I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." Humans possess the latter, but not the former, and the lack of this clarification tends to muddle a lot of contemporary philosophical debate on the topic. In other words, I am free to choose whether to stand up or to sit down so long as no one and no thing forces me to do one or the other, but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." Nor can he will that he wills. Willing is concomitant with being alive and existing.

In this way, "free will" is a nonsensical phrase, akin to "free thought" or "free digestion." So long as one lives, one wills, thinks, digests, etc. Freedom, at least generically, only applies to the absence of compulsion in determining what to decide.

As one who subscribes to libertarianism, I define a being with free will as one who is the 'uncaused, cause of their actions.'

but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously — Thorongil

Conflicting volitions are a common experience, you can't physically stand and sit at the same time but it's perfectly possible to be internally conflicted as to which you prefer.

I don't know about libertarian free will, it's open question for me. I do think that regardless of whether we have that kind of libertarian freedom we are capable of both strengthening and purifying our will through discipline and focus on the good, and that real freedom is the liberation of the will from weakness and corruption.

Surely there are several kinds of freedom. There is political freedom; there is the freedom which knowledge gives when you know how to do things, the know-how; the freedom of a wealthy man who can go round the world; the freedom of capacity, to be able to write, to express oneself, to think clearly. Then there is the freedom from something: freedom from oppression, freedom from envy, freedom from tradition, from ambition, and so on. And then there is the freedom which is gained, we hope, at the end - at the end of the discipline, at the end of acquiring virtue, at the end of effort - the ultimate freedom we hope to get through doing certain things. So, the freedom that capacity gives, the freedom from something and the freedom we are supposed to gain at the end of a virtuous life - those are types of freedom we all know. Now are not those various freedoms merely reactions? When you say, ''I want to be free from anger,'' that is merely a reaction; it is not freedom from anger. And the freedom which you think that you will get at the end of a virtuous life by struggle, by discipline - that is also a reaction to what has been. Please, sirs, follow this carefully because I am going to say something somewhat difficult in the sense that you are not accustomed to it. There is a sense of freedom which is not from anything, which has no cause, but which is a state of being free. You see, the freedom that we know is always brought about by will, is it not? I will be free, I will learn a technique, I will become a specialist, I will study, and that will give me freedom. So we use will as a means of achieving freedom, do we not? I do not want to be poor and therefore I exercise my capacity, my will, everything to get rich. Or, I am vain and I exercise will not to be vain. So we think we shall get freedom through the exercise of will. But will does not bring freedom, on the contrary, as I will show you.

What is will? I will be, I must be, I must not be, I am going to struggle to become something, I am going to learn - all these are forms of exercising will. Now what is this will and how is it formed? Obviously, through desire. Our many desires, with their frustrations, compulsions, and fulfillments form, as it were, the threads of a cord, a rope. That is will, is it not? Your many contradictory desires together become a very strong and powerful rope with which you try to climb to success, to freedom. Now will desire give freedom, or is the very desire for freedom the denial of it? Please watch yourselves, sirs, watch your own desires, your own ambition, your own will. And if one has no will and is merely being driven, that also is a part of will - being driven is also part of that will, the will to resist and go with it - all that is part of will. Through that weight of desire, through that rope, we hope to climb to God, to bliss, or whatever it is.

So I am asking you whether your will is a liberating factor. Is freedom come by through will? Or, is freedom something entirely different, which has nothing to do with reaction, which cannot be achieved through capacity, through thought, experience, discipline, or constant conformity? That is what all the books say, do they not? Conform to the pattern and you will be free in the end; do all these things, obey, and ultimately there will be freedom. To me all that is sheer nonsense because freedom is at the beginning, not at the end, as I will show you. — J. Krishnamurti

http://www.jkrishnamurti.org/krishnamurti-teachings/view-text.php?tid=591&chid=4910&w=freedom

Is there any difference to know, or not to know? I'm sure I don't know.

I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." — Thorongil

So, exactly how does one make a choice? Does it just pop out of nowhere, like a daisy?

I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." — Thorongil

:-} I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance.

Not sure the correlation between sitting and standing to this (again, :-} ); our characters are shaped by this will and yes, there are limitations to free-will, but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey. The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory.

I would like to preface this with saying that is one of the issues in philosophy that I get worked up over and I have strong personal feelings over, even if I have not read as much as I would like to on the subject. Bear this in mind as you read any subsequent replies.

I hold that free will requires the ability to do otherwise. In other words, I hold that the free agent has a power of volition that enables them to will different options in an undetermined and nonrandom way. While I am sympathetic to the compatibilist pursuits as good philosophers (questioning unreflective assumptions about freedom and responsibility) and are sympathetic towards their interests (feelings of freedom and moral responsibility that are deeply human and practically unavoidable), I ultimately remain unconvinced by their efforts. I do not find an unfettered will (a will unrestrained or overridden by direct external causes) to be sufficient to have moral responsibility.

