This bit:

The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you. — Bernardo Kastrup

is exactly wrong.

We differ only in experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self, but not in the subjective field wherein all these memories, perspectives and narratives of self unfold as patterns of excitation — Bernardo Kastrup

We differ in "experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self"... so what is left that is shared? What are those "Patterns of excitation" that are not "experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self" and which also do not have a value?

There is nothing left here, for the field to consist in.

Let's do it again. A field has a value at every point in the space it describes. That is what a field is.

Subjectivity does not have a value at every point in some space. Indeed, it is not the sort of thing that can have a value. Moreover, from what I can work out, Wayfarer and others agree with this.

Hence subjectivity is not a field.

You limit "field" to "a physical quantity" — Metaphysician Undercover

No I. and not to "physical" but to "quantity". That's the definition of "field" in science and mathematics.

Much the same move is seen in Kripke's Identity and Necessity, where this lectern is necessarily made of wood. It's not that a lectern could not have been made of ice, but that by this lectern we only pick out the wooden one. Our language game is set up so that if we are talking about any lectern not made of wood, then we are not talking about this lectern.

So far as explanations go, saying that something is an example of a field exactly becasue it does not meet the criteria for being a field is... odd.

So your description of the "field of consciousness" is apt becasue it does not match the definition of "field"...

Others seem to think that this works. But you will have to forgive me if I continue to be sceptical.

Part Four.

Quine reiterates his argument, further extending it to attributes. To be extensional, one ought be able to substitute equivalent terms without altering truth values, but Quine argues that this does not work in modal contexts. Hence for Quine modal contexts are "intensional".

One way to think about the distinction between intensional and extensional contexts is that a predicate in an extensional context refers to the very objects picked out, while in an intensional context the predicate refers to the attribute doing the picking...

Suppose this is our domain...

We can give the beads proper names by numbering them from left to right. The beads are 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8,9. Intensionally, the red beads are those for which "having the attribute red" is true. Extensionally, red = {1,2,3}. it just is those beads.

Quine takes the example

(39) The attribute of exceeding 9 = the attribute of exceeding 9

and the identity

(24) The number of planets = 9

and constructs the falsities

The attribute of exceeding the number of the planets = the attribute of exceeding 9

and

(40) (∃x)(the attribute of exceeding x = the attribute of exceeding 9)

Attributes, as remarked earlier, are individuated by this principle: two open sentences which determine the same class do not determine the same attribute unless they are analytically equivalent.

For those beads, that a bead has the attribute of being red is discovered by looking to see what colour the bead is. It is therefore not analytic, but synthetic. Being a member of {1.2.3} on the other hand, is analytic. Being red and being a member of {1,2,3} are not the very same.

Notice also {1} might have been blue. But it would still be a member of {1,2,3}.

For Quine, any attribute might have been otherwise, and so for Quine there are no essential properties. But every item in the domain is a bead; so while it is possible for 1 to have been blue, it is not possible for 1 not to be a bead and still be 1. 1 is necessarily a bead, and not not necessarily red. Being a bead is part of the (Aristotelian?) essence of 1, but being red is not.

Of course, Quine would point out that we arbitrarily limited our domain to beads. And he would be correct. What counts as an essential attribute is decided not by examining the beads, but in the linguistic act of setting up the domain. Essence, then, is an arbitrary part of the language game.

...does that disqualify its description as ‘a field’? — Wayfarer

No.

...a field is a physical quantity, represented by a scalar, vector, or tensor, that has a value for each point in space and time.[1][2][3] An example of a scalar field is a weather map, with the surface temperature described by assigning a number to each point on the map. A surface wind map,[4] assigning an arrow to each point on a map that describes the wind speed and direction at that point, is an example of a vector field, i.e. a 1-dimensional (rank-1) tensor field. — Wiki: Field

Why call it a field? What is the use of such language, if there are no values attached to points in space?

Seems to be no more than a veneer of the scientism we reject.

Well, you asked...

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....” — Mww

You do see here that the points of the field each have an associated value, don't you?

