I noticed that. Arguably the remnants of the Australian Country Party suffer from a poor combination of honesty and ignorance. And poor judgement.

Even to learn that the practice of "counting as"? — fdrake

I take that as a psychological or neurological question. Arguably neural nets are built in order to continue in some pattern - to "predict" is how it is usually phrase.

My calculator is a phone. Puzzling.

But taking on your example, if one were to treat a calculator - not the phone sort - as a phone, there would quickly be certain problems. Lack of reception, for a start.

So aren't pretending and imagining different to "counting as..."? When we count as, we "carry on" in the same way. We say this paper counts as money, and use it for transactions in an ongoing fashion. But pretend money or imaginary money - say a toy dollar note or a dream of a lottery win - can't do this.



One of the astonishing things I've learned on this forum is that there are folk who didn't learn to "Carry on..." in the requisite sense. Or perhaps they do carry on, but deny that they can.

Construction requires something to construct from.

Not just any consistent narrative will do. One needs to check that the narrative works.


So sometimes the story surprises us, we come across new things. How could that we if it were only our own creation? And we agree on most of the narrative. How can that be if we each were creating our own? And sometimes we are wrong, but how could we be wrong about something that was no more than our own creation?

Novelty, agreement and error - the trinity of realism. :wink:

It's a cliché, but "counts as" expresses a hinge, where language and the world meet - "fdrake" counts as a reference to fdrake. It's what we do, a habit, and needs no further explanation.

...to create the real. — frank

I'd be happier if you said "...to construct the real".

We could explore natural disasters, like the closing of King Island Dairy.

No more Lighthouse Blue Brie!

Take a look at table 2 in Renewable electricity policy for Australia. P.7.

Australia is a bit larger than Germany, (about 20 times the area), with correspondingly much longer grids, plural, and with different parts of those grids in very different locations. Modelling apparently suggests that "base load" can be ignored over such a scale, especially if the network is made more efficient and interconnected.

Foremost is perhaps the problem of local wiring being too thin to take the load form rooftop solar during sunny days. It will become prone to overheating and failure.

This is an issue to whcih we might return in a year or two, when the experiment has run it's course.

I do think "where the types come from in nature and norm" is a very different question than "under what conditions are sentences true", and a slightly different question from "where does the correlation between nature types and norm types come in". — fdrake

My two bits. Saying things that are true is something we habitually do. Doing otherwise is the exception.

Calling some particular act "eating" is a "counts as..." exercise. Putting it in your mouth, chewing and swallowing counts as eating. I read the PI Wittgenstein as saying that this is just what we do, and that philosophical investigation stops there. We might ask "Why do we call it eating", but this becomes a question for physiologists and etymology.

We should also keep in mind expressions such as 'I'll eat my hat" and "eating humble pie".

Contra Levi-strauss, it's all cooked, by the words we use. We can't step outside language, nor outside our culture into "nature".

"Counts as..." underpins language.

So what's the ontology of World X? — frank

Possible worlds in modal logic are not the same as possible worlds in physics.

A modal world is stipulated. It is constructed by setting out how it is different from the actual world. So "What if Elizabeth had died in her sixties, leaving us with King Charles thirty years ago?" stipulates a possibly world in which Charles has been king for thirty years. This is a different ontology to physical worlds mooted in multiverse theories, worlds that come into existence during quantum events. They are quite different.

There was at least one very good philosopher who insisted that possible worlds are also actual, just like this world - David Lewis. It's not a generally accepted view.

Modal logic is a tool for working through the consequences of modal stipulations. "What if all life disappeared and everything else stays the same" stipulates a possible world. In that world there will be gold in those hills, since everything else stays the same. There is gold in those hills, hence it is true that there is gold in those hills, and "there is gold in those hills" is true. There are also no people in that world to say "There is gold in those hills". And it is true that there are no people to say such a thing.

Simple enough.

