All logic starts with premises. You would just reject that, and it would be a waste of time. — schopenhauer1

Yes, it does. But the point of an argument, typically speaking, is to show that some intuitive premises lead to a position contrary to the defender's position or that the premises the defender adopts lead to a conclusion that is agreed upon to be wrong.
But your premises seem to be the type that would only be accepted by people who already adopt the conclusion that is entailed by it-so it is kind of useless in showing one thing to be at least somewhat unreasonable and does not actually mean anything regarding whetever that thing is reasonable or not.

One actually encompasses and respects the individual, and not using them. The other is in a locus that is not where the ethical concerns lie. An principle does not feel pain, people do. Wanting people to be happy and doing something for the principle of happiness are two different things. But it really becomes egregious when the third-party entity is not just happiness (as this can be construed as trying to make the largest number of individuals happy and thus possibly bypassing this argument of third-party), but things like "humanity", "civilization", "technology". People need to be born to keep these kind of things going. That would be a very poor argument for putting conditions of harm on others. — schopenhauer1

Well, what does it mean for the "ethical concerns" to "lie with" individuals? Assuming you are not begging the question by saying our ethical concerns are only about individuals and not society (which is not really correct, see people who advocate such a concept), how does that entail your conclusion that the betterment of society is just some kind of abstract construct that is just really not in touch with this reality?
I would like to see your argument in a logical form, as i can not imagine such an argument which does not beg the question or has premises that i have no reasons to accept.

Because "society" doesn't actually experience suffering or happiness or anything, individuals do. It can be many individuals, but once individuals get reified into an abstract concept "the greatest good" "pursuit of happiness", it goes out of the bounds of the locus of the experience. — schopenhauer1

And i will accept this conclusion that is prima facie counter-intuitive. What is wrong with it?

Ok, is this a debating point? You'd have to explain. — schopenhauer1

It was a weaker form of my view that negative ethics entails that we ought to destroy all human life-which was the main topic the whole time. The weakened version was that.
Do you agree with that at least version? If not, which part of my reasoning was wrong?

I don't. It's my personal choice. I just looked at how I act when it comes to any other situation where one can choose to use another's resources in any way. Most people (including myself) are risk averse in those scenarios. For example if I saw a house I think you like going on sale, I wouldn't just steal your credit card and buy it without your consent simply because there is a chance you don't like it or don't want to spend the money right now. I doubt you would either. So I just extended that to procreation out of a desire for consistency. — khaled

Well, you could just phone me and say "There is a sale going on over a house you would definitely like and time is running out, i will send you the details and you could tell me whetever you wanr to but it or not." Stealing my credit card would not yield any more benefit to me compared to you just phoning me and is just ineffecient. So, that is not a really good example.

Also, i would say that it is more probable that the person will be in a state of "My life is good enough." rather than being depressed. There is always a risk, but it can be drastically reduced. (And i am myself a proponent of a "local antinatalism", for people who can not raise children).

Well, since i agree that negative ethics entails procreation being immoral unless Earth is devoid of any suffering whatsoever, i will ask a question: How do you justify negative ethics? So far, you have just assumed it to be true and showed that procreation is immoral if we assume it. But you have not said why we should prefer it over a positive one yet.

A lot, because you keep advocating for a greater good principle and I'm saying this is overlooking individuals for third-parties. — schopenhauer1

Well, the discussion was not about that, but if you really want to criticize my position, please do it without assuming that ethics should be based on the individual and not society as that is just begging the question. Why is "overlooking individuals for 'third-parties'" bad?

In the case of one's non-harm principle being violated from someone else:

Non-aggression followed | Non-aggression violated

Following = good | Following = not bad as one is preventing harm from the
violation of non-aggression — schopenhauer1

Violating the principle by forcing everyone not to procreate is not bad as one is preventing harm from the violation of non-aggression by doing so.
I believe that just entails my conclusion above, which is what i was trying to say the whole time. It is a case of one's non-harm principle and non-aggression principle being violated from something else.

I'm not understanding how the principle would not apply in this case because "humanity will break this principle". — schopenhauer1

Premise A: For every situtation, the principle applies to that situtation if and only if the person affected is fully autonomous (or is autonomous enough) and following that principle will not result in the principle being broken by someone else.
Premise B: Following the non-agression principle in this particular case will result in the principle being broken by humanity. (Because humanity will procreate and thus violate it many times, not to mention will force animals to procreate too)
Therefore, the principle does not apply to this particular case.
If you have a problem with Premise A, then give me your own rule like i said just before the thing you quoted so that we can discuss it.

Also, i did not reply to your first comment because my contention is that this is not a violation of it or the violation is justified and i would have just said that. The problem is whetever this actually applies or not.

Ok I think I see. You are saying, shouldn't we prevent people who will cause pain to others. My response would still be that once born, considerations of other people's autonomy come into play. This autonomy is based on the fact that it is individuals who are the center of ethical considerations, not amorphous principle calculations (like the greatest good or something like that). Thus, the amorphous utilitarian calculation of destroying people who cause harm, would not be moral, even with good intentions. There is preventing harm and there is non-aggression. Both have to be followed. — schopenhauer1

But, assuming that you have the power to "prevent" people, by not doing it, you let the 15 billion people come into the world and have their consent violated. Are those individuals not the center of your ethical considerations because they are not born or..? The problem is-in the scenario i presented, it is not only the living people that will be autonomous but rather also the people that are not born yet.
Maybe you should say why you think those are not individuals that matter.

