just as good at recognizing triangles as you

How does dispensing with necessity generate a contradiction? Because you say so?

Perhaps you think I reject the law of non contradiction. No. I think it is true.

Perhaps you think that's contradictory. No, for I can express the law without invoking necessity: a true proposition is not also false. There.

Something doesn't 'have' to be true in order to be true. It's true that it is raining. That's not a necessary truth, but it's no less true for that.

As for not knowing what necessity is, I cannot comprehend what the word 'necessarily' corresponds to when it is added to true. So, a 'true' proposition is one that corresponds to the facts. What does a necessarily true one do?

that's question begging. You've just stipulated that the whole point of logic is to 'prove necessary truths'. I am pointing out the redundancy of the word 'necessary'.

You ask why should you accept my views - well, if they're true that gives you reason to accept them, no? Why do they have to be necessary truths?

I mean, everyone accepts there are tons and tons of contingent truths - do you alone disbelieve them all?

I don't think that's what 'will be' means - for instance, if I say "I will be there" then I am not saying that it is a necessary truth that I will be there, but just expressing my commitment to be there.

Thought you said that was impossible.

I don't understand. My question was "what does perfect goodness involve?" and your answer is

Someone who believes in it. — Daniel

Do you mean that if you believe you're morally perfect, then you are? What would you be believing?

ah, now you've lost your star. "No" isn't a coherent answer to the question I asked you. Anyway, lovely as this is, it's clearly a waste of time as we've reached the point where you're reduced to just asserting things (a point we reached a while ago, frankly).

Yes, so it means what I said it means - perfect goodness. You get a star for that.

Now try understanding the rest of what I said. I'll help - this is the first question: what does perfect goodness involve?

I pity your teachers. Omnibenevolence doesn't mean 'very benevolent'. Look it up if you don't believe me.

No. They. Don't. You don't know what the words you're using mean, do you?

Omnibenevolence doesn't mean 'all benevolent'. It means 'all good' or 'morally perfect'. Okay?

And you obviously can be benevolent and be all alone, irrelevant though that is to this discussion (just imagine a benevolent person, and then imagine them alone.....they're still benevolent).

I literally just explained that to you a post or so ago. Learn what words mean and then read it.

I've just told you: he couldn't be able to be. What you've asked, in effect, is "if morality doesn't exist, how can Robinson Crusoe be immoral?"

Like I say, you're not taking the time or trouble to understand the view I am expressing.

Again, then. Morality - you know, moral directives, moral values - are. the. directives. and. values. of. God.

If you think they're not, fine. But a) they demonstrably are and b) this thread is about what it means to be omnipotent, and if you're omnipotent moral directives and values would have to be your own directives and values otherwise they'd not be under your control.

He might behave in a way that God categorically disapproves of.

I think, perhaps, you're not taking the time to understand the view I am expressing. Again: an omnipotent being would have to be able to constitutively determine the content of morality, otherwise they wouldn't be able to do everything. Thus, whether an act is right or wrong is going to be determined by God's will.

Kant noted, correctly, that moral imperatives are categorical imperatives of Reason. He didn't, however, clarify who or what Reason was. That's what I'm doing: Reason is God. Thus, to be behaving immorally is to be behaving in a way that Reason - that is, God - categorically disapproves of.

Of course, if you meant that Robinson Crusoe is the lone person in the universe, then he'd be unable to do wrong because rightness and wrongness wouldn't exist.

Well, 'omnibenevolent' doesn't mean 'maximally benevolent'. It means 'morally perfect'.
And, as I've said before, being all powerful would mean that moral directives and moral values are God's directives and God's values, otherwise God would lack the power to make anything right and anything good.
So, from God's omnipotence comes God's omnibenevolence.
Now I fail to see from that, why this would mean God has created something. I mean, it's not inconsistent with him doing so, but it doesn't entail it. God could create nothing, value creating nothing, and esteem himself as a non-creator, and he would thereby be morally perfect.

I mean, I take it that if you think you sometimes see the future, that's what would need to have happened, right? An event that hasn't yet happened, would need to have caused a mental event in you...in the present. So, if you take what you think happened literally, then we have something that hasn't happened, causing something that has. That's surely nonsensical.

