I work with autistic people all the time. — bert1

And is what more important: what they can't do; or what they might do?

I don't see how to help here. If you don't see what is remiss in delimiting people in this fashion, I doubt I can show you more.

...and x is a task most people can do most of the time. — bert1

...and there it is, again.

I'm pretty sure that's how Banno would see it. — Wayfarer

Yep.

"Close the door"
Is "Close the door" true? Upon what evidence is "Close the door" accepted? How can we demonstrate "Close the door"? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't?

These questions are infelicitous.

Same for "Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy".

Thanks.

P is disabled in relation to task x if and only if P cannot do x. — bert1

So the next step is to see if you can find something that P cannot do, that would not seem to count as a disability in our offhand use of the term - flying, writing a great novel, putting their foot behind their head.

And then ask, does this wayward example show some great misunderstanding in the casual notion of disability? Or does it just show the definition to be somewhat inadequate?

But

The test is what creates the disability. — Banno

So

The elephant can't get up the tree in comparison to the monkey who can. — bert1

It's that the test is getting up the tree that is disabling. If the test were instead pushing the tree over...

Sometimes a disabled person will want... — bert1

...and stop there. The frame has moved from social expectation to what the person with a disability wants. That's already a step in the right direction. Should we always give them what they want? No - but notice that now we are asking a different question to "how do we fix this broken body?" That's the point.

The sun is that yellow disc in the sky up there — bert1

...looks to be a description. The difference between definitions and descriptions may not be as hard-and-fast as some think. Those advocating the social model don't much care about platonic realism, so much as about the way stairs and QR codes disempower some folk more than others. They differentiate the medical and social models in order to question assumptions about what a human body can do.

No, I think we're operating in different registers. What you're saying is quite true about domains of discourse. But I'm extending that to a further argument about epistemology and about the inherent contradictions of physicalism. — Wayfarer

Epistemology just is a domain of discourse.

You couldn't complete the formalising of your argument, and I think that's because there is a mismatch between your four presumptions and your conclusion. They are in different domains.

Re-arranged:

I’m denying that logical relations themselves—validity, necessity, entailment—can be reduced to physical causation. — Wayfarer

That's not unlike someone complaining about being given a fifty dollar note cut in half instead of twenty five dollars. I don't think Clarky disagrees - I certainly don't. I agree.

But I don't think we need ghosts to explain the difference.


(indeed, I don't think physics can be reduced to physical causation... but that's another topic...)

There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes. You and I agree that reductionist physicalist explanations for many phenomena are limiting and misleading. You just take it significantly further than I do. — T Clark

Yep - sort of.

A coin (remember coins? It's how we used to do money) is just a bit of alloy, but it takes on a special role in some of our games. There is a physical description and a financial description, and perhaps never the twain.

The point is, it's a glaring contradiction: — Wayfarer

Formally, there is a difference between the domain and the formation rules, and how each is used. The language is about the items in the domain, the rules for that language are not the subject of that language.

When a physicist looks for explanations in terms of physical substances, they don't presume that those explanations have mass.

You and I agree that physicalism, at the extreme, is erroneous - that maths does not have mass. We agree that this shows science to be incomplete. You try to explain this by supposing that there must be some other substance, some spirit, to go along with the physical. That brings in all the problems of dualism.

My response is less forthright - I am just pointing out that maths is something we do, rather than some sort of substance. Mathematics is a practice, a framework of reasoning, not a thing with substance.

No doubt this is another example of not truly understanding you.

(Can I point out how much I appreciate your putting up with my crap? Thanks for the replies. )

But surely the many fervent disagreements sorrounding the ontological status of numbers and scientific laws indicate that there is an issue there, beyond the strictures of formal logic. Specifically, the question of, if everything is indeed reducible to the physical, what of the nature of the mathematical reasoning that underpins physics? — Wayfarer

It simply depends on what you call a "thing". It's pretty clear that thinking one can apply F=ma to 7+1=8 and find the mass of = is a category mistake.

These are different games. As if you had complained that a checkmate beats a royal flush.

That some folk make such errors does not imply they have a point.

Cheers. And likewise. Good thread.

The question that jumps out at me is: are the mathematical laws themselves physical, and, if so, how? I don’t expect an answer to that, as there isn’t one, so far as I know. But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism. — Wayfarer

In formal logic, there is a difference between the domain of discourse - the a's, b's and c's that make up the content being discussed - and the logical connectives - the ^'s, ∃'s and =.

In physics, the content, the a's, b's and c's, are all of them physical. The connectives, including the mathematics, are not physical.

