How? They're different claims. In saying that there is a correct answer I am doing no more than expressing my belief that moral claims are truth apt. In expressing scepticism about whether we can formulate a rule about when such claims will be true and when false, I am simply expressing my belief in holism about morality.

For an analogy: there is a correct answer to the question "what is Bartricks thinking right now". But I do not think we could formulate any rule about it - that is, that on a Thursday at 5pm Bartricks thinks about butter".

They don't seem to me to contradict. "Sometimes the numbers matter; sometimes the numbers do not matter" are consistent statements.

These contradict: the numbers always matter. The numbers never matter.
These contradict: the numbers always matter. Sometimes the numbers do not matter.
But these don't: the numbers sometimes matter; the numbers sometimes do not matter.

Time. Waster.

As David Lewis said "you can't refute me with an incredulous stare"

Ah, I forgot - you're a time waster and don't read what I write and can't argue for anything.

Yes, I believe what I write.

Now, kindly do what I asked. What's the difference between an explanatory reason and a normative reason?

And where did I say 'all' when I meant 'some'?

And where did you refute my proof that Reason is a person?

I disagree, for either 'intuition' is synonymous with 'deliverance of our reason', or it means something else. If it means something else, how would it have any probative force?

Reason makes it sound like there is a correct answer. — khaled

There is a correct answer. How could there not be?

Fair enough, we can say that showing respect for other’s behavior is important. But, in the case of Bob, the consequence of his actions is REALLY good. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't doubt that, but I don't think the rightness of an act is a always a function of the goodness of its consequences. Sometimes it is, sometimes it is not. Sometimes respect has to compete with outcomes, but sometimes respect prevents outcomes from mattering at all - it all depends on the context.

For instance, let's say we could make everyone happy forever after if we subject one person - Tom - to a life of endless torture. Should we do that? Is there some number of happy people that would justify it? 1million? 1 billion? 1 trillion?

No, the numbers don't matter. It'd be wrong to subject Tom to that life to give 10 others a life of pure happiness, and just as wrong to do so if it gave 10,0000 people a life of pure happiness.

Applying this to procreation: let's say that if Maddy has a child then the child will have a life of endless suffering because it will have a ghastly disease, however the disease in question is one that will - without causing the symptoms it causes in Maddy - sterilize all the rest of humanity, thus stopping the wrong of procreation from occurring in the future. Should Maddy have that child? I think not. That case seems relevantly analogous to the Tom case above. I agree that it would be good - extremely good - for 10,000 people to have lives of unalloyed happiness, but it is nevertheless wrong to subject Tom to a life of suffering in order to secure it; likewise I agree that it would be good - extremely good - if all humans ceased to procreate, but I think it would be wrong to subject one person to a life of suffering to secure it.

The case you describe is not quite like the above, but it seems relevantly similar.

So sometimes the numbers don't matter. Sometimes they do. Sometimes they don't. I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do - and by how much - and when they don't. We have to trust our reason.

How many times? First, it is not a mistake to personify Reason. I have now provided - it feels like about 100 times - an argument that demonstrates Reason is a person. There are prescriptions of Reason; only a person can issue a prescription; therefore Reason is a person.

I have not equivocated over the term 'reason'; rather I have carefully specified the different uses to which it can be put. Can you?

For instance, explain to me now what the difference is between an explanatory reason and a normative reason.

Failing to properly quantify premisses(not specifying "some" and implying all when it is not). — creativesoul

Where?

This is a reply to the opening post.

1. Bob thinks that life is bad and procreation is prima facie immoral. Because of this, he avoids procreating and donates his spare money to Project Prevention. But, he has very wealthy parents and they want grandchildren. Those parents would only allow him to have their inheritance if he procreates. Bob knows that receiving the inheritance money would allow him to get far more drug addicts sterilized. So, he decides to have just 1 child to receive the inheritance money and he gives his only child a privileged lifestyle while still ensuring that he can donate very large sums of money to Project Prevention. — TheHedoMinimalist

I am an antinatalist of Bob's kind (that is, I think procreation is prima facie immoral, but may nevertheless be justified in many cases). But I am doubtful that Bob's act would be justified, given just how serious a wrong procreation is. I agree that it is good if others do not breed, and so I agree that Bob's act would promote more good than bad. But that's not all that matters. It is also important to show respect for others in one's behaviour, and respect for free choice.

