Yep

There is plenty of space for a richer rejoinder, along several lines. My attempt...

1. Faith is not believing without evidence so much as believing without conclusive proof. This is a common argument, along the lines of @Tom Storm's plane, somewhat downplayed. We do believe things without conclusive proof - arguably religious belief fits here.

2. Faith is a reasonable response to a sort of evidence that is different to the evidence seen in science. It's arguably a reasonable response to existential shock - the surprise that there is something rather than nothing; or to ethical problems, giving a reason for what one does with one's life.

3. Faith concerns trust and loyalty, rather than belief. More of what we do rather than what we think.


Something like that. There are counters to each, of course, and no doubt counters to those counters.

But that's not what we see here.

I pay attention to to Sky - for the amusement value.

claims that critics bring a hostile definition of faith into the debate. But religious tradition itself prizes faith most where reason gives out — when fear, torture, or death provide every ground to recant. Faith is celebrated precisely because it defies evidence and reason under pressure. The critics aren't inventing a pejorative meaning; they're taking religion at its own word.

He has failed to address this. He has indeed failed to address much of anything, preferring to denigrate those with whom he disagrees, rather than to engage with them. See the discussion with over the last few pages.

Yes. it'll be a big story only if the private media pick it up. As it stands, it'll be rejected as "Hate Media".

Sky's headline? "Albanese forced to admit he doesn’t have Trump’s number after claiming president might not have a phone".

As am I. I'm interested becasue of ethical concerns, and the appeal of respect for the suffering of particular beings that are "crushed" by universalising systems... from Habermas; together with the explicit move toward escaping systematisation by refusing the closure of synthesis. But I'm biting my tongue.

Faith and trust are different things, no?

Sure, trust is a part of faith, but not the whole.

So, what's the bit extra?

I've given my account: that faith continues where trust it is not justified.

Dutton thinks a dozen eggs cost $4.20.

The last debate was a rehash, of course. That bastion of the "hate media", the Guardian, has a summation: Who won the final leaders’ debate? Seven takeaways from Albanese v Dutton

As for Sky...

Despite the public result, Sky News host Paul Murray called the debate result for Mr Dutton.
“Peter Dutton clearly won the debate, and this will not be one of those 50-50 calls,” he said.

Fatih at work?

Your Overall F Score is: 1.83
You are a whining rotter.

Seems about right.

But the fact that I used "antagonisms" a couple of times there, instead of "contradictions", gets to the root of the problem. And indeed, I think some modern Hegelians prefer to use that kind of language (antagonisms, tensions, conflicts), abandoning the idea that logical contradictions reside in the object. I expect we can come back to this issue after we've seen him operate, and after he addresses it in ND itself. — Jamal

That paragraph is particularly perspicuous.

...the cause is not an inherent tendency in logic and language, but is something to do with social and economic pressures. — Jamal

Indeed.

Addenda: I left this thread and went to , where I found what is apparently a case in point of the approach that is seen as problematic. So we read 'A ball would be round because it is called "round," as opposed to being called round because it is round.' At issue is the problem of why the ball might be grouped with other round things. But here I can't shake off the view that Adorno might mistakenly be regarding identity (a=a) as much the same as predication.

Father O’Hara

Father O'Hara was a priest who participated in a Symposium on Science and Religion in 1930, who apparently argued for Catholic Doctrine on scientific grounds - that is, that science shows certain Catholic teachings to be physically provable. This Wittgenstein characterised as "superstitious", an odd choice of wording. I gather he is thinking of the "reasoning" behind, say, accepting that a horseshoe brings good luck, as one has not had bad luck since hanging it on the wall - a combination of confirmation bias and poor sampling. The reasons for the belief are misguided. For Wittgenstein, this source of belief seems to have lacked sincerity.

This is contrasted with the "Lev", who believes quite sincerely, and regardless of what occurs. Here, arguably, Wittgenstein understood the belief of the Lev to be incommensurable to those of an Oxford Scholar, that there were few if any grounds on which one might claim that a conversation between Lev and Philosopher shared some common ground.

This again brings out the issue of the commensurability of language games, no small issue. My own view follows Davidson here, that we must always have sufficient common ground for some degree of commensurability, in order to understand each other at all.

But this is a whole other area.