No presumption is made that 4+4=8 is physical.

If I had believed that the criticisms you offered had truly understood what was being proposed, I might be inclined to so believe. But, no. — Wayfarer

Ok. I'll bow to the true Scotsman. Those who disagree with you have not truly understood.

@T Clark,
I htink we've answered this objection:

You need to explain, how the contentious metaphysical statements can be claimed as "absolute presuppositions" in science, and what benefits they would bring into science. — Corvus

...Collingwood is not saying these presuppositions are true, but that they underpin the method that was, historically, adopted. Further, if we instead of treating them as metaphysical truths treat them as methodological prescriptions, their truth is irrelevant.

Is there a difference between a methodological and an ontological absolute presupposition. — T Clark

I think there is, but in terms of what we do with each rather than what they say. So Someone like @Wayfarer is quite right to point out that those who insist that the world consists of only physical substance have not made their case. But he might be mistaken if he thinks it wrong to set up a game in which we look only for physical explanations, just to see what happens. He'd then be like someone who insists on moving the bishop along a column instead of a diagonal. Yes, he can do that, but it's not what we set out to do.

I’ll take a swing at this, although I am on a bit of thin ice. If I am a physicalist, if I believe that all there is in the world is physical substances, that will guide me to look for answers in the physical world and to, perhaps, ignore subjective phenomena. We have found that approach to be pretty effective over the last few hundred years although we have also sometimes worried about its shortcomings. — T Clark

A good explanation. It's a bit like setting up the domain of discourse to only include the physical, and sticking to that rule. What we ought keep in mind is that setting up the domain of discourse is making a choice as to what we include and exclude.

I've mixed my metaphors here. Sorry.

It is what Banno thinks that Wayfarer thinks he is doing, which he is not doing, but which conviction no amount of patient explanation will ever suffice to overturn. — Wayfarer

Perhaps this is right. Or perhaps what you have had to say is not so coherent as you suppose?

We'd be better off talking about the ideas of these folk, rather than their personalities.

Exactly. — T Clark

Ok - then Collingwood is not telling us what to do.

For example, how do you go about demonstrating the universe is made up of only physical substances—matter and energy. — T Clark

We can't.

See Confirmable and influential metaphysics. That the universe is made up of only physical substances might be falsified by presenting a ghost - perhaps @Wayfarer thinks this is what he is doing - but not demonstrated. No matter were we look for non-physical substances, they may be hiding somewhere else, or undetectable by our present equipment... And this is a result of the logical structure of "the universe is made up of only physical substances".

But if we instead chose to look only for explanations in terms of pysical substance, then there's no need for such a demonstration.

And we can keep in mind that this is a methodological choice, so that if it happens that we come across something that does not appear to be physical substance, we can either reject the chosen method or we can look for further explanation.

I don't know how to understand "it has to be logically efficacious" unless somehow A implies B; but this means that if A is true, then B must be true. How does Collingwood get being "logically efficacious" without truth functions? Ans so, how can something that is neither truth nor false be logically efficacious?

But I'm missing something from Collingwood. He is suggesting that were we to look at what counted as explanation, evidence, and intelligibility in classical physics, we'd find that these presuppositions were operative — whether anyone articulated them or not. Collingwood seems to be telling us how things were understood, not how they ought be understood.

Yes! That will show us that we have a clear and distinct idea of 4% of the Universe. — Wayfarer

Yes! Much better than having a vague and indistinct idea of 100% of the universe.

But there is nothing stopping us from having another discussion, using different methodologies. We could call those discussions Aesthetics or Ethics.

The method here might be to reverse the direction of fit, so that rather than making assertions bout how things are, we seek instead to make assertions about how we would have them be.

We might for instance suppose that there ought be something like fairness or justice in the universe, and so act as to bring such things about.

And do this without denying that for the purposes of describing, the universe consists of physical substance. Since within that physical substance we might build fairness. So for the purposes of doing, we might act fairly.

Collingwood and I say yes, although saying it’s unjustified might not make sense considering an absolute presupposition is neither true nor false. It just has what Collingwood causes “logical efficacy.” It helps us get stuff done. — T Clark

Cheers. I don't have such a strong grasp of Collingwood, so please set me to rights. You know I'm going to be critical here.

There's an obvious and it seems to me insurmountable difficulty in saying that these presuppositions are neither true nor false. The result is that we cannot use them in our arguments.

