But how, you said you didn't understand? :P

That's ok. The feeling is mutual.

No. I was once madly in love with a melancholic. It didn't help at all that I am myself and so understood. — Mongrel

I am not sure whether there is a masochistic perfection to loving someone when you are down (and you are down all the time), but I hardly this this is true if you say once, which is past tense.

Cite any evidence of K. thinking of his leaving Regine as mistaken. — Agustino

I do retract my comment of his idiocy; I spent today in a profoundly draining conference and typing on my phone is not that easy. But, one could perhaps be classed as rather strange if he felt that his future lineage would ultimately be 'cursed by an extreme melancholy' as his family had been, when clearly the melancholy itself was created.

K mentioned that there was absolutely nothing about Regine that could have justified his abandonment of her — TimeLine

"...and she is and remains an intermediate court, a legitimate court, that must not be bypassed."

"...she was the beloved. My life will unconditionally accent her life, my literary work is to be regarded as a monument to her honour and praise. I take her along into history."

K mentioned that there was absolutely nothing about Regine that could have justified his abandonment of her
— TimeLine
Where did he mention this? Cite it please. — Agustino

"I cannot quite place her impact on me in a purely erotic sense. It is true that the fact that she yielded almost adoringly to me, pleaded with me to love her, had so touched me that I would have risked everything for her. But the fact that I always wanted to hide from myself the degree to which she touched me is also evidence of the extent to which I loved her… had my vita ante acta not been melancholic, marriage to her would have made me happy beyond my dreams.”

Do you think that an attempt for forgiveness meant a regret on part of the person seeking this forgiveness?

He never for a single second denied that he loved Regine. He believed it in his heart - he had the infinite hope of someone who was certain about it - had complete faith in it. — Agustino

Cite please.

Regine was his - not in time, but in eternity. He gave her up in time so that he may have her forever. — Agustino

Cite please.

Furthermore, not everyone will agree that "mutual love" is the most important aspect of our existence. That's what you think because that happens to be your dominant desire. — Agustino

Oh, you know my desires, do you? Well, here I was thinking that I was an authority to myself. Praise, O mighty Augustino, for seemingly crossing the metaphysical boundaries into the transcendental realm that is my subjective. Hail, Augustino, for thou art a god. :s

Love is what all people desire. This is merely an ad hominem attack to try and purport that my approach to the subject is skewed by proxy, perhaps because I am a woman. And mutual love needn't be erotic alone. It could be true friendship. It could be familial. But it must be reciprocal and genuine.

Regine implored K. to take her back for YEARS and K. still refused — Agustino

No, he came to her telling her that he wants her, asking for her hand in marriage and then changing his mind because his disposition was prone to this 'melancholy' for which she, in her devotion and love for him, implored him that she will do whatever it takes for him. You have confused her affections and her love for him and his waywardness whereby he would court her affections by telling her his eloquent and ardent feelings and then retracting the moment she reciprocates. She was constantly confused between these two states, but clearly she was devoted to him and loved him and he knew that and no doubt felt the same way in return.

He was terrified of the happiness that he would have attained with her.

I don't know. Not everyone's life is meant to be shared within the boundaries of authentic and mutual love. Take Alexander the Great. You think Alexander married because of love? Absolutely not - he married as was necessary to build the strategic alliances that his budding empire needed. Of course he probably chose to marry women he liked, who looked nice, were pretty and sexy for the time, were socially well-regarded, etc. — Agustino

I think Alexander the Great or Marcus Aurelius are extraordinary examples; he was merely a humble philosopher from Denmark and millions of men are just men who want to do something significant - like maybe write a book or work in a particular field - not become some whopping leader of a great empire. I agree that many men choose women who look nice and are socially well-regarded, but this is precisely why so many marriages end up failing; it has almost become easier to live in a lie, as long as there remains some superficial or fleeting happiness, which is usually the pat on the head from others in this social group. Genuine love promotes a longevity as it transcends this spatiotemporal domain; it is not about looks or society, just two people who are united with the same sensual experience. "Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies. The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her, so that he shall have no need of spoil... She stretcheth out her hand to the poor; yea, she reacheth forth her hands to the needy. She openeth her mouth with wisdom; and in her tongue is the law of kindness... Her children arise up, and call her blessed; her husband also, and he praiseth her."