Yes, in the instance of procreation one would perfectly be following the principles of non-harm and non-aggression by abstaining from procreation. AFTER someone is born, they are an autonomous person, an individual, someone who has an identity to point at in the world. Once born, circumstances of time and place are immediately something to consider. There is the fact that people need time to develop into autonomous individuals, and there is the fact that sometimes, at the end of life, or in unconscious situations, individuals can lose their autonomy as individuals. If ethics is at the level of individual, we have to define individual. People become more autonomous over time. The time of being an adult would be one's most autonomous. However, prior to this, the parent/guardian can have some say in the upbringing of the individual because the assumption is that the person is not developed enough to be autonomous yet. Thus, it would be immoral to leave a baby/small child to defend for itself when this leads to obvious harm for that person. The non-harm principle would take place here as there is less autonomy of the child. Once that person is an adult, the full non-aggression principle, comes into effect, and thus "forcing" something (even if you think it is good for them) would be violating this principle. We can debate "when" that transition comes to be, but that would take us down a rabbit hole that is probably beyond the scope of what we are trying to get at. It is not about the impreciseness of that transition, but that a transition does take place... — schopenhauer1

That is good and all (and i did not quote the later part because it would have been too long and did not have to do with what i was going to say ), but you are presenting examples:I was asking for the rule. Anyways, judging from what you have written, i think i got the rule:
"Non-agression principle applies in all cases in which it is not broken first and the person in question is fully autonomous."
Does that apply for cases in which someone will violate the principle themselves? For example, i do not think this applies for a police officer who has just caught a murder plan in the making-it was not violated,but it will be violated. So, i would say that we ought to change the rule to:
"Non-agression principle applies only in cases in which it is not broken first/will be broken if we follow the principle and the person in question is autonomous."
But i do not think that is your rule, since we know that people will make babies left, and thus, humanity will break this principle if we continue to follow this principle. Therefore, the principle would not apply to the above scenario.
What exactly is the rule that applies universally?

You'd have to explain this a bit more. I'm not quite getting the scenario. If we prevent birth, and that person who was prevented from birth might have caused suffering to others in large quantities.. is it that sort of thing? I'm not quite getting it. — schopenhauer1

The topic was about whetever negative ethics on it's own entails we ought to kill all life or not. So, my scenario was obviously about that-i do not know why you thought my scenario was about procreation.

As I've said elsewhere: Except for cases which I acknowledged- children needing guidance from parents, self-defense, or the threat-of-force, there are no excuses other than people have an agenda, and they want someone else to follow that agenda and that agenda is more important than the non-aggression principle. — schopenhauer1

Since there can be exceptions to this principle, can you tell us how we can know when we can violate this thing and why we can violate it at these times-that is, why they are exceptions to the rule?
I believe this approach may work better instead of us just repeating our points.

Well, the weight of the argument comes not from the Modus Tollens, but rather by first establishing the foundations of the premises. Without any such thing, you end up with a premise that no atheist would concede (some moral subjectivists would concede that, i think, but the argument is against atheist moral objectivists anyways) and the argument can easily be dismissed as a result.
You should have objected against the justification for the premise since it is present in the link you provided and you know there is justification. Also, one more point:

The second premise is questionable because it appears either to equivocate with respect to premise 1, or it is simply unsupported as a claim about objective moral knowledge. While premise 1 seems to hold that, without God, no objective knowledge is possible, premise 2 might be taken simply to mean that we have knowledge of our own moral beliefs, which might be purely subjective. — ModernPAS

Premise 1 does not hold that, without God, no objective knowledge is possible-it only holds that, without God, no normative knowledge is possible since there is no proper justification for any normative claim in a naturalistic world. Premise 2, on the other hand, basically says that such justification is there-moral objectivists basically assume that there is objective moral knowledge and thus hold that there is proper justification for it. Whetever we know it or not does not matter-only the ability to know that does.
Of course, it assumes moral objectivism, but that is because it is supposed to aim at them and not moral subjectivists.(And theists typically begin with justifying objectivism before talking about this argument).

So again, you are ignoring the autonomous human part. Autonomous individuals have to be accounted for. If you are paying attention, these ethical theories are grounded in individuals NOT third-party agendas (like some amorphous utilitarian calculation of harm that you proposed in your life-ending scenario). — schopenhauer1

Well, what about the will-be automomous individuals that won't be born yet? Are those "autonomous individuals" so important that the suffering that they cause are okay? Or, in other words, if the individual brings about a huge amount of suffering, aren't we entitled to prevent their desires and wills so that they do not do it anymore? Isn't this the reasoning we use for punishing criminals?
You do not account those other individuals.

In fact, one of the main reasons for not having people is that it is not using people in order for them to follow third-party agendas, however starry-eyed the reasons (like pursuing happiness, character-building games, finding their way in the current society, making society better, tending the farm, advancing the tribe, following religious principles, etc. etc.) — schopenhauer1

I have showed why it was not merely an agenda though. You just choose to ignore it and are now pretending nobody has tried to justify it-at least in this thread.

Individuals are where ethics resides because individuals bear the brunt of existence. Society and outside entities may help form individuals, but it is at the individual level that life is experienced, decisions are made, suffering occurs etc. Thus, third-party reasons that affect individuals who can otherwise have a say, would be using those individuals. — schopenhauer1

And "using individuals", in some cases, is okay, right? For example, we punish criminals. We punish children. We sometimes make decisions on behalf of people who are not informed enough to make a good decision even if they do not want it.
I am not going to quote the other paragraph as it is essentially the same point. I am just going to ask a question:

If people are not to be used in agendas (as is the case of birth), then to be consistent here, people once born, cannot be used in agendas (like ceasing all harm and suffering). — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by an "agenda" then? How can it be an agenda when it is the only thing that actually matters when making moral decisions?
Please define that word.

So, if you pay attention to my arguments, I put a lot of weight on non-aggression. Once born, people have their own autonomous identity as individuals and should be respected. Thus the principle of non-harm is contradicted here with the principle of non-aggression. Thus, this ethic would not be one of some Lex Luther villain, purely contemplating calculations of loss and harm. People as individuals are taken into account. Thus, as I have always advocated, the only means by which an antinatalist can further their cause is through argumentation and convincing of the individual. That is it. — schopenhauer1

Well, i was just trying to show that this has unwanted results (both negative ethics and the non-aggression principle). It just leads to more suffering. So, why exactly should we accept this principle by default? Just because?