So if @Wayfarer or someone comes along and says that there is also in the universe a spirit of some sort, it will do no good to retort with "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" unless we add that it is true. Telling him that "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" is neither true nor false says exactly nothing, and adds nothing to the discussion.

But telling him that as an issue of method, we are only going to look at physical substance, and just see how far that will take us - that would work.

Further, directives, unlike assertions, do not have a truth value. They are not true or false, but followed or dismissed.

So if we look at the presuppositions as directives, they serve to rule out certain sorts of explanations without engaging in a discussion of metaphysical truth.

The presuppositions supposedly set out how the world must be in order for us to do science. The transcendental argument at play, for at least some of these presupposition, is along the following lines: we are able to understand such-and-such; the only way that we are able to understand such-and-such is if the universe were so-and-so; therefore the universe must be so-and-so.

So for example our understanding the universe implies that the universe is understandable.

But some appear instead to set out how we ought go about the business of doing science. Rather than telling us how things must be they tell us what to do. So "[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature" might be understood as saying that that the Universe follows mathematical principles or telling us to use mathematics in constructing our laws; while "[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times" might tell us that the universe is globally consistent, or to apply the same principles everywhere.

Which of the presuppositions are ontological, others are methodological? Can we even make such a distinction?

We don't know for sure that "[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy" is true. Should we make such an unjustified presumption? Perhaps what this is, is not a truth about how things are so much as an instruction as to what sort of explanations one should look for.

There's potential to mistake methodological injunctions for ontological presumptions. We might at least be clear as to which is which. But might we not also do science if we followed these methodological rules:

[1] Presume that the universe is ordered and understandable.
[2] Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy.
[3] Explain things by constructing scientific principles, laws.
[4] Construct those laws using mathematics.
[5] Construct Laws that apply throughout the universe and at all times.
[6] Presume that behaviors of substances are caused.
[7] Presume that substances are indestructible.
[8] Presume continuous mathematics.
[9] Treat space and time as separate and absolute.
[10] Presume that substance can not be created from nothing.

Then we would not be making presumptions as to how things are, but choosing what sort of explanations we prefer. But this treats them as voluntary, whereas Collingwood treats them as ineluctable within an epoch. Perhaps Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions are mere heuristics.

Of course, the organizations that use QR are not trying to disadvantage anyone. They are trying to be efficient and hip (up to date). — BC

Yep. And all that is needed is an awareness of the assumptions underpinning the use of QR codes.

And money is so often an excuse rather than a grounds.

At it's heart disabilities advocacy is another push for recognising the variety of ways of being human.

Are any of the animals disabled in this scenario? — bert1

Yes, against the test.

That's the point; the test is what does the disabling, literally, by deciding who's in and who is out. The social model is a tool that shows this aspect of the medical model. It works in contrast to the medical model.

If that's not the definition, what is? — bert1

Here's a social model definition from PWDA

The social model sees ‘disability’ is the result of the interaction between people living with impairments and an environment filled with physical, attitudinal, communication and social barriers. It therefore carries the implication that the physical, attitudinal, communication and social environment must change to enable people living with impairments to participate in society on an equal basis with others. — https://pwd.org.au/resources/models-of-disability/

The test is what creates the disability.

First a parable.

The monkey - let's call him Amadeus - gets the job because of his obvious aptitude, and promptly sets up a fruit stall in a treehouse at the top of the tree, and for twenty years makes a comfortable living selling fruit to the birds and the other monkeys.

On his retirement the adjudicator returns and examines the books. He asks Amadeus why he only ever sells fruit to the birds and other monkeys, and never to the fish, elephants, seals, dogs or penguins that live thereabouts.

In a somewhat condescending voice, Amadeus intones: "We have never, in over 20 years (I've been here the entire time) had any fish, elephants, seals, dogs or penguins come in to the treehouse and express any interest in purchasing fruit"

"But..." begins the adjudicator...

"I gave you a fact. Suggesting we 'reconsider' our clientele is bizarre." retorts the monkey.

Yeah.

Send in the clowns.

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Bardot who works in the fish shop is...?

Ah, I disagree. On strictly the medical model, none of them are disabled. They are all perfect specimens. — bert1

Then you seem to me to have missed something crucial here.

Suppose they are all perfect specimens. Then their inability to achieve is imposed purely by the choice of test put in place.

Yes, the social model is what shows the bias inherent in the test. While the medical model only sees the inability to climb trees. And the capabilities model looks to see what each might do, rather than imposing something they must do.

Well, yes, what's real is dependent on the task in hand, so the Possibilism-Actualism Debate is pretty superfluous.