Donald Trump speaks highly of Melania... — Agustino

:-|

As I said, authentic. The love must be genuine. Anyone and everyone can say 'I love you' but it is not often that one actually genuinely means it.

Infantile love follows the principle: "I love because I am loved."
Mature love follows the principle: "I am loved because I love."
Immature love says: "I love you because I need you."
Mature love says: "I need you because I love you.”

Even amongst those who don't divorce, how many do you think aren't troubled by things like infidelities, adultery etc.? All my family (who aren't divorced) have cheated on each other for example. That includes older generations too. — Agustino

This is what happens when you do not actually love your partner. It is not easy finding a genuine bond, no one is saying that it is. Most people escape out of loneliness to form a bond solely because they will connect with a social group rather than actually have strong feelings of love and respect for their partner. They often play games with one another to keep things going when there is an underlying hostility or disregard, stay silent and accept their foolishness to a point of even sacrificing ones own identity and self just to survive, cheating and committing sexual immorality to make one feel momentarily alive. How tragic is such self-deceit, this public show.

We become disillusioned, but the latter does not mean it doesn't exist and most likely there is a strong percentage of couples that remain bound together by genuine affection.

Perhaps as an impetus that transforms one to consciousness, hence “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards." When he became conscious of his self-deception, he became tortured at his failure as one comes to see that only lies are what muddy a will; the will itself flows through love with others.

He might have succeeded in expressing his genius equally but differently if he had gone with R; but certainly not if he could not go wholeheartedly, and that has been my only point. If he really lived in regret then that would be an expression of his weakness, but he obviously did not live in regret to an extent that it crippled his creative spirit. — John

It is incorrect of you to say that his decision was right when he himself is conscious of it being wrong and thus you are injecting a level of your own idealization of K rather than appreciating the humanity behind his decision, that he is a man after all.

He lived in regret because his actions were regretful, they were wrong and he was conscious of that. He realised that she was perfect for him and worth courting, thus in the end, he missed out on the most important aspect of our existence, mutual love.

What made Kierkegaard a great man and a great philosopher was the fact that - save for initially, hence the initial self-deception - he was courageous enough to admit that he made a terrible mistake and that he was sorry for that mistake, something he clearly wanted to tell her. It is quite the opposite of what you think, admitting that his decision is not a strength but cowardice.

Life is meant to be shared within the boundaries of authentic and mutual love. That is not an idealization. That is a fact.

I don't know what this means. — John

It meant most people prefer stories of tragic love, which is why we rarely hear of the success in love; our preference has always been with our imagination that we blindly walk past an opportunity for genuine love.

Examples? — John

Do you need to make a celebrity of something so human? My physics lecturer who is a brilliant mind and authored several books speaks highly of his wife and partner of 32 years, in the introduction of his books and publicly. To pretend that long-term happiness between two people who genuinely love and care for one another as being very rare is farcical at best.

How many well-documented cases of great, lasting loves can you cite? The practical day to day exigencies of living together and raising a family are not things which come within the purview of the romantic ideal of 'great love', and are not likely to be supportive of its fruition, either. — John

Again, this is merely an unrealistic idealization particularly of Kierkegaard considering that you assume his greatness that therefore means his love for Regine would have also surmounted to something 'great' but there are a plethora of examples of love between two people that is lasting and genuine and that enables growth and an authentic happiness, many great figures who speak highly of the love shared with their partners that strengthened their careers and who they are as people. That in itself is the only greatness necessary. There is a clear schism of documented cases only because it exemplifies people' preferred trend to tragedy.

Of course it is certainly possible that kindred spirits can live together in a love that becomes ever deeper, even if not more intense, as they become the greatest of friends; but I would say that it is exceptionally rare, and, to quote Spinoza "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare" (emphasis mine). — John

A rarity does not mean an impossibility, the chance still exists that is enough to doubt any claims of failure. It is better to have tried in this mutual love and failed, then to have lived an entire life regretting and Spinoza is clearly right. The path to anything wonderful is always short and narrow and that intensity proves the authenticity of your love, such an intensity being delayed qua K.

