Images of a builder calling "Slab" and the assistant saying "...not until you set out the essence of slabbness".

When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task." — Leontiskos

No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw.

The Aristotelian view is really quite odd.

But they do not disagree that logic is about validity, and that validity is about the preservation of truth. So what you say here is not to the point. — Leontiskos

The contention I criticises was that logic consists in the preservation of truth.

I pointed out that parts of logic do not involve truth. For example the sequent calculus consists in a bunch of rules setting out what you can write down next - or previously. Truth doesn't enter until the tack, and even then it's the false that is introduced...

A valid argument is one that follows the rules. Yes, that usually also means that if the argument is given an interpretation, truth will be preserved, but that is incidental.

I am not claiming that preservation of truth does not enter in to logic.

I'm saying that there is a difference between a valid argument and a sound argument.

Such as...? — Leontiskos

Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.

I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat.

What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. — Leontiskos

I dunno. It seems to me you simply misunderstood Searle, and double down when this is pointed out. Meh.

...your ideal belief-relation... — Leontiskos

Not a notion of which I have made use. I try not to deal in ideals...

"Logics are theories of validity: they tell us, for different arguments, whether or not that argument is of a valid form" — Leontiskos

The next sentence is "Different logics disagree about which argument forms are valid". There is some considerable subtlety here.

Russell is playing with Logical Nihilism, rather than pluralism. https://gilliankrussell.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/logicalnihilism-philissues-v3.pdf
The picture is of an organic logic, which grows by lemma incorporation.

“(I believe) The right thing to do is apologize.” Now the personal claim of belief makes more sense here. The proposition is not true or false, nor can we be “wrong” about this proposition; — Antony Nickles

This is very interesting. I find myself wondering why "The right thing to do is apologise" should not have a truth-value. And so I find myself here somewhat at odds with Wittgenstein, and leaning towards Davidson.

"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's true", replied Banno.

Nothing seems amiss here.

I am not looking for an ultimate, correct and complete interpretation of belief in some formal language.

And I don't think Searle is, either. — Banno

To "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions" I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno

You seem to be making use of some as yet unstated transcendental argument, along the lines of the only way one account is better than another is if it is closer to the essence... — Banno

...what he says about his claim — Leontiskos

I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this.

I must be misunderstanding you. You seem to be implying that the only way that something can be "better" than another thing is if it is closer in some ideal, essential characteristic. But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal.

And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.

So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed.

This has degenerated into rhetoric rather than anything interesting.

Take a look at Gillian Russell's work. Let me know what you think.

But that someone makes up a formal system that has nothing to do with truth and calls it 'logic' is not much of a counterargument. — Leontiskos

Well, that would mean that, say, an uninterpreted explication of propositional calculus does not count as part of logic.

The point here is just that logic is bigger than the preservation of truth in an argument.

But logic is not merely rules for stringing symbols together. If I make rules for stringing symbols together I have not necessarily done anything related to logic. — Leontiskos

I wouldn't be so quick to draw that conclusion. We do say strings such as:

☐☐◇☐☐◇◇☐☐◇◇◇

"have a certain logic to them...".

Logic has advanced somewhat since the middle ages.

Trouble is, truth does not enter into formal systems until they are given an interpretation.

That is, there are logical systems that do not involve truth.

It follows that logic cannot be defined only in terms of preserving truth.

Now this is sounding like an esoteric cult.

Hmmm indeed - what did take place as Noosa Heads? What was "X"? I haven't been there for forty years.

The Nomological Net is not unlike Searle's background, and seems related to Wittgenstein's hinges. But consider this against the recent Kripke's skeptical challenge thread - Kripke's argument against being able to tell someone is following a rule.

But God lives there, too.

NUh. There's still the detail.

So the upshot seems to be that Anscombe and Davidson are approaching different issues, and so that they do not, despite appearances, contradict each other.

That's why I presented it.

Subtle, ain't it?

https://divinecuration.github.io/assets/pdf/davidson-mental-events.pdf . p. 141

No, it isn't.

...which has me wondering what an unapplied value might be.

We can at the very least know that existence exists right now. — PL Olcott

Rubbish. It's not at all clear what that might even mean. Use of ideas from Ayn Rand will only detract from your credibility.

I'll again leave you to it.

Well, if that is too much for you, there's a chap moving his arms around...

...note that a single action can be described in various ways. Is he moving his arm up and down? Pumping water? Doing his job? Clicking out a steady rhythm? Making a funny shadow on the rock behind him? Well, it could be that all of these descriptions are true. — SEP: Anscombe

It might be amusing at this stage to mention Ascombe's shopping list.

Anscombe has a piece of paper on which she has written a list of items to be purchased. Unbeknownst to her, as she collects the items, a spy writes a list of the things she collects.

It would not be too difficult to arrange the thought experiment so that the two lists were physically identical.

Yet the lists differ markedly in the attitude taken to them.

That attitude, our intent towards each list, supervenes on the list.

And?

I suggest you glance at the talk page.

Sure. Whatever gets you through the night.

The literature around this topic is more than extensive. That's one of the reasons for my caution. Also we are a bit off topic here.

But more reason to consider a thread, or threads, on Davidson.

What kinds of 'law'... — Wayfarer

Well, a regularity along the lines of "A whenever B".

So a mass experiencing an action will always result in a reaction.

Yet wanting a beer and believing there is some in the fridge need not always result in one gong to the fridge.

Two rational explanations, one with law-like characteristics, the other, not so much.

And yet it is not beyond the pale to say that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer.

Is that a causal explanation for your going to the fridge?

All very rough. Dibs you can't hold me to any of this.

Have a quick look at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#ReasCaus first.

It's a really pivotal question, not something with a quick answer. At least, not from me.

And that is the article I was contemplating as the first in a mooted series on Davidson, just for amusement.

But small steps.

How can it not follow? — Wayfarer

Well, given Davidson treats reasons as causes, that's no small question.

i.e., are instances of physical causation — Wayfarer

I don't see how that follows.


Emphasis on the word Physical.

As mentioned a few times in other threads, here's an odd logic:

Premise: We don't know anything with 100%, absolute, undeniable certainty.
Conclusion: Therefore, we don't know anything.

Of course, no one would actually suggest such an inept argument...

Yeah, but a good rendering of Davidson would have to go back to his work on the logic of action, and there's large, but perhaps not insurmountable - problems in all that. For Davidson, flicking the switch is the same as alerting the burglar, if you recall that argument. I think there's a lot of merit in it, but as much to do with Russell's view of Logical Nihilism as with Davidson's logic of action.

And "essence" seems to be creeping back into the discussions here, a problem in itself.

non-essential cause — Hanover

What's that, then?

Too much for a sleepy Saturday afternoon.


I think the text pretty clear and am not sure what I might say to elucidate it further. But see .

Me, or Davidson? I've not thought about it, and I'd have to go back and re-read Mental Events to set out Davidson's approach. Probably "mental event" would have been better than "mental state".

Why? Have you a direction for this thread?

Ah, you are looking for the essence of implication... :wink:

A lot of the confusion in this thread is addressed in the SEP article. — Leontiskos

Yep.

Yep. Been there.

For what it's worth, given that 2+2 is 4, "Socrates is a fish" entails 2+2=4.

The truth or falsehood of the antecedent makes no different to the truth of the entailment, if the consequent is true.

So would I.

Cool.

It's never the case that two and two is not four. So we are only considering implications in which the consequent is true. In all such cases, the implication is also true.

I don't see an issue.

Take a look at a truth table for implication.

Yeah, it's like there might be something interesting but just below the surface. Trouble is, so often such intuitions end in disappointment.

I'm not seeing it.