The alternative offered is that there is gold in those hills, but that truth is a property of statements; and since there is no one in that world to make a statement, "There is gold in those hills" is unstated and so untrue. There are multiple problems with this approach which have been listed over the last twenty or so pages. Perhaps the central one is the claim that there is gold in those hills and yet it is not true that there is gold in those hills, a pretty direct contradiction. So we have modal logic that involves a contradiction, in the presence an alternative that does not. The choice should be easy.

so far you haven't offered any replacement for language that allows for propositions in that world. — Michael

There's a reason for that, already given. If all you are going to do is repeat errors that have already been highlighted then there's not much point to continuing.

That's not the view of those in the CSIRO:
Base load power: The dinosaur in the energy debate

And now you're back to contradicting what you said earlier when you said that propositions are constructed by us using words. — Michael

It's not, and I'm sorry you can't see the difference between an utterance and a proposition. Chess is constructed by us using words and wood. When you look at a chess board, do you only see the wood? or can you also see Alekhine's Defence? In a world without wood, can there be no chess? But this has already been addressed; as it stands we are simply rehashing stuff that has already been dismissed.

This, I believe, is your original claim, a response to a post of mine.

So the claim is that when all life dies out there will be gold in Boorara but no truths or falsehoods because there will be no propositions. — Michael

The consequence of what you have said here is that there is gold in Boorara and yet it is not true that "There is gold in Boorara". This is at odds with [there is gold in Borrara ≡ "There is gold in Boorara" is true]. Perhaps the error is to think that all there is to a proposition is an utterance. But we dealt with that earlier. I'll repeat that 1+1=2, giving a new utterance of the very same assertion as was used earlier. There is something different about this utterance, but there is also something that is the same.

Or is it that the antecedent "there are no propositions" is a misconstruel? It is clear that there are propositions, including those that set up the world in question.

Again, a rehash of stuff already considered.

No I don't. — Michael

For twenty pages.

I'm only saying that truth is a property of propositions and that there are no true propositions (truths) in a world without language (i.e inside the World B circle). There are also no false propositions (falsehoods) in a world without language. — Michael

You want to say that there are no true propositions in a world without language. Hence you want to say that "there is gold in those hills" is not true in a world in which there is gold in those hills, but no one to say it. Waht I and others here have done is to show that this approach is incoherent.

There is a difference between an utterance and a proposition, hence there is a difference between a world in which there are no utterances and one in which there are no propositions.

But this is going over things that have already been said to you, more than once.

~~

I have only ever claimed that because there is no language in that hypothetical world there are no propositions in that hypothetical world and so no true propositions (truths) in[/i] that hypothetical world. — Michael

This is your mote-and-bailey fallback.

You want to say that there is no truth to there being gold in that world, but are stuck.

Sure, there is no English in that hypothetical world. But there is gold. That's the way it is set up, in the wording 'and nothing else changes". The alternative is to deny transworld identity, which is an option open to you. You would have few companions if you did so.

You say that propositions are constructed by us doing things using words but then say that there are true propositions even if we're not doing things using words. Make up your mind. — Michael

Where in any of this are we not doing things with words?

The mooted "world without anyone in it" is itself a bunch of words.

One of your mistakes here is to think that one can only write in the circles. — Banno

If it were left to the market, it's pretty clear that solar would (and indeed will) be the dominant source of power in Australia. But that is contrary to a narrative built up by right-leaning pundits over the last thirty years, supporting the idea of a centralised energy grid that is controlled by corporate bodies, rejecting the science of climate change and the reality of the market. Part of the need to propose Nuclear might be a vague notion of consistency. More likely it is inertia and desperation.

Given that the crux of the recent debate is over whether or not there are truths (true propositions) without minds, it's an appropriate juxtaposition.

If there are truths without minds then propositions are mind-independent (platonism).
If propositions are mind-dependent (conceptualism) then there are no truths without minds. — Michael

I've been attempting to show you how this misconstrues the issues it attempts to address. That hasn't worked.