Also, how can principles contradict each other? I do not think that is deontological ethics anymore, so i am curious to see your explanation.

Last of all, when confronted with two contradictory principles when assessing whetever one ought to make a certain decision or not, on what basis should one pick one over the other?

I believe that you should talk more about your assumption that god would not allow any imperfections. What is to be understood by this sentence and why would God not allow for "imperfections" in order to create "perfections"? Or, staying closer to Alvin Platinga, why are you assuming that perfection is even possible? In any case, it is either free will or evil that will not be achieved and, assuming that a perfect world needs humans, since the humans will be imperfect by the virtue of them not having one of these two things, the world won't be perfect and so there can't be such a thing. So, only a "watered-down" version of this perfect world may exist and this would include the best kind of humans-which is, as you concede to Platinga, humans who have no free will but commit evil anyways. Only these can be perfect, assuming that these are the best possible kind of humans.

This response fails in my opinion.

Once born, the principle of forcing the end of others to prevent suffering, does not hold up for reasons darthbarracuda was getting at. That is to say, once born, the rules of the intra-worldly affairs hold sway. That is, there are people with their own wills and goals. Prior to birth, there was an asymmetry of preventing pain (which is absolutely good even if no one to realize no suffering), and relative good (preventing good only matters if an actual person is around). Now, preventing someone's desires, wills, and negating that DOES come into play once born. Thus not only the prevention of harm, but the principle of respecting that a person exists with desires, etc. comes into play. Notice it is STILL a negative ethic.. Prevent suffering when you can, but prevent aggression as well. — schopenhauer1

Well, is preventing desires and wills really a bad thing compared to letting suffering go on? The problem is, these desires and wills lead to more suffering (almost every single one of them, i would say) and, more importantly, they also lead to new individuals that will definitely suffer being born. If you end the human race, you will also prevent the suffering of these new people who will be "forced into existence" and it is justified as a result-and i am ignoring the fact other living beings, aside from humans, can experience pain and suffer too. I would argue that this means that if you have the power to destroy all life on planet Earth and you choose to not do it, you are indirectly responsible for the suffering of those individuals and other living beings who will be born. In that case, is not preventing desires and wills of living individuals really better when not doing that means more people (and other living beings who will experience pain) will suffer? That does not seem to be the case for me, especially when one considers how many animals also get forced into existence in a more cruel way-it is countless. (especially the ones we use as food, like chickens)


Also, that was supposed to be a side comment-i am curious as to why you only quoted and replied to that and nothing else. Isn't the main topic something else-that is whetever intrinsic positives exist or not?

So the species work properly and betterment of society are the two positive ethics I see here (an example of X that I proposed for whatever positive ethics one proposes).Why do we need people born to better society and the species to work properly? I guess, a) Why prima facie does this matter? b) Why would forcing existence on someone who will definitely suffer be justified for this? In other words, why would the two negative ethical principles of non-aggression (non-forcing) and non-harming be violated on behalf of this grand agenda of species and society? — schopenhauer1

Not really, as my only two claims were that 1) Suffering and happiness work for those things and 2) Because the nature of these are similar, there is no real reason to treat them very differently like you suggest. I could've followed up what i said with that (since our thoughts about morality came from that and are still based on the very idea, i would say it is reasonable to suggest morality is basically that and also that the "oughts" we suppose come from that too, not really leaving any other candidate for the basis for normative claims) but i did not so that i could hear your justification for treating them that way.

Also, i do not agree with your assumption that these principles should be upheld at all costs, so...

Nah, I couple the prevent harm principle almost always with non-aggression principle. You should not force anyone into your perspective. In fact that is one of the main reasons for antinatalism in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Well, should that principle really be upheld if billions of people, not to mention any other living beings capable of experiencing pain, suffer everyday and will continue to suffer untill they eventually die? I can not see a reason not to violate it. The idea that we should uphold some principle that only exists to avoid suffering (If it does not, why even have it? It can not be a morally good principle then.) when all it does is allowing for more suffering sounds counter-intuitive to me.

Thus the "mixed bag" approach to ethics leads to an inevitable violation of negative ethics in favor of positive. — schopenhauer1

Apart from the unnecessary word -"violation", which has negative connations and can just be replaced by something like "trade off"-, this is exactly what people who claim that positive things have intrinsic value say. I'm not sure what your point is.

However, I do not see why this assumption must be true that negative ethics must give way to positive or that the positive necessarily needs to override the negative. Why would the prevention of suffering take a back seat to the promotion of "well-being"? — schopenhauer1

Well, i would say that it comes from the fact that pleasure/happiness and pain/suffering come hand in hand-suffering is there so that we are discouraged from doing that thing in order to avoid suffering (for example, we do not come too near to a fire because of the pain that we would experience if we did so) while pleasure is there so that we are encouraged to do another thing in order to achieve pleasure (for example, a little child may do his homework because the mother will give him a chocolate if he finishes it) These two things make is so that we are inclined to do the best thing for our species and the species may actually function properly as a result.
This is probably oversimplified, so there are most likely some errors. Howewer, the point is, there is no reason to treat them very seperately-they exist for the same thing (the betterment of society), they just work differently.

All positive experiences in this world are filtered through the lens of our temporal embodiment as a deprivational human animal - subject to stress, pain, need. suffering, aging and inevitable death. — Inyenzi

What exactly does that mean? Can you elaborate? Are you saying that happiness is a temporary escape from the pain, stress etc. that people experience? To put it another way, are you saying that we only want happiness because, when we are happy, we do not suffer (even if for only a short amount of time)?

