The difference between a scientific statement and a statement in ordinary language is that the latter is only making a claim about a particular. Science is trying to come up with lawlike statements that also has predictive value for future particulars.

As such, it would seem fitting that the 'burden of truth' is heavier for a scientific statement. And so I don't see why it follows that empirical justification wouldn't be enough for ordinary language statement, just because it is not enough for a scientific statement.

It's also perfectly possible that i've failed to understand your point :-).

It's also perfectly possible that i've failed to understand your point — ChatteringMonkey

That scientific statements don't have truth as a property inside the language game of science, but ordinary language claims do. The cat on the mat is true iff and only if there is an actual cat on an actual mat, which is really a correspondence relationship.

And the fact that they have a correspondence relation is a problem why?

And the fact that they have a correspondence relation is a problem why? — ChatteringMonkey

Because it entails the correspondence theory of truth, which is a metaphysical understanding of truth that deflationism is trying to avoid.

Why is that? One, because correspondence runs into problems establishing the relationship between world and language, and two, because the analytic philosophy movement would largely rather avoid metaphysics altogether, treating it as meaningless, an abuse of language.

Maybe it doesn't entail the entire correspondence theory of truth, as a metaphysical understanding of truth.

I mean, does mere correspondence (in the sense of empirical justification) necessarily entail a metaphysical view on truth?

Isn't that what you said in your OP near the end?

I mean, does mere correspondence (in the sense of empirical justification) necessarily entail a metaphysical view on truth? — ChatteringMonkey

I guess that depends on whether "the cat is on the mat" entails a realist or empiricist version of justification.

Let's say I'm a BIV seeing a cat on the mat. Empirically, it's true and can be verified by others in my experience of the world. But it's not actually the case that there is an external world cat on an external world mat. It's just something being fed to me by a computer program that stimulates my visual cortex, and auditory one when I experience others telling me they see the same thing.

So the question becomes is the statement, "The cat is on the mat", true iff and only if there is an external world cat on the mat, or can it be true if the cat and mat are empirically verifiable?

IOW, what sort of claim is ordinary language making? The reason for mentioning science is that scientific claims are very aware of making such distinctions, and it's quite possible that we could be wrong about what constitutes a cat on a mat, despite appearances. Maybe our best scientific theories would tell us that cats and mats are actually atemporal holographic projections that our brains turn into ordinary objects, or what have you. Something that is very far from ordinary conceptions of what it means for a cat to be on a mat. Or maybe the cat is in some complex superposition with the world we can't observe, but can model mathematically.

Science isn't really concerned with cats on mats, but scientific claims are couched in terminology that is provisional, because we can always be wrong about facts and theories. Therefore, science isn't really about truth, but rather empirical justification. So there's an important distinction to be made between the two, given that we can be wrong, and therefore our claims can be false.

In order for that to be the case, there has to be a difference between truth and empirical justification. Otherwise, how can we be potentially wrong? Fundamentally, the problem with deflation is that assertions can be false, so what makes the distinction between being true and being false? That's what any theory of truth has to grapple with.

Ah ok thanks for the clarification.

My guess would be that ordinary language is only making claims about empirical verifiability. Ultimately it's about utility it seems to me, i.e. communicating meanings to eachother. I don't think ordinary people have a metaphysical theory of truth, eventhough they probably do believe, as most eveybody does, that there is an external world cat on the mat.

Science isn't really concerned with cats on mats, but scientific claims are couched in terminology that is provisional, because we can always be wrong about facts and theories. Therefore, science isn't really about truth, but rather empirical justification. So there's an important distinction to be made between the two, given that we can be wrong, and therefore our claims can be false.

In order for that to be the case, there has to be a difference between truth and empirical justification. Otherwise, how can we be potentially wrong? Fundamentally, the problem with deflation is that assertions can be false, so what makes the distinction between being true and being false? That's what any theory of truth has to grapple with. — Marchesk

To this part i'd say my first response is still relevant. Science is doing a lot more than making mere provisional theories about simple particulars like there is a cat on the mat. In fact it would seem somewhat weird to say that 'there is a cat on the mat' is only a theory, even in science. There's the more universalising predictive element in science.

