• Artificial Intelligence, Will, and Existence
    “Meaningless! Meaningless!”
    says the Teacher.
    “Utterly meaningless!
    Everything is meaningless.”
    What do people gain from all their labors
    at which they toil under the sun?
    Bitter Crank

    It's really interesting that this is accepted part of the Christian Bible, given it's nihilism. But it's a really good ancient text.
  • The Fine-Tuning Argument
    One can be convinced of God by direct experience of Her. If one has had such experience, why waste time on petty, questionable arguments that pale into total insignificance in comparison?andrewk

    Because they might just be in your head, generated by having the beliefs you do in virtue of the religious culture you were raised in.

    When I came to understand that my religious experiences where being generated by my brain, I stopped having faith. I understand that not everyone views religious experience and faith the same, but for me if it wasn't real, and thus true, it wasn't worth having.

    To quote St. Paul, "If Christ has not risen, your faith is in vain." What's the point of going to church/temple/synagogue/mosque and praying and all that jazz if it's just made up? If you need help getting through life, then just eat, drink and be merry. Or pass time arguing over impractical issues on philosophy forums.

    If you want to feel spiritual, go look at the stars on a clear night.
  • Artificial Intelligence, Will, and Existence
    Alternatively, an AI might not find it's programmed goals to be meaningless regardless, and just keeps chugging along indefinitely. The whole existential crises has the unnecessary nature of human desires at it's root. Take that away, and an AI might not care whether anything is meaningful. It just computes.

    There is an interesting scifi novel called Permutation City by Greg Egan where the main character is experimenting with uploading copies of his mind into a simulated environment. Most of them commit suicide upon realizing their fate. But the last one is denied this ability, so he learns to cope with being a simulation. He still has the ability to modify his code at will, so one thing he does is change his motivation to tirelessly enjoy making table legs (digital ones of course).

    If we could modify our desires at will, how would that change the equation? I know sometimes I grow bored when I'd rather remain interested and engaged.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    The solipsist and I can agree that the cat is on the mat. It's true for both of us. But the solipsist means something different than I do, because I take cats to have their own existence independent of me, with their own feline mental states.

    "The cat is on the mat" solipsist version is different from "The cat is on the mat" realist version. What makes the solipsist version true is simply the appearance of a cat on the mat. What makes the realist version true is whether the real cat is actually on the mat, despite appearances.

    It's true that normally we don't have reasons to doubt the appearance of a cat on a mat, but it's possible under certain scenarios. Those scenarios won't make any difference to the solipsist. It's all just appearance in their mind.

    Is true performs a different role for the same sentence, depending on one's metaphysical commitments.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    So perhaps you meant to say that if the BIV is an anti-realist then their statement is true?Michael

    Sure. As long as "The cat is on the mat" is understood to mean my perception (or experience) of a cat on a mat, and not of a cat independent of perception.

    What's interesting here is that the meaning a speaker intends for a statement can effect it's truth conditions.

    As such, we can't really determine whether a BIV is right or wrong in saying that the cat is on the mat without knowing what they mean. What if they somehow realized or became convinced they were envatted? Then the cat on the mat means electrical stimulation of their visual cortex, or code in a computer program, which is certainly very far form the ordinary understanding of a cat being on a mat.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    You lost me here..creativesoul

    The BIV can verify their statement that a cat is on the mat, but the statement is false, provided that the BIV thinks the cat is an external object and not just a sensory impression. A BIV never perceives a real cat.

    However, it's interesting to note that if a BIV is an idealist, their statement is true.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    Problems will certainly arise from conflating verification with truth.creativesoul

    Right because a BIV can verify that a cat is on the mat, while wrongly believing this means there is an external world cat on a mat. And that's essentially what the ancient skeptics were saying. That we couldn't know whether our statements were true.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    If you already believe the statement, then adding "is true" adds nothing meaningful to it.creativesoul

    But I don't believe that there is life on Mars or that Julius Caesar had that number of hairs on his head. I don't disbelieve it either, because I just don't know, although my number is unlikely to be the correct one.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    The point is that a deflationist is not trying to resolve issues around meaning or verification (rightly or wrongly). They are just pointing out that there is no great mystery to the ordinary use of truth terms.Andrew M

    Right, there isn't, as long as one isn't doing philosophy and is only speaking in ordinary terms. But at least as far back as the ancient philosophy, problems arose for our naive view of things such as truth just being a matter of checking to see whether the cat is on the mat. Why is that? Well, because of things like skepticism, relativism, and the problem of perception.