There's a good read at Wittgenstein on the Gulf Between Believers and Non-Believers

239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves
the contrary. And so if Moore said "I know that this is wine and not blood", Catholics would contradict him. (On Certainty)

Yep. Here's 240:

240. What is the belief that all human beings have parents based on? On experience. And how can I base this sure belief on my experience? Well, I base it not only on the fact that I have known the parents of certain people but on everything that I have learnt about the sexual life of human beings and their anatomy and physiology: also on what I have heard and seen of animals. But then is that really a proof?

241. Isn't this an hypothesis, which, as I believe, is again and again completely confirmed? — On Certainty

Faith, again, is epitomised by belief continuing when the other things you know and the have heard and seen show your belief to be wrong. It's when the belief is challenged that the faithful continue in that belief.

(addenda: This is where things held on faith differ from basic or hinge beliefs. A hinge is consistent with one's other beliefs. )

it’s often used to justify many of the irrational ideas listed above. — Tom Storm

Yep. The sort of immorality spoken of earlier in this thread and elsewhere, exemplified by the Binding of Issac, is a case in point - where a blatantly wicked act is excused on grounds of faith.

Leon has put on the same performance previously, directed at myself, and at others. In the end, it's sad.

Religious traditions themselves emphasise believing without seeing. For example, "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe" — John 20:29. So pointing to the irrational structure of faith is not ignorance, but honest engagement with what religion itself sometimes claims.

The analysis over the last few pages shows that there is more involved in faith than just belief despite the evidence. But belief despite the evidence is a part of faith. Calling faith "irrational" isn't automatically an insult, since rational belief is belief proportioned to evidence. If a belief is maintained without sufficient evidence, there's perhaps little of concern. If a belief is maintained when the evidence indicates it is incorrect, then that’s an issue.

Another part of this might be a difference in the level of uncertainty with which one is comfortable. I'm happy to leave things undecided, an attribute that might well be common to agnostics. But I suppose if uncertainty causes discomfort, believing without evidence would be an aid to digestion.

I probably should be clear that I would still count faith as a virtue. Sometimes we must make a leap. Or commitment to fragile, finite things — like love, freedom, or democratic life — knowing they can fail. We might still praise faith when it means trusting, hoping, or committing in uncertainty — not when it means believing without evidence about factual matters.

'Never start a land war in Asia?" — Tom Storm

:lol:

Did you take a look at the SEP article on Faith? Even a quick glance will show that the issue is far from settled, especially amongst the believers.

If one has a mental set such that one is convinced that one must hold to a specified belief no matter what, then of corse on cannot enter into a discussion on those issues "in good faith", as you said. That is, when one's back is against the wall, one cannot back down, and so must resort to insult and affront.

So what you have done here is not only to argue against the rationality of faith, but to demonstrate it by eliciting the responses above. This was never an open discussion, at least for some participants.

Consider this in relation to the recent chats hereabouts concerning liberalism.

Thoughts?

Also noticed

...group belonging... — ChatGPT

This is an unaddressed aspect, worthy of some contemplation. Faith is about community, about "us" and "them"... as can be seen in this very thread. And community links to identity, going towards the defensive offensiveness seen in the posts on this page.

Some might find this tool interesting... a meta analysis from SEP.

https://www.inphoproject.org/idea/1569.html

or here:

https://www.hypershelf.org/sep/20/?doc=faith

I asked "Tom was surprised that "evidence" was not found."

Good — very sharp of Tom.
Actually, "evidence" was present, but not as frequently repeated across the whole set.
Let’s double-check:
"evidence" appeared clearly in the definitions of:
proof ("evidence or argument establishing fact")
hypothesis ("proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence")
It also indirectly relates to "proof," "truth," and "fact" — but "evidence" as a word didn’t show up much elsewhere.
Summary:
Evidence is important when faith is defined against proof — that is, faith as belief without direct evidence.
But once the definition of faith shifts toward loyalty, duty, trust, or group belonging, "evidence" falls away and isn't part of the conceptual structure anymore.
That absence itself is meaningful.
Austin would definitely note that faith talk often refuses or moves away from the domain where "evidence" operates — depending on the act being performed (e.g., declaring loyalty, expressing religious belonging). — ChatGPT

Notice the "But once the definition of faith shifts toward loyalty, duty, trust, or group belonging, "evidence" falls away and isn't part of the conceptual structure anymore"? This begins to show our differences in emphasis with the theists hereabouts. This is probably what causes Leon such indigestion.