Though I am unsure of his thought experiments, I agree with Derk Pereboom that what we really want is some sort of control of the people we are. If we die and are allowed to see the entire path our life took, we want to know that the power, during the individual moments in our lives, that we could have done something different. If determinism is true, then we could not have done anything different than what we have done, are currently doing, and will do in the future. In a counterfactual sense, things could have been different if the parameters had been different, but that is irrelevant to the actual state of affairs.

Aristotle's concept of choice (liberum arbitrium) is the mediation between reason and the passions.

It was Christianity, specifically Paul who discovered 'free will' as a faculty wherein I struggle with myself. In Romans he says "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (7:15) The emphasis on God's laws changes from the blind obedience of Thou shalt, to the love of God' and his laws in freely willing of their fulfillment, and one's own guilt when his laws are nilled.

How do you define free will? — Sineview

Uncoerced choice.

What are the parameters of human freedom? — Sineview

With regard to choice: the absence of coercion, human nature in general, genetic predisposition in particular, and environmental circumstances.

Can we make only internal choices, or can we actualize our internal choices in the external world? — Sineview

Choice is actualised through subsequent intention, planning, volition, and action.

Conflicting volitions are a common experience, you can't physically stand and sit at the same time but it's perfectly possible to be internally conflicted as to which you prefer. — Sivad

Yes, and that inner conflict is best described as the tension between rival choices, not between rival wills. You only have one will.

So, exactly how does one make a choice? Does it just pop out of nowhere, like a daisy? — TimeLine

Perception, and then thought based on perception, furnishes the material which make up the different options available to choose from.

I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here, and I certainly don't see any objection to what I said.

but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey — TimeLine

What is "it?" Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say.

I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." Humans possess the latter, but not the former, and the lack of this clarification tends to muddle a lot of contemporary philosophical debate on the topic. In other words, I am free to choose whether to stand up or to sit down so long as no one and no thing forces me to do one or the other, but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." Nor can he will that he wills. Willing is concomitant with simply being alive and existing.

In this way, "free will" is a nonsensical phrase, akin to "free thought" or "free digestion." So long as one lives, one wills, thinks, digests, etc. Freedom, at least generically, only applies to the absence of compulsion in determining what to decide. — Thorongil

Willing two opposites simultaneously seems nonsensical. It that were the case, willing should be described as indecision, not decision.

I hold that free will requires the ability to do otherwise. In other words, I hold that the free agent has a power of volition that enables them to will different options in an undetermined and nonrandom way. While I am sympathetic to the compatibilist pursuits as good philosophers (questioning unreflective assumptions about freedom and responsibility) and are sympathetic towards their interests (feelings of freedom and moral responsibility that are deeply human and practically unavoidable), I ultimately remain unconvinced by their efforts. I do not find an unfettered will (a will unrestrained or overridden by direct external causes) to be sufficient to have moral responsibility.

[...] If determinism is true, then we could not have done anything different than what we have done, are currently doing, and will do in the future. In a counterfactual sense, things could have been different if the parameters had been different, but that is irrelevant to the actual state of affairs. — Chany

Yes. To my thinking, hypothetical ability -- that is, our choice would be different if circumstances had been different -- does nothing to satisfy our ability to do otherwise. 'Otherwise' pertains to an alternative, which by nature depends upon the "first" option (the option that will be chosen, if determinism). But under compatibilism, all that's changed is the first option, which the agent is still compelled to choose.

Aristotle's concept of choice (liberum arbitrium) is the mediation between reason and the passions.

It was Christianity, specifically Paul who discovered 'free will' as a faculty wherein I struggle with myself. In Romans he says "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (7:15) The emphasis on God's laws changes from the blind obedience of Thou shalt, to the love of God' and his laws in freely willing of their fulfillment, and one's own guilt when his laws are nilled. — Cavacava

Since you bring up reason and passions... Say that our reason and our passions are inherent to our design, and in that way, determined. Yet we have the ability to deliberate between them and choose our preferred. Does this undermine self-determination/free choice? In other words, we have the choice between two options, but the options presented to us are externally determined.

Something I've been thinking about.

With regard to choice: the absence of coercion, human nature in general, genetic predisposition in particular, and environmental circumstances. — Galuchat

You're saying that human nature and genetic predispositions qualify as coercion, correct? Are uncoerced choices possible, then? Human nature and genetic predisposition would seem inescapable and fully influencing of our choices, since they affect the mechanisms by which one chooses.

Since you bring up reason and passions... Say that our reason and our passions are inherent to our design, and in that way, determined. Yet we have the ability to deliberate between them and choose our preferred. Does this undermine self-determination/free choice? In other words, we have the choice between n options, but the options presented to us are externally determined.

