Ontology is definition.

Well done. Yes, one of the take aways from all this is the separation of intent from meaning. Seeing how this works takes some effort. The idea that the meaning of an utterance is found in the intent of the speaker is somewhat ingrained. We say "That's not what I meant", after all; And we also say "But it's what you said!"

We can backtrack this to the discussion of Lewis, and conventions. It's hard to see how conventions might work without invoking intention - we intend to act in accord with the convention. But what we've seen here is how interpretation precedes convention. I think we can maintain a sort of continuity between Davidson, Searle and Lewis, but there is plenty here to work on.

But we can see that conventions do not determine the meaning of an utterance.

Maybe they're right? Social stability is a life-and-death issue. Having a logical story isn't — frank

:wink:

Fair. So it comes down to what you value.

Good response. You've been reading his paper Intending? That's the topic there.

There is no guarantee that our surmised intent is the correct one, no law-like structure that locks intent in with action and belief. Intentions are future-directed and shaped by beliefs and desires but not reducible to them.

Radical interpretation is a process for assigning truth values to utterances, not a process for determining intent. But this does not rule out that intent might enter into the interpretation. "Pedro intended to climb Everest" is true IFF that was Pedro's intent.

We might surmise intent, charitably, by presuming holistic coherence and rationality. Of course people do not always act holistically nor coherently. The process is not algorithmic, not law-like, and not infallible. It's human.

How's that?

I literally responded with a philosophical account of why God had to sacrifice Himself, devoid of faith — Bob Ross

Accepting that account requires accepting that Jesus is the son of god... it's in the first sentence. That's not philosophy.

A painting is a picture whose predominant medium is paint. — Janus

I've not been claiming that all paintings are pictures, as though there were some context-independent fact of the matter, but that all paintings can count as pictures — Janus

They are not all pictures but can all count as pictures.

Ok.

I have remained silent on the issue for a number of years. — Punshhh

Can't say as I'd noticed.

I don't think it's mutually exclusive. — Michael

I don't disagree. Although asking someone to "dance the flamingo" need not be an intentional malapropism, and yet still be understood as a request to dance.

The issue is, which is to be master? We have the convention of treating tables differently to seats, but before we can do that, we needs must understand which is a table and which a seat. That's an interpretation.

If someone asks us to "dance the flamenco" we must first interpret it as a request to dance the flamingo in order to recognise it as a malapropism. Recognising the breach of convention requires first recognising the convention - and hence first interpreting the utterance as an (illegitimate) instance of the convention.

So it's not that language does not make use of convention, but that the recognition of convention is itself dependent on interpretation.

As you will recall, Davidson focuses on a situation where you don't know the language Jenny is speaking. You don't recognize any of the words. All you get is behavior and the assumption that she believes the same things you do. — frank

In the extreme case, yep.

So how did you gather that Jenny uses "the cat" to talk about Jack? What behavior did you observe that caused you to conclude this? — frank

Extended empirical observation of Jenny's behaviour within the community in which she participates. Watching her pet the cat, buy cat food, chastise someone for not chasing the cat off the mat. A Bayesian analysis of behavioural patterns, perhaps, although we don't usually need to go so far in order to recognise patterns in the behaviour of others.

The interpreter assumes that Jenny and the others in her community have much the same beliefs as the interpreter - that there are cats, bowls, mats, and so on to talk about.

The inconsistencies you have noted do not matter to those who believe.

Part of the reason is that they have been taught that belief is of greater import that consistency.

It follows that any argument you might offer is irrelevant, because what is at stake is not rational.

It's why the replies from believers consist mostly of repeating doctrine rather than responding to the inconsistency. To reaffirm the creed is to participate in the truth.

This also explains the segue into theology, which consists in attempting to cover, or as they might prefer, "explain", the inconsistency.

When faces with the profound, inexpressible, existential mystery, the rational response is I don't know.

But silence is difficult.

Davidson seems to be fine with settling for the physical state language game , without recognizing what he may be missing by excluding the other game. — Joshs

What game is he excluding? He gives quite a sophisticated account of intentionality.

Jenny says "the cat is on the mat"

Jenny often uses "the cat" to talk about Jack, the black cat. So she says things like "The cat's bowl is empty" when Jack's bowl is empty.

Jenny uses "...is on..." when one thing is physically on another.

Jenny uses "the mat" to talk about the prayer rug near the door.

So I offer the following interpretation: Jenny's utterance of "The cat is on the mat" is true If and only if Jack is on the prayer rug. (notice the T-sentence)

I can now proceed to check this interpretation as more information becomes available.