I think K's self-regard must have been monumental for him to treat another so shabbily on the ground that he is so important a figure with so much great to do that it's best (for Regine!) not to return love for love. As to the shabbiness, I don't refer merely to his breaking the engagement (which he saw fit to do twice), but to his subsequent haunting (stalking?) of his unfortunate victim, at least until she married, thereby reminding her that he would never be hers. A man of honor would have let her be after refusing her. — Ciceronianus the White

This is precisely it, the humanity and very actuality of the situation. He was haunted by his decision to abandon her and likely his approach and treatment of a mutual love that when he became conscious of his self-deceit, it compelled a desperation that never ceased. His initial actions to justify his abandonment were all merely a way to make himself believe that he did the right thing only to realise that she was perfect and he was wrong.

I think that marrying Regine would have been a mistake, unless he was able to be wholehearted about it, which he obviously was not. What we imagine a love relationship will be and what it mostly likely will become are two very different things. It is much easier to be romantic about the whole affair when looking from afar. — John

I think you need to look at this from afar as what I see here is more of an idealization of Kierkegaard for abandoning love in place of his philosophical love for God rather than appreciating that even Kierkegaard himself was conscious of - though a few years later - his mistake to his everlasting regret. The problem is not the outcome of the potentiality of this love as there was none; K mentioned that there was absolutely nothing about Regine that could have justified his abandonment of her, despite initially attempting (self-deceptively) to make himself believe that there was.

The result was unjustifiable suffering and likely to both parties and though it may sound appealing to those that appreciate such existential suffering, it is completely foolish and cruel. It was unethical to play games and be deceitful to her as a way to ward of the potential of confronting the future that appears frightening, and yes, there is always a risk that such a romance would never fruition to something beautiful and solid, but likewise, there is also a chance that it will form into a great love that could have compelled him on the same path or even greater. In the end, all that was left was merely pointless suffering because he was an idiot.

A lot of virtue signalling plays the same unconscious role - serves to attract a virtuous person to you (even if you may not be virtuous to begin with) simply because that's one of your deepest desires. — Agustino

There is nothing wrong with such emotions, on the contrary I - like Kierkegaard - know that whilst it is compelling intellectually, an absence of love is very root of our failure to attain the virtuous disposition that we seek. On the contrary, perhaps the warning should be deflected back to you as Kierkegaard' writing on the subject is very clear and whilst Kierkegaard' decision may be appreciated out of respect for his work, in the end we will never know whether he would have been greater or worse if he did decide to be with Regine or not. All we know is that they both were miserable because of it. Again. "To cheat oneself out of love is the most terrible deception; it is an eternal loss for which there is no reparation, either in time or in eternity."

Regine. So I would not say "to escape his fears", but rather to avoid what he knew would be an untenable situation, and would result in even greater suffering for Regine in the long run. I think his actions were ethical, because he had not made the final commitment. — John

When one transcends love they by definition abandon it as was closely stated earlier by Cavs, only Kierkegaard came to realise it much later. Indeed, his initial decision may have been the assumption that the situation was untenable, that the idea of marrying Regine would have been a mistake both for himself and for her, but he realised that it was wrong afterwards, that his so-called 'final commitment' was self-deceptive and the very reason why he was tortured by the decision.

It is indeed his fears, fears that to commit to Regine may have situationally limited his capacity of genius, but he realised that to be wrong and on the contrary it was the very impetus to his overall capacity to undertake the subjects that he did. As you say, Gauguin did not know what the outcome would have been and neither did Kierkegaard, only he came to clearly and absolutely regret it, which is verification enough that even he realised it to have been wrong.

He gave her up because he knew he would have been miserable with her... and so she would have been miserable too. — Mongrel

This may have been what he initially assumed that compelled his decision, but he induced the very misery that he sought to avoid by what he later came to realise was self-deceptive. As he said himself, "To cheat oneself out of love is the most terrible deception; it is an eternal loss for which there is no reparation, either in time or in eternity."

It is true that he was cruel - he wanted to make her hate him at one point. That's why he allowed himself to be portrayed as a cold-hearted seducer, etc. — Agustino

This is the deception that drove her to suffering and thus contrary to his moral obligations and perhaps his behaviour towards her enabled a temporary solution that compelled her marriage to someone else, but such suffering within never ceases without forgiveness, that we will never know whether she, as much as he, was tormented.

