You think 'that' deserved applause? Why?

My argument is very simple: it is default wrong to do something to someone else that has a serious affect on them and to which they gave no prior consent.

That's obviously exactly what procreating does. So it is default wrong.

What's Boethius done? Well, just pointed out that there are sometimes cases where it is not overall wrong to do something that will seriously affect someone else and to which they gave no prior consent.

Er, that's not something I deny.

So, what you applauded was a huge miss. Do you cheer at a football match when your side misses a goal?

I somehow did not see this reply so am replying now, rather late in the day.

Now, to solve the surgeon issue of consent on unconscious patient you invoke "more good than harm" so "default consent is regrettable but we don't care about it in that situation, and you can apply the same to government "more good than harm", but then parents can also apply it to children "having children does more good than harm". — boethius

No I didn't. Why might a surgeon sometimes be justified in performing surgery on someone who cannot consent? When not doing so would result in a great harm to the patient.

Now, compare that to a procreation case. Does not creating someone result in a great harm to them? No.

So, sometimes - sometimes - we are justified in doing something that significantly affects another person without their prior consent when failing to do so would result in a great harm befalling them.

so I guess you agree that as long as parents are plausibly justified in having children then all's ok, even if that significantly affects their yet-to-be-born baby — boethius

Yes, obviously. My point is that they are not. It is default wrong to do something that significantly affects another person without their prior consent. That's what procreating does. Thus, it is default wrong.

That does not mean it is actually wrong, as there may be other factors involved. But it means some kind of justifying reason needs to be supplied.

Return to the surgeon case. Is it default wrong to perform surgery on someone without their prior consent?

Yes. But often it is overall justified to do so because in many cases consent cannot be given and yet failure to perform the surgery would result in serious harm to the patient.

But that kind of justification does not apply to standard cases of procreation, does it?

Again, in another realm where you have actually put in the work to understand your own argument and it's implications, maybe this would be a point for you. — boethius

That's just staggering arrogance masquerading as an argument. It's you matey who have not understood my argument.

The reason I would advocate for humans in general to keep procreating even if life sucked for everyone right now is the same reason I advocate that individuals having hard times don't just kill themselves and end the suffering now: because it can get better. I have hopes that humanity can create a future world that is not so full of suffering as this one always has been, and in order for that to be worth doing, someone needs to be alive in the future in order to enjoy it. — Pfhorrest

But I, an antinatalist, am not arguing that life sucks. Antinatalism does not entail pro-mortalism (that is, the view that we have overall reason to kill ourselves). Antinatalists are against beginning lives; they are not thereby against continuing lives that are already underway.

For an analogy: someone who discovers that, were they to get pregnant, their child would suffer some sort of disability and decides on that basis not to have a child is not thereby expressing a judgement that those with disabilities do not have lives worth living.

And the problem of evil does not assume that life sucks either, only that the evils of life are unjustified.

If some kind of simple utilitarianism is the correct normative ethical theory, then the balances of pleasures and pains in a life would settle the matter of whether it is morally right to bring it into existence.

There would still be a problem of evil even assuming that kind of view is true, and it would still have some very odd implications in respect of procreation (it'd imply we ought to start breeding like rabbits if, that is, most lives record greater average balances of happiness over misery). But the point is that to show God to be justified in creating innocent sentient life one would only need to show that the pains were necessary to secure some maximal quantity of pleasure later.

But utilitarianism is false and certainly I am not assuming it is true and most of those who believe there is a problem of evil do not assume it is true either. Happiness is not all that matters. Dignity matters and it matters what kind of person you are. Better, for instance, to be a miserable kind person than a happy bastard. Better if wicked people suffer than good people. And so on.

For example, imagine two possible worlds. One is full of good people who are miserable. The other is full of wicked people who are happy. Which is the better one to create if creating one and one alone is the only option you have? Which one would a good god create? Surely it is not obvious.

But, importantly, if the god also had the option of creating neither, then surely the god would take that option?

Or imagine that only way to make everyone else maximally happy is to make one person utterly miserable. Would a good god create such a world? Surely not. For that world, though it contains maximum happiness, also contains a terrible injustice. And a good god would resist creating a world that contains an injustice like that.

In saying that am I thereby committed to the view that, if we live in such a world, our lives are not worth living? No, clearly not. Most of the lives in that world are most certainly worth living. Eminently so. Yet I think no good, omnipotent, omniscient being would create such a place.