So the question is, what are the values in the supposed field of subjectivity?

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer

The electromagnetic field has vector values at every point in space. Photons are ripples in the field - the photon can be described by a frequency and a direction, or by its energy - values in that field.

If there is a field of subjectivity or consciousness or whatever, it would need to be defined by the values attached to the points in space across which the field is spread. Presumably zero for empty space, and then... what? How will subjectivity be measured or calculated? What are it's units?

Moreover, if it has no units, and yet is somehow to explain the physical world, how does one get from the field of subjectivity to the measurable values of the electromagnetic field? Where do they come from? What equations show the relation here?

An issue not unlike that faced by Cartesian dualism in its inability to explain how one consciously moves one's hand.

I still call bullshit.

And I don't think much of his friends.

It seems worth pointing out that PNC will apply throughout all possible worlds.

The point is rather that one cannot then turn around and point at an "approved" formalism as evidence of the rightness of a metaphysical position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. But if a metaphysical position, understood formally, entails a contradiction, that is reason to reject the metaphysical position. Which is to say that our metaphysics ought not be inconsistent.

Before we continue, it would be useful to set out what "Aristotelian essentialism" might be, in its variations. It is not monolithic, and we may well find some agreement .

Barcan seems sympathetic, but Kripke less so. In formal terms, we can differentiate between fixed and non-fixed domains.

Fine would have us consider essences in terms of definitions rather than necessary properties. Now it remains that it is very unclear to me what an essence is for you, but I suspect that you would find Fine more to your liking than Barcan. Fine wants to rescue essences from modality.

"let's ditch this system because it isn't consistent with the proper metaphysics." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The other philosophers here are quite entitled to differ with Klima on several points. Most obviously, they may question whether his notion of metaphysics is indeed "proper"; they might also ask whether his articulation of "proper metaphysics" really does not match our best, consistent and coherent account of modality; and they might point out that if a theory does not fit well with out best logic, that provides us with ample reason to question not the logic, but the theory.

The classical inference rules are not counterintuitive. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll go over the argument once again for you. You suggested that a possible world semantics for modal logic was counterintuitive. I'm asking you what might be concluded from this, by considering how one might react to someone who claimed that the classical inference rules were counterintuitive. You cannot say that someone is wrong concerning their intuition. If they do think classical inference counterintuitive, what a teacher might do is work through some examples to show them how classical inference leads to coherent deductions, allowing one to express one's ideas consistently.

Similarly, all a teacher can do for someone who finds possible world semantics of modal logic counterintuitive is to show that the results are coherent and consistent, and hope that the pieces that seem counterintuitive fall in to place, becoming intuitive as the logic is learned.

You would I hope agree that logic is a discipline, that it requires some effort to follow and understand and that it does considerably more than simply to reinforce one's intuitions.

Nor will mere intuitions do as a basis for any shared argument, given that our intuitions are not all held in common. Intuition cannot serve as a basis for rationality.

Modal logic, including possible world semantics, is an accepted part of formal logic, with a very strong foundation and application across diverse fields, including many outside of philosophy. Choosing to use it is not so much like choosing between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to probability, as choosing between integral and differential calculus. You may use the tool appropriately to the task, with confidence.

You are not the person to be giving out physics lessons.

In case this was missed...


Things really are bad. It's different from last time. The damage being done here is permanent for a few reasons.

....Even if you refuse to accept the unapologetic pivot to a fascist Russian modeled mob kleptocracy, the US is fucked. For decades.

:razz:

Not helping.

The question is not apt because the notion of a field of subjective experience fails to match with what is meant by "field" in physics. It has no values.


Cheers. Have a good evening.

t's simply an analogy. — Wayfarer

Then it doesn't help. Those "excitations of fields" have a value. What is the value of the subjective field three centimetres in front of of you nose?

...the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity. — Bernardo Kastrup

That's not presenting an analog. Calling it an analogy is what folk do when their explanation doesn't work. so that they can follow up with "you just don't understand... you can't see the analogy"

Like you did earlier.