It is not good enough to hold onto an imagined story of love, the honour and honesty to face the brutality of your feelings with courage, the absence of which meant that in the end it was his devotion in God and not hers that was in question.

Okay, you're not telling me something too controversial here - I agree :D — Agustino

Holy moly. :-O Can it be?

Kierkegaard was acutely aware of self-deception though, and viewed self-deception as the worst possible state. — Agustino

God still enabled Abraham to keep his son and to embrace the joy in love, that when there is an authenticity in this love between two people, one could say the sacrifice had gone ahead as if Kierkegaard renounced the very fabric of our existence, the very gift that God gave us. His acute awareness of self-deception is because his cold - almost cruel - methods of justifying his initial decision to abandon her surfaced as being a lie he told himself.

It was an abandonment of love. He was afraid.

So what's the truth? Did Kierkegaard break off the engagement he himself started with Regine out of fear and anxiety? As a way to escape his fears? Or did he break the engagement out of devotion to God?

Either way, are his actions ethical? Is Kierkegaard justified to break Regine's heart and abandon her, putting up a cold front despite her suffering? What's your opinion? — Agustino

There remains nothing that would have enabled him to believe that his decision to reject her was justifiable, and this is where his subjective battle tormented him and why he needed forgiveness. It is exactly as you say, fear, and the precipitating guilt that followed that perhaps resulted in his need to engage philosophically with God since there should be no fear in love. If one would turn aside 'a legitimate court' like her, than what is authentic in any decisions that we make or perceptions that we believe?

He probably did all that he could to make himself believe it was the right decision, but self-deceptive lies always catch up. The worst thing in the world is to abandon a person that you genuinely love and there is no justification in allowing her such suffering which I fear he may have realised too late, which is why he desperately wanted to talk to her but never could.

Feelings of compassion are always morally relevant. Morality can never be "verified" - except by God who knows what is in your heart. A person can live an outwardly perfect moral life - as verified by others - and yet be corrupt to the bone in the depths of his heart. — Agustino

Look, my place with Kant does stop at that point viz., compassion as I too personally agree that there is more to self-actualisation than what reason can dictate, but notwithstanding, the categorical imperative' purpose remains a tool to articulate that subjective experience into an objective action, a way in which one can narrate feelings of guilt for committing something immoral, to utter an inherently unknowable that renders one capable of redemption and to say "I'm sorry" since such language or moral deliberation is articulated through knowledge. What is knowable must evidently require reason but reason itself is also subject to err (likely the effect of our impulses), hence the necessity of authenticity in this applied self-actualisation. It is finding the mean between both Schopenhauer and Kant.

Authentic love has an incredible power in transforming us from mindless drones dictated by impulse or ego to genuinely compassionate and moral beings but without consciousness of this knowledge that enables one to commit themselves to affect causal powers by adhering to a set of commandments, one could quite easily lapse into a state of self-delusion that inevitably make them worse, hence the parable of the unclean spirit returning (L11:24); love, without reason, is blind.

I agree that no one cannot really know what is going on within a person, that is the precise point and the very purpose of ethics. I find it very difficult tolerating false liars pretending they a good people, using contemporary modes of social ettiequte to enable this false image when they contribute nothing, all this pretending and games merely a way to convince those around them that they are good people. It really is painful to see that sociopathy has become a norm.

Sorry but this is so false. Compassion is ultimately without reason - without a why. If you have a why for being compassionate, then you're not really compassionate, you're just utilitarian. You're just being compassionate for a reason. That's like loving your child because he brings you money :s — Agustino

What a fallacious scenario.

Kant' philosophy is about objective morality and compassion is merely a subjective experience irrelevant to our relations with the external domain and our role in ethical and moral duty. It does not dismiss the emotional subjectivity of the experience, on the contrary feelings of love and compassion therein epitomise this transformation or 'revolution' of thought and character, but it is just not one we can verify vis-a-vis the external world. That is, we cannot verify whether your feelings of compassion are in anyway morally relevant; you could rape someone, and then feel compassion by them by helping them put their clothes back on. Moral duty enables us to communicate and reciprocate moral laws over time that would prevent something like that, but in the end the subjectivity is wholly unique and dependent on the identification of ones own conscience that requires an autonomy.

