He’s saying in plain English, the passage of time always depends on there being a change in one physical system relative to another. — Wayfarer

That'd be the measure of the passage of time. Do you have reason to suppose that time could not pass without change? Not that we could not measure time without change, but that time could for some reason not pass without change.

Folks are never hesitant to appeal to the implications of science when it seems to support realism. But when anti-realism enters the picture, woo betide them. — Wayfarer

But you are not advocating antirealism, you are advocating mysticism.

Straight to quantum strangeness, 'eh... Davies' view is speculative at best.

It forgets the Page-Wootters mechanism, loop quantum gravity, Bohmian mechanics, many-worlds, and so on. It conflates "observer" with "consciousness".

It's an illegitimate leap.

Measuring is what is significant. — Wayfarer

significant - to do with signs, hence mind.

It cannot be concluded that time does not exist without minds. It's an illegitimate leap.

The same problem that infects all your ontology.

But again all you have argued is that in order to know, believe, doubt, or measure time there needs to be a knower, a believer, a doubter or a measurer.

That tells us nothing about time. Only about believing, doubting, and measuring.

Are we being extreme idealists here? — Corvus

Yep.

Thanks. Geology was a big interest many years ago - I should do some reading thereabouts.

The OP appears to be playing on a misguided understanding of "perceive". I'm not seeing much by way of significant argument.

presumably geologists - read instruments, the readings being perceived. — tim wood

And to a surprisingly high resolution...



Towering structures in Earth’s depths may be billions of years old
and



The mysterious, massive structures in Earth’s deep mantle

This thread's all a bit too fanboy for my taste.

Russell portrayed he of the moustache as an insecure, pretentious man with a fear of morality. There's quite a bit to that. While Russell was an aristocrat, N. was an aristocrat wannabe, expressing a bitter intellectual's fantasy of strength. Of course such psychologising is not a critique of what he actually says. Except that ressentiment has such a central place in N's criticism of Christianity - so it seems fitting to treat his philosophy as reverse ressentiment...

The Übermensch is a much maligned character. Where would he be found now? Not Musk or Trump, derivative and failed as they are. No, the modern Übermensch is Freddie Mercury, at least as he was portrayed in Bohemian Rhapsody. Mercury transcended conventional norms in music, performance, and identity, reinventing himself again and again, displaying the will to power in his stage performance as well as in punching out Sid Vicious.

Nietzsche remains the idol of post-pubescent males. Someone to consider and grow beyond.

:wink:

Not sure why you tagged me here, Banno. — Arcane Sandwich

Only becasue you tagged me.

Courtesy of ↪Banno. — Arcane Sandwich

Cheers. Leave it there. Thanks.

So what's the problem with the electoral reforms?

Independents would have a cap of $800 000 on their spending, while parties would have a cap of 90 million.

Yep, it's an attempt to fix the rejection of both major parties by rigging funding rather than by addressing the issues that have led to voters rejecting them.

, @Bob Ross, I've no more to add than I did at , the contents of which I believe remains unaddressed.

(AE2) Magnetism cannot be perceived by human beings. — Arcane Sandwich

Demonstrably, AE2 is wrong.

Thanks - it's been an interesting topic, your summation is appreciated. Three response.


First, for my part I "think" is too broad a word to bear the sort of analysis attempted here. In addition, since the context "I think..." is extensionally opaque, I doubt the wisdom of supposing that there is a general case to be made.

Relating this to the OP, accepting (3) rather than (4) seems to be claiming that Pat is mistaken as to her account of her own metal life. I doubt such a move can be justified.



Second, even if we supose that such a critique of Pat might be valid, Way's account still looks at odds with the OP.

To make a judgement is implicitly to state 'I think that <p>' or 'I believe that <p>' In this sense, judgement is itself not one perspective among many but the condition for the possibility of any perspective. — Wayfarer

Arguably, to make a judgement is to think that some state of affairs is so, for some account of "think". But one can think of some state of affairs without judging it to be so. Hence even if to make a judgement is to think, to think may not always to make a judgement.

This is perhaps what is asked in the OP - not does every judgement involve thinking, but does every thought involve judgement.

The simple truth behind this is that we can entertain a proposition without thereby accepting, believing, or assenting to it.



And third, Frege's approach bypass such discussions by placing the whole argument within the scope of the Begriffsschrift, "⊢". The Begriffsschrift might be "I think..."; or "I judge...", "I believe...", "I wonder if...", "I doubt...". That is irrelevant to the content. Hence, demonstrably, the content can be considered separately from the intent and the intentionality.



So I'll still opt for (4). The grain of truth in Rödl's thinking might be that when Pat thinks "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" Pat is supposing there to be oak trees and leaves. It would be a stretch to call this a judgement, as if there were an alternative here.

China is growing into a super power. — frank

You think?

I give up.

There are concerns the US has left a chasm that could be filled by China." — frank

Ok.

Then China will win.

That's not what I was referring to. Not military power, soft power.

That's what I said.

Chinese wisdom has it that one does not start a war until one has already won.

It is about to win.