Or put in another way, there not a whole lot of different ways to empirically verify if there's a cat on the mat. To empirically verify Newton's theory of gravity however, you can play with a host of different variables... and find out that the theory doesn't hold in black holes for instance.

To distingish between true and false in ordinary language you just (empirically) verify if it's the case or not. And again if you're not entirely sure yet or there is a dispute... I mean, this is not perfect, but it seems to work most of the time anyway.

This runs into a difficulty. Scientific statements are not true, they are rather confirmed by experiment and consistency with existing theory. But this is conditional upon future testing and theoretical development. Thus an empirical justification does not make statements about the world true. However, ordinary language does say that a particular cat is either on a particular mat, or it is not. That's a true or false statement in the ordinary language game, not a conditional scientific fact. — Marchesk

I think you're drawing a distinction between scientific and ordinary claims here that has its own difficulties. I don't see why scientific statements couldn't be true. Yes, they are provisional in the sense that new information may come up that cause scientists to reject them. But that's true for ordinary statements as well. You might find that there was no cat on the mat after all, it was instead a trick of the light or some such.

Per the OP, I don't think there is much difference between a deflationary view and a correspondence view in practice. The language game just is that there are things in our shared experience that we talk about (and that we generically call "the world"). If we decide to call this object a "cat" and that object a "mat" then we can also talk about the relation between them. Aristotle's, "to say of what is that it is is true..." applies equally well whether cats and mats are intrinsic features of reality, objects in the computer game we are playing, or projections within a hypothetical matrix.

Good points, so even if ordinary language clams are empirically based, there's still a discrepancy between truth and verification. Because we acknowledge that an empirical claim can be wrong. Well, what allows for this possibility? Clearly, it's something more than just seeing that the cat as on the mat, or performing whatever current experiments.

The answer is that it's the actual way things are that makes a claim true or false, and not just looking to see whether the cat is on the mat, or performing some experiment. And this leads back to the correspondence theory of truth.

It is the distinction between appearance and reality. It can appear to us that a claim is true, and yet it actually be false. An experiment can confirm a theory for now, yet that theory can turn it to be wrong in the future.

My understanding of the language game paradigm - at least as presented by Wittgenstein - is that it's highly pragmatic and focused on the relationship between speech acts and consequent actions, which may be further speech acts or other sorts of acts.

Looking at 'the cat is on the mat' in that light, I think the language game theorist would be interested in what I would do if somebody said that to me. I might go and look for the cat at the place where I had last seen the mat. If it was there, I might then chase it away, or stroke it, depending on how I felt about the cat. If it wasn't there I might go back to the first person and say 'It's not there any more. When did you see it there?' - another speech act. These are the acts that might arise consequent on the speech act 'the cat is on the mat', given the way we play the language game.

I think there's a pragmaticist element to the correspondence picture, which means that it is not an absolutist theory, but an intersubjective account. A statement that the cat is on the mat would be true if no one could have any possible reason to doubt it. Such an account of correspondence truth really makes no metaphysical assumptions about the ontological status of things in themselves, although it would also seem to be the case that we generally have no reason to suppose that the things we publicly experience, which are beyond any reasonable doubt as to their being experienced, tell us nothing at all about what exists independently of anybody's opinion about it.

These are the acts that might arise consequent on the speech act 'the cat is on the mat', given the way we play the language game. — andrewk

Right, but what does that have to do with the truth of the statement? Because part of our various language games is that various statements can be true or false.