Okay. I think i finally got you: You are advocating that positive things have no intrinsic value-like negative consequentalism. If one adopts this view, it logically leads to global antinatalism.
Premise 1: One ought to aim for the morally best thing.
Premise 2:The morally best thing is a universe without any suffering. (Since positive things have no intrinsic value)
Therefore, one ought to aim for a universe without any suffering.
Premise 3:If one ought to aim for something, then one ought to aim for it by the method with the least suffering.
Therefore, one ought to aim for a universe without any suffering by the method with the least suffering.
Premise 4: The method with the least suffering for achieving a universe without any suffering is not procreating.
Therefore, one ought to not procreate.
Is that what you are saying? If so, would not such a position mean that we ought to nuke the Earth so that nothing suffers anymore (i am geniunely curious)? The only suffering involved then would be the suffering of the people that did not die during the seconds in which they are dying, which is minimal compared to billions of people and animals that suffer everyday.

Since some of the things you and i said in different parts of the same posts are the same, i will only respond to different points (or ones that at least look different).

Why does some goal have to include society. This is your big assumption. — schopenhauer1

What should the goal include then? It would have to include either self-interest or the interest of the whole. If it is the first, then that is egoism. If it is the latter, then it is the interest of the society, which means we should make the society better and sarifice ourselves for a greater good. (Since the interest of the society comes first).
One of these have to come first in an ethical consideration.
Or, if i am wrong, what should be a goal of morality?

No that's not my reasoning. It wouldn't matter if the person was overjoyed that you forced them into this character-building exercise. The principle of non-aggression was violated, period. — schopenhauer1

I thought that the reason you talked about this in the first place was not to just repeat what you have said, but show that my moral reasoning entails an obviously wrong consclusion-that forcing that person to play the game is wrong. My moral reasoning does not fail here.
As for the actual game, then it is okay because the person does not get annoyed etc. that the person brought them to life and the suffering/pain ratio is, for the purposes of this discussion,1. That means it is permissible.
The initutive aspect of your principle comes from the fact that we feel our freedom is constrained when we are forced to do things-oftentimes, the forcing does not actually lead to a positive outcome and nothing good comes out of that as a result. When it actually does though, it is seen as if the forcing was justified for that particular case.

Again, why are individual harms used for some type of social balance, happiness, or any agenda? It makes no sense. Ethics are not for abstractions but persons, individuals, identities. — schopenhauer1

And what would someone call a group of individuals? Society, maybe?
Or are you just saying that the idea is not feasible? I would not think so, since, for the purposes of being consistent, i was talking about a society where the individuals experience happiness and it balances out as a result. Short term loss (if it is actually loss, that is), long term gain where the ethics are for individuals and the individuals are happy people.
Also, please note that i am talking like this since i am too ambitious in my reasoning-i also want to be able to claim that, even if a person suffers, it is okay as long as there is no better alternative that involves bringing about a human being.

I can weaken my position and just argue that;1) The initutive aspect of the principle does not apply to this and 2) The outcome is at least indeterminate 3) If a thing leads to better outcome, the pain is okay (this is connected to 1, because i argue that the reason we have such a principle is because it often does not lead to better outcome and so it is best not to try).

By the way, now that i think about it: Does the reasoning behind the principle actually apply to this situtation in the first place? The principle applies to people who, when forced to do a spesific thing, will feel that their freedom is contrained which will probably mean that they will not get the benefit (if there is a benefit, that is) since they feel forced to do this or to people who assume the benefits will be very good when it is definitely not (dictatorial regimes, for example, assumed that what they they forced was good for the people when it was clearly not the case). The former definitely does not apply unless we are talking about pessimistic people, and the latter does not apply either as it can only be defended by indirectly assuming antinatalism. (Using premises that only antinatalists would accept) So, in order for this to actually apply to procreation, one would have to show antinatalism to be true. So, the argument is circular if it's purpose was to conclude that antinatalism is true.

I have again, somehow accidentally posted a comment without finishing it. I would be glad if someone moderating this would delete this.

What am I not being skeptical at all about? In my view, if no one is born, there is no one to worry over or nothing to worry about- literally. I am skeptical about "fuzzy" "warm-hearted" intent that brings with it negative baggage though, yes. One has no consequences for any actual person, and one definitely does. This already puts the balance in the side of never having been. — schopenhauer1

If you think of it like a "fuzzy" intent and that the spesific version of the principle we actually use actually applies to this case, then yes.
But you are not being skeptical about your own principle. For what reason should a person accept it as opposed to something else? It is an absurd version of a commonly accepted rule.

Viable to enforce what? Intent was clear that one had good intentions? That is not a reason to force one's agenda on someone else. You may like a game and think it builds character to anyone that plays it. But to force people to play it because you think they will thank you later on is wrong. — schopenhauer1

What i meant by "viable" was "actually possible."
In your case, forcing anyone to do it is wrong because it is either not feasible (i.e. they will probably not do this and you will end up annoying them) or the negatige outcome associated with forcing people is worse (i.e. annoying them so much means that their day will be ruined and the "character building" aspect will not compensate for it).
Also, i never mentioned someone thanking me later on.

Also, why is an individual beholden to a species? To force people's hand into existence (and deal with this consequence) for the sake of humanity, or the species, is to use someone for an agenda. That is wrong to use people as such. If I have an agenda, should I force you into it simply because I want you to? If no, why should this hold for instances of furthering the species? If the species goes extinct, what is the wrong here? The universe will cry? The ghost of HereToDiscuss lamenting on what could have been? — schopenhauer1

So doing things for the sake of humanity is not good in itself? Isn't that egoism?