No worse than thinking there's no question. — Wayfarer

There's a difference between recognising a question and accepting an answer. Sure there's a question here - a profound one. But you jump to a conclusion that does not work.

Handwaving waffle about physical fields of subjective experience does not help. It's too easy to show it to be garbage.

:rofl: The 'nature of the wave function' is the single most outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum physics. To this day, Nobel-prize winning theorists still do not agree on what it is, that that disagreement is completely metaphysical. — Wayfarer

The bit where you think you have the answer, but don't.

Bernardo Kastrup's 'field of subjectivity' is a way of describing mind or consciousess as a universal manifests through manifold particular forms. In plain language, he's saying that what we think of as individual minds—your or my consciousness, that of living beings generally—are not completely separate but rather are localized within a broader, all-encompassing field of awareness. — Wayfarer

Which is not physics. That's becasue in physics a field is a space with a value at every point. If he does not present a way to understand what that value might be, he is talking through his hat.

And if he is not doing physics, then we ought not see his expertise in physics as supporting his argument.

And what values does Kastrup set for each point in the subjective field?

Becasue that is what is required of a field in order to be a field.

IF he doesn't give us a way to calculate the value of the field of subjectivity at each point in whatever space he is talking about, he is not talking physics.

Even if, and I want to make this perfectly clear, even if he is "perfectly conversant with quantum physics".

So - what's wrong with it? Why is one universal field of subjectivity any more or less credible than atomic theory? — Wayfarer

I don't know how to explain this, since your asking the question seems to show a misunderstanding of what a field is in physics. A field is a mathematical function assigning a value to every point in the given space.

How the fuck does subjectivity give, or be understood as, an assigned value to every point in a space? What could that mean?

There's a chasm here, that you apparently do not see.

my Corgi still cannot comprehend simple high school algebra. We have to learn our limitations. — jgill

:wink: But did your corgi learn it's limitations? Did it learn that it cannot do high school algebra? That would be pretty cool.

Ah, the "the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity" thing.

It’s not something easily understood, but there are those who do. — Wayfarer

There are those who agree with you, it seems - but whether they understand you, that's a different issue.

There remains the enigma mooted by Kastrup, that what is known only to oneself is also known to all. Unaddressed, save for the hand wave.

Your suggestion is essentially equivalent to what I suggested in my last post, and indeed the likely tool for constructing the sample space i was referring to. — sime

That's what I thought. "One simple space" - so the step-wise structure disappears? That would presumably be the case if we implemented S5 in this way. Our trips through the space would correspond to moving within one big equivalence class. To model the sort of thing @Count Timothy von Icarus has been suggesting* we might use S4; we would have Reflexivity and Transitivity, but no more, and therefore some structure. This might allow something closer to our intuitions for physical necessity.

So if S={a,b,c,d} and the accessibility was {a,b}, {b,c},{c,d},{d,d} by transitivity and reflexivity, then not all states are accessible form each other - not {d,a}, for example, and accessibility is nested - {b,c},{c,d} implies {b,d}.

The result could model a causal hierarchy.

Oddly, the lack of symmetry means this is not reversible - a time-like direction?

I'm finding this quite unexpected, and intriguing. If we move to S4.3, and □p→□□p, we bar looping back, reinforcing the time-like directionality. In effect it implies a sort of entropy...

Too speculative, I think; And on reflection I am not sure it achieves more than S4.3 might by itself...except that paths might be traced probabilistically.

*(added) so we might have "If Socrates is sitting, then Socrates is necessarily sitting" in S4.3, but not in S5. Necessity that persist forward.

Hope you and the wife are happy and healthy. — creativesoul

Avoiding Cyclones by cancelling our travel plans, as it turns out. As a result I find i have time on my hands.

Thanks - I didn't really expect many to pay much attention to this thread, to the extent that I would not have started it but for @J's interest.

↪Banno You mean, the one in which you put your metaphorical arms around my shoulder, and clearly explained that you didn't know what I was talking about? That walk? — Wayfarer

:smile:

For you, probably. Funny how folk who point out problems with your posts mostly haven't understood you.