I think the language game perspective doesn't concern itself with truth but with consequences. So truth is relevant to the language game only when it has consequences. For example, if Jeet says to me 'the cat is on the mat', and I go and look and it's not there, and I am suspicious that Jeet, who I know hates the cat, might have harmed it, I might say 'It's not there. You lied! What have you done with the cat?' I have accused her of saying something that she knew to be untrue, and that has consequences for us. If it turns out that she has harmed the cat, I might give her an eviction notice from the house if it is within my power to do that.

Good points, so even if ordinary language clams are empirically based, there's still a discrepancy between truth and verification. — Marchesk

Yes, they are different things. But I think the point that the deflationists are making is simply that the explicit assertion of truth about a statement doesn't add anything that wasn't already implied by the statement itself. They are not making any claims about the role of verification.

That is, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true (or false) then the statement "it is true that the cat is on the mat" is similarly true (or false).

The problems with the deflationary theory, assuming the account in the OP is accurate, start with a non-sequitur. While adding "is true" to a statement adds nothing to it's meaning, that's because truth is presupposed within all thought and belief, and all statements are statements thereof(assuming sincerity). So, the non-sequitur would be the claim that truth is redundant as a result of "is true" being so. It's a non-sequitur because "is true" is not equivalent to truth. It does not follow that truth is redundant. Rather, it follows that "is true" is redundant.

It seems to me that there's an underlying conflation in the deflationary account between truth and meaning. Redundancy is all about meaning, not truth.

In the bigger picture, I am quite confident in saying that truth, meaning, thought, and belief are all irrevocably entwined. The fundamental error is getting thought and belief wrong. Thought and belief is the origen of truth and meaning. Both arise from within rudimentary(pre-linguistic) thought and belief formation. That's for another thread, but it's worth mention here...

That is, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true (or false) then the statement "it is true that the cat is on the mat" is similarly true (or false). — Andrew M

But that's a trivial observation at best. What's interesting is what makes a statement true or false. We already knew that "The cat is on the mat" was asserting a proposition. Focusing on that doesn't resolve any of the issues around truth.

"Is true" is all about belief, not truth. Again, assuming sincerity. "Is true" is insufficient for truth. Adding "is true" to a belief statement does not make it true. It also does not make it believed by the speaker. One can brazenly add "is true" to anything they say as a means to convince another that the claim is true, or to convince another that the speaker does believe it. That can be the case - and certainly is at times - even if and when the speaker does not believe that it is. So...

In the bigger picture, I am quite confident in saying that truth, meaning, thought, and belief are all irrevocably entwined. — creativesoul

I think so as well. Saying the cat is on the mat involves meaning about cats and mats and what it is for that statement to be true or false, and why we would think so, but also how we can get it wrong.

I think so as well. Saying the cat is on the mat involves meaning about cats and mats and what it is for that statement to be true or false, and why we would think so, but also how we can get it wrong. — Marchesk

Placing a sharper point on it...

Saying "the cat is on the mat" involves meaning between "cats" and cats, "mats" and mats, and the phrase "on the" with what is otherwise a non-linguistic spatial relation between the cat and the mat. The mental connections(associations, correlations, etc.) drawn between these things are precisely what makes the statement meaningful. If, and only if, the meaningful statement corresponds to reality; fact; the way things are; the unfolding events; etc; then it is true.

The T-sentence shows this rather nicely... although it's not meant to do so. It does nonetheless. On the left is the meaningful claim and on the right is what must be the case in order for the claim to be true(in order for it to correspond to fact/reality).

If, and only if, the meaningful statement corresponds to reality; fact; the way things are; the unfolding events; etc; then it is true. — creativesoul

Right, the is true part is asserting an accurate linkage between world, belief, meaning and language.

The snow is white is true if, and only if, the snow is white. This shows that is true adds the additional meaning to a sentence that there is a linkage to something that makes the sentence true.

But the snow could be yellowish or brownish, and thus the statement doesn't link up with the actual color of the snow, and is therefore false.

If we aren't discussing any particular patch of snow or cat, then the statement isn't true or false, except in the general case that snow is white when it's not mixed in with something that alter's it's reflective property. And of course there's nothing general about cats on mats. Cats could sit or not sit on any number of surface areas.

