The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. Each is a distinctive perspective of the world, but it is a world that we all participate in, and use common language to describe. — Andrew M

The problem with this is that the world is more than individual perspectives. Science describes a world independent of that. We can't sense most of what science tells us, and what we do sense is based on our particular biology, which science has to work to abstract from to arrive at mathematical models that are predictive and explain the world as it appears to us.

Another problem is that people do have private thoughts, dreams, feelings. We can't always know that Alice's tooth is aching, or whether she's faking. But she knows, because she's the one feeling or faking the pain. We also don't know what it's like if her brain works in an idiosyncratic way from our own. Thus people who have no inner dialog, people who think in images, people with odd neurological conditions and so on.

As Chalmers and Nagel have argued, the red sensation is not part of any objective explanation. Rather, it's either a label ("red light") or the known end result ("red sensation"). It can be removed and it doesn't effect the science at all. It's a correlation with our talk of sensations.

As Block and Lanier have argued, we don't know whether the red sensation is itself biological or functional. So a computer might implement the same functionality and not have red sensations. Or maybe it does, and so do meteor showers and nation states on the occasions they implement said functionality. Both of which imply some sort of weird identity that's absent from the biological or functional concepts.

But this is most plainly put is Locke's primary qualities being used in science, while the secondary qualities themselves remain unexplained. Somehow the primary qualities in an organism results in secondary ones, but so far no explanation has shown how. Thus, the hard problem remains.

You asked whether it was a part of metaphysics. I was explaining to you how it is. Whether you find it interesting is irrelevant.

It’s a question of whether objects having parts is coherent and consistent with physics. If not, then complex objects don’t exist.

Kind of similar to arguing over the coherency of qualia.

Even if we say red sensations are relational, we're still left with the problem of explaining how the neural activity which produces them does so. So far, neural activity along with every other objective fact of the world can be described without reference to the sensations we experience the world with.

That's a problem, regardless of how you characterize it, and whether it's the end result of a reporting mechanism. There needs to be an explanation for how the sensations are produced.

Yep, there's a difference between red and a certain frequency. No problem. What about the qualia? — Banno

The hard problem arises here because we have sensations of a world which is different from our objective explanations of that world. Red isn't a certain wavelength of light, nor is it certain neurons firing. Red isn't part of our scientific explanation of the world. And yet we all have sensations.

Even if we dispense with qualia as incoherent, we're still stuck with the secondary qualities of perception, along with dreams, inner dialog, imagination, hallucinations, etc. We still have a modern form of the mind/body problem. It doesn't go away just because we ditch a problematic term.

What's missing is the explanation of how those individuals are stimulated or non-perceptually affected, and how they are subsequently disposed to behave or believe that adequately describes thought and belief itself(consciousness). "Consciousness" as described by proponents of "qualia" is based upon a gross misunderstanding of how consciousness emerges(here I'm fond of the discussion regarding whether or not perceptual features/properties/quale can be divorced from conscious experience and retain their unity as an entity). — creativesoul

I somewhat agree with this, if we grant Dennett's arguments for quniing qualia. However, you do seem to be espousing illusionism in this paragraph. Which would be that we're being deluded by some trick of cognition into thinking sensations of color, sound, paint, etc. are something they're not, which is some form of the private, ineffable subjectivity.

If there is such an illusion, the mechanism needs to be explained so that we can see how this illusion comes about. The problem I and many others have with this approach is it implies that sensations themselves are illusions, because that's the only way to avoid espousing qualia. Which would imply that we only think that we see color, hear sound, feel pain.

What could that possibly mean? And what does that do for epistemology if our sensations are themselves illusions? And aren't illusions themselves experiences?