And if we lived in such a world - that is, a world in which we are all happy bar one person whose miserable life is a necessary condition of our lives being happy - then though we have no obligation to kill ourselves we would, I think, have an obligation not to perpetuate the situation by breeding (assuming, that is, that breeding perpetuates it).

My point, then, is absolutely not that most of our lives are not worth living. I think most of our lives are worth living. My point is that it is reasonable to believe that an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good god would not create a world like this one and that, on that basis alone, it is reasonable to infer that we would not be good if we acted in a like manner and created more innocent sentient life and made it live here.

Yeah. As usual with Bartricks's types of argument, they're based on one massive flaw, and this is it. The Problem of Evil is a question of why God brought Evil into the world - any amount of evil at all. The problem of deciding to procreate is one of whether there is too much evil in the world to outweigh the good. — Isaac

I don't know what massive flaws you're talking about. Perhaps the mere fact an argument leads to a conclusion you dislike constitutes a massive flaw as far as you are concerned - I suspect so. But it's Reason's view that counts, not yours. So, you know, get over yourself.

You say "The Problem of Evil is a question of why God brought Evil into the world - any amount of evil at all". Well, no. When you make such confident pronouncements you do nothing more than reveal your ignorance of the problem.

The problem is to do with unjustified evil. For it is only that kind of evil whose creation seems prima facie incompatible with being omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good. That's why those who believe in God attempt to tackle with the problem by showing that the evils that exist are 'justified' rather than non-existent (although showing them to be non-existent would also work, of course).

For example, take the standard free will defence against the problem of evil. According to this line of argument, God was justified in permitting the moral evils that we - we, free agents, that is - create because they were an unavoidable aspect of giving us free will and the value of free will is greater than the disvalue of the evils it creates.

Note, those who run the free will defence - and it is far and away the most popular line of reply - are not denying the existence of evils. They are not denying that God brought them into being. They are arguing, rather, than the evils in question are justified and thus do not redound to the moral discredit of God (and thus do not imply his non-existence).

Another example - another popular line of reply is the so-called 'soul making' theodicy, according to which the whole point of our being here is to cultivate and exercise certain virtues. And then the point is that we need to live in a world like this one - one that contains natural disasters and injustices and arbitrary reversals of fortune - in order to be able to acquire and exercise them. You can't be forgiving, for example, if no-one wrongs you; you can't be brave if there's nothing to fear, and so on.

THe point is not whether these attempts at dealing with the problem of evil work, the points is that in both of these cases there is an acknowledgement that evils exist, but a denial that their existence is unjustified.

So, once more: you're wrong. The problem of evil is not a problem to do with any evil whatever, but to do with apparently unjustified evils.

But let's assume - falsely - that you're right and that any evils whatever raise it. Well, that just makes my case even stronger. For it is undeniable that by creating new innocent sentient life you create some evils.

So not only are you wrong and, as usual, demonstrate that standard combination of ignorance and confidence, if you're right you've made my case stronger, not weaker. Good job!!

There is one issue though: an omnipotent God has the option to bring people into the world without suffering. Humans do not. So, for your argument to work, it has to apply to non-omnipotent beings. And then we're back to the old question of whether or not existence is worse than non-existance. — Echarmion

Yes, I accept that an omnipotent, omniscient being has more options than we do, for they have the option of either changing the world so as to make it a safe place for innocent sentient creatures to live in, or keep the world as it is and desist from creating innocent sentient creatures. So they have two options where preserving their own goodness is concerned, whereas we have only one. But still, we do still have that option. That is, if we lack the power to make the world a place free from evil, then we should exercise our power not to introduce innocent sentient life into it. After all, that is a way of preventing many evils from occurring.

As I have just said to Jellyfish, I am not arguing that the problem of evil refutes the thesis that God exists. All I am arguing is that, other things being equal, it is not reasonable to believe a good, omnipotent, omniscient being would have created a world like this one and then made innocent sentient beings live in it. And then I am arguing that, given we know full well what kind of a world this is, and given we have a god-like power to create innocent sentient life should we desire, then we would not act on that desire if we were morally good.

We're not omnipotent, but we have a god-like power to create innocent sentient life. We are not omniscient, but we know that the world is a dangerous place and that anyone we subject to living in it will suffer many evils and almost certainly create some of their own. So, we are not omnipotent, but we have enough power, and we are not omniscient, but we know enough, and given our power and given our knowledge, we would not be good if we did what we think no good god would do: if we created innocent sentient beings and suffered them to live here.