It's raining, so I'll play with the notion of faith a bit more.

An exercise from J. L. Austin is to look up a key term in a dictionary, then look up each main word in the definitions given, so as to build up a list of the sorts of concepts relating to the key term.

Here's "Faith" from dictionary.com.

noun
confidence or trust in a person or thing:
faith in another's ability.
belief that is not based on proof:
He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact.
belief in God or in the doctrines or teachings of religion:
the firm faith of the Pilgrims.
belief in anything, as a code of ethics, standards of merit, etc.:
to be of the same faith with someone concerning honesty.
a system of religious belief:
the Christian faith;
the Jewish faith.
the obligation of loyalty or fidelity to a person, promise, engagement, etc.:
Failure to appear would be breaking faith.
the observance of this obligation; fidelity to one's promise, oath, allegiance, etc.:
He was the only one who proved his faith during our recent troubles.
Christian Theology. the trust in God and in His promises as made through Christ and the Scriptures by which humans are justified or saved.

I asked ChatGPT to find the main terms here and then list them. Here's the chat.

The summary is

In short: belief, trust, duty, loyalty, God, truth, and group affiliation seem to be the most tightly recurring conceptual anchors around "faith." — ChatGPT

When I expressed surprise that "certainty" was no amongst the terms, GPTChat replied:

"Certainty" didn’t really appear much in the original definition you gave, or in the secondary terms from the standard dictionary breakdowns we just did.
Instead, terms like "belief," "trust," and "confidence" dominated — but belief and trust don't necessarily imply certainty.
In fact, if you think in an Austinian way:
— faith (in these definitions) tends to involve confidence despite lack of full proof — rather than absolute certainty.
— Faith seems to operate where certainty is absent or incomplete.
You’re catching an important gap: faith is often about commitment without certainty. — ChatGPT

Just to be clear, ChatGPT was used here in order to cut the amount of work involved in Austin's method, which he envisioned as being done by a team of nerds in the confines of a few rooms in Oxford - after his experiences during the war... There will be the usual replies disparaging GPT, with most of which I would probably agree. But this is to indulge in an ad hominem (ad LLMinem?) in order to avoid engaging with the material - and this is exactly the sort of activity where a LLM might be useful in saving us some of the drudge.

How does this help? Well, your account was that faith involves trust in an authority. If this were so then we might expect to find "trust and "authority" amongst the main words found. While "trust" is there, "authority" isn't.

Anyway, I'll stop there for a bit. Breakfast time.

Oh and just to be clear, this is the sort of activity I suggest may be of more use than simply stipulating definitions.

frankly I think you would benefit from some study of formal logic.

Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them. — A Christian Philosophy

Think on that for a bit. Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why?

This actually an open discussion in contemporary logic, one I tried to address in this thread: . Curiously, it seems to be those of a theistic bent who have most trouble with such thinking.

What is your definition of "faith"? So far, it sounds like it is "believing something despite the evidence". — Bob Ross

This didn't come up on my notifications. Odd.

Starting a discussion with a definition is usually a mistake. It turns the conversation into a fight over whose definition is right. No stipulation will capture all the uses and implications of an interesting term. And for any stipulation, a counterexample is easy to find. Better to map the ground the term covers—by setting it alongside related ideas—than to try to trap it in a formula.

So instead I've been doing some mapping. "believing something despite the evidence" is part of that, since it sets out one extreme of faith - that one demonstrates great faith if one continues to believe despite what is evident.

We could do more along those lines, but the adversarial tone of these threads does not lend itself to that sort of thing.

...a realm linguistic theory tries to avoid.. — Hanover

Well, no, it doesn't. It deals with it by clarifying what's going on in metaphysical chat. That Kant made much the same error as Plato is not all that helpful... and that so much theology is built on Plato furhter complicates stuff.

Form other stuff you have said, you might agree that there only is a "forest" in so far as we interact with it - perhaps in recognising the river and the grassland as not forrest, or in planting seeds in order maintain the forest, and so on. The meaning (use) of "forest" rests on what we do, not on some abstracted forest form in a perfect world.

The picture Plato paints is arse-about.

