And Kant had how many kids?

Yes there is - the person who is created. You're falsely assuming that to be affected by something you need to exist prior to the affect occurring.
Imagine you know that any child you have will live a life of total agony from the instant it comes into existence until the end. Well, are you seriously maintaining that the child is not affected by the agony it suffers because it did not exist previously? That's just silly.

Premises 5 and 6 are false. Not procreating does not necessarily lead to the extinction of moral agents.
And even if it did, how is that any kind of 'contradiction'? No moral agent would be willing his/her own demise.

Imagine that tomorrow all the world's women freely decide that they do not wish to have children. Is it respectful to rape them? No, obviously not. It would be wrong to rape them and wrong, in no small part, because rape, by its very nature, is something one cannot consent to.
If one fails forcibly to impregnate them then, forseeaably, the human species will most likely become extinct. That, we might agree, is bad. But the whole point of a deontologist position is that it matters what means you use to prosecute an end. The fact - if it is a fact - that the demise of the human species would be a bad thing does not justify doing anything and everything to prevent it. We are only permitted to prevent bad outcomes using means that pass the categorical imperative. And clearly acts of rape do not. Again, why? Because the nature of such acts is such that those affected by them cannot consent to them.
Well, that applies to procreative acts themselves. The fact is it is the most important thing, if one is a Kantian deontologist anyway, is to honour the intrinsic value of persons by not treating them in ways that they cannot consent to. Seeking to create a person, precisely because it is something that cannot be consented to by the person who is to be created, therefore fails to demonstrate that respect.

But my case above makes no appeal to actual consequences. Rather, the point is that procreative acts are ones that cannot be consented to by the affected party. So it is not consequentialist at all. There is, of course, a consequentialist case to be made too, but here the focus is on the nature of the act of procreation. Those who intentionally procreate are acting in a way that cannot be agreed to by the affected party.

Ah, I don't think it is question begging. Your argument, I think, is this:

1. If everything we do is antecedently causally determined, then we lack free will.
2. If we are physical things then everything we do is antecedently causally determined
3. Therefore, if we are physical things then we lack free will
4. We are physical things
5. Therefore, we lack free will

What I am doing is arguing that the above argument is weaker than this one:

1. If everything we do is antecedently causally determined, then we lack free will
2. If we are physical things, then everything we do is antecedently causally determined
3. Therefore, if we are physical things then we lack free will
4. We have free will.
5. Theefore we are not physical things.

My argument's premises are all well supported by reason and its conclusion contradicts no truth of reason. But your argument has one premise that is no supported by reason - your premise 4 is just an assumption, not a self-evident truth of reason. And your conclusion contradicts self-evident truths of reason.

[ But what it is right or wrong for us to do is not constitutively determined by our feelings.

Our reason is our source of insight into what it is ethical for us to do. Perhaps creatures whose reason told them not to treat sex as just another leisure activity, not to sell or buy it, that it is especially wrong to force it on someone, and really only ok to engage in it in the context of a loving relationship had more children than those whose reason told them something different. But this by itself does not discredit what our reason tells us about this.

Yes, it is a lottery insofar as we cannot guarantee that our attempts to create a person (or bring a person into this realm if they already exist elsewhere) will succeed. But most Kantians would say that it does not really matter if the act is succeeds in bringing about the agent's ends, for what matters ethically is the nature of the act itself.
So, if I plan on spiking someone's drink but the drug I am using only stands a 20% chance of having the desired effect on my victim, I have still done wrong if I spike someone's drink with it despite the fact it is a matter of chance whether I succeed in my plan.

Re being glad we're alive - I think we can be glad about something and still think the act that brought it about was wrong. That's certainly what Kant thought anyway, and I think our rational intuitions concur. For example, imagine I am in a hospital and I desperately need a vital organ if I am to survive. The doctor - who thinks I'm just great - decides secretly to kill the patient next to me so that the necessary organ becomes available and I survive. He does this and I live on. When I become aware of what has happened I might be very glad that I am still around yet at the same time think that what the doctor did was seriously wrong. Indeed, I might even be very grateful to the doctor - he saved my life - and still think he did wrong.