You don't make it clear perhaps, but I re-read your OP and now I take it that you are rejecting the problem of evil in order to defend some kind of theism? — jellyfish

No, I am not arguing that the problem of evil refutes the thesis that God exists. Rather, I am arguing that the problem of evil implies it is wrong for us to procreate. I am saying that good humans who have the power to create innocent sentient life but also know that were they do to so they would be making it live in a world of evils, do not exercise that power.

What's the problem? We live in The Most Arbitrary of All Possible Worlds aka "shit happens, sisyphus-like 'life is just shoveling one pile after another', so get on and get over it" — 180 Proof

Well, there's not a problem so much as a normative conclusion that we can draw: namely, that we ought not to exercise our power to create innocent sentient life.

The 'problem' is that while many people recognise that it would be inconsistent with being good for an omnipotent, omniscient being to create a world like this one and make us live in it, they do not recognise that this implies that they, to be good, ought not to exercise their god-like power to create innocent sentient life.

Many recognise only too well the vices that an omnipotent, omniscient god would be instantiating were he to create a world like this and then make innocent sentient life live in it; but they don't recognise that they will be instantiating these same vices if they make innocent sentient life live in it.

Yours is the 'hotel manager's theodicy'. You expect existence to be like a well-run resort, where all the guests are happy, the service is always perfect, and there's never any illness or death. And because it's like that, you infer that 'the manager' - which is your depiction of what 'God' is supposed to be like - must be held responsible. But your post shows no insight into the problem of evil as traditionally construed (and whether you believe in it or not.) — Wayfarer

You are misusing terms. A 'theodicy' is an attempt to explain why God has allowed evil.

Anyway, I do not understand what point you are making. Where is the error in my reasoning?

If you go to a restaurant and you are served a luke-warm pot noodle for a main course, is it reasonable to believe that you are in a restaurant run by the best chef in the world? No, not remotely.

If you go to an art gallery and all the pictures are scribble, is it reasonable to believe you are looking at drawings by Michelangelo? no, not remotely.

If you live in a world full of diseases and earthquakes that kill and maim innocent sentient beings, is it reasonable to believe you are living in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good person? No, not remotely.

What do you think the world should be like? No predation? No possibility of disease? Nobody would ever die, get injured? How would that work? How could a world be like that? — Wayfarer

Yes, that's what I'd expect it to be like. Just as if you told me that in the next room there is a meal by the finest cook conceivable, I would expect it to be nice through and through, rather than a luke warm pot noodle that tastes suspiciously like it might have been made with the chef's urine. If, then, I find in that in the next room there is a luke warm pot noodle with a hint of urine about it, then I'd conclude that I am not eating food prepared by the finest chef conceivable. I admit that it could be - for there are explanations that we can come up with of why the best chef conceivable might have prepared a pot noodle using his own wee rather than prepare a proper meal. But, on the face of it, it doesn't seem reasonable to think that you're eating something prepared by the best chef conceivable given that it appears to be a pot noodle made with urine. Why? Because the best chef conceivable knows how to prepare a wonderful meal, has the power to do so, and can be expected to be motivated to do so.

Likewise, if you tell me that there is a universe that has been created by an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being and that this being has also created innocent sentient beings and made them live in it, then I'd expect that universe to be a paradise in which there is no predation, no horrible diseases, no major mishaps. I wouldn't expect this place. Why? Because a being who is omnipotent, omnsiceitn and morally good can be expected to be against all the predation, diseases and injustices and to have the power and knowledge to prevent them from arising.

Importantly for my purposes, it is not the creation of a universe like ours that creates the problem. It is creating it and then making innocent sentient life live in it. That's what creates the problem. There's no problem of evil confronting someone who believes that a universe devoid of innocent sentient life is the creation of such a being. It is the thesis that this universe - a universe that contains floods and earthquakes and diseases that kill and maim innocent sentient life - that generates the problem of evil, and it does so precisely because of the introduction of innocent sentient life.

To use a much hackneyed example, swinging your fists around is not a problem until you start doing it in the close vicinity of other people.

What's the moral? The moral is that a morally good being doesn't exercise the power to create innocent sentient life in a world like this one.

I am using the problem of evil to try and show the apparent incompatibility of human procreation and moral goodness. The problem of evil implies God does not exist. It also implies, I am arguing, that those humans who procreate are, other things being equal, not good people.