    I get what the deflationist is trying to do, but it seems to me like it does so by ignoring what motivated the whole truth debate in the first place.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    Adding "is true" to a belief statement adds no additional meaning.creativesoul

    I see what you're saying, but let's take this statement:

    Julius Caesar had 46,873 hairs on his head when he breathed his last breath.

    Now I don't believe that, but it could be true, if he did actually have that exact number of individual hairs when he died. I have no idea how many he had, but I read that he was balding, and the average number for a full head of hair ranges from 100 to 150 thousand. So maybe 46 thousand is somewhere in the ballpark.

    Let's take another one:

    Life exists in some form on Mars.

    That statement is true or false, but we don't know which it is, so we can't say it's true. Adding is true would mean we had some reason for thinking there is actually life on Mars.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    If, and only if, the meaningful statement corresponds to reality; fact; the way things are; the unfolding events; etc; then it is true.creativesoul

    Right, the is true part is asserting an accurate linkage between world, belief, meaning and language.

    The snow is white is true if, and only if, the snow is white. This shows that is true adds the additional meaning to a sentence that there is a linkage to something that makes the sentence true.

    But the snow could be yellowish or brownish, and thus the statement doesn't link up with the actual color of the snow, and is therefore false.

    If we aren't discussing any particular patch of snow or cat, then the statement isn't true or false, except in the general case that snow is white when it's not mixed in with something that alter's it's reflective property. And of course there's nothing general about cats on mats. Cats could sit or not sit on any number of surface areas.

    So again, truth is something about the world for these kinds of sentences.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    In the bigger picture, I am quite confident in saying that truth, meaning, thought, and belief are all irrevocably entwined.creativesoul

    I think so as well. Saying the cat is on the mat involves meaning about cats and mats and what it is for that statement to be true or false, and why we would think so, but also how we can get it wrong.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    That is, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true (or false) then the statement "it is true that the cat is on the mat" is similarly true (or false).Andrew M

    But that's a trivial observation at best. What's interesting is what makes a statement true or false. We already knew that "The cat is on the mat" was asserting a proposition. Focusing on that doesn't resolve any of the issues around truth.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    These are the acts that might arise consequent on the speech act 'the cat is on the mat', given the way we play the language game.andrewk

    Right, but what does that have to do with the truth of the statement? Because part of our various language games is that various statements can be true or false.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth


    Good points, so even if ordinary language clams are empirically based, there's still a discrepancy between truth and verification. Because we acknowledge that an empirical claim can be wrong. Well, what allows for this possibility? Clearly, it's something more than just seeing that the cat as on the mat, or performing whatever current experiments.

    The answer is that it's the actual way things are that makes a claim true or false, and not just looking to see whether the cat is on the mat, or performing some experiment. And this leads back to the correspondence theory of truth.

    It is the distinction between appearance and reality. It can appear to us that a claim is true, and yet it actually be false. An experiment can confirm a theory for now, yet that theory can turn it to be wrong in the future.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    I mean, does mere correspondence (in the sense of empirical justification) necessarily entail a metaphysical view on truth?ChatteringMonkey

    I guess that depends on whether "the cat is on the mat" entails a realist or empiricist version of justification.

    Let's say I'm a BIV seeing a cat on the mat. Empirically, it's true and can be verified by others in my experience of the world. But it's not actually the case that there is an external world cat on an external world mat. It's just something being fed to me by a computer program that stimulates my visual cortex, and auditory one when I experience others telling me they see the same thing.

    So the question becomes is the statement, "The cat is on the mat", true iff and only if there is an external world cat on the mat, or can it be true if the cat and mat are empirically verifiable?

    IOW, what sort of claim is ordinary language making? The reason for mentioning science is that scientific claims are very aware of making such distinctions, and it's quite possible that we could be wrong about what constitutes a cat on a mat, despite appearances. Maybe our best scientific theories would tell us that cats and mats are actually atemporal holographic projections that our brains turn into ordinary objects, or what have you. Something that is very far from ordinary conceptions of what it means for a cat to be on a mat. Or maybe the cat is in some complex superposition with the world we can't observe, but can model mathematically.

    Science isn't really concerned with cats on mats, but scientific claims are couched in terminology that is provisional, because we can always be wrong about facts and theories. Therefore, science isn't really about truth, but rather empirical justification. So there's an important distinction to be made between the two, given that we can be wrong, and therefore our claims can be false.