Here's what seems to me to be a relevantly analogous case. Bullying is prima facie wrong. But imagine that Bob knows that if he starts bullying Sarah, his behaviour towards her will so revolt others who witness it that those others will resolve not to be bullies themselves. And thus, by bullying Sarah, Bob knows that overall he will bring about a reduction in bullying. Sarah will be bullied. But there will be less bullying overall if Sarah is bullied by Bob.

Is it right for Bob to start bullying Sarah? Well, I'd say not. Yes, if he does so there will be less bullying overall. But the rightness or wrongness of an action is not solely determined by its consequences. We also ought to show respect for others, and that means not using them as tools. Bob would be using Sarah as a tool - an anti-bullying tool - and that seems wrong, despite the fact that fewer people will be bullied as a result.

Likewise, if Bob were to procreate then he'd be using his child as a tool to reduce procreation. And that, I think, is wrong. Not necessarily, of course. An antinatalist who is a pure consequentialist - which is rare, because pure consequentialism is implausible - would disagree. And other antinatalists might disagree because they may judge that in this kind of a case the good consequences outweigh the badness of the disrespect shown by performing the act.

I'm trying to tell you that maybe you shouldn't take this old view for granted. — softwhere

You just assume I am taking it for granted. Reasons. Provide reasons not to - that is, actually try arguin for something.

All the stuff you didn't quote and respond to. If you don't understand something, then please ask for clarification. Pretending that I didn't go to any effort is silly. — softwhere

You haven't argued anything, all you've done is quote. You can't argue by quote, you need to express it afresh, otherwise I'm debating with Wittgenstein, not you.

A strong theory has to make sense of its own possibility — softwhere

What do you mean?

toy examples — softwhere

What do you mean by a 'toy example'? This word 'toy' is all the rage at the mo - what do you mean by it?

I think this forum is great for discussing our readings away from this forum, but I don't at all think that online debate is a substitute for that reading. — softwhere

But this forum is a place for arguments. You're not presenting any.

What is neglected in such a principle is the nature or way-of-being of this 'I' and this stuff, language, that thought is made of. — softwhere

I don't see the relevance to the question (and thoughts aren't 'made' of language, they're states of mind).

There is much more to the case against language as a nomenclature for mind-stuff essences, but this is a start. — softwhere

What start?

What's the case for this source of norms? If you look into thinkers like Hegel, you'll find the idea of cultural evolution, where ethical norms and the norms of intelligibly are unstable. — softwhere

So I have to read Hegel now?! The case is this: norms of reason exist (so, prescriptions, demands, that kind of thing). Only a subject can issue a prescription. Therefore norms of reason are the prescriptions of a subject - Reason.

Anyway, I don't really understand the rest of what you said, but it looks suspiciously as if you've got some fixed convictions based, it would seem, on fallaciously inferring that as we have to use language to talk about the world, the world is made of language, or some such.

But you still seem to me be talking 'about' arguments rather than making them.

You say this:

To be more blunt, strong cases have been made (later Wittgenstein, for instance) against thinking that knowledge is something definite like an attitude of 'Reason.' And what does the capitalization add? It suggests that 'Reason' is a kind of divinity. As I've written in other posts, there's some historical truth in that. But it's dicey in this context, is it not? — softwhere

But I made a case for my view, and once more you are merely reporting that there is some mysterious counter-case. Why not make that case?

As for why 'Reason' has a capital R, it is both in order to distinguish Reason - the source of the norms of reason - from the faculty, 'reason' that we use to detect those norms, and from 'reasons' which are the directives constitutive of the norms themselves. So, reasons are norms, norms have a source - Reason - and we have faculties of reason by means of which we detect them.

If you look at my posts in this thread, I started to sketch a different approach — softwhere

But what's wrong with my analysis? There is patently a difference between simply believing something is true and knowing something (it is implausible that it is just some arbitrary linguistic convention). Our reason tells us this - tells us that under some circumstances a true belief qualifies as knowledge, and under others not. Yet there seems nothing that any clear case of knowledge has to have in common with any other, apart from involving a true belief (as Gettier cases and variations thereon amply demonstrate).

That's how attitudes behave. Hence my conclusion (which I do not claim follows of necessity) that knowledge is constituted by an attitude of Reason.

A case can be made that knowledge isn't something other than our conventional use of the word 'knowledge.' — softwhere

Cases can be made for anything. What matters is the quality of the case, not its mere existence.

Just because 'knowledge' is a noun doesn't mean there's a definite entity called 'knowledge.' — softwhere

Who are you attacking here? Where have I said that there is an 'entity' called 'knowledge' (I am arguing that there is not)? And where have I inferred that from the fact that we have a word 'knowledge'?