And i doubt present company will make much of such a view.

Medical model thinking.

I very much appreciate this post. Thanks for writing it.

The heart of the issue might be as simple as recognising and providing for the variety of human beings. We exist in many ways that are not white able bodied male cis hetro and middle class.

Another example, I wonder if you've noticed. A recent bugbear of mine is QR codes. Convenient for the sighted, invisible to others. They have become ubiquitous, in cafes and bistros and posters and museums and hospitals, providing access to ordering and advertising and other information. The temptation is to assume that all folk have equal access to them; but it ain't so. There are built in assumptions about vision, fine motor control, access to a smartphone with a camera, and technological literacy, and a potential assumption that if you can’t use this, you are the problem.

Simple accomodations include providing a short URL near the image, a printed menu on request, NFC plus text fallback, or staff assistance explicitly advertised.

I half agree. — bert1

Well, there's a start... :wink:

The act is a compromise. The definition of disability is uncompromisingly medical. The legal protection is conditional on medical/functional evidence. the obligations it effects reflect social model principles,
reasonable adjustments duties, so that employers, service providers and landlords must take steps to remove barriers that put disabled people at a disadvantage.

Those advocating the medical model included those drafting the policy, whose task was delineated, "boxed", by adopting the medical model, and the Courts, with a history of interpreting statutory thresholds that reinforced the functional/medical approach.

Those advocating the social model included the Trade Union Congress, who explicitly criticise the act on these grounds, a long list of various individual disabilities advocates, charities such as Scope, academics and the Disability Rights Movement.

Any coherent definition of disability must involve a functional test, no? — bert1

You will no doubt have seen this:

Instead of asking all to climb the tree, we might ask what each would require in order to be able to pick the fruit.

Do you want to go on to the other SEP article, or have we treated it sufficiently?

I haven't gone into the detail of the section on Combinatorialism as much as we might .

Thanks for the thread.

Do you actually believe that "extension" in the case of physical objects is the same as "extension" in the case of abstract objects? — Metaphysician Undercover

The extension of "Bridgett Bardot" remains Bridgett Bardot, even if she had started a fish shop instead of going into acting.

But how can a state of affairs exist in the world over a period of time when in the world a period of time does not exist. — RussellA

Ok. I'll not spend time pointing out again that to exist is to be in the domain of discourse. Cheers.

Yes, of course it's a methodological difference.

Your possition is philosophically deeper than I initially recognised. You are arguing that the formal apparatus (modal logic) only works given certain unconditioned norms, and that we can't use that apparatus to demonstrate that everything is contingent, because doing so relies on non-contingent structure. But the weakness there is whether some "ground of intelligibility" constitutes a thing that exists necessarily (which is what the OP asks about) or just refers to conceptual/logical structures that don't "exist" in the relevant sense.

Cheers.

The critique I've offered was in good faith.

This pretence of victimhood you adopt when challenged is unbecoming.

Cheers.

Hmm.

What do I mean by 'no limitation'? Prior causality is the discovery of some other state that necessarily lead to another state. If X didn't happen, Y would not form in that way. But if Y formed in 'that way' without a prior cause of X, then it is not necessary that Y formed in that way, it 'simply did'. This also means that it could have 'simply not'. It did, but it wasn't necessary that it did. It necessarily is because it exists, but it didn't necessarily have to exist. — Philosophim

You might want to read the paper that I linked in this instance. — Philosophim

That paper relies on treating necessity as causation. It moves from a causal argument about the universe being uncaused to saying nothing is necessary and nothing has “prior meaning”.

The paper essentially equates metaphysical necessity with causal self-sufficiency, claiming that because the universe (taken as a whole) has no cause outside itself, there is nothing necessary outside existence.

In other words, it treats uncaused = contingent, and assumes that necessity only arises via causal explanation.

Sorry, I think the point was missed again. I would distinguishing modal/metaphysical necessity (what must be the case) from causal dependence (what brings something about).

You appear to treat necessity as something derived from examining causal chains, sliding back into the old mistake: equating necessity with the inevitability of causal sequences.

Necessity does not require a causal history. A triangle has its angles sum to two right angles whether or not any triangle is ever drawn or exists physically. The fact that you can trace a causal chain for some contingent phenomenon does not make the phenomenon itself necessary.

To be sure, some folk posit a reduction of causality into modality - that in some form, "A cause B" means that in every case in which A occurs, B also occurs, and so that B necessarily follows from A. It's a not unproblematic account. And the revers of what is suggested here.