Can you think of any examples of total revolution; where existing institutions are not merely co-opted and rearranged, but completely done away with by starting from scratch? — Janus

Khmer Rouge's cultural revolution:

As the new ruler of Cambodia, Pol Pot set about transforming the country into his vision of an agrarian utopia. The cities were evacuated, factories and schools were closed, and currency and private property was abolished. Anyone believed to be an intellectual, such as someone who spoke a foreign language, was immediately killed. Skilled workers were also killed, in addition to anyone caught in possession of eyeglasses, a wristwatch, or any other modern technology. In forced marches punctuated with atrocities from the Khmer Rouge, the millions who failed to escape Cambodia were herded onto rural collective farms. — https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pol-pot-overthrown

It only cost about 2 million lives or 25% of the population of Cambodia. Of course that's one of the worst case scenarios, but it is a cautionary tale against ideological purity driving revolution.

No one has ever made this argument, as far as I’m aware. Conservatives are skeptical of human reason and believe a moderate reform is far better for everyone than radical revolutionary change. They believe that we ought not to sacrifice present society on the whims of a few revolutionaries. It actually sounds like they have more empathy than the revolutionary types. — NOS4A2

I wonder what that makes Frank Herbert. His Dune saga has the oppressed become the oppressors as they wage a holy war. But it was setup by the oppressors which backfired on them. He said he wrote the Dune Saga as a warning against charismatic leaders. He also has the main protagonist in book four talk about how revolutionaries are easy to convert to aristocrats, because they seek power.

think this is hard to take seriously for anyone who suffers greatly under whatever social order exists at the time. Conservatives like Stove always seem to lack a degree of empathy for those in different situations: they have something to lose, but they don't recognize that many others don't. "I don't want to suffer, so you should just keep suffering." — darthbarracuda

Everyone has something to lose as long as they are alive. Wars have collateral damage, and they can disrupt food supplies. They can also result in even more oppression. If I'm homeless, the situation isn't made better by gun fire in the streets and stores being bombed.

These are pretty flabby responses. No one has pointed out that Stove constructs an obvious straw man. Look around and you will see folk fighting for Black Lives, for the environment, for the rights of the disabled, for a living wage, for animal rights; No on argues for change for the sake of change. — Banno

There's a big difference between pushing for changes within current institutions, and wanting to dismantle them in favor of new ones, which often means violent revolution or civil war. Some have lead to better outcomes, but often enough they do not.

Who gets to be in charge of the rebuild after everything is torn down? There's no guarantee it won't be someone authoritarian, supported by followers who won't tolerate dissent. There's also no guarantee that disruption of the economy doesn't lead to starvation. And if there is no clear victor, conflicts can stretch on for decades. There are plenty of historical examples to draw from along with current ones. A few are the stuff of nightmares. Hopefully, nobody wants a repeat of Pol Pot.

It sounds like Stove is in favor of the first. So that would mean things like police reform, reparations, disability rights, increased minimum wage, and better treatment for farm animals. Instead of tearing it all down in hopes that the victors are capable of making something better, assuming they even want to, depending on who's victorious.

I should have specified in terms of funding and global reach.

The US has massive geographical advantages with two large coastal areas on the Atlantic and Pacific in addition to the Great Lakes and the Gulf. Plus it has tons of rich farmland and Silicon Valley, whose companies are not negatively impacted by a pandemic, since their services are still needed and their workers can work remotely. California's economy alone is massive. Plus the US military remains the largest in the world.

And it's not like the US hasn't been through major wars, civil unrest and economic downturns before. 1918 was a worse pandemic at the end of WW1, then followed up by a major world depression the 30s and the second world war.

But if the US does get replaced as the major power in the world, it will be China, which is not a better option for most countries.

Nor need an antirealist deny that there is a physical world. It is open to them to say that if we talk as if there is a physical world, then by that very fact there is indeed a physical world. — Banno

True, but then this doesn't explain why we think a modern scientific account of the physical world is better than some previous mythological or metaphysical one. There has to be some explanation for why empiricism works better for understanding whatever reality is and how technology improves.