A morally good, omnipotent, omniscient being might create a universe like this one but devoid of all innocent sentient life. For perhaps they just like seeing volcanoes erupt, like having beautiful viruses around, like earthquakes and so on. So, just creating a world like ours does not, in and of itself, seem like an act that is incompatible with being omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good.

But creating innocent sentient life and making it live in that world - a world of earthquakes, viruses, volcanoes and now in addition all the evils that sentient lifeforms can visit on each other - does not seem like something a morally good, omnipotent, omniscient being would do. They'd either redesign the world so that it didn't contain those evils, or they'd resist the desire to introduce innocent sentient life into it.

Do you agree with that?

I am not being idiosyncratic. You are confident that I am. But to be that confident about the matter I'd assume you knew a lot about the problem - more than me, for instance (and I'm no expert). Hence my questions. But it seems you don't. So you've decided that I am idiosyncratic in my use of the term 'problem of evil' despite knowing less about it than I do.

The two versions that are traditionally distinguished are the 'logical' and 'evidential' FYI.

The original problem of evil is a problem for anyone who believes themselves and this world to be the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good being.

What I am saying is that human procreators face the problem too.

Of course, saying that something is a problem is not to declare it insurmountable. However, in this case I think those who face the original problem have far greater resources to deal with it than human procreators do.

It's also known as the Epicurean Paradox.

Can you distinguish the two versions of the problem?

What's the other name for the problem of evil?

No, not remotely irrelevant. If the problem of evil is generated by the introduction of innocent sentient life into the world, then that's - you know - kinda relevant to the morality of human procreation. As explained in the OP.

And also 'no', the problem of evil is to do with apparently unjustified evils. But we'll put that aside.

Yes, and there's no evil in a world in which there's no innocent sentient life, yes?

You can't refute someone by lolling at them. That isn't philosophy, it is just rude.

I've explained why it raises a problem of evil for human procreation, haven't I?

Once more: it is not creating a universe like this one that creates the problem of evil (if you think otherwise, explain - for I have asked you twice now whether you think a universe like this but devoid of innocent sentient life would contain any evil but you haven't answered). But creating a universe like this one and, wait for it, making innocent sentient beings live in it creates the problem.

Why? Because an earthquake isn't bad until it starts maiming and killing people, yes? An eruption isn't bad until the larva starts burning people alive, yes? Viruses aren't bad until they make people ill. Innocent, sentient life.

Once more: it is introducing innocent sentient life into the world that creates the evils that we then think no good God would tolerate.

That is the problem Epicurus raised. it is the one discussed in the literature. The one the 'free will defence' is supposed to help alleviate. That one.

I am not denying that it might be possible for evils to exist absent innocent sentient life. But those evils are going to be controversial and are not the uncontroversial kind that motivate the problem of evil.

It is about the problem of evil, as I've just explained. The evils of the world that seem to imply that it is not the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good being are evils that are created by the insertion of innocent, sentient life into the world.

The philosopher Epicurus was the first to raise the problem, and he was a hedonist and thus cannot have considered the problem to consist of anything other than what I have said.

So it is about the problem of evil. And it is about procreation and the interesting implication that the problem has for human procreative activity.

Edit: I also do not understand your 'angels on the head of a pin' comment. I asked a question: do you think a world similar to this one but devoid of all innocent sentient life contains any evils?

What's uncontroversial is that innocent sentient life does not deserve to suffer.

Whether guilty sentient life does is another matter. It's irrelevant. For what I've said in the OP is that what seems to create the problem of evil is that this world does not seem to be the kind of place an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good person would suffer innocent sentient life to live in (and thus this in turn implies that we - as beings who have the power to bestow life and knowledge enough of the world to know that it will subject those we force to live in it to many evils - ought not to suffer innocent sentient life to live in it).

No, a volcano erupting is not bad in and of itself. Or at least, it doesn't seem to be. But put a child on the slopes and then that eruption creates a very bad situation - for now it is causing an innocent sentient being to suffer.

Perhaps there can exist evils absent any sentient beings. But if so, they're not the kind that typically motivate the problem of evil.

Anyway, do you think that a god who creates a universe that is similar to ours but devoid of all innocent sentient life has done something morally bad?

Like I say, such an act seems as morally innocuous as me building a model railway.

If they're innocent, then they don't deserve to suffer or be treated unequally or lose their dignity.

Should we find a way to make every baby a serial killer to allow our procreation to be moral? — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I don't see how that follows from anything I have said.

I still don't understand how you're addressing my argument.