Dreadful stuff, seeing as you asked for my opinion. The phrases "unitary and universal" and "bottom level of reality" and "prior to spatiotemporal extension" ought set one's teeth on edge; they are vague to the point of incoherence. The magic hand wave of "The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you" contradicts the very use of terms such as "subjective" from which it derives.

Wayfarer, you do not have my memories, nor I, yours. That's kinda what "subjective" is. It is not shared.

The science you castigate and beg to become more "subjective" functions exactly because it works to overcome subjectivity by building on what we do share.


This is what I tried to explain on our little walk.

So to the end of part three:

The upshot of these reflections is meant to be that the way to do quantified modal logic, if at all, is to accept Aristotelian essentialism. To defend Aristotelian essentialism, however, is not part of my plan. Such a philosophy is as unreasonable my lights as it is by Carnap’s or Lewis’s. And in conclusion I say, as Carnap and Lewis have not : so much the worse for quantified modal logic. By implication, so much the worse for unquantified modal logic as well; for, if we do not propose to quantify across the necessity operator, the use of that operator ceases to have any clear advantage over merely quoting a sentence and saying that it is analytic.

I find myself agreeing with Barcan, that Quine is mistaken to think the choice is between an Aristotelian essentialism and rejecting quantified modal logic altogether. And so the issue becomes the various and diverse notions of essence and how they might cohere and confute one another.

Rather, their faith would lead them to believe there's something wrong with the logical argument. — Relativist

If you like. Your example shows the unfalsifiabilty of objects of faith, which is the crux of my post. Any arguments or evidence to the contrary are rejected using ad hoc hypothesising. This is part of the irrationality of faith.

A more charitable interpretation might be found in Wittgenstein's hinge propositions, but that's a much bigger topic.

So the same Pat can hold both beliefs at the same time. — Fire Ologist

Where did that nonsense come from?

No.

Cheers.

Two beliefs:
Pat believes that "god exists" is true
Pat believes that "god does not exist" is true.

In both cases, Pat holds a certain proposition to be the case.

I am not responsible for your own confusion.

Ultimately, I think the question we're addressing is "Can a set of possible worlds be adequately modelled in terms of a sigma algebra defined over a sample space?" — sime

This is what needs tracing out, to be sure.

In considering this I have been struck by how accessibility in modal logic resembles a Markov process, with states resembling possible worlds and transition probabilities resembling Accessibility relations. A directed graph resembles a Kripke frame... but Markov processes are not binary, unlike modal logic. Would that I had a stronger background in the maths involved.

Again, there is a lot going on here.

Yes — sime

Thank you. I very much appreciate this simple gesture towards agreement.

OK. In probability theory possible worlds are elements in a sample space, which consists in all possible outcomes of some experiment. These possible worlds are fixed by the definition of the probability space, they are mutually exclusive in that only one world can be the outcome of any one experiment. They are not hypothetical, but points in a mathematical space.

Wearers possible worlds in modal logic are stipulated, are not mutually exclusive and sit within a structure R which determines what worlds are accessible, one from the other.

Even counterpart theory would have these modal characteristics. Neither approach to modality involves a structured space of possibilities.

This looks to be the mistake in 's "Trump had only a 20% chance of winning the 2016 election". (Let's move away from using Trump in our examples. please... He gets much more attention than he deserves.) That is, it misses the part where modality is stipulated, not found.

I would be happy to continue the conversation were I able to make sense of your position, but your thoughts rattle around in a hurricane of different words.

And others compete for my attention.

Which is all to say that to collapse faith into assent to propositional knowledge will tend to totally miss this and will mean just talking past numerous other traditions (e.g. Neoplatonism, Orthodoxy, etc.). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yet if faith, or any belief, is to enter into our ratiocinations, it must be put in to propositional form. In particular, if it is to explain our actions, it must be able to participate in those explanations.

The alternative would be silentism. If this is what you are advocating I would be both surprised and please.