I would agree with you if it weren't for...well...Chalmers. He's got a paper on proto-consciousness and for him it is non-experiencial, it's not consciousness, but it's not matter either. Because of that, I can't be sure Penrose isn't on the same track.

You quoted me "consciousness is not a process". Could you please give me more content of that post where I said that?

So you're saying Penrose is actually referring to phenomenal consciousness but he calls it proto-consciousness just because most of people conflate consciousness with self-awareness?

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? Isn't that the basis of the reification criticism? After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree? — Art48

It seems to me he doesn't have logical arguments, but rather he's driven by psychological biases. He's against the idea that consciousness is somehow fundamental. He doesn't arrive to this conclusion by logical reasoning, he simply doesn't want this to be the case. At the same time, he seems to acknowledge the problems of materialism, so the only way is simply to re-define consciousness. Hey, consciousness is a process, there is nothing like to be X. He's basically moving the same problem to another level. If tomorrow he were convinced processes don't do the job anymore, he'd find another escape: consciousness is not a process, it's a mambo-jambo. Mambo-jambos escape all problems, so think about consciousness as being mambo-jambos.

But that's just my opinion, and I might be wrong about him.
But even if I accept his view of ''consciousness being a process", he still hasn't convinced me why processes cannot be emergent and most importantly, how come there is something like to be a process.
The latter is not connected to the topic, so I don't need an answer for that.

But if everything is a manifestation of universal mind or Brahman or The One, then everything could be considered a process. — Art48

No, there is The One and there's its manifestation. Two things.

In a monist ontology, there is only one "thing" and everything else is a process, an action of The One. — Art48

It seems you agree with me that The One and the process are different.

If everything is a manifestation of The One, then processes are not fundamental but might be considered emergent. — Art48

Agree and I would actually add that emergence itself is a process.

then I'd say the whirlpool is an emergent process because a whirlpool fundamentally differs from water. — Art48

That's strong emergence. I don't think water is fundamentally different from its molecules. Water is its molecules.

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/popper/natural_selection_and_the_emergence_of_mind.html
It seems to me he didn't avoid emergence after all.

Identity theory is emergence. Consciousness is a certain material arrangement. That material arrangement must come into existance somehow, it mist emerge.
Viceversa, consciousness is reducible to a certain material arrangement.
I don't see how that's not emergence.

And in his view, consciousness is fundamental or it is neither fundamental nor emergent?

I don't know what the difference could be between proto-consciousness and consciousness. There's no conceptual space in between consciousness and non-consciousness for it to exist in. — bert1

Then why don't they just call it consciousness?

So it is inevitable after all in your view.

Which makes it very strange that you are concerned whether or not there are theories of consciousness which "manage to bypass emergence" then. — Pantagruel

- so irrelevant.

Oh, and things are processes. — Pantagruel

Actually, I can, in principle, agree with that. Still... I personally don't see how this affects emergence.

I’m not familiar with Joscha Bach but I’m looking at some web pages about him now. What I’ve read so far reminds me of Bernardo Kastrup’s theories. — Art48

The two are actually kind of enemies, they had a rough dispute some time ago.

I understand the problems of all the theories you mentioned, but that is not what I'm about here.
All I want to know is if there is a way in which we can build a theory of consciousness starting from non-conscious, without emergence being involved or implicit. I'm looking for a way to get around emergence completely. Or maybe some other theory has already done this. Maybe functionalism, maybe Bach's theory. I don't care about theories where the mind is fundamental, i.e. idealism or panpsychism.

So far, 180 Proof says that all I need to do is to consider consciousness a process rather than a thing, so in this way I can explain consciousness without appealing to emergence, because activities are not emergent. I didn't say it can't be a process, I'm saying I personally don't see how this could make any difference. So...
1. Do you think a process is fundamentally different from ''a thing"?
2.Do you think processes are so distinct from the rest of reality that they are neither fundamental nor emergent?
3. Do you think ''emergent process" would be a non-sense concept?

1.