Words can only be general because they denote universals — Wayfarer

So 'Wayfarer" is a universal? No.

But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist. — Wayfarer

That doesn't follow, and he doesn't, anyway.

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects — Wayfarer

Back to playing with 'exists'. If a 'ligatures of reason' is logical stuff like quantification and equivalence, then say so and we can have some agreement. Ohterwise, what the fuck is a 'ligatures of reason'?

Thanks. A thoughtful reply.

I'm struck by how much this is an evaluation. And an evaluation that debases the physical world. A hierarchy, the commons at the bottom, the few at the top. A defence of elitism. So it would not be a surprise to see forms defended by erstwhile aristocrats. Just an observation.

Ordinary language concerns itself with practicalities. Its concerns are belief and appearance, enabling us to navigate daily life, make things, buy things, survive. Plato sees this as a problem, since truth is to be found in dianoia or noēsis. But that’s also what makes common language powerful—it works. It’s how we build, argue, care, joke, mourn. It may not be about eternal truths, but it's deeply human. And it is where meaning is found - since meaning is the use to which we put our common language.

So as one moves along the line, one moves away from use and practicality, presumably toward misuse and impracticality. There's the link to linguistic concerns.

Not a style of discourse I like much, being more at home in analytic responses. But increasingly folk seem to like this sort of fluff. Perhaps this will show you something of why I find forms somewhat objectionable.

apparently you missed quite a bit. Cheers.

True. It's a matter of taste, though. — frank

More a matter of coherence.

Thanks for clarifying. It's the general picture to which I would draw attention, much the same as the quote Wittgenstein used as his starting block in Philosophical Investigations.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

I don't know what Plato thought of Pegasus, I don't think there is much in the literature on the topic. Perhaps Pegasus is an example of a form that is not instantiate - possible-but-not-actual; or a "nonexistent object" that nevertheless exists within the realm of imagination and myth. I do think it useful, in understanding were the Theory of Forms goes astray, to consider it in line with assumptions of how language works that, if not evident in Plato's own writing, are nevertheless apparent in others, including Saint Augustine.

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm

Yep.

The slippery slope. You need faith to fly a plane, so why not have faith in the Trinity - as if these were on par.

There are multiple uses of the word "faith", and no single definition will account for all. This is so for all complex terms. However we see faith most clearly where the faithful are most provoked, by martyrdom or by doubt. And that shows most clearly the distinction between faith and mere belief.

On the contrary, I think it clear to what Plato was pointing, but that he was mistaken.

so you are defining "faith" as "belief despite the evidence" — Bob Ross

No. I said the marker of faith is holding on to a belief - that your friend will pick you up or that the bread is flesh - despite the evidence.

We are not talking past each other. I am directly challenging your account. You would strain to a similarity between the physician's claim that cancer causes mortality and the priest's, that the bread is flesh. The first can be help true on the evidence, the second is contrary to it. The second is an epitome of faith, and shows your account remiss.

That's clear. Thanks. — Tom Storm

That's all? For all my efforts? At least let me know if you agree, and if not, perhaps where and why.

Or was your aim just to drag me back into this mud wrestle, for your amusement?

:wink:

By authority, I don’t mean only entities which have power or rights to judge another; but, rather, entities, namely agents and institutions, that are considered properly equipped to do or divulge something. — Bob Ross

I'm not seeing that this is useful, nor how it makes a difference, nor indeed how it might count against what I wrote.

2. If you concede there is trust in the experts involved in your belief that “smoking causes cancer” and you grant my definition of faith, then your belief that “smoking causes cancer” is at least in part a matter of faith. This doesn’t mean it is invalid or on par with every other belief that is faith-based. — Bob Ross

But I do not grant your definition of faith. While the belief that smoking causes cancer need not be faith-based, the belief that a piece of bread is flesh must be faith based. Again, the marker for faith is belief despite the evidence, not because of it. Hence,

Whether or not a belief has an element of faith in it is separate from whether or not the evidence for believing is credible or sufficient to warrant that belief. — Bob Ross

is mistaken.

Why is the concept of a plane bounded by three sides 'mystic'? — Wayfarer

It isn't. But reifying it is.