Yes I am very much doubting that any basis for morality is working towards a perfect society. It would be just as insane if someone said that the basis for morality is working towards communism, religious fundamentalism, or techno-utopianism. It is insane grandiosity to actually think that we should put more people on Earth to advance this type of agenda (and indeed it would be an agenda). I have a vision of a way society should be, therefore everyone should follow it? Of course not. Same goes for procreation. Again, the same pattern emerges- procreation is NO EXCEPTION to the non-aggression rule. — schopenhauer1

Nope. All you have to accept is that there is a society X that is able to be achieved, such that it is a society that would balance out the possible suffering people experienced in order to make it (if the people actually experienced suffering more, that is). It does not have to be perfect.
And utopias do not really count since they are not able to be achieved, so they do not work.

Again, what is it with the focus on positive outcomes? What is the need for this when no one existing would matter not for this need for positive outcomes? Non-aggression entails non-procreation which means that forcing someone int he name of positive outcomes matters not if we want to be consistent with not forcing others. — schopenhauer1

I do not get this. To me, you essentially sound circular when you argue that positive outcomes do not matter.

So now you are fully admitting to a morality where the individual is simply a pawn in some utilitarian calculus. — schopenhauer1

The emotional language aside, technically, all consequentalists treat an individual as "a pawn in some consequentalist calculus".

This is your idea on it. But forcing it on others? I say no, this is a violation of the non-aggression principle. Where is it justified that one ought to create negatives for someone so they can have some positives too? If I prefer a game and think most people should play it, am I right in forcing others to play it? I would say no. — schopenhauer1

Probably because your analysis of the situtation is flawed. Like i said before, the negatives will almost always be more than the positives in that situtation. It is not feasible and annoying them is not worth it.
There is no need to invoke a principle here.

I have no idea what "soul-making theodicy" is, but it sounds like an excuse to cause harm. There is no reason to cause harm in the hopes of some positive outcome. — schopenhauer1

Try Googling it then. It is also called the "Irenean Theodicy" and it is based on that very idea.

If we have a society where we all agree that to make others suffer is good, then we can pat ourselves on the back that creating suffering isn't bad. If we try to turn the tables and make suffering a positive, then we can invert negative experience and pretend that it is justified to create for others, like in cases of procreation. But let's be consistent. If this was applied in almost any other realm on an autonomous adult, this would not fly. You couldn't justify force harming them (violating the principle of non-aggression) in order to save them, which is essentially what this idea's logical consclusion is. — schopenhauer1

If society agreed that suffering was good and all, then suffering would still be bad. I am not a moral subjectivist.
You can not make suffering a positive or a neutral thing. It is only justifiable if there is a positive outcome that comes with it and that is what i am arguing in the first place-that there is a positive outcome that comes with it.

I'm not sure how "collateral damage" doesn't make sense. It means unintended bad consequences that go along with the "good stuff" intended. — schopenhauer1

I said "not persuiasive enough". I can just not accept your version of it since i do not accept your premise about pain.

Fuzzy meaning "warm and fuzzy". It sounds good so it must be good, sort of thinking. Wait what is the goal of society and how is that goal justified as THE goal? Why would individuals be used for society's goals or any future generation's goals? That seems wrong- to use people as fodder (with imperfect happiness) for some utopian future happiness (that is not guaranteed at all or in the realm of achievable perhaps). Either way, this is a poor excuse for procreation- that it is some unwritten goal to work towards X. That is nowhere near being justified. — schopenhauer1

Well, all there has to be is some kind of a goal that includes society, so "Should it be the goal?" does not work here. If you want me to, i can change the first premise.

Also, i would say that it is okay to "use people as fodder" against this "idea of mine filled with madness" (not what you said, but i am giving you the emotional incentive here). Especially when this spesific instance is not "using people as a fodder" since it is unknown whetever a person experiences suffering more than happiness (going by hedonism here, i can change it if you want). You are making it sound like we live in a society filled with despair so that we think it's immoral to do this.

2) Going back to the premise of this thread regarding happiness. The point is happiness (you use the term "good") is a sort of cudgel to banish any objections raised against not forcing others. Force is force. Intending to force a good outcome on someone is still aggression. Why does it get a pass? Combined with the idea of collateral damage, and excess baggage (more than the intended good does actually get forced onto someone), is doubly damaging. An aggressive act, which does more than the intended good (i.e. negative outcomes) is pervaded onto someone in the hopes the collateral damage isn't so bad. We are assuming starting a life for someone is good for them, if you project that the outcomes are indeed going to be likely. This does not override the force that is taking place because you have a warm and fuzzy intent in there (Happiness, Good, Love). — schopenhauer1

Collateral damage is not persuasive enough, and you need to clarify how it is "excess baggage" and how that means it is bad in this particular situtation.
Also, how is it a "fuzzy intent"? I would say that achieving such a society (or a society that is close to that) is the "ultimate goal" of morality. There is a reason why morality exists in the first place.
Healthy skepticism is okay, but being overly skeptic about a particular thing then not being skeptic at all about an alternative view that is less justifiable is not.

If you want to be consistent in following non-aggression, even creating new people should fall under this.. As you stated at the beginning, "An action taken on your view without consent that affects another" is still bad, even made with the intent of good outcomes for that person.Unlike unconscious, elderly, children who have already had the force put on them, and we are mitigating the worst scenario..birth unnecessarily forces a situation onto someone. In other words, once born, certain things need to take place to prevent death or pain for that person, but certainly the force of having the person was not justified in the first place. — schopenhauer1

A) How is it the worst scenario? The "zombie survival" scenario alone is worse. Maybe talk about how i have to hold that it would be okay for one members of a sex to rape the other in a "survival" scenario where only about 100 people live and they live in an island and the members of a sex does not consent. (Or, for an easier example, it would be okay to rape someone if just 2 people live and one does not consent and would suffer very heavily as a result of the rape. But they would probably be dead irregardless of that as 2 people is not enough since they're under the minimum viable population needed to survive.) In order to be consistent, i will have to hold that too.