For example, It's problematic to say we evolved from a common ancestor because we agree to talk that way, as if Darwin and other biologists were better at propaganda than their opponents. Or that lasers work because we agree to talk about light as if certain physical theories were the case.

As for the cat on the mat, the cat itself doesn't care what we agree on. I realize you're not an antirealist, just wanted to add what has always bothered me about the position.

Why have a flat ontology? — Marty

Because Occam. And I think Quine. But mostly because it seems the more complex, everyday stuff is determined by the micro stuff.

Aren't their truths about individuals? I can say I'm angry, you can say that I don't look angry. I can reply that I'm holding it in. Surely there is a truth about whether I feel angry.

In Ethics, we seek to change the world to match what we say. — Banno

You do this by influencing public opinion or those in power. While it's true that we can critique the morality of public opinion or those in power, if we want the world to be more moral, then we have to change one or both.

Problem is, what makes it "more moral"? That you're able to persuade people? Because as you pointed out, morality isn't like chemistry. Chemistry forces the scientist to adjust their language to coincide with the facts. But ethics is trying to persuade people to change their moral valuation. Which can differ depending on the ethicist.

Unlike with chemistry, there is no agreed upon fact to determine what people should value. Take equality versus freedom. Which is more valuable when they come into conflict? Depends on who you ask.

We either discard the possibility out of hand or we have to accept that the content of our intuitions may be wrong. — Isaac

Usually in philosophy, one is not hemmed in by an either-or. People are frustratingly good at finding alternatives. There are many approaches to consciousness, so it's decidedly not a binary proposition. We don't have to accept or discard anything because it's not a settled matter.

I am one of the multitude who must labour for others in order to provide for my family. I am a peasant — Kenosha Kid

As opposed to laboring for yourself to provide for your family? Let's say at the end of your labors your children inherit enough to start a bakery. At first they do all the labor, but after some success, they're able to hire others to help do the labor. Eventually, the business becomes very popular, with multiple stores, and now your children are managing the business instead of doing the day to day labor.

However, in the deep dark past one of your ancestral groups came across another group camping out on a fertile tract of land. That group refused to share, so your ancestors killed them and took the land for themselves.

Should your children's bakery be considered some form of theft because of that? We can't know, but probably all of our ancestries have various crimes in their past. Maybe the crime is civilization itself, but then again, it's not like hunters and gatherers never have conflicts.

But what does any of that matter to us now? We can't go back and undo it. We only know the more recent crimes recorded in history, to the extent they were. Recent in terms of all those thousands of years humans have been around.

And I'm talking about history where everyone involved is dead, and thus nobody can actually be held accountable.

What do we mean by selfish then? — Brett

Doing something that disregards someone else's well being, to the extent you're in a position to be responsible.

It all depends on what's meant by being "selfish'. Someone could say you're being selfish by staying inside playing video games instead of going out to protest the world's injustices. But you aren't causing anyone harm, and you aren't helping either. Should you be helping? Should other people decide that for you? Should you decide for them?

I'd say it's just as selfish for society to determine how an individual should be happy, within the constraints of having to live together.

Is the self-interest that comes with doing what makes you happy inherently selfish? — Calvin

No.

When does doing what makes you happy become selfish? — Calvin

When it harms others.

Or, 'how you feel about it'. — Wayfarer

I feel like positivism is misguided and can't support it's own claims.

This is a bit picky, but since this is philosophy, I'll just come out and say it. You don't necessarily own your body at least until you are dead. Because you cannot dispose of it, you cannot sell it or at least, arguably you didn't ought to be able to. I think Shakespeare had something to say about this. — unenlightened

The problem with this line of thinking is that it justifies society telling you what you can and can't do with your own body, depending on what society thinks is appropriate. It has certainly been used against abortion, drug use, prostitution, drinking, tattoos, makeup, jewelry, certain hair styles or clothing and so on.

