yes, indeed. That was said with some irony. But the disruptive emperor requires novel strategies.

Yes. It's about how we want things to be. It's not that emotivism is wrong so much as that it doesn't properly recognise the difference between what I want and what we want.

Trump wants to take over Ukraine's power supply. And he is looking to expand the Union.

Zelenskyy might consider calling Trump's bluff by offering Ukraine as the 51st state, threatening the US with a direct conflict with Russia, but with the benefit of a huge wealth of what the Orange Emperor calls "raw earths".

Trump is seeking to manipulate the war to benefit 'merican business. Zelensky might consider giving him what he wants. Then Trump might develop an appreciation of the complexity of the problem.

Back to the Binding of Isaac. The replies assumed that I was holding god culpable for the torture of a child. But god, being god, does what it is necessary to do; so if god demands a sacrifice, he could not have done otherwise.

But Abraham, on the other hand, might have not collected the wood, might not have trussed his son or held the knife. He may have done otherwise. On this account it is Abraham, not god, who is to blame.

Yes, but my point, perhaps badly worded, is that if the statement 'stealing is wrong' amounts to no more than the emotivist's "boo stealing!" This can't be truth-apt. I'm not convinced yet that the emotivist is wrong about this. — Tom Storm

Ok, but then my point still stands. One can't derive any consequent from "boo stealing!". At the very least a moral statement worthy of the name needs to apply to more than just oneself. That you don't like chocolate ice cream is not a reason for you to stop others eating chocolate ice cream. That one ought not kick puppies is a reason for you to stop others kicking puppies. "One ought not kick puppies" is different to "Boo puppy kicking".

The statement "stealing is illegal" is true, verifiable by looking the law up to see see what it says. — Hanover

Yep. "stealing is immoral" is a much harder problem.

Do we have them just to facilitate survival and therefore ingrained in our DNA? Or do they come from a higher source of wisdom directing us toward higher purpose? — Hanover

Why are they the only options? What are the other options? And these two do not appear to be mutually exclusive.

Not something with which I am familiar. But in intuitionistic type theory, isn't a theorem synthetic if its truth depends on constructive proof rather than mere definitions? That is, not all synthetic theorems contain existential quantifiers. Consider "Every red bead appears before every blue bead on the string", which is not analytic, which must be determined by inspecting the arrangement of beads, and which uses universal quantification only. I may be misunderstanding your point, but being synthetic is not dependent on existential quantification only. However if your point is just that theorems containing an existential quantification are always synthetic because they require constructive proof, then yep.

In practice, we allow empirical counterexamples to revise our concepts, meaning that the statement was never purely analytic to begin with. Quine might say that "All swans are white" was part of a revisable web of belief rather than something analytic. It's not that we stipulate that "all and only white waterfowl are swans", an unfalsifiable, analytic and false proposal.

In any case, the idea of using an intuitionistic logic here is interesting.

…we need a "strong man" leader. — Ludwig V

Lord, preserve us from strong men.

“Necessary“ should probably be used in its quite specific modal fashion. “Absolute“ is pretty ill defined, and probably a nonsense word. It would be interesting to do a catalogue of hinge terms and bedrock terms and riverbed terms and so on.

Yep. The bedrock metaphor is not as good as the riverbed metaphor. The bed remains relatively fixed.

Whether it is true is a very different question to whether it is truth-apt.

Yep.

But others here do not have that excuse.

The difference is that moral truths have an illocutionary (?) force. — Ludwig V

Yep. The force of some statements is "Things are thus". We change the words to match how the world is. The force of some other statements is "Things should be thus", and we change the world to fit the words. That's why you can't get an ought form an is - there's a change in direction, an about-face.

That "one ought not kick puppies" needs no justification does not mean it cannot be justified, as you suggest in terms of more general rules. It's just that if someone is told not to kick the pup, and they ask "Why not?", they are missing something important, which is not found in "Becasue bullying is wrong" but seen in what they think it OK to do.

I hesitate to say that accepting such statements is an act of faith — Ludwig V

Good.

Two points: moral statements are statements, and statements are generally truth apt - the sort of thing that is either true or false.

And if they are not truth apt they cannot participate in rationalising our actions. They cannot, for example be used in syllogisms, such as "Stealing is wrong, one ought not do what is wrong, therefore one ought not steal".

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt? — Tom Storm

Odd.

It is true that stealing is wrong.

"Stealing is wrong" is false.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. — Tom Storm

And yet they are. It goes with the territory of "statement"
:down: :down:

the infinite sum of the series in question is 1. — T Clark

Yep. The distance covered is finite. The flip side of that is that the time taken for each step is zero at infinity, so while there are a mooted infinity of steps in the process the distance covered and the time taken are both finite.

The apparent paradox is no more than a failure to apply the relevant maths appropriately. It is not a "difference in reality" between physics and mathematics.

So yes, it does help us understand infinity somewhat. For those able to grasp it.

Gulf of America — J

Not a location I recognise. :meh:

Good night.

A computer bootstraps from ROM. — frank

And you are not born into an abyss.

But how do you know which direction to grow in? An external set of rules? Or things you were born knowing (as in Meno's Paradox). — frank

Bootstrapping.

:chin: Virtue ethics. Growth.

I was thinking more of Aristotle.

Yep.

It's something you were born with. — frank

I disagree. "Morality" develops over time, as one learns from and interacts with others. It's about becoming a better person - about developing values and virtues...