Are you saying that no decisions are free and thus nothing we do is right or wrong, blameworthy or praiseworthy?

If so, then that's both implausible (for any case against free will is going to appeal to a claim that is less self-evident than our possession of free will) and too all-encompassing to be relevant.

That's what creates the evil. As I said in the OP, imagine an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good god creates a world similar to this one except that it is devoid of all innocent sentient life. So, there are still earthquakes and tidal waves and viruses, but no innocent sentient creatures to suffer from them.

Does that scenario create a problem of evil? No. The act of creating a universe like that is as morally innocuous as me, say, building a cathedral out of matchsticks.

So, what creates the problem of evil is the fact that introducing innocent sentient life into a universe such as this doesn't, on the face of it, appear to be the kind of thing a morally good person would do.

It is unclear to me how you are addressing my argument. You have just said some things about freedom. Relevance?

I am talking about an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good being, which is traditionally what the word 'God' with an upper case G denotes. But let's not get into a debate about labels.

Anyway, you can't refute someone by labeling what they've said heretical. Why would I care?

Er, no - you realized you couldn't refute the argument. The argument that proves God exists.

All such prescriptions have originated from someone — Wayfarer

Yes, all prescriptions have some person or persons behind them. But that just confirms my second premise, which says precisely that.

So I am unclear which premise you are disputing.

When you suggest that prescriptions cannot exist absent human discourse you beg the question. Prescriptions do not require humans, they require minds. For it is in virtue of having minds that we can issue prescriptions. And what enables us to develop a discourse in which we are able to express our preferences to one another is precisely that we all have the language of reason to appeal to.

So you're just assuming that all prescriptions have to be human prescriptions and that humans can develop languages without the assistance of reason.

But that's mistaken, as my argument shows. To challenge my argument you need to show one of its premises to be false, or at least to raise some reasonable doubt about one. But so far you have not.

It's not a trick, it's called 'philosophy'. You know, using reason to figure out what's true.
Take a course in critical thinking.

Here's a question you might encounter on an IQ test: if all As are Bs, and all Bs are Cs, are all As Cs?

What's the answer?

Look, you clearly don't know what a valid argument is.

This is valid:


1. There are existing prescriptions of reason
2. Any existing prescription is the prescription of an existing person, a subject, a mind (I use those terms interchangeably).
3. Therefore, the existing prescriptions of reason are prescriptions of an existing person, a subject, a mind.
4. The prescriptions of reason are not prescriptions of mine, or yours, or any of ours
5. Therefore, the existing prescriptions of reason are prescriptions of an existing person who is not any of us.

Can't you see that?

Any living cat is a mammal. Any living mammal has a heartbeat. Therefore, all living cats have heartbeats. Yes? Or do you think that's poor reasoning? Poor, or good?

Now, I'd say that's good reasoning. You'd say "that's just your conviction". Unbelievable!

It's a valid argument. If you can't see that it is valid, then you've got problems.

The argument is not invalid or ridiculous. It is valid. It has a conclusion you don't like.

Welp, on that one, I'm out of here. — Swan

Well, I never realized it was that easy and quick to cook a Swan. And what a disappointingly thin flavour, I must say.

Seems to me that you tar a lot of people with that brush. — Wayfarer

It's true of a lot of people. You think ruthless followers of reason are the norm or the exception?

I can't see any compelling grounds, — Wayfarer

that's because you don't recognise a valid argument when you see one.

I have not said that Reason is a person, I have demonstrated that she is by means of a valid argument whose premises are true beyond reasonable doubt.

Once more I am doing the exact opposite of what you say.

I am not expressing convictions. I am arguing.

It's difficult. Try it.

No, 4 doesn't contradict 2. 4 refers to us lot - humans. It doesn't apply to all subjects. They're consistent, they just entail that Reason is not one of us.

Well, I was leaving open the possibility that I might have equivocated. I don't think I have, but someone who listens more carefully to reason than I do might be able to show me that I have, in which case the argument wouldn't be valid.

Look, it seems to me that 2 + 2 = 4. That doesn't mean it's a matter of personal conviction. That itself is poor reasoning. It seems to me that there's a chair to my left. That doesn't mean whether there's a chair to my left is matter of personal conviction. I do have the personal conviction that there's a chair to my left, but chairs are not made of personal convictions (hence why I'll fall over it no matter how convinced I am that it is not there).