This also applies to 'reason' (used as a noun). — softwhere

Reason does exist and any case you make for thinking Reason does not exist will presuppose Reason's existence.

While philosophers have often trafficked in decontextualized essences, other philosophers have pointed out the problems with this approach. — softwhere

Why not just address the case made in the OP rather than engaging in philosophical journalism?

In the OP I argued that knowledge is not a thing, but is rather an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs. No-one has actually addressed that view yet. Rather, they're just fiddling with Gettier cases, even though this is a hopeless task given that anything one adds to 'true belief' in an attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge will have to fall short of guaranteeing the truth of the belief in question (for then it will be implausibly strong) which is all that's needed for Gettier case construction. Hence why since they were first outlined, no-one - but no-one - has been able to do it.

It can't be done, and rather than continuing trying to do it - which appreciation of the nature of the cases reveals to be impossible - one should instead extract a moral from it. Which is what I did. A moral others have ignored.

Learn to distinguish between actual and potential infinities.

Take rage. Some people are enraging. And the more you interact with some people, the angrier they make you. Is there any upper limit to how much anger one can feel? No. Anger can just go on getting more and more intense. There is no limit - it represents, then, a potential infinity.

Counting is like this. You can keep counting - 1,2,3 - on and on and on, potentially forever. There is no biggest number. Tell you what, try it - go and sit in the corner and start counting and tell me when you get to the biggest number possible, then report back.

Your claim: Time can't be infinite because of infinite regress. — TheMadFool

No, that's not my claim. Look, I laid the arguments out.

Why is an 'infinite regress' a problem? Because.....you can't have actual infinities.

So, the claim is that you can't have actual infinities.

That's why infinite tasks are impossible. They're impossible because they would involve an actual infinity of something, namely tasks. Thus, as there can't be actual infinities, infinite tasks are impossible.

You seem hell bent on focussing on the wrong thing. So, it is not the 'taskiness' of infinite tasks that makes them impossible, but their infinite nature. And it is not the 'regress' of an 'infinite regress' that is the problem, but the 'infinite' bit. Why? Because - wait for it - you can't have actual infinities of anything.

Your reason: If time is infinite than we have an infinite past which raises the question "how did we reach this point in time?" Infinite regress. — TheMadFool

Again, that's not anything I've said.

An event - P - that is in the past is going to get more and more and more past, yes? Potentially infinitely, yes?

That, in itself, is not a problem. Potential infinities aren't actual infinities. So the fact that past events become ever more infinite - and will go on doing so forever - isn't, in itself, the problem.

Here's the problem. If time is a dimension, then in order to be able to accommodate the above, it would need to extend for an actual infinity. And nothing can be like that. So it isn't a stuff.

So, again, events in the past are becoming more and more and more past, potentially for infinity. But for that to be possible, 'actual' past - the time gloop these events are floating about in - would need to extend infinitely. And that's impossible.

Question begging. Look it up. It's what you're doing.

Tasks involving infinite steps are, indeed, impossible. That doesn't mean tasks are impossible. It means tasks involving infinite steps are.

I have no idea what you're on about. Ever. It's just nonsense.

Given that time is just a spatial dimension we have limited access to, there should be no problem in imagining time too to be infinite. — TheMadFool

That's obviously question begging. You can't have actual infinities, so time is 'not' a dimension.

The same applies to space. You don't solve one problem by showing how it arises for other things.

Because we can't have actual infinities of anything, we need to rethink time and space - we 'must' be thinking about them in the wrong way. I am focussing here on time. Bringing space in - given that it raises many of the same problems - is unhelpful.

Time - time - is not a stuff, not a dimension. Why? Because thinking of it that way means it would instantiate actual infinities. That's sufficient to establish that it is not a stuff, not a dimension. But additionally, there would be no intrinsic difference between future, past and present (yet clearly these are radically different).

Yes, but there has to be a practical implication, an infinite task, that creates the difficulty. — TheMadFool

No, even if there are no agents, you cannot have an infinite amount of anything. You don't make 'infinity' a problem just by adding 'task' to it.

Again, the reason infinite tasks are impossible is not because tasks are impossible, but because infinities are.

I can't even comprehend the terms that are being used.
Like here.

It is not, I think, a kind of stuff or dimension. This is for numerous reasons. Conceived of as a stuff (or dimension, if dimensions are not stuff) — Wittgenstein

What, exactly, are you having trouble with?

1. If cheese is a dimension, then it will be infinitely divisible
2. Nothing existent( cheese) can be infinitely divisible.
3. Therefore, if cheese is a dimension it does not exist
4. Cheese exists :yum:
5. Therefore, cheese is not a dimension — Wittgenstein

Yes, that argument is valid and sound. Like mine.