Thanks for admitting you are hostile :D (Y) >:O — Agustino

Hence the 'fail to get it' bit... :-}

TimeLine wouldn't get bored, you know. — Agustino

Sarcasm is underlying hostility disguised as humour, a way to ward off someone who has historically failed to 'get it'.

Fellow feeling means being able to identify with others - their pains, suffering, etc. Fellow feeling emerges out of a - like you like to say - a metaphysical realisation that we're all one - or better said, we emerge from the same ground of being, we have a common source. — Agustino

This 'realisation' that emerges as a revolution of character is still a conduct of thought and thus not beyond but rather a result of the faculties of cognition. This identification with our conscience indicates a beginning of our autonomy and self-inhered responsibility to those in the external world where ethics becomes a practice. This practice becomes the categorical imperative; it is compassion with reason, not just some mystical gobbledegook where one can flout being compassionate without knowing why.

..sugar-coated babydoll! — Agustino

...sweet pickle — Agustino

Clear bunny bunny? (L) — Agustino

Yeah, sarcasm over, creepy crust. :s

One cultivates compassion by fellow-feeling and meditation. — Agustino

Define fellow-feeling?

soft, warm, hot, tender... — Agustino

Is that how you define compassion?

It's good you like feeling it man. Is it soft, warm, hot, tender, loving and mysterious? — Agustino

Bet you can't wait to get married to your virginal, submissive, obedient, quiet, catholic girl born with no sense of taste or a personality?

Well isn't that just peachy, sweet cheeks. An illusion is the belief that your feelings within this metaphysical realm is somehow free from the articulation of consciousness, and even if this is so, one can learn to cultivate compassion, hence the CI.

I think Kant created a moral abomination with his categorical imperative. Schopenhauer was right - Kant was thoroughly deluded in terms of morality. Morality isn't based on imperatives, but on compassion. — Agustino

That's nice, dear. And where do you think compassion is derived?

Well, if there's one word to describe my life, it's ''BIZARRE''. You don't know how reasonable ''chreograph a dance'' sounds to me. Also, the proposition doesn't sound as outlandish as you think - many mystical traditions have dance as a path to realization. — TheMadFool

As a former contemporary dancer, I can actually understand this, but I hardly think the philosophical world would. I can just imagine Chalmers with his leather jacket and colourful socks pirouetting to Tchaikovsky’s Nutcracker in a lecture theatre as he swishes his hair about attempting to explain p-zombies.

The reason why morality has yet to be explained rationally is the elusive domain of conscience, love and the ever frightening external reality of which metaphysics itself has yet to demonstrate (hence consciousness). I think Kant has done a pretty good job rationalising morality.

And what is this bizarre you speak of? You're not sitting crossed legged and naked in a room full of mirrors, while on a laptop and eating porridge?

For example take ethics - logical analysis of the moral landscape has utterly failed in providing a satisfactory solution to its problems. — TheMadFool

I hardly think working in contrast to rational processes will enable us to get any closer to solving the problem of consciousness. Exactly what did you have in mind? Choreograph a dance?

Personally, I'm with Doestovesky's Underground Man: "I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a very charming thing too." — Noble Dust

Dostoyevski is my absolute favourite writer, his ability to describe the human condition, of the ordinary and unoriginal who are applauded for their esteemed qualities or the suffering and filth of genuine hearts is quite simply unmatched. “Love in action is a harsh and dreadful thing compared to love in dreams.”

Please answer the question and stop quibbling. — woodart

I was, at the time, enjoying a hearty breakfast. Then, I moved on to writing. Now, I am about to have lunch, but I realised that there is nothing in my fridge, so a nice walk in the sunshine to the shops to buy some groceries is on the agenda. I must apologise, but I don't actually remember you asking a question. Could you repeat it for me please?

Please clarify. Are you saying my decision to eat shrimp rather than pizza is not a choice? That only "rational choices" are really choices? How many of the situations in our lives where we have to pick between two or more options are what you call "actual choices?" — T Clark

Not necessarily. You are hungry, but why? Physically, you are in need of sustenance to enable the energy to function adequately. You are a human being and as such require a number of daily nutrients to ensure optimal health and therefore what you ingest should rationally point you into the direction of foods that would enable this, but your 'mouth watered' at the idea of eating shrimp pizza, what will provide you with the pleasurable stimuli that therein also contains minimal nutrients and probably an overload of unnecessary energy. It makes no sense and your impulse to eat it was due to this immediate and albeit fleeting pleasure.