So again, truth is something about the world for these kinds of sentences.

I'm not sure I would put it like that. Truth is correspondence between meaningful claims and the world. Well, let me re-phrase this... to be perfectly clear truth is correspondence 'between' thought/belief and fact/reality(the world; the way things were and/or are; the case at hand; events; happenings; the universe; etc.)

The snow is white is true if, and only if, the snow is white. This shows that is true adds the additional meaning to a sentence that there is a linkage to something that makes the sentence true. — Marchesk

I actually reject this account. Here's why...

Adding "is true" to a belief statement adds no additional meaning. That is because all belief presupposes it's own truth, belief statements notwithstanding. That is precisely what makes "is true" a redundant use of language, because it adds no further meaning to a belief statement. To believe a statement is to believe that it is true.



What's below is metacognition at work. It is thinking about thought and belief(specifically the truth conditions for a statement thereof).

"The cat is on the mat" is true if, and only if, the cat is on the mat.

On the left of "is true if, and only if" is the meaningful claim. On the right is what must be the case in order for the claim to correspond to fact/reality. The "is true if, and only if" part in the above merely 'paves the way' for the truth conditions that follow. If, and only if, those conditions 'obtain', the statement is true.

Adding "is true" to a belief statement adds no additional meaning. — creativesoul

I see what you're saying, but let's take this statement:

Julius Caesar had 46,873 hairs on his head when he breathed his last breath.

Now I don't believe that, but it could be true, if he did actually have that exact number of individual hairs when he died. I have no idea how many he had, but I read that he was balding, and the average number for a full head of hair ranges from 100 to 150 thousand. So maybe 46 thousand is somewhere in the ballpark.

Let's take another one:

Life exists in some form on Mars.

That statement is true or false, but we don't know which it is, so we can't say it's true. Adding is true would mean we had some reason for thinking there is actually life on Mars.

But that's a trivial observation at best. What's interesting is what makes a statement true or false. We already knew that "The cat is on the mat" was asserting a proposition. Focusing on that doesn't resolve any of the issues around truth. — Marchesk

For a deflationist, what makes "the cat is on the mat" true (or false) is for the cat to be on the mat (or not). More generally, "p" is true iff p.

The point is that a deflationist is not trying to resolve issues around meaning or verification (rightly or wrongly). They are just pointing out that there is no great mystery to the ordinary use of truth terms.

I see what you're saying, but let's take this statement:

Julius Caesar had 46,873 hairs on his head when he breathed his last breath.

Now I don't believe that, but it could be true, if he did actually have that exact number of individual hairs when he died. I have no idea how many he had, but I read that he was balding, and the average number for a full head of hair ranges from 100 to 150 thousand. So maybe 46 thousand is somewhere in the ballpark.

Let's take another one:

Life exists in some form on Mars.

That statement is true or false, but we don't know which it is, so we can't say it's true. Adding is true would mean we had some reason for thinking there is actually life on Mars. — Marchesk

We can say that it's true regardless of whether or not it is, and regardless of whether or not we already know.

If you already believe the statement, then adding "is true" adds nothing meaningful to it.

The point is that a deflationist is not trying to resolve issues around meaning or verification (rightly or wrongly). They are just pointing out that there is no great mystery to the ordinary use of truth terms. — Andrew M

Right, there isn't, as long as one isn't doing philosophy and is only speaking in ordinary terms. But at least as far back as the ancient philosophy, problems arose for our naive view of things such as truth just being a matter of checking to see whether the cat is on the mat. Why is that? Well, because of things like skepticism, relativism, and the problem of perception.

I get what the deflationist is trying to do, but it seems to me like it does so by ignoring what motivated the whole truth debate in the first place.

...problems arose for our naive view of things such as truth just being a matter of checking to see whether the cat is on the mat. — Marchesk

Problems will certainly arise from conflating verification with truth.