• ModernPAS
    9
    In this post I would like to discuss several objections to two axiological arguments: one axiological argument for the existence of God and a related axiological argument against naturalism. I would like feedback regarding my thinking on these arguments and my objections to them.
    Here are some relevant links:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiology

    https://structureoftruth.wordpress.com/2018/05/26/the-axiological-argument-ii/

    https://structureoftruth.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/the-axiological-argument-iv/

    Let us first examine an axiological argument for the existence of God. The argument is axiological because it contains a premise about values—namely, that there are objective values that we can know to be objective—and argues that from that and a second premise it follows that God exists. The briefest form of the argument appears as follows:

    1. If God does not exist, then we cannot have moral knowledge.
    2. We can have moral knowledge.
    3. Thus, God exists. (1, 2 MT)

    The argument is valid. If the conditional statement, “If God does not exist, then we cannot have moral knowledge,” and the statement, “We can have moral knowledge,” are both true, then it must also be true that God exists, by modus tollens. However, the argument does not appear to be sound, since both premises are questionable. The first premise is questionable because the existence of God is not the only condition on which it is possible to have moral knowledge. There is no contradiction in thinking that there is an objective moral code that we can know, despite there being no God. Thus, it does not follow that without a God there can be no moral knowledge. The second premise is questionable because it appears either to equivocate with respect to premise 1, or it is simply unsupported as a claim about objective moral knowledge. While premise 1 seems to hold that, without God, no objective knowledge is possible, premise 2 might be taken simply to mean that we have knowledge of our own moral beliefs, which might be purely subjective. In other words, there is room for skepticism about the objectivity of moral beliefs in premise 2. Thus, the two premises have different senses of the words “moral knowledge.” If premise 2 is taken to mean that we have objective moral knowledge, then skepticism is still possible, since we have yet to establish that we have objective moral knowledge. Again, we may know with certainty that we hold certain moral beliefs to be objectively true, but our feelings of certainty do not guarantee that such beliefs are objectively true. Thus, the argument appears to be unsound.

    A second, related axiological argument concludes that naturalism is false. A brief version of the argument is the following:

    1. If naturalism is true, then either there are no objective moral values or we cannot know that there are objective moral values.
    2. There are objective moral values, and we can know them.
    3. Thus, naturalism is false. (1, 2 MT)

    This argument is also valid: if it is true that if naturalism is true, then either there are no objective moral values or we cannot know that there are objective moral values, and if it is true that there are objective moral values, and we can know them, then it must also be true, by modus tollens, that naturalism is false. However, the argument appears to be unsound, since premise 2 is objectionable. First, the claim that there are objective moral values is unsupported. Again, just because we can know with certainty that we have moral values that we believe to be objective, it does not follow that they are objective. Even if it is true that everyone in the world holds the same moral values, it does not follow that those values are objectively true. In other words, just because one—or even everyone—is a moral realist, it does not follow that moral realism is true. One, or everyone, can still be wrong. Second, even if there are objective moral values, it does not follow that we know what they are, even if everyone holds the same opinion regarding which values are objective and which are not. Again, everyone in the world can simply be wrong about which moral values are objectively true. Thus, because premise 2 is unsupported, the argument against naturalism appears to be unsound.

    I would like to receive feedback regarding my objections to these two arguments. Thanks.
  • SophistiCat
    2.2k
    Arguments of this sort stand or fall on the elaboration and defense of their premises. Are you familiar with any such works? Are you prepared to discuss them? Without a familiarity with specific positive cases, discussing these arguments is like judging a book by its chapter headings.
  • HereToDisscuss
    68
    Well, the weight of the argument comes not from the Modus Tollens, but rather by first establishing the foundations of the premises. Without any such thing, you end up with a premise that no atheist would concede (some moral subjectivists would concede that, i think, but the argument is against atheist moral objectivists anyways) and the argument can easily be dismissed as a result.
    You should have objected against the justification for the premise since it is present in the link you provided and you know there is justification. Also, one more point:

    The second premise is questionable because it appears either to equivocate with respect to premise 1, or it is simply unsupported as a claim about objective moral knowledge. While premise 1 seems to hold that, without God, no objective knowledge is possible, premise 2 might be taken simply to mean that we have knowledge of our own moral beliefs, which might be purely subjective.ModernPAS

    Premise 1 does not hold that, without God, no objective knowledge is possible-it only holds that, without God, no normative knowledge is possible since there is no proper justification for any normative claim in a naturalistic world. Premise 2, on the other hand, basically says that such justification is there-moral objectivists basically assume that there is objective moral knowledge and thus hold that there is proper justification for it. Whetever we know it or not does not matter-only the ability to know that does.
    Of course, it assumes moral objectivism, but that is because it is supposed to aim at them and not moral subjectivists.(And theists typically begin with justifying objectivism before talking about this argument).
  • tim wood
    9.3k
    It's customary in arguments in which the terms are not well-defined or understood to either provide definitions or to define them for the sake of the argument. Three terms: God, existence, moral knowledge. Without establishing some common understanding of these the argument is fatuous.

    My friend above notes a problem with your first premise, but I think he was too gentle.
    If God does not exist, then we cannot have moral knowledgeModernPAS
    This is mere claim. As such a fatally weak leak in the chain of argument - unless you can prove it. Give that a try.

    Your second argument is simply a waste of time. (Left as an exercise for the student to understand why.)
    In a way, this is using the forms of Aristotelian logic as a kind of blunderbuss, the characteristic of which that it would fire, given a sufficient charge, almost anything you could get down the barrel, which was flared for accessibility. You have crammed some "premises" down the barrel and fired, but in all of the premises there is not enough material of substance to impact even the easiest of targets, the projectile instantly falling apart at first contact with air.

    Which is to say that conclusions can never be more substantive - in any sense - than the premises, which in the present instance have none at all, a deficiency the form of the argument cannot remediate.
  • OmniscientNihilist
    171


    morality is just a fancy word for fairness. tit for tat.

    its not hard to see what we are all basically equal and therefore its right to be fair and wrong to be unfair.

    morality demystified.

    religion dethroned
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