• Perception
    ↪frank
    Midgley's idea of differing areas of discourse.
  • Perception
    We say the sun rises in the east when it's really that the earth is spinning. — frank

    Well, yes. It is true that the sun rises in the East; and we say it is true that the ball is red. What is "really" doing there? Prioritising one narrative over another?

    Everything is the product of the brain. The question is what stimulates the brain to cause that perception — Hanover
    If everything is the product of the brain, then what simulates the brain is the product of the brain. Your narrative leaves you unable to interact with the world. But of course for you the world is just a product of the brain.

    You built yourself a self-consistent self deception. Solipsism.
  • Perception
    ↪frank
    Sunrise is an issues of differing coordinate systems. Is that what is being said about colour?
  • Perception
    We might talk about the ball as having a colour but that's a fiction... — Michael

    THis alone should be sufficient to show Michael's error. The ball is red.
  • Perception
    But since repetition is de rigueur, Here's my observation. I agree entirely with the scientific account of the physiology of colour. However, this account is not well reported by abbreviating it to "colours are just mental percepts" or some such. Overwhelmingly, we agree as to the colour of the things around us. It follows that colours are constructed from information about the world around us. We have also been able to constructed various group enterprises concerning the colours of our world - those involving red pens and red tomatoes, for example. This shared facet of the nature of colour involves more than just the firing a few neurones in an individual.

    So I'll go along with an analysis that says that red is a property of most ripe tomatoes, depending on variety.

    Some folk claim properties must in some way inhere in the individual in question, and so suppose that while the tomato might be round and firm, it is not red. That strikes me as unneeded philosophical theorising.

    I'll also say things such as that this is a closed box of red tomatoes. Some philosophers will claim that such knowledge is impossible. I find their accounts unconvincing.

    All this by way of pointing out that while being red involves the firing of certain neurones in an individual brain, there are in addition an assortment of other issues. Colours are more than individual mental percepts.

    46 pages. Even @Mp202020 gave up long ago.
  • Perception
    ↪Hanover
    What a mess. After reading this I've no idea of what what I am accused.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Fooloso4
    I can't see how any of the multiple quotes count against the contention that Wittgenstein held the proper use of "know" to involve justified true belief.
  • Perception
    I thought that that 'issue' had been long since resolved. — creativesoul
    But, with this thread, evidently not.

    Edit: And it looks as if the conversation will continue. That's how threads such as this function, with folk who know the one, true answer talking past each other.
  • Perception
    Isn't one of the issues here now "What is to count as seeing?"

    Kinda where we came in.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    And yet, in 3 and 7 he gives examples of things he knows without giving propositional justification. — Fooloso4

    And does he maintain this position despite his later arguments? That's kinda the point.

    How is "look closer" propositional justification? — Fooloso4
    It's not. Again, that's the point.
  • Perception
    ↪Hanover
    Ok.
  • Perception
    ↪Hanover
    You tell me. I'm not arguing about the physiology.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    Would it help if we noticed that Wittgenstein is acknowledging uses of "know" that he subsequently argues are illegitimate?
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    But as I understand it looking closer could never provide Wittgenstein with justification for knowledge, and thus it is odd to say that "looking closer" will somehow yield justification. — Leontiskos
    Yep. He and I might agree with you. Here he is perhaps looking at common misuses of "know".

    The oddity is that the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data, and so for Wittgenstein to say that sense data does not count as a justification seems to commit him to the view that knowledge of this kind does not exist at all. — Leontiskos
    Yep. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree that "the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data"? I doubt it. I can't imagine him using such a construct. it's the sort of thing he found so disagreeable in the Vienna Circle.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. — Fooloso4

    You are quite right – it's not. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer".

    But it seems you can't.

    No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door. — Fooloso4
    This is not what Wittgenstein might say. He might point out that while you may be certain there is a chair, the lack of a suitable justification implies that it is improper to say you know there is a chair there.