B) Notice how you spesifically said "with the intent of good outcomes for that person." If the reasoning is clear and it is viable to actually enforce it, then it is okay. In fact, this is a "life or death" situtation for a species and i would contend that the risks associated with not enforcing it is worse.

As for 3, it is not relevant and i have indirectly replied to you in the post before. So, i will not quote it.

4) Why should a person be beholden to a principle (happiness, the good, society), in the first place? If you're looking for more abstract principles.. using someone for your own or society's agenda is a good place to start. An agenda to further society and to create "good experiences in the world" is counterintuitively using people's lives as a way to follow this agenda. What is it about this agenda that it needs to be forced onto a new person? What justifies this other than people like the idea so they will do it on behalf of someone else? Even if we use terms like "more positive outcome" what is it about this that this NEEDS to take place? — schopenhauer1

Maybe it is because this is not an "agenda", but something that is the "core principle" of probably anyone's morality (not actually, but it is rather that we want to achieve a perfect society or, in a weaker form, that we ought to work towards it).
Are you doubting that we ought to work towards a perfect society?

I will ask again, are parents on a messianic mission to bring positive outcomes? — schopenhauer1

I will say "yes", if you really want me to.

If the universe is devoid of positive outcomes, then what? The mission has failed? — schopenhauer1

If accepted, this only entails that morality is essentially meaningless as, if the universe is devoid of any morally principles, there is no difference to the universe itself.
That is only relevant to metaethics. Otherwise,you have to show why we should adopt your spesific position.

We already acknowledge life is not JUST positive outcomes, its a mixed bag, but bringing suffering into the world in order to have positive outcomes seems unnecessary at best, and aggressive for sure as it still perpetrates to another person, forcing their hand if you will, and obviously affecting them for a lifetime (as it is the start of life itself). — schopenhauer1

I love how you say "unnecessary at best" when lives of a species is at stake here. It is the single most necessary thing we need in order to have such positive outcomes in the first place (or any good thing, really). The principle is violated for a good cause.

So there are two things here- a) Positive outcomes don't need to take place at all, even if the outcomes are "better" as the alternative of nothing is not actually affecting any actual person negatively or harmfully — schopenhauer1

And i do not adhere to the claim that a person that has never experienced pain or happiness (the net is zero, going by hedonism here) is better than a person who has experienced pain but experienced happiness more. Pain is okay if it leads to a positive outcome. The whole idea of "soul-making theodicy", for example, is it is okay for there to be evil because it helps humans develop. In a relevant sense, they experience suffering but the outcome is better.

) Despite positive outcomes once born, there are always negative outcomes that are brought with it, thus the person is forced into negative outcomes by this decision. Thus the non-aggression principle should still stand, even in the decision of procreation. — schopenhauer1

This is the same as before, just slightly rephrased. You are just emphasizing the negative outcome that the person will experience as a result and, indirectly, making an appeal to our emotions here.


Also, apart from your contention to my first premise (which is a relevant contention), how are these objections even relevant?

And, one last thing, why did you emphasise my second premise when you have not responded to it and the premise is undisputable (if we are talking about a human society, that is)? Society is "The aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered community." For a thing to be a society, it needs to have people in it. This is an
analytic statement. You can not have a human society without humans.

) Collateral damage. Your experience is not another person's experience, even genetically related. In fact, you can have siblings and cousins that have radically different ways of being, personalities, and experiences. The projected outcome for a child that the parent intended MAY not be the case for that child. You can provide me the "But often times it is" or the "Most people say they find life good" but it is questionable whether even if a majority of people outweigh the collateral damage of the suffering of others. — schopenhauer1

You are assuming that there is something hidden in the premise that i am implying-that this society is such a society that i describe. Such an assumption is not needed and i did assume it, but i might have assumed that such a society is possible. If one can achieve such a society.

Consider zombie survival movies (or games or books) for an easy example. The people born there are born to a life of suffering, but our initution is that it is justified because we will eventually have a society in which such suffering will not be that much. My reasoning applies there too and is certainly not affected by it.

Given the Benatar asymmetry (from David Benatar's book, Better Never to Have Been), this reasoning is more compelling. The reasoning is that since the good that is not experienced by the person not born is not good nor bad, since no ACTUAL person is deprived of it, and that it IS good that an actual person is not actually suffering, on the whole, this asymmetry always balances the equation towards better never to have been. — schopenhauer1

Why are you assuming that:
A) We should only consider the effects of this decision on this particular person
B) We should only consider the suffering of the person in question?

For one, even if true, it does not affect my argument in any way. (Since the suffering can still be justified). And you have not said why we should believe that the person suffers more than it experiences happiness. Yes, it might actually be the case, but we do not really have a way to assess this and ,because of that, there is no reason for me to accept either that that is actually the case or that it is the case that, on average, suffering is not that much compared to the happiness.

By the way, i accidentally pressed "Post Comment", so i will have to continue this in another post. If a moderator etc. could merge this post with the other one, i would be glad.

Since we have reached kind of a deadlock in regards to the justification for this principle, i will just drop the issue and focus on why procreation may be an exception and will just hope that it will not be an issue.