There are abstractions. These are constructed by us, doing things using words. The are not the mysterious Platonic forms you fear, but ways of doing stuff with words and with things.

In what I've quoted you suppose that propositions much either be mind-dependent or not mind-dependent. That's like insisting that you have either stoped beating your wife or you have not stoped beating your wife.

Propositions bridge, or rather, transcend or supersede, the supposed gap between world and word. That gap is a figment of philosophy done wrong, a result of cartesian dualism, a mistake. Your repeated unconsidered use of the picture metaphor reinforces this error.

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. — Davidson

Going back to where this line started, there is gold in the hills of Boorara. If all life disappeared from the world, but everything else stayed the same, there would still be gold in the hills of Boorara, but no one around to say so. There is gold in those hills. "There is gold in those hills" is true. "There is gold in those hills" is true even if there is no one around to say "There is gold in those hills".

Are you arguing for mathematical platonism, or are you arguing for a non-platonic interpretation of "there are an infinite number of true additions and false additions that we could write out"? — Michael

Neither.

So please clarify your position on this. Is it sensible to write out red and blue mathematical equations inside the World B circle? — Michael

One of your mistakes here is to think that one can only write in the circles.

Is talkback still influential? I find that hard to credit.

Liberal decisions were once made on the basis of neoliberal ideology. As the conservatives took control, policy became more about building inequality into the distribution of wealth. Now it seems to be simply about doing the opposite of whatever the ALP policy is.

It used to be that the ALP appeared to have more basic integrity than the Liberals. Now it's more like that the Liberals have just given up on any rational approach to problem solving, in favour of simply being contrary.

I'd be happy for nuclear energy to be on the table. I do not think it anywhere near viable.

What is amusing, and prompted this thread, is that the erstwhile liberal, small government, market driven economy party are proposing to build them at taxpayer expense rather than leave it to corporations to decide if it makes economic sense.

And to proved cash to the operators of gas power stations rather than to give it to consumers, thus biasing the market.

As I said, what it shows is that China and India are undergoing rapid development.

Δ% graphs are a bit deceptive. What it shows is that China and India have been undergoing development.

Here's an ABC report that came out today.

shame you and Australia — ssu

Well how else we gunna pay for our holiday in Bali? Besides, it's not US who burn the coal... we just sell it to China and India. It't them you should blame...

Or so the story goes.

...even Indonesia and other smaller island nations are so far away... — ssu

Maybe not... Australia-Asia Power Link

Typical of large scale investment here.

Curious.

Australia's energy policy? That's a laugh. It's been impossible to invest in major energy projects for decades because of the tossing and turning. Energy projects need stability. The Liberals have been in denial with regard to the environment, and science in general. Both Labor and Liberal Parties are beholden to gas and coal - huge exports.

Gas is a joke. We rank fifth in the world for exports, but have a shortage of gas for domestic supply; a result of the most absurd lack of forethought.

We are pretty much made of coal, one way or another, but haven't built a new coal power station since the early nineties*. We sell the stuff to India and China instead.

Most Australian houses could pretty much power themselves with solar and a battery - I do - and so the uptake of rooftop solar is enormous. Around a third have PV.

Here's a comparison of the two main parties, and the Greens. It's outdated, as the LNP have just introduced a plan to build seven nuclear power plants, using very sus economics, and gas, to sort things out.

* A couple were built in WA, as it turns out. I stand corrected.

Infrastructure has suffered years of neglect.

The first concerns the dispute between platonism and conceptualism – are propositions mind-independent or not? — Michael

And so the issue is forced into a juxtaposition. Better to ask how propositions are dependent on mind, and how they are dependent on the world.

is a proposition’s truth value verification-transcendent or not? — Michael

Which proposition? Why assume there to be one answer for all propositions? Better to ask which propositions are verification-transcendent (a dreadful phrase), an even better to ask what verification is.

Sorry for putting the wrong words in your mouth. — fdrake

No worries.

Interesting. We pick out things using constants, and we say things about them using predicates. I don't see a problem with treating truth as a predicate over sentences, if we do it with care.