I mean, I assume you accept that cheese is not a dimension? And I assume you acknowledge that the argument is valid? Yes?

Right. Now substitute the word 'cheese' for 'time'. Do any of the premises suddenly become false? No. Does the argument somehow become invalid? No.

So, what. Exactly. Is. Your. Problem?

How many natural numbers are there? Infinite yes? Is that a problem? No. Why? Because it doesn't lead to an infinite task.

How many points are there on a line? Infinite yes? Is that a problem? Yes. Why? As Zeno showed Achilles can't catch up with tortoise. An infinite task. — TheMadFool

Er, no. It is the impossibility of an actual infinity that makes an infinite task impossible!!

Numbers aren't things. There aren't an actual infinity of numbers, rather they constitute a potential infinity.

No, why is an infinite regress a problem? It is a problem because you can't have an actual infinity of anything.

For example, consider the first cause argument. Anything that has come into being needs a cause of its being. Positing another being that has come into being as the cause of those beings that have come into being starts one on an infinite regress. Why is that a problem? Why can't it be 'turtles all the way down'? Because you can't have an actual infinity of anything, be that causes, objects, actions.

What's philosophy?

Answer: it's using reason to investigate reality.

What's its value?

Answer: first, the question itself presupposes the value of philosophy, for answering it requires doing philosophy (thus, the questioner displays either insincerity or stupidity or both). Second, it is intrinsically valuable. Third, it is instrumentally valuable, as you can quickly discover for yourself by simply not using your reason to figure out what's what and then seeing what happens.

Why do we have philosophy departments and professional philosophers and universities?

Answer: universities were created by philosophers (Plato and Aristotle respectively) to teach philosophy. People who went to their universities became very clever. Very clever people thrive, stupid people don't. Thus, nations that make their populations clever by putting them through universities become wealthier, healthier places to live. Hence why any half-way sensible state funds universities and philosophy programmes even though in philosophy you are taught to trust reason over state authorities and traditions.

I trust your questions are now answered.

Reading much of the newer metaphysics and epistemology posts (especially Bartricks') I find they go around in circles forever. — khaled

That's fighting talk. You said things about my arguments - mine explicitly - that are false.

Don't pick fights you aren't going to win.

Hmm, I still don't see a difference: if time is a stuff, then there is an infinite amount of past earlier than now, and an infinite amount of future later than now. If space is a stuff, then there is an infinite amount of it behind me and an infinite amount of it in front of me.

The problem with infinite regresses is the 'infinite' bit. So, that we recognise an infinite regress to be a problem just underlines that actual infinities are problems - for an infinite regress just is an actual infinity.

Ah, and then the condescension. So, just to be clear: you've said my arguments appear circular and to go nowhere.

None of them are circular. They all go places. Good job!!

Well, they don't go nowhere either! I mean, what you're saying is just plain false.

I've argued that morality is made of a god's - Reason's - attitudes and I've done that using deductively valid arguments that have premises no-one can reasonably deny. How's that 'going nowhere'?? Gone to a place you dislike, perhaps, but that's different.

I've argued that truth is what Reason asserts to be the case - that is, that truth is a performative of Reason. Again, that's not going nowhere.

I've argued that our minds are eternal souls. That's not nowhere.

I've argued that it is wrong to procreate. That's not nowhere.

I've argued that knowledge is an attitude or feeling that Reason has about some true beliefs.

I've argued that time can't possibly be a substance.

No argument that I have made is circular, and their conclusions are hardly insignificant.

So what you've said is patently false. Like so many others, you just dislike the conclusions and so have decided that there must be something wrong with 'philosophy' given that I've used it to arrive at them.

It 'does' lead to an infinite regress.

It's true that there's at least one additional reason to think that time is not a substance (a reason to do with the intrinsic difference between past, present and future), but when it comes to the problem of actual infinities, the problem is the same. Space and time go the same way.

Time, if it is a substance, would have to extend infinitely because otherwise it would not be possible for an event to become ever more past for infinity. And that's manifestly absurd - no substance can extend infinitely.

But exactly the same is true of space as well. Space has to extend infinitely - how could it have a boundary? Whatever is outside the boundary would also be space.

And any region of space is going to be infinitely divisible.

One can just insist that this is not so - that is, one could, as Devans99 seems to be doing - reason that as no actual infinities can exist (correct), space must be reducible to discrete portions or atoms of space. But the problem with that is that it doesn't recognise that the problem is with space per se - any portion of space is going, by its very nature, to be divisible. I mean, try and imagine a portion of space that isn't divisible - it's impossible.