Taking "Forcing your view on someone else" to be "Making an action based on your own view that significantly affects someone else and without their consent". The reason it is wrong is because either you might actually be in the wrong (especially in morally gray areas) or the positive outcome you get by making the action is negated by the negative effects on the person. Since i do not adhere to the idea that a person suffers more than it experiences positive outcomes (albeit, even if it was the case, it would have still been able to be justified since one could imagine that we will eventually reach a society in which people do not experience suffering that much, but rather enjoy the positive outcomes in life), i will only have to say that i am not in a morally gray area here and the reasoning is clear and cut:
Premise: If a thing is needed in order to have a non-temporary society in which people do not experience that much of a suffering and experience positive outcomes more and if the action is not unnecessarily painful (i.e. the action generates the best outcome compared to the others) then the action that we do in order to achieve that thing is good. ((A^B>C))
Premise: Having people in the first place is needed in order to have a non-temporary society in which people do not experience that much of a suffering and experience the positive outcomes more.
Therefore, if the action in question generates the best outcome compared to the others that we do in order to achieve that same thing, then it is good.
Premise: Maintaining some rate of procreation generates the best outcome compared to the others that we do in order to achieve that thing.
Ergo, maintaining some rate of procreation is good. (i.e. at least some people should procreate).

Like any ethical debate, it comes down to first principles. — schopenhauer1

Depends. If the question is about applied ethics, it may be that which form of normative ethics you have

If you don't believe forcing others to do things is wrong, then this argument would not matter to you. — schopenhauer1

You merely said that it was obvious. Howewer, that is not really the point. Violating that principle, i would contend, is wrong because of an actual core principle (maybe it brings the total happiness down, maybe there is some deontological reason that lays out that it is wrong) and it is not merely something we should take to be true. "You should not violate other's rights." is not an axiom.
And, like any other "principles", there are exceptions to this principle since the reasoning behind the principle does not apply to those exceptions.

However, for those who do think so (most non-sociopaths it would seem), then yes this would be an issue and more a matter of consistency than questioning the actual principle itself. — schopenhauer1

Or that this is an exception to the rule. To justify this, i am repeating myself, one would have to show that the reasoning behind that principle does not apply to this particular case. And, in order to do that, we need to know the actual reasoning behind that principle. That is why i am asking you why it is wrong to force others to do things.

If you take it to be something that we should not violate under any circumstances (which i doubt), then you would have to prove your case since most people do not believe that. Forcing people to do things, in some cases, is good.

I will concede you the point that procreation falls under that principle. It is not that important.

Going back to the main point, i will ask you again, one more time: Why is forcing people to do things wrong? Why should we adapt that principle?
You have not given an answer so far.

So, why should we adapt the non-aggression principle? Why should people be forced into anything at all? That is the heart of the matter. There is an agenda taking place, and this agenda is literally forced onto the next generation. Why should the person be forced into this agenda, be it happiness principle or otherwise? Let me ask you this, if happiness is the goal, are parents then messianic "deliverers" of happiness by having children? Are they on some sort of mission whereby individuals are beholden to follow? This may sound odd, but that is the logical conclusion of such thinking- even if the person presenting it has not thought it all the way through. — schopenhauer1

I am going to accept all of you said: This is a violation of this principle, we do it in order to "deliver happiness" (my argument would not be that they would experience happiness but rather that, in order to have a society that we want, be it an utilitarian or a Kantian or something else one, we have to have alive people-otherwise there would not be a society at all, but this particular argument still holds against your objection, so there is no problem) and parents are on such a mission that they hold that individuals must follow.
Now, i am asking again: Why should we adapt this principle? Why should we not force people to things? You just gave a very, very brief answer and then skipped to the argument.

Correct. They are misguided as they are using "the pursuit of happiness" as an excuse to justify violating the non-aggression principle (not forcing others). It is the ultimate "get out of free card" because somehow the connotation of the emotion/state-of-being of happiness makes people fee warm and fuzzy and therefore must be automatically a good justification. — schopenhauer1

I do not understand this. Is the argument that people experience happiness when alive and it is a good thing, so we should procreate? If so, it is as good as the argument that existence has harm and we should steer away from harm at all costs, so we should not procreate-not that good.
Also, why should we adopt the non-agression principle? I believe that the answer to this question can help us understand whetever reasons for procreating justify violating it are good or not.

It's not really question of binary either because it's about the body. If the issue is you exist with a penis, then whether one is male, female or anything else doesn't define the problem.

If one ought not have a penis, then there is motivation to remove it whether you are male,.female or something else entirely. Whether having a penis is binary or non-binary does nothing eliminate the issue. Either might be true, the person question would still want it removed, it's the state of body which they hold to be a problem. — TheWillowOfDarkness

While the first part is true (albeit both of you are strawmanning each other, you are doing it by taking "delusional" to be something different while he does it by taking "being a part of something" to be something different), there is a problem with this: Some transwomen are fine with their penises and do not have genital dysphoria. So, it is not merely them having a penis existing that is the problem.

That is the same for a lot of things that you would think transwomen would have a problem with: manly voice, beard (i have even heard someone say she only cut her beard because it was weird, but she liked it), being called a "he" or a "lad"...

It is because some of them can't see someone with a penis/manly voice/beard as a woman, especially themselves, that they want to change it. *The misidentity is the reason, not the mere fact that they have a penis or whatever.
*That is not to say that they do not recognize such people as women (if they do identify as such, the the vast majority of them do), but rather that they would not be able to convince themselves that they are a woman because of these features. It would constantly bug them (for simplicity's sake).
It is "I ought to not have a penis because i do not want a penis since it makes me feel manly which i do not want.", not "I ought to not have a penis simply because i just do not want a penis for an unknown reason."

i guess you could say the creator creates a blue print (dna) and puts it under stress conditions to test the result. The actions we take our a product of nurture/nature or dna and lifetime events. — christian2017

Is there any need? You would do that only if you did not know the result. Howewer, God would know the result beforehand given that he knows all true propositions and "Agent A, under these conditions, will choose B." is definitely true or definitely false in a deterministic universe.