From this I can also infer that Jenny believes that Jack is on the prayer rug. Might further infer that she intends to scold me for allowing him to do so. But these are post hoc. following after from the interpretation.

If we’re trying to capture the meaning of a statement and the meaning is encoded in intentional terms, — Joshs

Are we? Davidson's aim is to set out the meaning of some utterance, not to set out folks' intent. Their intent can be quite incidental.

Davidson's reply is that there is no law-like relation between physical states and intentions.

you said not all paintings are pictures, as though there were some fact of the matter, — Janus

A pretty weak restriction, if what it does is allow some paintings not to be pictures.

I'm finding this conversation a tad tedious.

I'll allow for paintings that are not pictures. If you see that as too restrictive, I don't much care. It's you who insists that Black Square is a picture as well as a painting. I think it's a black square, as opposed to a picture of a black square.

Charity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank

Odd, that you say

Charity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank

Then use a quote in support of that, that does not mention intent

We can indeed use a presumption that the speaker's beliefs are much the same as our own in order to interpret their utterances, and thereby surmise their intent.

Charity is supposing that others have much he same beliefs as we do.

In about 10 years we may have... — Joshs

Been that way all my time.

Heuristically programmed algorithmic computers, parallel processing, neural networking... each promised more than it delivered.

The missing bit is that a description of an intentional state is not a description of a physical state.

a drawing, painting, photograph, etc. — Janus

I'll go over the thought again, I guess. Any definition given for art will invoke a counterplay by some artist. The act of defining art - and by association, painting or drawing or picture - stipulates a view that can be overturned.

The analogue in logic is that any axiomatic system sufficient for arithmetic will exclude some truths.

It's always open to you to stipulate that this is art, that isn't... But that'd be pretty arbitrary, and we need not accept your stipulation.

It's more fun not to.

I know you're doubtful whether there could be a useful interpretation of holy books — J

Not useful - folk do put the texts to various and varied use. But that there is one interpretation that is the correct one - that's, shall we say, undecided, perhaps undecidable.

Part of the reason is that giving an interpretation is not a single act, it's an ongoing process.

...A better interpretation... — J

Better for what? Again, no absolute scale is available.

They seem to go hand in hand...?

The idea is that there is a correct interpretation.

Amongst others. I'm not a close follower of Supreme Court process, but the idea that we can discern some imagined shared intent amongst the authors of your constitution is absurd. We might play on "author-itarian" here.

I would say that both humans and LLM's require going through a lot of complex inner states in order to engage in language use. — wonderer1

The inner state of a computer is usually described physically, while the inner state of a person is described using intentional terms - as believing this or that, wanting something to be the case, and so on. Two ways of speaking.

So the question is, do we attribute belief and desire to ChatGPT?

And the partial answer is that we do not need to do so, in order to give meaning to the sentences it produces.

Which is another argument against the idea that meaning is speaker intent.

So when someone says, "The cat is on the mat," they are not asserting that the cat is on the mat? — Leontiskos

So you just wrote "the cat is on the mat". Twice.

Did you thereby assert it?

Or can you do other things with the string of letters <The cat is on the mat>, apart from asserting them?

The question is whether it's entirely just a rules based language game or whether you're trying to find some other foundational structure. That's my point directly above related to Davidson's need to rely upon ascribing intent else he would just be a conventionalist. — Hanover

Again,

The interpreter surmises a sentence S such that the utterance of "p" by the speaker will be true if and only if S. S is confirmed or adjusted on the basis of ongoing empirical evidence.

There's no appeal to internal meaning or intention - doing so would result in circularity.

Intent might be inferred post hoc. — Banno

This account does not rely on speaker intent. Nor does it rely on setting out the intent of the speaker, although it might be used to do so.

You've heard of "the intentional fallacy" in lit-crit, right? Same issue. — J

The problem occurs in the US Supreme Court as well, apparently.

intent is a necessary component in Davidson's triangulation theory. — Hanover

It explicitly isn't.

We can attribute an intent to someone only after we have understood what they are saying. Understanding their utterances is prior to attributing an intent. Understanding their utterances is not dependent on attributing an intent.

Should Davidson not hold that way, he would lose the foundational element for meaning to exist and he would blur into a "meaning is use" position. — Hanover

I don't see that you have explained why this must be so. Davidson is in line with Wittgenstein in saying that we should look at what is being done with an utterance rather then looking for any opaque intent on the part of the utterer.

It begins to look as if we disagree on the accounts given by both Davidson and Wittgenstein.