So I think there the fact we may be glad we're alive - and perhaps even grateful to our parents for having created us - does not imply that they did nothing wrong in creating us.

It is not clear to me whether you're agreeing or disagreeing with what I've said. You seem to be describing what it may be in our reproductive interests to believe or desire, but what I am talking about is the moral significance of sex (not its biological significance).

Definitely causeless, but it may be that something that lacks a cause can, in some sense, also be said to be its own cause.

No. But we - the conscious things - are not physical things. Try refuting the argument before deciding its conclusion is wrong.

There's no delay to consciousness and I doubt you've read the Libet article.

I should also add, that the new generation seem far from breezy about sex. They seem acutely aware of the wrongness of sexual molestation and sexual manipulation.

As regards your second point - yes, quite. If there were no religions I think sex would still appear to be ethically special. It appears ethically special to me, for instance, and I am not religious in the slightest.

Address the argument.

Well first we should respect appearances. If we just decide that some appearances are deceptive because the truth of our theory is incompatible with them, then we have made our theory unfalsifiable and show ourselves to be dogmatists, not followers of reason.

So, the fact that sex appears to most reason-responsive people to be ethically special in the ways I have described (and no doubt many other ways that I have not) is default good evidence that it is. The appearances may, of course, be the product of corrupt forces. But we would need some evidence that this is the case, not just a conviction that it is.

It is not plausible that religions just arbitrarily decided to insist on the ethical significance of sex, especially not when it is probably in a religion's interest to insist on its ethical insignificance (so that its members have lots of it and breed like sheep). It is far more plausible that religions insist upon the ethical significance of sex because sex appears to be ethically significant and religions want to provide their own special backstory about that ethical significance.

Plus, in point of fact the Abrahamic religions built, in no small part anyway, on foundations laid by Plato. Plato's views on sex were not informed by religion, but by reason.

Isn't it more plausible that the reason religions typically make a big deal about sex is that sex is obviously ethically special?

What you're doing is assuming that we're physical things. But that's just a dogma of the modern age.
It is a self-evident truth of reason - one you yourself appeal to - that free will is incompatible with our decisions having been antecedently determined.
But it is even more powerfully self-evident that we have free will.
Consider: in the lengthy debate over free will the majority of those who have thought long and hard about the issue still conclude that we do, in fact, have free will. They either conclude that compatibilism is true, or they conclude that incompatbilism is true but that the indeterminism is says is necessary for free will actually obtains (libertarianism). Only a minority (albeit quite a significant minority) conclude that we lack free will. So evidently most of those who think long and hard about this issue recognise that it is powerfully self-evident to reason that we possess free will.
So this premise:

1. We have free will

is exceptionally powerfully supported by our rational intuitions.

Less powerfully supported, by powerfully supported nevertheless, is this premise:

2. Free will is incompatible with everything we do being antecedently determined (that is, if we have free will, then not everything we do is antecedently determined)

The conclusion that follows from these two premises is this:

3. Therefore, not everything we do is antecedently determined.

But as you point out, this premise is also true:

4. If we are physical things, then everything we do is antecedently determined

And what follows from 4 and 5 is this:

5. Therefore we are not physical things.

We're not physical things, because if we're physical things then what you say is correct - we would not have free will. But we manifestly do have free will, therefore we are not physical things.

yes, but it clearly is part of the story of why it is wrong, so your analysis is implausible.

I do not understand what you are getting at. Whether a god exists or not has nothing to do with what belief in such a being might inspire people to do.

No, the point is you haven't articulated a coherent problem.

I did explain what a rational intuition is. It is a representation of reason. You can see that 2 + 3 = 5, yes? Do you see it with your eyes, smell it, taste its truth, feel its truth through the surface of your skin? No, you see its truth with your reason. That - that mental representation - is a representation of reason.

Hmm, I don't think you're saying anything. What I said was true.

I am very much of the view that many thinkers of the past are in a different league, intellectually, to most of those around today. But their intelligence lies in their ability to channel reason - to listen and report accurately what she says. So why not just present their arguments rather than quote from texts as if the text - rather than reason - has authority in these matters?

