I don't think we can talk about the decline of trust in public without talking about the political use of fear and the political strategy of
anti-politics. We know that we can't trust politicians now, but we need reasons to stay mostly complacent or afraid to act, and we need useless channels to funnel dissent down to maintain (undemocratic) stability.
The alienation of people from their government representatives mirrors the alienation of the political class from international vectors of power. One way to address this issue is to replace non-compliance with structurally conditioned indifference; the 'non-linear' part of Russian propagandist Surkov's
non-linear warfare:
In his enforcement of Putin’s will — or his own interpretation of it — Surkov carefully constructed and presided over a system in which Russians could play-act an intricate imitation of democracy. Every persuasion on the political spectrum was given a Kremlin-backed voice within the system as Surkov ensured that the Kremlin organized and funded a wide range of political groups and movements, from liberal to Communist to conservative, sowing confusion and cynicism in the public while at the same time co-opting any genuine opposition. The messengers differed, but the message was the same — the Kremlin was always in control. Under Surkov’s simulation of politics, dissent wasn’t crushed: it was managed.
The key part of this management strategy is the creation of supported avenues for dissent which stymie the formation of effective popular movements.These are gatekeepers for political action, moving the goalposts or hiding them.
Selectively inefficient legislative apparatuses play a role here: the legal system covering criminal negligents in Grenfell in the UK is a good example, so was the lack of jail time for our criminally negligent speculators in 2008. Sometimes this can be interpreted in terms of regulatory capture, sometimes it's (also) a systemic blindspot (see inequality + overproduction and climate change). A diffuse and inefficient (or intentionally badly enforced in the case of our tax laws) gatekeeper-administrative apparatus has the dual purpose of blocking internal political intervention and discouraging grass roots activism by rendering it internationally collaborative by necessity. It has the perhaps intentional side effect of alienating honest citizens from politics by denying the efficacy or applicability of their votes and petitions.
The media management of outrage interacts with our modern day equation of politics=political discourse to play a role here, the contours of acceptable opinion are rarely perturbed, and the well known alliance between powerful corporations and media outlets (cough Murdoch and Koch cough) project the voice of the ruling class from the institutions which help shape the terms of debate in which popular opinion is formed. Politics on social media is typically sound and fury organising nothing except the convenience of our ruling class.
An emerging role for 'influencers' is taking place, acting as pseudo-servants of the ruling classes by embodying acceptable opinions which are near the contours of acceptable opinion. The communities which support influencers also necessarily become associated with a consumer identity through the algorithms which shape the medium they are in: these algorithms also watch their every move, and our governments have almost unrestricted access. Here we can see the role of ideological echo-chambers, discretising identity into a panopticon of conflicting units that in reality have far more shared political interest than their antipodal role in discourse suggests.
This promotes a second level of apathy and indifference, there are people who can 'see through' this shit, which includes many liberal commentators, but this is still within the narrows of acceptable opinion; it is fashionable to bemoan the degradation of discourse, and this too is organised over influencer communities.
Then, unfortunately, we have anti-politics; which is a populist political rhetorical strategy that demeans official political opponents as part of the ineffective system (which everyone recognises), and thereby they provide false hope of revolution in rhetoric but their policies are more of the same. We have luminaries here from the milquetoast left and right, Tony Blair, Barack Obama, Nigel Farage and Trump.
The political situation surrounding anti-politics must be seen on the level of social structure which produces these effective demagogues rather than blamed on the examples. Their popularity only makes sense under the
public acknowledgement of the degraded power of democracy in the West. Of course, Western democracies have rarely had this power, the interwoven threads of capital and government were created along with the working class and colonial expansion, exporting the hatred and indifference of the ruling class for their workers and citizens abroad, which was immediately re-internalised through the politics of fear-mongering racism.
The politics of fear in general also plays a privileged part here, as trust in our nation is better fuelled by xenophobia defining an empty, other-less Us through blind prejudice against the other; better fuel than a sincere commitment to a democracy of trusted institutions, which requires a lot of fire and sackings and arrests to achieve at this point. This politics of fear resonates with the anti-political and discursive elements of the non-linear war we face on all fronts; systematic trust is dead, we need to recreate it politically on our own terms.
For talk about the resurgence of right nationalism across Europe and America, the politics of fear, the anti-political element, and the reactionary disgust against feminism and post-colonial studies interact to make an actionable space of belief to propagandise. One way out of this trilemma of fear, undermined democracy and corporate power is fascism; which has the problems it always has, the other is to
organise left; which requires us to repurpose the media which fail us every day.