In which case you have reduced the concept of emergence to simple analyticity. That is discussed in the article regarding the weaking of the concept of weak emergence. — Pantagruel

I don't care about the definition! Define it as you like. The difference between me and you is that you don't accept that there is a concept of strong emergence as it is defined by most of philosophers. I don't care! Define it as you like! Ok... there is only emergence in the sense you described it. This makes no difference to this OP.

2.

Can you just clarify why you feel that emergence is a problem of some kind? — Pantagruel

When did I say emergence was a problem? Do you even understand my question?

It is either question-begging or self-contradictory. — Pantagruel

For the last time, no, it is not! I am not embracing or dismissing emergence.

1.

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/ — Pantagruel

I'll read it. Still... the definition is irrelevant to my OP.

2. Define epiphenomenon in your own terms please.

3.

(as a corollary of material reductionism). — Pantagruel

- it seems to me you don't understand that reduction entails emergence. You cannot reduce something that wasn't priorly emergent.
It's like saying you can deconstruct something that has never been constructed.

After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not? — Art48

Even if it were an activity:
1. Aren't activities ''things"?
2. Do activities exist?
3. If they exist, are they fundamental or emergent?
4. If they aren't neither fundamental nor emergent, how could we explain them?

Activities are not emergen — 180 Proof

Who says?

1.

"Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said. — Pantagruel

Can you provide me with reliable sources on that one? Thank you!

2. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? ↪Pantagruel You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!

1. So you've changed your mind. There is no way to avoid emergence.

2.

Your OP conflates two questions into one — Pantagruel

- No, it doesn't.

3.

To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. — Pantagruel

- I don't care what your personal belief is. There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents."

4. How come reductive materialism avoids emergence at all? You have the freedom to define emergence as you like. So define emergence and then show me that reductive materialism does not imply emergence. Thank you!

Well, reductive entails emergence. Reductive material IS weak emergence. From the fundamental to consciousness = weak emergence; from fundamental to water = weak emergence; from fundamental to chairs = weak emergence. From consciousness, water, chairs to fundamental = reduction.

the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree — Pantagruel

No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them.

What "false accusation" are you falsely accusing me of making? — 180 Proof

As long as you reify "consciousness" (into a humuncular folk concept), — 180 Proof

- where had I reified it before you mentioned that?

Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? — Pantagruel

No. My question is not about consciousness, it is about emergence. I am not interested if it's possible for something to exhibit consciousness without being conscious.
My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong).
In this regard, mentioned functionalism and this theory https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_model?searchToken=aov5trxduudkxcx5rw0f9i9dn

I replied that I don't see how these two theories lack emergence and he then accused me of ''reifying" consciousness. That's the story.

1. I don't understand why accused me of ''reifying" consciousness before me giving any definition of consciousness.
2. I don't understand how come functionalism and Self model don't imply weak emergence.

Help me on these two matters please!

Well, it would be kinda hard for me to take your false accusation as an argument against weak emergence. Making a strawman looks like you're the one in need to believe weak emergence is false because it might be problematic for your deeper little innocent beliefs. I am not biased in any sense.
So I am waiting for you to overcome your personal insecurities and be rational.

That we are... literally! :lol:

Guys, I need help! Can someone explain to me what wants to say? I am not capable to grasp it. Thank you!

You're very confusing. I guess intentionally. My questions are very clear and it seems to me you're the only one complicating things around here.
So... my clear questions demand clear answers. I didn't define consciousness before you accused me of reifying it. I didn't say what consciousness was, everyone has the freedom to define it. I asked if one could come up with an alternative on strong and weak emergence.
You said yes, and gave me two examples. I don't think they avoid weak emergence. Any counter-arguments?

I cannot understand you. I'm not reifying anything here in my opinion.

1. Is a physical body/organism/brain necessary for the existence of consciousness (in the way you define consciousness)? If yes, would you accept that the body/organism/brain is a weakly emergent property of fundamental matter?

2. "The self-model is the central concept in the theory of consciousness called the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). This concept comprises experiences of ownership, of first person perspective, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. These features are instantiated in the prefrontal cortex" - how is that non-emergence (weak emergence)?