I’m a little confused. If malapropisms “by their very nature run contrary to the conventions of language” then there are conventions of language. So the very existence of malapropisms is proof that there is a (conventionally) “correct” way of speaking (else nothing could be a malapropism). — Michael

Yep, there are conventions in language. But Davidson argues that they are not what give our utterances meaning.

I understood Tim to be arguing that it is convention that explains meaning. If that is so, it is hard to see how going against a convention, as in the case of malapropism, can be meaningful.

But the intention of its programmers, as best we know, is to impersonate intention on the part of the program. — J

Perhaps. But what I'd like to emphasis is that Davidson's theory of meaning is not dependent on intent. It assigns a truth value to an utterance. It can be used to infer an intent, but does not derive meaning from intent.

In the case of ChatGPT the sentences can be interpreted, given a truth value, and yet no intent be inferred.

That was a spellcheck error where it somehow put "not" instead of "more." — Hanover

Yep. I had given that a high probability.

Same referent though. — Hanover

Not if reference is inscrutable...

A painting is a picture — Janus

Why?

Kazimir Malevich, Black Square (1915) explicitly does not represent anything.

Also, note that "picture" does not occur in the OP.

A painting captures a moment in a narrative. — BC

I like that.

Not all paintings, then, are pictures.

"Yesterday I didn't know there was a curriculum, and today I'm writing it".

That's how it works.

I'm not seeing the relevance of your comment about the painting and the wall. — Janus

How does a Last Supper differer from a coat of off-white?

A painting is a picture whose predominant medium is paint. — Janus

...unless it was painted using Microsoft paint.

Point being, whatever rule is offered, someone will produce an exception. That's not saying you are mistaken.

But more importantly, democracy and the role it plays in our nation should be taught in schools. — Punshhh

It is.
Citizenship programmes of study: key stages 3 and 4 National curriculum in England

Sure, if you like. We can drop "intent" from that without much loss.


Added: we don't much need the bit about inferring some intent on the part of the speaker. We can do so, but it's not needed. Meaning here is not the intent of the speaker. Speaker meaning is something else.

That'll cause some folk no end of confusion. It shouldn't. It does not imply that the speaker does not have an intent.

Need not words — Hanover

But I'll give them anyway.

paint a drawing of a painting — Hanover

Painting of a (drawing of a (painting of a (house)))
The outermost quantifier determine all. So

Is a painting of a drawing of a painting a painting or a drawing? — Hanover

A painting.

Is a painting of a house a house or a painting? — Hanover

A painting.

Is it different to say say "nice smile" or "nice painting of a smile" when referring to the Mona Lisa? — Hanover

"Nice smile" picks out the smile. "Nice painting of a smile" picks out the painting.

Are these questions aesthetic questions, linguistic, or metaphysical? — Hanover

Issues of scope, so perhaps logical.

Is a representation art, symbol, or a phenomenonal state? — Hanover

Just what is the house? — Hanover

That'll depend on the use to which we put each term. There's no fact of the matter until we choose.

Davidson intends his approach to be extensional, so he avoids intentional contexts. Hence intention plays little part in his approach.

The three points of the triangulation are speaker, interpreter and shared world.

The interpreter surmises a sentence S such that the utterance of "p" by the speaker will be true if and only if S. S is confirmed or adjusted on the basis of ongoing empirical evidence.

There's no appeal to internal meaning or intention - doing so would result in circularity.

Intent might be inferred post hoc.

Just get the scope right. Not really a problem.

The second prong of Davidson's triangulation requires ascribing intent to the speaker charitably assuming rationality and logic to the speaker. — Hanover

Yes, although the point made above concerning the IEP quote applies here, too. Somewhat perfunctorily, the goal is not to expose the intent of the speaker, but to note the circumstances under which their utterances would be true.

So we have the meaning of a Chat reply if we have the circumstances under which it would be true.

In this regard, no intent need be attributed to Chat in the process of working out what it meant.

(This appears to be another argument against the speaker's intent theory of meaning...)

Yep.

So have we moved from aesthetics to Art History?

And why is there not an expression for visual arts equivalent to "musicology"?

The story we tell about the painting is different to the story we tell about the wall, even if the medium is the same. The Sistine Chapel ceiling might have had a couple of coats of nice duck-egg blue...

Further, not all paintings are pictures...

At the least, something being art is dependent on how we chose to talk about it.

"I can't think otherwise" is usually a hint at a kind of transcendental argument going on, if it be articulated. — Moliere

Nice.