You've had a read, I hope, of Austin's Are There A Priori Concepts?. I've mentioned it so many times over the years. I can quote stiff, too:

(ii) Finally, it must be pointed out that the first part of the
argument (a), is wrong. Indeed, it is so artless that it is difficult
to state it plausibly. clearly it depends on a suppressed premiss
which there is no reason whatever to accept, namely, that words
are essentially 'proper names', unum nomen unum nominatum.
But why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one
identical' object present which it denotes? Why should it not
be the whole function of a word to denote many things ?
Why should not words be by nature 'general' ? However, it is
in any case simply false that we use the same name for different
things: 'grey' and 'grey' are not the same, they are two similar
symbols (tokens), just as the things denoted by 'this' and by
'that' are similar things. In this matter, the 'words' are in a
position precisely analogous to that of the objects denoted by
them. — Austin, Philosophical Papers, pp 40-41, my bolding

I say the problem is in trying to come to grips with the sense in which such concepts exist. — Wayfarer

Very much so.

what do you think of this definition? — Tom Storm

I haven't been following this discussion. I've pretty much said what I thought already. So my answer here may well be out of context.

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

We might agree that faith is a type of belief. Adjusting Moore, it would be odd to claim that one has faith in something that one does not believe.

I'd prefer to call it a propositional attitude rather than a disposition. A belief is a belief that..., and thereafter hangs something with a truth value. The disposition to occasionally scratch your arse does not much seem to count as a belief. The truth value is salient here.

We use the same word - "faith" - on the one hand for a conviction that such-and-such is true, and on the other for a trust or confidence in something or someone. The prototypical examples of faith in this second sense in contrast to mere belief are those in which fidelity, loyalty, or trust come to the fore. Too have faith, as Kierkegaard pointed out, is to take a leap.

While that might involve some authority, there is no reason to suppose that it must. And indeed, faith in a friend or faith in love look to be counter instances, were authority is not involved.

Bob differentiates between faith-based and non-faith-based beliefs. It's not clear that this is helpful. Taking his own example, I would not characterise a belief that smoking causes cancer as being faith-based. Sure, we are putting some trust in the experts who study such things, but we can go and look at their results for ourselves if we have doubts. The evidence is there. Contrast this with the priest who insists that the bread is Jesus's flesh. The evidence does not support the priest's contention and indeed is contrary to it. This is a much stronger example of faith at work than the scientists' contention that smoking causes cancer.

Hence my earlier suggestion that faith is seen most clearly when one believe despite the evidence.

There is a rhetorical ploy at play here, where faith is used to account for belief both in something evident - that smoking causes cancer - and also for something contrary to the evidence - the bread is flesh; and these as if they were of a kind. As if the faith in transubstantiation were no more than a variation on the scientific method. There simply a fair amount of such bull in this thread.

The appeal to authority doesn't cut it for me.

He said a bit more than just that. As Hanover pointed out, he held that true knowledge is knowledge of the forms, and developed a proto-scientific methodology based on that notion. He looked at various triangular things and decided that they must have something in common that makes them triangular; then he went the step further. Since names refer to things, if there is a name such as "triangle", then there must be a thing to which it refers, the form "triangularity". He then posited that this "triangularity" is what is important, not the individual instance, which are no more than a shadow cast on a cave wall.


Alternatively, we might understand "triangularity" as a way of grouping some objects, as something we do, and without supposing the existence of a mystic form.

The truest triangle... — frank

One can see and respect the merit of Plato's ideas - and ideals - without accepting them. His is a brilliant account. There is a difference between understanding Plato and thinking that he is correct.

We can ask, does this work for us, now? Do we treat seeking knowledge as seeking to understand a realm of perfect, unchanging, and eternal things which are the true reality, distinct from our physical world? Should we do so?

Is our aim to understand true triangles, or is it to understand real triangles? After all, it's the ones with the bumps and imperfections with which we find ourselves working. So why not both?

That the forms rest on a mistaken theory of reference is not a theory about Plato's motivation. It's nto that Plato invented the Forms because he misunderstood language; but that the plausibility of the theory—its intelligibility and appeal—rests on a semantic model that doesn’t hold up. That’s a diagnosis of the theory’s presuppositions, not its origin story.

Plato would require that true knowlege of something is knowledge of the form... — Hanover

And was he right? I doubt many would now agree.

I agree. Nothing to see here.

There is, I think, no way to erase a sin — NotAristotle

How merciful.