I open to that we are not responsible for our actions. If we are not held accountable i would be fine with that. — christian2017

Well, then the problem is that you do not really argue against people who think that scientific determinism or god or them taken together existing/being true means that we do not have free will but simply say that your spesific concept of free will is different. That does not really even have anything to do with God as your spesific concept of free will does exist irregardless of whetever the world is deterministic or indeterministic or agent-casual libertarianism is true.

i would argue to be completely predictable does not mean something does not have a will of its own but maybe i'm not thinking about it the right way. — christian2017

Well, i would argue that it can't if that is the case, but there are compabitilists that would argue against it. Howewer, the problem is not merely that determinism is incompabitable with free will, but rather that, in your view, god determines the outcome by creating the set of affairs P that causes agent A to decide B over C and therefore "manipulates" the agent into choosing decisions. The agent has no choice over the matter, only God does.

It means the given definition is lie.

Supposedly, the body is meant to make the identity, but this is not the case. We find the presence of the body is not granting the identity at all. The body is silent upon identity. The body is not making or stopping anyone being male, female or anything else. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes. That is true for any definition that is about a body. And..? All that means is that it is somewhat arbitrary and nobody would dispute that. The question is "Should we use this definition? If so, to what extent?" We use this type of categorization in, for example, pedigrees and sexual reproduction as the chromosomes really matter in the first one and women and men (by this definition) have different bodily reactions and the entire proccess is different for women and men.
Also, how does that mean the definition is a lie? How could a definition even be a lie? The only way seems to be the definition contradicting the actual definition we use and we do use this in spesific contexts. Sexes, i would contend, are very useful.

If one has an identity, it must be given by a truth of identity. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But we use definitions for identities and "the truth of an identity" does not give the definition in the sense you are using. So, no definitions fit your criteria. Or all definitions fit your criteria but you just take it to be the case that the biological definition is not correct (not the one we should use) and thus end up being circular in your judgement, which is worse.

Of course, if you just want to say that we should not use this outside where it matters, then i'm more than okay to just concede you the point since that is the position i hold. A transwoman is a woman in an everyday context and i would not say that a transwoman is a man unless we are speisifically talking about biology (or genetics).

i understand completely why you would say that.

On the first part of your post, i would argue both new born babys and even bacteria as well as animals can make decisions. Those decisions however have little to no impact on the world. — christian2017

Well, but they are not morally responsible for their decisions, are they?

Both of those definitions comment on identity. They don't describe bodies at all.

The account is of which people can belong an idenity (male or female), supposedly, by which body they have. It's all about idenity.

If we look at the bodies, we find they don't care about these identities. A body which produces sperm does so whether it has an identity of male, female or something else. A body which has eggs does so whether it has an idenity of male, female or something else. The body does not define only those with sperm are male or only those with eggs are female. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, it having eggs or sperm makes it female or male as per the definition. If you wany to say that it is "identity", then so be it. (Well, then, any definition would be ascribing "identity".)

And, yes, bodies do not care about definitions. And..? Autistic brains do not care about their identities, psychopathic brains do not care about theor identities and disabled bodies do not care about their identities either. The list goes on and on. Your point seem to be just pointing the obvious. Howewer, what does that have to do with sex and it's relation to gender apart from both of them being about identities?

How is a new born baby's movement primitive or should i say what do you mean by that? I'm sure you would agree the new born baby feels pain as well as positive feelings? — christian2017

Yes, it does. Howewer, it is primitive in the sense that it behaves exactly like animal counterparts.

Yeah as to the rest of what you said, that is for the most part true. I guess the point i'm making is that the human brain is like a billiards table of particles and those particles are effected by events that occurred billions of years ago. — christian2017

Then, surely, the production of our decisions is not in our control since whetever we will decide one thing or not has been decided not by us, but rather by factors outside our control. The agent has no control over the production of a decision. To quote Derk Pereboom:
"If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has control, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control." (the incompabitilist initution)
If such a thing is true, then all of our decisions are produced by a source which we have no control over.

For sure, my point I'm the notion of biological sex is exactly like gender is this respect. It is not a description of bodies, what bodies can do or what bodies might do, but rather a concept of (supposedly) when and where certain identity and traits(e.g. male, female) can occur or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

How? Let us consider these definitions i thought of:
"A person is a female if and only if that person has eggs."
"A person is a male if and only if that person can produce sperm."
I would say that this is what we generally mean by "sex". If my definition is the definition we use or it is close enough, i have to ask: How is this related to an identity in any way?

I have a question: What exactly is a "sex identity"? Can you please elaborate upon that? Right now, it seems like you're just describing gender and claiming it is sex, which would be a weird claim if that's what you are trying to say.

it can move its arms, make noises — christian2017

Yes, but it moving it arms or it making noises is essentially a byproduct of primitive responses. It is like saying we choose to react to cute things in a particular way-we do not.
Also, whetever an agent change the world or not does not necessarily entail that the agent has free will or not. You can not be able to do otherwise and still have free will (from a compabitilist perspective, that is, in the basic desert sense)-whetever we have free will in regards to one action or not depends on how the decision was brought about. If, for example, you were told that you had to vote for one way in an election or you would be killed and you did it because you were going to vote for it anyways, you still "freely" choose the action-you deserve blame or praise for it (if, for example, you choose a tyrant, you deserve blame for it, if you choose someone against a tyrant, you deserve praise).

Yes, it points to that in some sense. The baby does not have free will, and there is nothing in us that would allow us to have free will either.
Now, how does an infant have free will?

Scientific determinism is a concept that arose in the early 1800s partly due to Newton's work.

As i stated to someone else i see the universe as giant billiards table and our dna as well as our environment completely decide what we will do. I might have inferior dna and a good environment and someone else might have superior dna and a bad environment. — christian2017

Okay. So, how does that allow for free will? In that case, we are reducible to events or states in a casual history of events and we have no bearing on what decision we will make. Our decisions were decided by something other than us. (our DNA and our environment). This, i think, does not allow for free will in the "basic desert" sense (i.e. us being blame or praiseworthy for our actions). A baby lacks free will in that sense too.