    In order for that to be the case, there has to be a difference between truth and empirical justification. Otherwise, how can we be potentially wrong? Fundamentally, the problem with deflation is that assertions can be false, so what makes the distinction between being true and being false? That's what any theory of truth has to grapple with.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    And the fact that they have a correspondence relation is a problem why?ChatteringMonkey

    Because it entails the correspondence theory of truth, which is a metaphysical understanding of truth that deflationism is trying to avoid.

    Why is that? One, because correspondence runs into problems establishing the relationship between world and language, and two, because the analytic philosophy movement would largely rather avoid metaphysics altogether, treating it as meaningless, an abuse of language.
  • Physics and Intentionality
    I don't understand #2. What makes the laws of nature "intentional"? Can you explain intentionality? I understand it as a mental attitude where propositions are about something.
  • A problem for the deflationary theory of truth
    It's also perfectly possible that i've failed to understand your pointChatteringMonkey

    That scientific statements don't have truth as a property inside the language game of science, but ordinary language claims do. The cat on the mat is true iff and only if there is an actual cat on an actual mat, which is really a correspondence relationship.
  • Positive Thoughts
    A glass can be both half full and half empty. Kinda corny, but true.Posty McPostface

    Perfectly balanced, as all things should be.

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  • The Fine-Tuning Argument
    I'm not sure what the bubble machine metaphor is attempting to assert. I take it the bubbles are akin to universes that evolve the right paremeters over time.

    Thing is that bubble machines and factories are designed by intelligences. So the evolutionary bubble process has it's start with intelligent design and intentional decision making to setup a filter process for longer lasting bubble.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    The physics of the empirical reality being fed to the BIV would need to be capable of producing a conscious observer for physicalism to be a defensible position.noAxioms

    This is a true, and that's a sticking point. On a Denettian position, it's difficult to see how being envatted and experiencing a fake physical world is possible. And in fact, Dennett has denied this is actually possible, because he doesn't think a computer program can handle the combinatorial explosion of interacting with a fake physical world.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    OK, you call it a direct realist here, but that is more or less the physicalist position: that what one perceives is the stuff that we're made of.noAxioms

    Well, a scientific realist need not agree with direct perception. They can be an indirect realist, thinking that our perceptions of color, sound, etc. are illusions generated by the brain, and only the mathematical/physical descriptions are of real properties.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    How did this brain come to believe there is actually a physical world (a sine qua non for physicalism)? That is an essential question, because it has bearing on the rationality of its belief.Relativist

    Because the vat is feeding them the sensory impressions of a physical world, similar to Neo in the Matrix.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    You're saying that we observe the avoidance of problems associated with other viewpoints, and this is observational support for direct realism.frank

    I'm saying that we all start our philosophical arguments somewhere. And depending on where you start, there are certain considerations that fall out as a result.

    I was just reading the SEP entry on solipsism for diversion, and early on a comment is made on how solipsism is a natural consequence of a certain view of the mind and epistemology. If you start out by saying the mind is necessarily independent from the body and knowledge begins with the subjective, then solipsism falls out from that sort of view.

    And if being envatted is a possibility, then so is solipsism. There is a certain relatedness to these cartesian and ancient skeptical concerns.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    And we were talking about physicalism. Do you see that being identical to direct realism?frank

    Not at all, just that direct realism is a good epistemology for supporting physicalism.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    Is this part of the scenario? Or are you asserting it?frank

    I'm asserting that there is a BIV who espouses physicalism to explore whether there position could be consistent or defendable as a BIV, whether they realize their condition or not.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    What could you observe that would confirm or disconfirm either direct realism or physicalism?frank

    We all make our philosophical arguments from some starting point, which will have some metaphysical basis. If one begins with there being a physical world that's directly perceived, then that rules out other problems that crop up with a different metaphysical starting point.
  • Can a BIV be a physicalist?
    Physicalism can't be grounded in observation whether BIV or not.frank

    It can if one is a direct realist, because then you're perceiving the actual physical objects, instead of being aware of some mental intermediary.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I'd rather not think about Trump in the nude, thanks.
  • Jumping Points of View in Metaphysics
    To take the math or the models as reality because it is how humans translate is anthropomorphisizing the universe. You are taking the human view to be THE view outside all subjective views.schopenhauer1

    But the models are about something which is outside all subjective views, or at least human/animal ones, because as Apo mentioned, it's invariant across all such views. The mass of a table is not relative to any view. It's true that the concept of mass is human, but the property mass is about is not. It's real.
  • Reviews of new book, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in the Natural Sciences
    Perhaps it's useful to recall that when these were created, they represented in many but not all cases the best answers at the time to sets of questions. Our understanding of the world has evolved. We don't ask the same questions today. And the old answers such as they were, won't do.tim wood

    You still have some scientists talking about things like the world obeying laws of nature, or evolution progressing toward greater complexity. You have a guy like Kurzweil claiming that the universe is such that it leads to ever more efficient forms of computation. You have physicists talking about how the universe is mathematical or computing itself, or fundamentally information.