Likewise, for truths of reason. It is my personal conviction that this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

But that doesn't mean it's validity is a matter of personal conviction. It's valid regardless of whether I think it is.

that's the thing about reality. Our faculties - ultimately via our faculty of reason - give us insight into how it is. But they don't compose it.

But a certain sort of person - one who is fundamentally opposed to philosophy proper and just treats it as kind of self-indulgent exercise in self-expression - thinks otherwise.

The argument I made is valid. Someone who thinks it is invalid just because that's their hunch is not someone I want to debate with - not until or unless they can show me, by appeal to self-evident truths of reason, that it is invalid.

I agree that moral responsibility and free will can largely be used interchangeably. I don't think that's just something compatibilists would say - the terms are used interchangeably by most disputants. That is, when it comes to the contemporary debate over free will, the dispute is not over whether free will is required for moral responsibility - it is almost universally agreed that it is and that it is that kind of free will, the responsibility-grounding kind, that is what's under debate - but over what conditions need to be satisfied in order to be morally responsible/free.

But "If I have free will, then not everything I think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes" is only definitionally true on an incompatibilist view of free will. — Pfhorrest

No, that's not true. It would not matter if it was true, for a powerful argument does not require premises that are beyond all dispute, but premises that seem to have powerful support from reason - and that one does (hence why so many are persuaded that incompatibilism is true).

But it isn't true. Logically speaking one could be a compatibilist and accept that if everything we think, desire and do has been determined by prior external causes we lack free will. For one could maintain that so long as we exist with aseity - that is, so long as we have not been created but have instead existed eternally - then the condition can be satisfied consistent with causal determinism being true.

So, in fact that premise is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism. That is, it does not beg the question against compatibilsts.

Like I say, it would not matter if it did - for it is bad reasoning to start out with a position (be it compatiblism or incompatbilism) and then reject premises that seem unfriendly to it.

My point, then, is that people do tend to reason badly about free will and the form that bad reasoning takes is to form a theory first, and then filter what reason says through that filter.

It's valid according to the canons of logic.

For an argument to be valid, it ought to be valid to all and any - otherwise we're no longer engaging in a debate, but a matter of personal conviction. — Wayfarer

Er, no, the exact opposite. All you're doing is expressing your personal conviction - your personal conviction that the argument is invalid. What I'm doing is reasoning. It is not my personal conviction that God exists. God demonstrably exists.

Well, I take it that 'God' denotes a person with the qualities of omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness. I can prove that a being with those qualities exists.

I won't bother you with questions, I'll just do it and remove your doubts.

1. There are existing prescriptions of reason
2. Any existing prescription is the prescription of an existing person, a subject, a mind (I use those terms interchangeably).
3. Therefore, the existing prescriptions of reason are prescriptions of an existing person, a subject, a mind.
4. The prescriptions of reason are not prescriptions of mine, or yours, or any of ours
5. Therefore, the existing prescriptions of reason are prescriptions of an existing person who is not any of us.

That argument is valid and its assumptions seem, to me anyway, to be beyond question. One can't coherently raise a reasonable doubt about assumption 1 without involving oneself in a practical contradiction.

Assumption 2 enjoys 'default true' status, and so the burden of proof is one anyone who wishes to deny it to provide an uncontroversial example of a prescription that lacks entirely any person as its issuer.

3 is entailed by 1 and 2.

4 is self-evidently true. If I insist that 2 + 3 = 6 that will not mean there is any reason to believe it. And as it applies to every one of us, it narrows the scope of whose prescriptions the prescriptions of reason could be to one person: her. Which is what 5 says.

The prescriptions of reason are the prescriptions of a person: Reason.

This person - the person of Reason - is omnipotent. Why? Because there's nothing higher than Reason. She is not bound even by the laws of logic, for those laws are ones she herself writes. There is therefore literally nothing she cannot do - which is just what it is to be omnipotent.

This person is also omniscient, because for a belief to qualify as an item of knowledge it must be justified. And 'justified' just means 'endorsed by Reason'. She is, the, the sole arbiter of knowledge and is therefore omniscient.

This person - the person of Reason - is also morally good. This is because moral values are the values of Reason. And Reason, being omnipotent, is going to be as she values being. Thus, Reason is morally good because she values being exactly as she is.

There. Reason is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally good person and she exists. Proof: done.

Flattery will get you everywhere. Run away, the nasty reasoning man has come to town.

Not with you I couldn't - you pretend to be something you're not, namely someone who knows the area (when clearly you don't). Why would I take instruction from someone who doesn't know what they're talking about?