What we must conclude, on pain of simply refusing to face up to what reason is telling us, is that we are thinking about space and time incorrectly.

I find it hard to accept that, whilst I sit here typing, my fingers are passing through an actual infinity of positions. — Devans99

Yes, they're not. Your fingers aren't what you think they are - if they were what you think they are, that is, objects extended in space, then they would have to pass through an actual infinity of postions in order to move. So they're not objects extended in space.

Time is 'stuff' because:

- The physical laws of the universe are time-aware, so time must be something (IE 'stuff')
- Time has a start, so when time started something physical about the universe changed, so time must be 'stuff' — Devans99

Well, time exists, but not everything that exists is a substance. Time is not stuff - not a substance - for the reasons outlined, namely that if it were a stuff there would be no intrinsic difference between future, present and past and because if it was a stuff it would have to extend infinitely - that is, actually extend intinity - which is manifestly impossible. (not all substances are extended, but time would have to be an extended substance - so it is extended substances, not substances per se, that contain actual infinities).

So, it seems to me that you are fallaciously inferring from the reality of time, the substance of time. But time can be real yet not be a substance - which is what we must conclude if the argument's I've presented go through.

Because scientists are not investigating what time is - they are just measuring stuff - whatever they say will be consistent with what time is.

Reading much of the newer metaphysics and epistemology posts (especially Bartricks') I find they go around in circles forever.

What is A
A is when you put B and C together
What are B and C
B is a D E and C is a slightly F G
Etc — khaled

No they don't - show me an argument of mine that is circular - they're just difficult questions to answer and you're clearly impatient. Note too, what you describe above is not a circle.

But first, you're assuming time is a stuff or dimension, despite the arguments that appear to demonstrate that it isn't. So you're clinging to a picture that's just wrong.

Take this:

If we consider the particles within space, then they have a position - which can be regarded as information. — Devans99

Information is 'about' things, it does not 'constitute' the thing it is about. So, let's imagine a particle - a thing - in space. Now the particle is divisible. The space it occupies is divisible.

So, a particle - conceived of as an object extended in space - is infinitely divisible. Space, conceived of as a dimension, is infinitely divisible. And that's sufficient to demonstrate that our ideas of them are wrong, for no such things can exist.

Likewise with time.

The traditional way of thinking about time is just wrong, then. Anyone who thinks otherwise needs to address the refutations I gave, not simply assume the refutations fail and continue to persist with the traditional way of thinking.

If you say so — John Gill

No, I didn't just 'say so' - I've made arguments. You're not engaging with them - you're just expressing vague sceptical concerns about the whole project of using reason to investigate reality.

It certainly is absurd. But the absurdity is no more or less than the absurdities that arise from taking actual infinities to be a reality.

So, once more we arrive at the conclusion that time is not a stuff.

Although presumably you'll say that it is a discrete stuff.

But then I want to know how that can be. To use space as the analogy: you have said that space is discrete. But how? Can you conceive of a discrete unit of space? Why can't it be halved?

The reality you are aware of, perhaps. Is there nothing else? — John Gill

You don't seem to be getting the point. I am not saying that there is no more to reality than what I am aware of. I am saying that no actual infinities exist - that a hotel with an infinity of rooms is an impossibility. And thus, as time most certainly exists, it cannot be a dimension or stuff.

It's a simple and devastating argument. And there's the additional one - also devastating - about the intrinsic temporal properties of past, present and future.

Ok, here is Hilbert's writing: — Banno

Where? Nothing isn't evidence.

I'm making an omelet. — Banno

For a living, I assume? Tip: remove the shell, don't just mince it in with the egg.

Ah - one negation too many. Fixed - now it parallels your argument. — Banno

Actually fix it - present it again.

Prove me wrong. Produce a reference, form Hilbert, that supports your point. — Banno

Do your own research. Prove me wrong.

And while you're trying to do that, try actually getting the point once in a while.

1. If time is a dimension, then past, present and future are not the intrinsic temporal properties
2. Past, present and future are the intrinsic temporal properties
3. Therefore time is not a dimension — Bartricks
This argument is philosophically more interesting.

Consider this argument, which purports to show that width is not a dimension...

1. If width is not a dimension, then left and right are not intrinsic spacial properties.
2. Left and right are intrinsic spacial properties
3. therefore width is not a dimension. — Banno

That argument is invalid. And you've missed the point.