    And here the form "I thought I knew" is being overlooked. (21)

    He is setting up the discussion by considering various uses of the terms involved. (7) is not a conclusion, it is setting the grounds by showing how we use "know" to express certainty – see the other examples in the surrounding text. He goes on to unknot the ramifications of this casual use, in an attempt to make consistent sense of it.

    I will respond one more time then drop it. — Fooloso4
    That would be for the best.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    its a matter of interpreting the text as a whole — Fooloso4
    Trouble is, this text is not a whole. It is an incomplete process, a work in progress. @Sam26 and I have pointed this out repeatedly.
  • Perception
    The factual explanation is that the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing. — Michael

    The bolded word is where Michael oversteps. Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see. The brain is not the sole determiner colour.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7. — Fooloso4
    SO allow me to address them directly:
    3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.
    7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
    Neither of these count against what I have said. In the first it is pointed out that "know" involves being satisfied that something is the case - seeking justification. The second shows that certainty is lived, acted out. These are central to, not inconsistent with, the account I provided.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right. — frank

    But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know — Fooloso4

    @Frank, you seem to behaving the same problem, with Fool, as I. That Wittgenstein dislikes Hume is bedsides the point. Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    Perhaps I will try again.

    I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!

    This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'.     — Fooloso4

    This is an example that fits my case exactly. Wittgenstein is pointing out that there is no justifying proposition that supports "I know that a sick man is lying here", that it is instead something seen in what is before us. Hence, he says that it is nonsense to say "I know...".

    You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. So:
    The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification? — Fooloso4
    Yes, that's right - there is no justifying proposition, and hence saying "I know..." is for Wittgenstein illegitimate.

    You seem to want to disprove my case by presenting things which support it.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Banno My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty. — Sam26
    I agree, except that "subjective" is counterproductive here. Moore would have "This is a hand" as an expression of something of which he is convinced - a self-justified true belief. Wittgenstein points out the ineffectiveness of self-justification, buts agrees that it is certain that "This is a hand". So he is loath to say say he knows "this is a hand", while agreeing that it is indubitable. His solution is along the lines of treating it as fundamental to the way we use word in our interactions, as a foundation to the word games. He does not come to a conclusion, although conclusions have been read in to the text by others.

    For my part, something like Searle's account of language must be correct, were there are certain things that must be taken as granted in order for a language game to take place – there must be some agreement amongst the "players" as to what is occurring. On that account we might read "This is a hand" as something like "This counts as a hand for the purposes of our everyday encounters", where the ..."counts as..." sets up the institution of calling this waving, nose-picking, pen pushing thing a hand.

    Problems will occur when hinges are said to be non-propositional, or not true, as Moyal-Sharrok wishes to. This needs a fair amount of tidying up, but it is clear that if some belief is going to function as part of an explanation for a behaviour, it needsmust be truth-functional.

    Perhaps the difference I have with her is that I do take beliefs to be evaluative attitudes. Being so is how they relate to actions, and without acts, beliefs are nothing.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    You’re making Wittgenstein’s point for him. — Joshs
    Good, since I think he is right.

    . For Wittgenstein the distinction between certainty and knowledge is that between a conviction or picture of the world, and a justifiable proposition. — Joshs
    I agree. What an odd pair you and Fool are.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Fooloso4
    I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. Not much I can do for you.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for this conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell).

    Wittgenstein's view is that Moore can be certain, but not know, that he has a hand.
  • Perception
    ↪Hanover
    Nice.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Fooloso4
    This is unproductive.

    Are you arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification?

    Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification...

    So, going over it again, Moore claims to know that this is a hand, despite not having a propositional justification. Wittgenstein objects, amongst other things, that this is a misuse of know, that Moore can be certain, but in the absence of a propositional justification, he cannot properly be said to know that this is a hand.