I'm not too sure of (1), in that we can specify the structure of, say, a first order logic in a few steps, and without mentioning that these steps are true - that is kinda taken as granted. But the general point, that our utterances are usually to be understood as being true, stands - only it remains that this takes "...is true" as a predicate over utterances.

It seems to me that "S is true" does define (or commit us to) S being true, and without circularity. I gather you are thinking along the lines of what the Hare asked Achilles. The answer is, it's just what we do; we treat "S is true", "S is true" is true, '"S is true" is true' is true, as read, and just get on with it.

(2) doesn't much count in extensional contexts, but we might fall back on relevance logic. That could be interesting. What they have in common is that they are true... Is that circularity vicious? or jsut a harmless recursion?

The set of true sentences should be coherent, as in consistent, for whatever version of consistency is being used; but it can't be complete. We can kinda infer this from Gödel.

Intersting thoughts, though.

That there are unborn babies just is that new babies will be born in the future, and so that there are unuttered propositions just is that new propositions will be uttered in the future, consistent with everything I have been saying. — Michael

Sure. But there are only a finite number of unborns. There are infinite additions. So, again, if only those additions that have been uttered are true, you are short on additions. By quite a bit. You might decide now to change your argument to those additions that are utterable, rather than just uttered, but that would undermine your contention that it is assertions that are true or false - you are now talking about possible assertions.

A game played by kids - stand in a group in the middle of a public space - a school playground is ideal - and look and point at the sky. Pretty soon everyone will be looking at the sky.

But there is nothing there.

On the topic of epistemology, the existence of UFOs is classic Popperian stuff.

You can prove that there is a flying saucer in your back yard - f(a) - by showing it to us.

You can thereby prove that there are flying saucers - ∃(x)f(x)

You might show that there are no flying saucers in your back yard.

You can not disprove that there are flying saucers. Showing that there are non in your back yard does not show that there are not some elsewhere. In Popper's terms, the thesis is no falsifiable.

But also, and obviously, that people have been looking for flying saucers does not prove that there are flying saucers.

Either way, platonism is wrong and truth- and falsehood-predication only makes sense in the context of using language. — Michael

The vanity of small differences powers a thread such as this. I agree. But you are saying it wrong.

You just slide the goal from utterances to propositions to assertion:

You can't show that there are unuttered propositions by uttering a proposition. — Michael

Only in the trivial sense that there are unborn babies. — Michael

And yet Srap showed that it is so. I'll count this as progress.

You can't show that there are unuttered propositions by uttering a proposition — Michael

Of course you can. Show, not say.

You are headed to absurdity, forced to conclude that the number of true additions is finite, since it is limited to only those that have been uttered.

Nonsense.

No he didn't. — Michael

Yes, he did.

I'm saying that if there are no utterances then there are no propositions, i.e. that platonism is wrong. — Michael

This is a conflation of seperate issues. If you would read my posts. There are unuttered propositions. Srap showed this by uttering one. The only alternative is for you to claim that 799168003115 + 193637359638 = 992805362753 was not a proposition, and also not true, until Srap made it so by uttering it. But that is just to misunderstand addition.

And Platonism is wrong, becasue propositions are not elements of the domain of first order logic. They are constructed in the second order. All that stuff you keep ignoring about a,b,c and f(a) and F(a) is true.

The claim that there are true and false propositions even if nothing is being said is incoherent. — Michael

And yet showed you an example that negates your assertion.

Perhaps you start with "there are no utterances without something being said" and erroneously conclude that therefore there are no propositions that are unsaid. But utterances and propositions are not the very same. Here is yet another, different, utterance, expressing a proposition already several times: 1+1=3.

You didn't address the argument, which is that different utterances are understood as saying the same thing; therefore what they say is not peculiar to an individual utterance. 1+1=3 says the same thing in this post as it did in the previous. But it is a different utterance.

I don't see how that answers my question. — Michael

I'm not surprised.