I am referring to phenomenal consciousness, qualia, "what it is like to be"-ness. I am not referring to self-consciousness.

For me it's important to know if we can avoid emergence (weak or strong) starting from non-consciousness. Panpsychism and idealism start with consciousness.

Thank you, man!
So just to make things clearer. I am referring to both weak and strong emergence.
Weak emergence = consciousness just is a configuration of something that is non-conscious/ it is totally reducible to non-consciousness, like water being weakly emergent from H and O, without having new properties,
Strong emergence = consciousness appears from non-consciousness, but it has totally different properties.

I think "functionalism" (e.g. a tangled hierarchy) comes closest. — 180 Proof

Even if I haven't seen emergence being mentioned in functionalist theories, it is hard for me to make sense of this without weak emergence at least. Functionalism states that consciousness is a function of the brain or at least a function of an organism. Firstly, the organism must weakly emerge (let alone the brain). Secondly, consciousness would be a particular configuration of matter satisfying a role in that particular emergent body. So I personally don't see how consciousness wouldn't be a weak emergent phenomenon in functionalism.
But because I haven't seen it mentioned in functionalist theories, I also take into consideration the fact that maybe my logic is wrong. Is that the case?

1. From what I understand from this interview, Penrose says consciousness is part of the fundamental reality, but it is not the only fundamental part. ''Consciousness itself is a feature of that physics we need for other reasons". Maybe I'm wrong?

2. I still don't understand what proto-consciousness is in his view. How does he differentiate it from normal consciousness? How does he differentiate it from matter?

I am familiar with your view, and I don't make sense of it. But thanks anyway!

Thank you a lot! By the way, are you familiar with Bach's theory of mind? Is that weak or strong emergence in your opinion?

That's basically strong emergence. Am I wrong?

But is the simulation/consciousness material in Bach's theory or it has different properties than matter?

Thank you!

So his metaphysics does not avoid emergence, thus avoiding weak and strong emergence problems, he assumes emergence happens (weak or strong, I still don't understand Joscha's position), and after that, he comes up with a narrative about what happens after emergence, i.e. brain creates a simulation. Is that right?

Thanks! Looking forward to hearing from you!

(A less metaphysical and more frankly fuzzy version seems feasible to me, by the way.) — green flag

So would you be able to avoid emergence (weak or strong) with your fuzzy version?

I sent you a private message.

I'll write you in private on this one.

What's the difference between protoconsciousness and matter?

Thank you for your answers! Please give me more time to reflect. Thanks!

I would adopt weak emergence. And I'd jump straight to functionalism. I didn't think functionalism was a subset of identity theory. I thought Identity theory was that the mind is the brain, or something like that. — bert1

I didn't say functionalism was a subset of anything. And why would you jump straight to functionalism?

Token-type identity? Which side is the physical, which the mental? I don't think I've understood this one. I did a quick search and nothing immediately came up. — bert1

There are no sides, there's one and the same thing. Type - category, while token - an individual subset of that category. In Type-Type, we had to admit that pain must be C-fibers firing, while in Token-Type, different pains can have different physical forms. But the following issue arises: in virtue of what we can call a pain, pain? Answer: By its function. Therefore, functionalism.

but I thought multiple realisability was one of its features, not a bug. — bert1

Actually, there's a ''multiple realization" problem for functionalism too, similar but not the same as that of identity's problem. I won't get into details here though.

I disagree with you here. In principle one could have two identical brains realising the same function. In that way we would have two experience of the same type, assuming functionalism. They would be qualitatively identical, but quantitatively distinct. Have I misunderstood you? — bert1

If two brains are identical to the last atom, then they would be both qualitatively and quantitatively identical (assuming they experience the same environment as well).

My position here is the following: every experience is, in fact, identical to a physical state. Simple as that. But there are no categories of experiences (eg pains). We call them pains just because they're similar, but there is no such category in reality. There are just physical/mental variations. That's ALL. We don't have categories - we don't need to appeal to functions.

This position doesn't explain anything, but it does get rid of problems. I haven't found strong refutations so far.