Passions cause reason to bust a move, and yes they can be externally determined, but the will occupies our internal (reflexive) point of view (ego), which self determines itself based on history, circumstances and what reason and passions tell it.

Yes. To my thinking, hypothetical ability -- that is, our choice would be different if circumstances had been different -- does nothing to satisfy our ability to do otherwise. 'Otherwise' pertains to an alternative, which by nature depends upon the "first" option (the option that will be chosen, if determinism). But under compatibilism, all that's changed is the first option, which the agent is still compelled to choose. — Sineview

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the last sentence. Could you please explain?

Yes, and that inner conflict is best described as the tension between rival choices, not between rival wills. You only have one will. — Thorongil

That tension is a conflict of the will, and will often fails, we end up doing things we will not to do or not doing things we we will to do. That's why we talk about strength of will or weakness of will, willpower etc. I don't see why the will can't be in conflict?

You're saying that human nature and genetic predispositions qualify as coercion, correct? — Sineview

Incorrect.

Are uncoerced choices possible, then? — Sineview

Coercion is the use of physical force, threat or intimidation without regard for a person's desires or volition in order to obtain compliance. Using this definition, I suspect that, absent oppressive living conditions, choice coercion is more exception rather than rule.

Human nature and genetic predisposition would seem inescapable and fully influencing of our choices, since they affect the mechanisms by which one chooses. — Sineview

Correct. In this, it's important to note the difference between coercion and influence.

Human beings are not free to function contrary to human nature. This should be intuitively obvious, but just in case evidence is required: we cannot see in ultraviolet like bees, and we cannot hear ultrasonic frequencies like dogs. Our sense organs detect signals within a specific range. In other words: they are limited, or constrained; they are the parameters of human sensory perception. Also, we cannot fly like birds, we cannot run 40 mph like cheetahs, etc., etc.

In like manner, human choice functions within the limits of human consciousness (the sum total of a person's current mental activity). Its operation is preceeded by problem-solving, and it is the result of decision-making. These are types of controlled and/or automatic information processing. This controlled/automatic functionality provides the requisite flexibility for responding to our environment instantaneously, or in a delayed manner (according to the exigencies of a situation). It also results in thinking which misinterprets its environment under certain conditions (i.e., errors, illusions, and biases). These natural faults in thinking are counteracted only by the application of a morality (which is probably why morality is a human universal).

If not intuitively obvious, an experiment could be developed to test the following hypothesis:

Human choice is ultimately limited to satisfying corporeal desires (being mindful of mortality), social desires (being mindful of a transcendent public good, and obligations imposed by social norms, laws, etc.), or ethical desires (being mindful of moral obligations imposed by conscience, intersubjective morality, etc.), and human preference with regard to satisfier choice is as follows:
1) First Choice: personal satisfiers.
2) Second Choice: social satisfiers.
3) Third Choice: ethical satisfiers.

In addition, a person is not free to function contrary to their own genetic predispositions. This also should be intuitively obvious. If not, two examples should suffice:
1) Temperament (those aspects of personality considered to be innate, as opposed to learned) is an example of a heritable attribute which affects behaviour (limits choices) and remains essentially unchanged throughout the course of a person's life.
2) Mental disorders also affect behaviour (limit choices), sometimes resulting in criminality. Many are genetically determined. Some can be treated (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder), and some cannot (e.g., narcissistic personality disorder and psychopathy).

So, the influence of human nature in general, and genetic predisposition in particular place limitations (constraints) on a person's choices. They are parameters of human freedom with reference to choice.

This is why free will, defined as the ability to do otherwise, is an illusion. Whereas, defined as uncoerced choice, responsibility depends simply on the presence or absence of coercion. If the choice was coerced, the person is not responsible for their subsequent action(s), conversely; if the choice was uncoerced, the person is responsible for their subsequent action(s).

Perception, and then thought based on perception, furnishes the material which make up the different options available to choose from. — Thorongil

To reiterate, how is your argument relatable to Schopenhauer with whom you have incorrectly associated it with? And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans; intentionally substituting the argument by pulling focus on something unreasonable and irrelevant undermines your own intelligence.

Not sure the correlation between sitting and standing to this (again, :-} ); our characters are shaped by this will and yes, there are limitations to free-will, but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey. The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory. — TimeLine

Then perhaps you should read more Schopenhauer. What one does is what one wills. Willing to move my hand to the left is moving my hand to the left. There is no willing in the absence of doing.

Choice is possible merely because it's will mediated by intellect. Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes.

And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans — TimeLine

Neither do I :-}

our characters are shaped by this will and yes, there are limitations to free-will, but it is not entirely absent and suddenly replaced with 'choice' which basically contradicts what Schopenhauer was attempting to convey. — TimeLine

The only freedom that the will has lies in the choices it makes.

Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes. — Agustino

Wait, will stops one from being blind? I think Schopenhauer just turned in his grave.

So, the influence of human nature in general, and genetic predisposition in particular place limitations (constraints) on a person's choices. They are parameters of human freedom with reference to choice.

This is why free will, defined as the ability to do otherwise, is an illusion. — Galuchat

I don't know of any serious arguments that deny constraints or limitations, but if there is even the smallest degree of libertarian freedom then agent causation is real and there is the ability to do otherwise.

How do you define free will?

To better explain what I'm looking for, here are example questions.


One way of explaining it is to imagine yourself typing the following:

"How do you define free will? To better explain what I'm looking for, here are example questions."

Now imagine that as you type what appears on your screen is this:

"How do you do? I'm very well thank you."

Now you can imagine what free will is and what it is to have it thwarted.

Generally, if you know what a reasoned or purposeful action is then you know what free will is. And if you know what it is for a purpose to be frustrated then you know what it is for there to be an absence of free will. And anyone who does not know what a reasoned or purposeful action is a person who has not typed a post on this forum, because to type a post is to undertake such an action.

Wait, will stops one from being blind? I think Schopenhauer just turned in his grave. — TimeLine

Do you have reading comprehension problems? :s

And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans — TimeLine

Neither do I :-} — Agustino

Wait, will stops one from being blind? I think Schopenhauer just turned in his grave. — TimeLine

That is what you call a straw-man. If you re-read what I wrote, you would know that:

Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes. — Agustino

I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine

I said will is still superior to 'choice'. That is not a straw-man. Now, run along.

No, your comment here is a salad of Schopenhauer's concepts, which is precisely why I've ignored it.

I think you may have confused what Schopenhauer meant here, that the will is independent, a thing in-itself. Our perception of the external world is merely a representation of this will, but what this representation may be perceived as does not necessarily represent reality as it is, as our instinctual drives can propel us to act independent of reason for instance. — TimeLine

Absolute nonsense. First, YOUR WILL isn't thing-in-itself. Second, Will (impersonal) can be thing-in-itself with reference to the phenomenon, but not absolutely. That's why S. leaves the thing-in-itself as unknown in Vol II.

First, YOUR WILL isn't thing-in-itself. Second, Will (impersonal) can be thing-in-itself with reference to the phenomenon, but not absolutely. That's why S. leaves the thing-in-itself as unknown in Vol II. — Agustino

Yes it is. That is the point when it comes to 'choices' which is a mode of intellect and merely an experience of this undivided will in itself (book III, section 31) and hence why we can't know it, which works in the same way with movement. The experience of the will in itself - our representations - is a lower phenomenon that is irrelevant, spatiotemporal (hence the principal of sufficient reason). Now, I assume by not absolutely you are implying that not everyone is a genius, that some may perhaps be enabled with - or at least not subject to - this principle viz., Kant, but this ability to transcend is nevertheless related to Ideas and it doesn't change the fact that we are subject to the will that is a thing in itself.

Did you use a Pomo essay generator for that? :P I really don't understand what you're trying to say, and I'm quite familiar with Schopenhauer.

• Representations aren't the experience of the will in-itself. Will and Representation are two sides of the same reality.
• I don't see what anything I've written about has to do with genius.

I can't see how:

I'm quite familiar with Schopenhauer. — Agustino

With:

I don't see what anything I've written about has to do with genius. — Agustino

Are you unfamiliar with his aesthetics? You must be considering you didn't understand my spatiotemporal reference. And i'll ignore your little cheap diversion for now.

Are you unfamiliar with his aesthetics? I'll ignore your little cheap diversion for now. — TimeLine

Yes I am familiar with Book III of WWR, what about it? The point I was driving has nothing to do with it. Furthermore it has absolutely 0 to do with S's discussion of genius.

Why are you bringing the Platonic Ideas in discussion when we were talking about the Will, Representation and Thing-In-Itself? You do know that the Thing-In-Itself is revealed with the quietus of the Will, so how can Thing-In-Itself be Will, ultimately?

Familiarise yourself with this thread. Read all posts there: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1036/schopenhauers-transcendental-idealism/p1

Especially this one, and the post I'm quoting from Thorongil there:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/52614#Post_52614

Yes I am familiar with Book III of WWR, what about it? The point I was driving has nothing to do with it. Furthermore it has absolutely 0 to do with S's discussion of genius. — Agustino

Actually, it does. Why don't you go read 5.1 of here and see the correlation to the transcendence of the spatiotemporal framework that is relevant to the argument on those that may be free on the principal of sufficient reason. We are talking about choices, no? Representations and the faculty of reason? The experience of objects in space and time? To be a genius is the only time the intellect can surpass the will, when for most it merely serves it.