There are concerns the US has left a chasm that could be filled by China." — frank

Isn't that obvious? China will be ecstatic.

↪Banno I know, I know. I've promised myself, and everyone here, to 'stop posting about Trump', about a million times. But I can't look away, it's just too awful, and the threat too imminent. — Wayfarer

Yeah, but it is sound advice, especially for one's own wellbeing.

What have you decided concerning the OP?

Crikey editor Sophie Black today set out some guidelines for dealing with reporting Trump that are worth a look.

Don't pay attention to what he says. Look at what he does. "Unless, that is, there’s an opportunity for a joke".

It is a meditation on his beliefs. — tim wood

This may be the only way to make sense of it.

There's more on modal collapse, with comments on Plantinga, in the SEP article on divine simplicity. A slightly different, but related, use to the one I made of the modal collapse argument here. "The MCA’s main value is as a concrete point of entry into this constellation of difficult questions."

Count Timothy von Icarus's account looks to me to be a correspondence theory. — Moliere

Looking again, you may be correct.

"truth is the adequacy of thought to being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Really not sure what this says.

An interesting piece in that rag, the Conversation, suggesting the better term is a "state capture".

Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

An old paper - 1980's? . His views had changed somewhat by the time of Truth and Predication (2005).

We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted assertability, ideally justified assertability, what is accepted in the conversation of the right people, what science will end up maintaining, what explains the convergence on final theories in science, or the success of our ordinary beliefs. To the extent that realism and antirealism depend on one or another of these views of truth, we should refuse to endorse either — pp 47-8

.

As to Thompson re-introducing conceptual schemes... — Joshs

But

That world, however, is not given, waiting to be represented. We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.

Those incommensurate domains philosophers are to navigate look very much like conceptual schemes.

I'm interested in essence, and I'm not a Thomist. — Arcane Sandwich

Then I wasn't referring to you.

I never took Kripke to be talking about essences per se — J

Yep. The mention of essence is a response to recent interest hereabouts, mostly amongst a small group of Thomists. A discussion of necessity here will probably the obliged to address less than clear ideas of essence.

Our concern here is that tautology is often thought of as necessity. Filling that out is a topic in itself.

Good.

Nice. Do you have the actual hard copy?

Oversimplifying, Quine fusses over the sentence "Cicero has six letters", and how we can get from that to "Something has six letters". The thing that has six letters is a word, not Cicero. He suggests treating modal sentences in a similar way, as substitutionally opaque. He want to do this becasue he dislikes the supposed ontological implications of other approaches.

But I don't think possible world semantics has the dire consequences he envisions, and specifically, the sort of essentialism it invokes is ontologically inert.

This not by way of an argument but an outline.

Does Davidson think of us as having just one conceptual scheme? Shared by all humanity, past, present and future? — Ludwig V

It would be wrong to summarize by saying we have shown how communication is possible between people who have different schemes, a way that works without need of what there cannot be namely a neutral ground, or a common coordinate system. For
we have found no intelligible basis on which it can be said that schemes are different. It would be equally wrong to announce the glorious news that all mankind -all speakers of language, at least - share a common scheme and ontology. For if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one. — On the very idea...

So no.

The holism in Davidson consists in our sharing the same world, and hence that whatever beliefs you have about that world are a variation on the beliefs I have. He was not a realist, in the traditional sense, since he does not hold that we are interpreting a word by constructing a conceptual scheme that is about that world. Nor is he an antirealist, since truth is not a function only of our conceptual schemes.

I don't know Thompsons’s work, but there is something odd in what quoted, since it wrongly claims Davidson was a realist, then sets out an approach that rejects realism and antirealism in much the way Davidson actually does, but then re-introduces conceptual schemes.

It looks very much to be yet another misreading of Davidson.

Some folk supose that since everything we believe is mind-dependent, everything is mind dependent.

It isn't so.

Marxist materialism is a different kettle of fish — Wayfarer

Yep.

Sometimes the OP is too broad for the thread to keep to a theme. That's the case here. Too many side issues.

:worry:

well, it's not difficult to translate left and right into north and south. For the rest, I'll leave you to it.

I don't much care. Physicalism suits my purposes. You can phrase it how you wish.

...ecstatic... — Wayfarer

Well, not in my experience either.

I'll use materialism for newtonian philosophies and physicalism for the doctrine that physics is the only ontology, others may do as they please.

the truth of the B-series would render the A-series impossible, and vise versa — Metaphysician Undercover

well,

...but he believed that the A series when taken together with some hypothetical C series that he only partially explicated, could reconstruct the so-called B-series in a non-contradictory fashion. — sime

i'll leave it to @Sime to fill this in.

Sure, but the question is which of the two is used to speak the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why not both.

Cheers.

So what I am offering is not too far from the Wittgensteinian suggestion that A-series and B-series are different language games.

If you like.

It comes down to the juxtaposition of idealism and realism against physicalism, realism against antirealism, in which you tend to the idealist persuasion. It might be possible to give an account of the debate in which both are correct. 's mentioned of McTaggart went ignored.

Edited for