But like how we have the first-order processes of mind, where there are rules that govern cognitive resources in a way the renders the conditions necessary for sensory experience, hunger as an impulse is required; taste, on the other hand, is an experience. Therefore, attempting to ascertain the conditions that enable this perception of 'shrimp' to manifest itself in your mind and that governs your decisions is necessary. Perhaps - at elementary level - comparatively think about a man who lives in abject poverty; he would not salivate over shrimp because he never ate it; empiricism would agree, but Kant probably wouldn't.

What percentage of the actions you take in life do you think are rational? — T Clark

In reality, not much, such is being human. But, I do what I can and philosophy helps.

I hear you talk, but I do not hear you saying very much - you seem very adept at hiding behind your words - obfuscation. Are you saying we choose without reason or our choices are moral? Try and be clear - stop trying to impress us with your words - impress us with a clear reason. — woodart

First of all, I am writing so you can't hear me talk. Secondly, I am not hiding my words, you just fail to understand. And who is 'us'?

Nothing rational took place because it was instinctual. Your decision was propelled by an impulse but a rational choice to eat foods that contains the highest nutrients for optimal health and the required energy to sustain you despite the taste is an actual choice.

I am not not sure if I understand this. Does it exclude instinct? Are cats and dogs capable of choices? If it's based on pleasure and displeasure why is it important if it's represented or immediate? The source of the action seems to be the same. — mew

A 'choice' must be rational, thus cats and dogs are not capable of choice but are purely instinctual. The decision to act with reason irrelevant to the pleasure or displeasure that it will produce and that therein contains no instinctual influence can be considered an actual choice. Choice must always reflect what is moral.

A choice can perhaps be a decision that contains an absence of an impulse or instinctual drive that mechanically pulls us to act without reason in order to immediately satisfy and it needn't only be sexual or aggressive. It is acting without reason; the autonomy to reason is acting without being enslaved to our impulses. A choice must therefore be wholly moral, something peculiar only to those who possess it. "Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.”

I'm an old arty-fart, I quite agree the forum looks ok as it is, and it won't put me out if nothing changes, but I dislike this Facebook-like conformity. — mcdoodle

I cannot see how considering that the former addition of 'likes' is gone and indeed there are no personal picture posting. It is nice to indulge in some aesthetic pleasure, but alas some here would take it to another level that it may reduce the quality of posts into scintillating ad hominems.

I liked 180 Proof's quirkiness. — mcdoodle

180 proof was legendary but he was to the point and had concise, almost perfect oneliners. Augustino is legendary with his own quirkiness now, as he is, but to further inflict us with essays of rainbow vomit where we would need to wear ultraviolet sunglasses just to read his posts, it would probably get him banned and I wouldn't want that.

I think the site looks perfect as is. All this place needs is the palm-face and rolly-eye emoticons. I miss them.

So why don't you reformulate that objection as clearly and precisely as you can, and I will respond to it. — Thorongil

You said that humans possess 'free choice' and not 'free will' before comparatively stating that by Schopenhauers' "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills" that implies freedom to be nothing but a compulsion, I am confused as to how you assume choice is not a compulsion. I am of the opinion that this 'choice' you purport is an illusory representation and though conceptualisation of the will through Ideas may enable a transcendence from the cognitive limitations through his aesthetic argument as it is no longer spatiotemporally individuated, it is only a conceptualisation of the thing in-itself. The intellect is always subservient to the will.

I'm sorry, cupcake, but you haven't shown this at all. — Thorongil

Here we go. You are not suddenly right because I don't have a penis. Argument, please.