That person or body, it seems, cannot be subject to the law — Ludwig V

While the US High Court apparently agrees, this seems to me to be quite mistaken. Subjecting oneself to one's own judgement is simple consistency.

Nobody thinks it is a rational system. — Ludwig V

On the contrary, such an ad hoc approach to social engineering is quite rational, as Popper argued in The Poverty of Historicism. By not adhering to a fixed constitution, the British system allows for more responsive, piecemeal reforms rather than trying to impose a grand, all-encompassing plan.

Just trolling the theists...

it's a matter of feelings. — frank

Well, yes, but it's more than that. It's not just my or your feelings here - we all agree that kicking puppies is not an honourable activity. Why?

Nor I.

So we have social prohibitions that are not acts of faith.

That kinda fucks up Devine Command Theory.

, OK. Seems we have some agreement.

So is believing "One ought not kick puppies" an act of faith?

From what reasoning did you infer that it's wrong to kick puppies? — frank

We don't. That's kinda the point.

Of what use is asserting that "It's wrong to kick puppies" — frank

...as part of an inference. And an inference depends on truth values.

One ought not kick puppies.
John kicked a puppy
John did what he ought not.

If "One ought not kick puppies" has no truth value, it cannot guide us in such inferences.

But it can, so it does.

what does that tell us about "red"? — J

:smile: Isn't it your bed time...?

In one sense it tells us that there is nothing more to say about red; given the domain is only the beads, red just is {1,2,3}.

I agree that there is something annoying here, but I suspect that it cannot be well articulated.

Commands aren't truth apt. — frank

So you are saying that it is not true that we ought not kick puppies?

That we cannot make the inference - If one does what one ought not, then one is culpable; it is true that one ought not kick puppies; therefore those who kick puppies are culpable?

The "we want to say" is a nod to what cannot be said, but is instead done or shown.

After all, can you give a reason for saying that {1,2,3} are red, that does not involve showing us or at least looking at the beads?

Do you know any democratic state in ancient history, larger than one city? — Linkey

Ancient democratic cities included Athens, Argos, Corcyra, Chios, Rhodes, Syracuse, Croton, Thurii, Ephesus, and Miletus. Athens imposed democracy on cities within the Delian League - Erythrae and Clazomenae, we know of. Others remained under the command of episkopoi.

This of course caused some resentment, and opposition to enforced democracy. A familiar path.

Seems the thread has moved off topic to attempts to explain or even justify totalitarianism... I wonder why that is topical? Seems to be a common theme on the fora at present.

So we might justifiably go off-topic ourselves, a little bit.

There are moral truths, at least, in that some statements are both moral and true. I usually use "Don't kick puppies for fun" as a trite example. "Don't kick puppies for fun" is true. If someone disagrees, that's not so much about the truth of the sentence as about their moral character - that is, they are wrong.

By the same reasoning, the sentence is not something that needs justification. might count it as a given, a hinge, or a bedrock belief.

We might, heading back to the topic of this tread, ponder if it is an act of faith. I think it more an act of common decency. Thoughts?

Missposted.

So going back to this,

If planets and planètes have the same extension, then "The number of planets is greater than 7" means the same thing as "The number of planètes is greater than 7". Is there any intermediary step that would show this to be true? — J

Extensionally,

Planets = Planètes = {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune} — Banno

The list of planets just is the "meaning" of both Planets and Planètes, and so since their number is greater than seven, both the English and French sentences are true.

There is a seperate issue, why Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune count as planets, while Pluto, amongst other things, does not. But given that we accept the list of planets, then

The number of the planets > 7 = "Le nombre de planètes > 7

without further explanation. That is, if planets and planètes have the same extension, then "The number of planets is greater than 7" means the same thing as "The number of planètes is greater than 7" without further ado.

It's not that use reduces to extension, but that the use of a (proper) name is it's extension - what it refers to. This in contrast to Quine rejecting the use of proper names.

How do we make coherent a situation where the extension remains the same but the color changes? — J

I'm not seeing a problem with that. It might have been that beads 4,5, and 6 were the red beads. In which case, in that domain, "...is red" would be extensionally equivalent to {4,5,6} instead of {1,2,3}. And an extensional sentence about the red beads would have the same truth value as an extensional sentence about the beads {4,5,6}, and passes the test of substitution.

We want to say that there is more to being red than being {1,2,3}; but note that that "more" is intensional rather than extensional.

There need be no "intermediary step" of the sort you suggested,

To be sure, if it is a question whether the cat ought to be on the mat, there is no fact of the matter. How could there be? — Ludwig V

Well, that the cat ought be on the mat is either true, or it is false... unless you have some alternative?

It would be interesting to juxtapose Nussbaum's comment with Arendt's banality of evil.

Another thread, perhaps.

So to the rather odd paragraph about physical necessity. There's a bit of having one's cake and eating it, too, going on here.

Upon the contrary-to-fact conditional depends in turn, for example, this definition of solubility in water: To say that an object is soluble in water is to say that it would dissolve if it were in water. In discussions of physics, naturally, we need quantifications containing the clause ‘x is soluble in water’, or the equivalent in words; but, according to the definition suggested, we should then have to admit within quantifications the expression ‘if x were in water then x would dissolve’, that is, ‘necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves’. Yet we do not know whether there is a suitable sense of ‘necessarily’ into which we can so quantify? — p 158-9

So we need necessity in order to do physics; but we must debar it from logic. A difficult path to tread.