It might be demonstrable that logic requires a god. The god it requires would be omnipotent because the god in question would have control over both its existence and content.

Yes, but the way in which it involves logic is that it tells us something about what the nature of logic would need to be for there to be an omnipotent being. All Alcontali is doing is talking - irrelevantly - about the content of logic.
The point, though, is that an omnipotent being would have to be the author of logic. That is incompatible with some concepts of logic. Well, either those concepts are the ones that have something answering to them -in which case we can conclude that no omnipotent being exists - or we have good evidence that an omnipotent being exists, in which case we can conclude that the alternative concepts do not have anything answering to them.
So we can learn something about the nature of logic from this kind of inquiry.

I have answered the question. If you insist that the question is unanswerable, demonstrate that by showing my answer to be false.

I refer you to my earlier answer. You're not addressing the question, or realizing that you're not addressing the question.

I still don't see what problem you're highlighting. God is good just if God approves of himself. So he can do what he wants, as long as he approves of himself he will be good.

No, why do you think I think that?

We're talking at different levels. my question is about whether or not an omnipotent agent would have control over logic. What you're doing is talking about the content of logic. What you're talking about it is irrelevant. Whatever you say about the content of logic, my point is that an omnipotent being isn't bound by it.

If you say no question can be given a yes/no answer, the omnipotent being can give you a definitive answer to any question you ask. And so on.

Whatever it is that you're saying - and it isn't clear to me what you're saying - you're either attempting to appeal to reason, or you're not. If you are not, then what you're saying counts for nothing. If you are, then show me how what I've said fails to report what reason says.

Reason says that to be maximally powerful is to be able to do anything. Reason says that if you can't do something - anything - then that's a restriction on your power. Therefore, a maximally powerful agent is not in any way restricted in what they can do. Thus, a maximally powerful agent is not bound by logic. They are the author of logic.

I appealed to reason.

that same applies to other philosophical questions - they're not questions physicists address.
I think, perhaps, a lot of people with scientific backgrounds assume that they're the ones who are really studying reality and, as such, philosophy is just science without any empirical rigour. And thus if only scientists turn their attention to philosophical questions they'll be able to sort it all out.

And I answered the question and gave my reasons for the answer. Those reasons justify that answer. You seem to be thinking they don't - why?

There you go again - more content. You're not addressing the question.

No, this is simply false: go into a physics department and ask the physicists in it what the difference is between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist about free will and see if they know.
The nature of free will is not something investigated by physics. if you've studied physics - and you say your background is in it - at which point in your studies did you study free will? Which module in a physics course studies it?
It isn't something physics studies.

I don't follow your argument. Indeed, you make some claims that seem incoherent to me. You say that God's goodness and his power are the same - but that's confused. God's goodness is going to consist in his approving of himself. God's power consists in the fact he can do anything.
Anyway, I don't yet see a problem - forgiving someone involves adopting a certain attitude towards them. Doing something wrong involves doing something God doesn't want you to do (more than that, no doubt, but at least that). What's incoherent about the idea of someone doing something that someone else doesn't want them to do, and then that person forgiving them? I'm not yet seeing the problem.

So far I have provided for arguments for the thesis that my mind is an immaterial soul. Each one was deductively valid and had premises that are far, far more plausible than their opposites. here's another:

1. If an event harms a person, that person must exist at the time of the harm
2. The total destruction of our material bodies are events that will harm us if or when they occur, other things being equal
3. Therefore, we will exist at the same time as the total destruction of our bodies, if or when such events occur, and other things being equal.
4. If we are our material bodies, then it is not possible for us to exist at the same time as the total destruction of our material bodies under any circumstances.
5. Therefore, we are not our material bodies

Why can't you leave the restrictions of a physicist's mindset? Physics doesn't investigate free will at all, so what's to leave? Again, physicists are simply not studying free will at all.

To figure out what free will involves you have to use your reason. Your physics background will neither help nor restrict you - it is simply irrelevant.

No, it is to do with the concept of power. To have maximum power one needs to be able to do anything at all, for if there is something one cannot do, one lacks the power to do it. And lacking a power to do something is to lack a power.