(Gallup pole from 2023) Americans say they read an average of 12.6 books during the past year, a smaller number than Gallup has measured in any prior survey dating back to 1990. U.S. adults are reading roughly two or three fewer books per year than they did between 2001 and 2016.
I fear there's long term effects on our societies with this. What do people think about this? — ssu
eliminative materialism. — Wayfarer
One perspective (Dennett, 1987) is that propositional attitudes are actually dispositional states that we use to adopt a certain heuristic stance toward rational agents. According to this view, our talk about mental states should be interpreted as talk about abstracta that, although real, are not candidates for straightforward reduction or elimination as the result of cognitive science research. Moreover, since beliefs and other mental states are used for so many things besides the explanation of human behavior, it is far from clear that our explanatory theories about inner workings of the mind/brain have much relevance for their actual status.
And then, of course, there are direct realists who view experience/perception as the actualization of a capacity that persons (or animals) have to grasp the affordances of their world. Brains merely are organs that enable such capacities. — Pierre-Normand
And this would be wrong. — Lionino
No. Experience exists within the brain (either reducible to its activity or as some supervenient phenomenon), whereas proximal stimuli exist outside the brain. So neither proximal stimuli nor distal objects are constituents of experience. — Michael
Mental phenomena; colours (inc. brightness), shapes, orientation. — Michael
Because naive and indirect realists mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on its constituents and so disagree on whether or not we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. — Michael
The proximal cause is the entity that stimulates the sense receptors. With sight it's light, with hearing it's sound, with smell it's odour molecules in the air, and with touch and taste it's the distal object itself. — Michael
Well, certainly not when it comes to sight where the proximal stimulus is the light. In the case of touch and taste they'd agree. — Michael
There's a distinction between a distal object being a constituent of experience and being a cause of experience. Indirect realists accept that distal objects are a cause of experience but deny that they are a constituent of experience. — Michael
As I see it indirect realism is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, with naive realism claiming that distal objects are literal constituents of experience, entailing such things as the naive theory of colour. — Michael
I have knowledge of percepts but I don't have knowledge of the proximal stimulus or distal object. — Michael
Having a rational awareness/understanding of it. — Michael
I have access to colours and pain and smells and tastes. These are all percepts. — Michael
We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus. The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object. — Michael
I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track? — Bob Ross
My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning. — Bob Ross
Those with 3 channel colour vision and those with 12 channel colour vision will agree that some object reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, but they will see it to have a different colour appearance. — Michael
What defines them as being indirect realists is in believing that we have direct knowledge only of a mental representation. Direct realists believe that we have direct knowledge of the distal object because nothing like a mental representation exists (the bottom drawing of direct realism). — Michael
In contrast, a direct realist posits no such intermediate representations at all. For the direct realist, the act of representing the world is a capacity that the human subject exercises in directly perceiving distal objects. On this view, phenomenology is concerned with describing and analyzing the appearances of those objects themselves, not the appearances of some internal "representations" of them (which would make them, strangely enough, appearances of appearances). — Pierre-Normand
Right now I am at -2 on the mood scale. Have you ever experienced what it is like to be at -2 or -5 or +5? I have. I have to take 600 mg of Quetiapine XL per night to get to -2 on the mood scale. If I didn't take it, I would be stuck at -5. Have you ever had hallucinations? If you haven't, you won't understand how scary and confusing it is to have one's reality warped by things that are not really there. — Truth Seeker
I will read Hume and Kant if I ever get to either 0 or +1 on the mood scale. Thank you for the recommendations. — Truth Seeker
I don't think that it's science's job to either establish or disconfirm this thesis. I think the mind/body problem, the so-called hard-problem of consciousness and radical skepticism stem from distinctive philosophical outlooks regarding the disconnect between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" that Wilfrid Sellars identified as "idealizations of distinct conceptual frameworks in terms of which humans conceive of the world and their place in it." On my view, it's entirely a philosophical problem although neuroscience and psychology do present cases that are illustrative of (and sometimes affected by) the competing philosophical theses being discussed in this thread. — Pierre-Normand
I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated. — Bob Ross
You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess. — Bob Ross
If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.
I didn’t understand this question: can you re-phrase it? — Bob Ross
To use a concept, is to deploy it; and to presuppose a concept is to use a concept in a manner whereof one does not explicate its meaning (but, rather, uses it implicitly in their analysis). — Bob Ross
Oh, I think I understand where your are heading; so let me clarify: by claiming ‘being’, or any absolutely simple concept, is unanalyzable and primitive, I DO NOT mean to convey that we cannot come to know what they are. I mean that we can’t come to know them through conceptual analysis: they remain forever notions, which are acquired via pure intuitions (about reality). — Bob Ross
If we classify it as such, it would no longer fit OP's criterion of "not want to be a person who does it". We don't do diseases. — Lionino
With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide
You may bring up the example of touching a hot pan, — Lionino
↪Fooloso4 Is it possible to be too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Midgley's point? I doubt that Midgley would have disagreed with your account of Descartes. — Banno