Schopenhauer in the second Volume of WWR pulls back from the complete identification of thing-in-itself with Will. Therefore what is left after the complete abolition of the Will is nothing from the perspective of us - those still full of Will. — Agustino

If the will is independent of cognition as the thing-in-itself, one cannot within the boundaries of the intellect confirm the existence of it, ergo it would be contradictory to state otherwise and hence why it is unknowable, an immanent metaphysic that defies an empirical answer just as much as one cannot claim freedom from the will. The result is that one is condemned to a paradox. There is a transcendence from this metaphysics, but that still remains an appearance that interprets the thing-in-itself. "I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, and hence in time, which is the form of my body's appearing, as it is of every body. Therefore, the body is the condition of knowledge of my will." He is trying to strike down our cognitive limitations while at the same time acknowledge the essence of our nature, the key being conceptual knowledge hence Ideas.

intellect only tells the will how to get to where it wants to get — Agustino

the intellect is subservient to the will — Agustino

?

But it doesn't have to be like that - hence Schopenhauer's denial of the will. — Agustino

He denies the illusory will, the representations that individuate. The will in-itself stands outside of this intellect or cognitive faculty and is the force behind everything.

It's late and cold and I had a shitty day. Perfect song.

That the intellect guides the will presupposes that the intellect is subservient to the will already. The will wants X. The intellect tells the will how to get X. Will it take road A or B? That's the choice.

That's why this has nothing to do with genius or sainthood, but with our natural way of functioning. — Agustino

No, it doesn't, which is where the spatiotemporal argument becomes relevant, that these grades of objectification of the will did not develop by our experience of physical or bodily awareness, but it is distinctly through innerste or the representation of that innermost will, hence the will in itself. The intellect is subservient to the will independent of our cognition. To become conscious of this force does not deny this fundamental feature but merely an awareness that the intellect itself is able to access Ideas that individuates our experience or representation of the world.

No level of transcendence is required at all. Even a person with a weak intellect - his will is still guided by that intellect - only that the intellect isn't powerful enough to see all the choices that are available, to see the advantages/disadvantages they entail, etc. So the weak intellect is almost as if the will was blind. — Agustino

I understand what you are trying to say, but when you say "his will is still guided by that intellect" only it lacks 'power' that this grading of the objectification of the will (and I assume lower phenomenon) lacks this so-called power because it is unable to perceive Ideas and is thus subsumed. It becomes irrelevant; you either are, or you are not and when the latter, the intellect is subject to the will.

But I still don't see what this has to do with what we were talking about. We weren't discussing Platonic Ideas — Agustino

Let's go back to the problem I had initially, the notion that there is no free-will but there is free-choice and the latter purports an intellect or capacity to distinguish between the subject and an object, a person who can experience space and time superior to the independence of this will. As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. You can see it here:

"According to Schopenhauer, corresponding to the level of the universal subject-object distinction, Will is immediately objectified into a set of universal objects or Platonic Ideas. These constitute the timeless patterns for each of the individual things that we experience in space and time. There are different Platonic Ideas, and although this multiplicity of Ideas implies that some measure of individuation is present within this realm, each Idea nonetheless contains no plurality within itself and is said to be “one.” Since the Platonic Ideas are in neither space nor time, they lack the qualities of individuation that would follow from the introduction of spatial and temporal qualifications. In these respects, the Platonic Ideas are independent of the specific fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, even though it would be misleading to say that there is no individuation whatsoever at this universal level, for there are many different Platonic Ideas that are individuated from one another. Schopenhauer refers to the Platonic Ideas as the direct objectifications of Will, and as the immediate objectivity of Will.

Will’s indirect objectifications appear when our minds continue to apply the principle of sufficient reason beyond its general root such as to introduce the forms of time, space and causality, not to mention logic, mathematics, geometry and moral reasoning. When Will is objectified at this level of determination, the world of everyday life emerges, whose objects are, in effect, kaleidoscopically multiplied manifestations of the Platonic forms, endlessly dispersed throughout space and time.

Since the principle of sufficient reason is — given Schopenhauer’s inspiration from Kant — the epistemological form of the human mind, the spatio-temporal world is the world of our own reflection. To that extent, Schopenhauer says that life is like a dream. As a condition of our knowledge, Schopenhauer believes that the laws of nature, along with the sets of objects that we experience, we ourselves create in way that is not unlike the way the constitution of our tongues invokes the taste of sugar. As Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) states in “The Assayer” (1623), if ears tongues and noses were removed from the world, then odors, tastes, and sounds would be removed as well."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/#4


This goes back to my original post and why I said

The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory. — TimeLine