A future event can't cause a present event, yes?

So if a future event can't cause a present event, then you didn't perceive the future. It just felt like you did.

Why did it feel like that's what happened? Because when you experienced the event in question, for some reason your mind created another experience as well, namely the experience of thinking you remember the event you're experiencing. Thus, introspectively it felt to you as if the event you experienced is one that you had previously anticipated, whereas in fact the event you experienced is one that your mind created a false memory of you anticipating. Note, it didn't create the false memory 'prior' to you experiencing the event, but either simultaneously with it or later than it.

Do you believe a future event - an event that hasn't happened yet - can cause something in the present?

Most people are not grade 8 pianists either, but one could almost guarantee one's children would be if one were to train them from birth. That most people are not something does not in any way lead to the conclusion that it's not possible to ensure one's children are that thing. — Isaac

Beside the point. Yes, most people are perfectly capable of leading morally superlative lives, the point is that they're a) highly unlikely to and b) they're not obliged to (they wouldn't be morally superlative otherwise) and c) even if they did, that would only operate to exaggerate the badness of the suffering they undergo, for the better one behaves, the more unjust it becomes that one suffers.

If god is omnipotent, he can create a stone so heavy that he himself can't lift it.

But if he can't lift it, he ain't omnipotent.

If he can lift it, he failed in creating something so heavy that he can't lift it.

This is the argument. This is not to prove that god is not omnipotent; it is to prove that omnipotence is a quality which is not possible. — god must be atheist

But the argument doesn't work, which is probably why only grade 6 children are impressed by it.

He 'can' create such a stone (obviously). That doesn't mean he 'has' created such a stone.

I can go to my kitchen. That doesn't mean I am in my kitchen. I can create something too heavy for me to lift. That doesn't mean I have. And so on.

John is a bachelor. That means he doesn't have a wife. It doesn't mean that he's incapable of acquiring one.

If he acquires one, he won't be a bachelor anymore. That doesn't mean he isn't a bachelor.

God is all powerful. That means he can do anything, including ceding omnipotence. That doesn't mean he's ceded his omnipotence.

So you're repeating a 'puzzle' that simply isn't a puzzle once one starts thinking more clearly about it.

I want to follow up on an issue that Counterpunch raised, but then fled from discussing. And that's the issue of whether an omnipotent being would have created everything.

I don't think so. It is sufficient to be omnipotent that one 'can' do anything. I mean, there's no difference in power, it seems to me, between a being who can do anything and created a universe, and a being who can do anything and didn't.

Finding that there exist other beings aside from one's self is not, it seems to me, incompatible with being omnipotent, for it could still be the case that one could do anything.

If that's correct, then one could be omnipotent and have created nothing. Indeed, to insist otherwise would be once more to put restrictions on an omnipotent being.

So, God could have created everything if he had so wished, but whether he actually did so or not is an open question and it is not inconsistent with his being omnipotent that he created nothing at all. Or so I think at the moment.....

Not sure I follow you. God can't be a slave to time, for then he would not be omnipotent. So time must be a slave to God. That is, God must have dominion over time. I suggest that this would be the case if time, like the laws of logic, was made of God's attitudes. What God remembers 'is' past, for 'to be past' is no more or less than to be being remembered by God; and what God anticipates 'is' future, for 'to be future' is no more or less than to be being anticipated by God. Something like that.
So, God does not get power from time; rather, time is in God's power.

Well, I certainly agree that those who think a good, all knowing, all powerful being wouldn't have suffered us to live in a world like this one would be big hypocrites if they then suffered someone to live in it themselves by having children. And if they did that - and most do -they would, in my view, make themselves deserving of all that subsequently befalls them, as they are now being done by as they would do.

This thread is not about the problem of evil, but anyway the fact is that there are two problems of evil - the logical and the evidential. It is almost universally agreed that there is no logical problem of evil: God's existence is logically compatible with the existence of evil (my question to you shows that there are all manner of circumstances under which a good person would not give another everything they wanted). The problem of evil that remains and is debated to this day is the evidential problem.

That's important, because that means that if there is a proof of God's existence, then the evidential problem of evil disappears and becomes a mere puzzle.