    One of the reviews in the OP mentions several modern philosophers who have been reviving Aristotelian ideas. So to say that it's just outdated ideas only good for historical purposes is ignoring that some modern intellectuals and scientists still think along those lines.

    Not all the ancient ideas died out or have been replaced by better ones. We still grapple with plenty of questions the ancients first asked.
  • Jumping Points of View in Metaphysics
    t is ignoring the Cartesianism which is the philosophical misstep.apokrisis

    However, the justification for Cartesianism, which has it's roots in ancient philosophy noting the distinction between appearance and reality, is that the way we perceive the world is clearly based on the kind of bodies we have, and not the way the world is. Otherwise, there wouldn't be such a notable discrepancy between appearance and reality.

    Again, the third person point of view is rightfully the invariant generality that would be seen across all possible acts of measurement. And so science turns out to know what it is doing.apokrisis

    Sure, but in doing so, it reveals a perspectiveless view from nowhere that is different from how we perceive the world. Science reveals a world beyond perception, or in addition to how we perceive things.
  • Reviews of new book, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in the Natural Sciences
    Those philosophers and scientists who dismiss metaphysics, often casually and without much argument, have to demonstrate how they can do this without doing ­metaphysics themselves. I predict that they will not be able to do this. Even the logical positivists had metaphysical assumptions.
    https://www.firstthings.com/article/2018/08/aristotle-returns
    — Tim Crane

    Indeed. I like the discussion of causality in the review. Also the mention of Nancy Cartwright's work. She had interesting and nuanced ideas about scientific laws.
  • Reviews of new book, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in the Natural Sciences
    Do you really not know what "beyond their scope" means - or what I meant by it? If you mean to represent that ancient philosophies are or should be the correct tools for science and research and advancing knowledge, then you are espousing a terminally Procrustean view.tim wood

    It doesn't matter when an idea was put forth. What matters is whether the idea has merit. You're arguing that ancient philosophical ideas should be dismissed because they're old. That's a fallacy.

    Also, even though we've made tremendous scientific progress since then, there are still many fundamental questions that haven't been answered. What are laws of nature? What is causality? Why do we experience a flow to time? Why does time have a direction? How is it that the world is intelligible? Why is math such an effective tool? And so on.
  • Reviews of new book, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in the Natural Sciences
    Mm, its much easier to wax nostalgic for 'lost knowledge' than it is to actually engage in argument. A favorite strategy of facists everywhere.StreetlightX

    Doesn't the book referenced in the OP present an argument for a revival of Aristotelian metaphysics on scientific and logical grounds? Or at least the review I read summarizing it presents arguments.

    I understand disagreeing, but I don't understand being dismissive.
  • Environmental Alarmism
    This has probably to some extend prevented pragmatic policies from being implemented. For the believers it was probably never enough, and the non-believers don't want to give in to the lies and all-or-nothing rethoric of the believers...ChatteringMonkey

    This is sadly true of politics in general, or at least it has been in US politics the last couple decades. I wish the pragmatic approach would win out, but polarized people tend to be more motivated to vote and put pressure on their representatives. Compromise should be seen as one of the foundations for a healthy democracy. We won't always agree, but there is usually a reasonable middle ground.
  • Environmental Alarmism
    Alarmism, or scare-politics, is a common way to influence people to care about an issue. That is a strategy that politicans use themselves, as do activitists. The problem is that it can also backfire, the boy cried wolf et al... And to some extend that is what has happened with enviromental issues.ChatteringMonkey

    That's what I was wondering. I do think longterm it tends to backfire. There's only so many apocalyptic scenarios one can hear before most people just end up shrugging and going on with their lives. Or they react to feeling mislead by supporting the other side, even if there is reason to care about the issue.
  • Environmental Alarmism
    Things haven't been as bad as he had predicted back in the 60's and 70's. So, I hope you're right, but I fear notWayfarer

    I don't know what being right is. I vacillate between things will work out and we're doomed. Maybe it's somewhere in between.