So where to draw the line? Should we outlaw obesity because it's a health cost? Mandate every able bodied citizen to exercise and eat healthy, and not participate in risky activities like rock climbing or hang gliding?

On the other hand we all know that if something is physically real, it or its effects can be observed or detected in some way. — Janus

Assuming we know what "physically real" means. As for effects, we can say the existence of categories of particulars in the world is an "effect" of universals, if one wishes to argue for realism.

It;s not that the arguments are not thought to be discursive; they may be valid as fuck; but that their premises are groundless and even incoherent. — Janus

This could apply to any contentious argument. Take Dennett versus Chalmers. One rejects the other's premises. Chalmers charges Dennett with being ideologically dogmatic about materialism, Dennett says Chalmers is being misled by faulty intuition.

So who's right? Depends on which set of arguments you find more persuasive. So what now? Do we just agree it's all sophistry?

The point is that if I state that any empirical object is real, we all know what that means; that we can all ( given that we are not blind, or lacking in tactile sensitivity , etc.) see it, touch it and so on. — Janus

There's plenty of posits in science which are not empirical, like quarks. They're used to explain the empirical. Thus the debate around scientific realism. That and the philosophical questions around scientific findings like the various interpretations of QM, or questions about causality and the arrow of time.

Our ancestors could walk the land and hunt to provide for themselves and their families until someone had the wicked and clever idea of saying, "Actually this is mine now. If you want to eat, work for me." — Kenosha Kid

More like people started congregating in permanent villages, giving rise to the city state. Once people have permanent digs, ownership becomes more meaningful, as does the division of labor, money, accounting, governments and so on.

I believe that what they are saying really amounts to something like "you don't feel it"; they are conflating discursive understanding with feeling. It's just the same with poetry and the arts in general; there is nothing determinately discursive to understand; it is all a matter of feeling. — Janus

Or those who think metaphysical arguments are meaningless dismiss logical arguments because they don't feel like those arguments are discursive.

See how that works? I don't know the name of the logical fallacy, but it certainly is one.

seems to be saying that nobody understands what they believe themselves to be claiming metaphysically. If they could understand it they ought to be able to explain it. — Janus

There's entire SEP articles on various metaphysical positions explaining what is meant. But every attempt at explanation gets dismissed by those who think it's meaningless.

I don't know what to say to that. I find the explanations meaningful, but I'm being told that I don't really. That's kind of irritating. It's similar to how my believing relatives think I must really believe God exists deep down, because it's impossible to be an atheist.

It's facile (and usually their only "comeback") for such enunciators to claim that those who claim that their claims are meaningless simply "do not understand". — Janus

It's not that they don't understand, it's that they claim there is nothing to understand. We're not claiming any sort of special knowledge about metaphysics. The arguments are there for anyone to read and debate.

But what about the correlationist??? What is his view on objects when no minds exist??? Do objects still exist but in a different form than what we measure them to be?? Or do they not exist? But then this is solipsism. — francis20520

I believe they take basically an anti-realist stance regarding ontology. Yeah, the world exists without us, but no, we can't say anything about that world independent of how we're correlated with it. What I've been told in the past concerning dinosaurs and what not is that if you could time travel back then, you would see that the world was full of dinosaurs, because that's how it would looks to us. That still doesn't tell us what the world is like independent of human observers.

So they take science to be a correlational exercise based on the empirical world, which is the world as it appears to human beings. It's not a realist enterprise.

It also seems to me that most of the Witty fans also think something like the above. I agree with correlationism when it comes to everyday experience, but I do think science takes us beyond that. We can know something about the real world, it just takes a lot of work. Which does mean that not everything in experience is merely correlational. Like dinosaur bones.

However, at first we didn't know they were dinosaur bones from ancestors living millions of years ago before a massive extinction event. People thought those bones belonged to dragons.