    Now, you seem to think this is not quite correct, but it remains unclear to me what alternative you might be proposing.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Sam26
    Yep. Any point can be taken as fixed, providing the origin of a coordinate system. And if any other point is chosen by someone else, then it is a simple mater to translate from one coordinate system to another. Further, the Principle of Relativity ensures physical laws are consistent, regardless of which system of coordinates is chosen.

    Again, choosing the foundation is an act, a way of using words.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Fooloso4
    You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno
  • How do you tell your right hand from your left?
    ↪Moliere
    There is supposedly a language, Guugu Ymithirr, that could only phrase things in terms of absolute directions. So "raise your right hand" might be "raise your north hand". The culture placed great emphasis on knowing which way one was facing.
  • How do you tell your right hand from your left?
    ↪Moliere
    You could not learn your left from your right if there were no difference between left and right.

    So it's not just something you learn.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Joshs
    I'm not too sure how to unpack your claims here.

    So supose we have a culture in which "certain performances... might be performed in an entirely different way... to produce entirely different meanings".

    On what grounds could you then claim that this culture was playing chess?

    Supose the rules they follow are phrased in terms of - I don't know, it's your argument - river gods against mountain gods or some such. If what they do is equivalent to a game of chess, then their rules are functionally equivalent to the rules of chess - a translation.

    And if they differ so substantively that the actions performed are not equivalent to a game of chess, then you have no grounds to claim they are playing chess...

    Same with your answer to
    ↪wonderer1
    ; if their "bike" is used to dig holes, then the equivalence of the name "bike" is incidental; your claim that the digger is a bike is groundless.

    So I've been unable to make much of your post.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. — Fooloso4
    You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification?

    Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. I don't see, then, how you can make sense of §10; nor of much that comes after, for a hundred or so pages. Wittgenstein argues that Moore is misusing "know" and should instead have said he certain that this is a hand. Hence the book's title.

    I'll leave you to your variant.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ...but... — Sam26
    I don;t see a point of disagreement here. The next bit: "This position I will hold!" – that is, it is something I do!
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Sam26
    Yep. This counts as a board, this counts as a bishop, and so on. Explicated neatly by Searle's status functions.

    They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language game.
  • How do you tell your right hand from your left?
    ↪frank
    Well, it shows the lie of the reduction to relativism and subjectivity – a theme in this thread as well as many others. Folk see space as not absolute, and conclude that therefore it is only subjective...
  • How do you tell your right hand from your left?
    Imagine a stone and a boulder on a far away planet. Is the stone to the left or to the right of the boulder? — frank
    Well, yes - that answers your OP, doesn't it?

    You don't need anything so remote.
    You and I sit opposite each other at a table. On my right is a knife, on my left, a fork. The fork is on your right. Does that mean there is no objective truth as to the location of the fork? — Banno
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Sam26
    :wink: It's a faux, foundationalism, in that it is for a purpose, and not handed to us by god.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Sam26
    Care might be needed to avoid a foundationalist reading of OC. I don't think there are some sentences that are unquestionable in an absolute sense. It's rather that if we are going to perform some given task, we must take some things for granted - if you would do maths, you need to grant that 1+1=2; if you would pick your nose, you must take this to be a hand; and so on.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    ↪Sam26
    Cheers.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    1) One can reasonably talk about the conditions for knowledge and experience and things prior to language, using language to describe them (Kant may represent this approach.. one done by many philosophers) — schopenhauer1
    Well, this results in pages and pages about philosophical constructs such as the thing-in-itself... silence is much preferable. But it's not the silence of the Zen master, it's the silence of doing things.

    2) Witt's notion: at some point language games cannot exist without certain "hinge" beliefs. Yet we can explore where hinge beliefs originate to some degree, even using empirical methods (developmental psychology and such). — schopenhauer1
    Sure. The first step here is the one given above - that not doubting is something we do, not something we uncover.

    Notice that this fits exactly with the core idea that we should look to use rather than meaning.
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