The "normal" for Peter included all of these activities. Even if it weren't whatever bodily functions he and others like him had would be the "normal", effectively eliminating the possibility of knowing his artificial nature. — TheMadFool

I'm not sure how. At least the Cylons from the recent BSG and Replicants from Blade Runner were synthetic biology, not electronics.

The main protagonist in the film is a man by the name of Peter who finally discovers that he's a synthetic (AI). What qualifies as very "intriguing" is that Peter doesn't know he's an AI until he sees his innards, something that he's compelled to do to save his wife. Basically, Peter thinks he's human or a biological right up till the moment he looks inside his body and sees electronic circuitry, etc. — TheMadFool

So, did Peter not notice his lack of eating, pooping, peeing, sweating? What about sex drive? If his innards are a bunch of electronic circuitry, then he's not undergoing biological processes like digestion.

1. Is it possible that we, humans, are like Peter, under the [false] assumption that we are not artificial intelligence (AI)? — TheMadFool

I'm guessing this would have showed up in surgery or the morgue at some point.

2. What, for us, qualifies as a similar, illuminating
experience, regarding our true nature (AI or not AI), to Peter seeing his own innards - electronic circuitry, powerpacks, and all? — TheMadFool

I poop therefore I'm an animal.

If you don't believe that it's raining outside but it is in fact raining outside then you would be saying it truthfully. — Michael

Right, but I wouldn't be saying that i know it's raining outside, but believe otherwise!

There might not be a reason for him to say it but he might nonetheless say it. As you say, it's a silly statement, but also a true statement. That's the puzzle. — Michael

While I could say, "It's raining outside, I don't believe it", I couldn't actually be saying that truthfully.

That's where science comes in. Scientists don't have much patients for philosophical wordplay, they rather have you do an experiment. — Wheatley

Sure, but let's say Johnson kicked that rock to prove it was solid against atomists claiming it was a bunch of atoms and the void. Then low and behold physicists discover that solid objects are mostly empty space. So Johnson's common sense reaction doesn't amount to much other than rocks appear solid and also hurt when you kick them.

Now let's say somehow science determines that our universe is a simulation. That means Moore waving his hands around amounted to proving nothing about an external world. And Diogenes walking away isn't the same as moving through physical space.

Point being that common sense objections to philosophical arguments don't amount to much.

I like the two related examples:

Samuel Johnson's kicking a rock while hollering, "I refute it thus!", and Diogenes walking away from an argument claiming that motion was impossible.

I like Diogenes the best of the three.

I certainly believe that I know Moore was full of shit waving his hands around, thus the common phrase, "hand-waving an argument away".

Now tell me I'm wrong!

Yeah, it does seem like a sleight of hand. But it does also play into belief versus knowledge and certainty, so I could see where it's a jumping off point for Wittgenstein.

I find it uncomfortable as well. Sex without genuine connection seems to me like masturbating with someone else's body. You pretend to care so that you can use someone else.

And to know that another person doesn't care about you beyond your appearance, and to be okay with that, makes it sound like you don't really care about yourself. — darthbarracuda

It can be uncomfortable for you and even personally wrong, but some people want causal sex, and that's fine for them. Or at least, it's for them to determine. It's too easy for society to want to go the moral condemnation route.

The elite's primary project is to remain the elite and keep the rest of us on edge with each other so we don't turn on them! They are good at this. They've been doing it for centuries, all over the world. — Bitter Crank

Do you really think there is some kind of consistent coordination amongst the super rich and politically powerful? Do Soros and Koch brothers and Putin all want the same things? Is Bill Gates in league with Xi Jinping? Are Oprah and the Saudi Prince on the same side?

Mr. Robot's a great show, but its global 1% of the 1% club led by a mastermind state Chinese hacker is a little on the conspiratorial side, as is the Illuminati. Sure, Jeff Bezos and Aliko Dangote want to keep their billions and strive to continue being successful, but that's a little different than a global effort by all the elites to keep everyone else out.

Also, they'd have to admit Trump is part of the plan.